Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout20190611Mendez Motion for Reconsideration.pdfRaul Mendez 2712 N. Goldeneye Way Meridian, ID 83646 PH (208) 860-s037 Ra u I mendezZllZ@gmai l. com RECEIVED I0l9 JUil I I pil l2r 32 ,, Li? ijl #ttu*Pr'h i 8.,o* VS BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION RAUL MENDEZ,CASE No. INT-G-19-03 Cornplainant, COMPLAINANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TNTERMOUNTATN GAS COMPANY, Respondent. Complainant Raul Mendez moves for Reconsideration of the'Commission's'Order No. 34336 per IDAPA 31.01.01.33r. The Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) performs both legislative and judicial functions per IDAPA 31.01.01.43. see Intermountoin Gas. Co. v.Idaho Public Utilities Commksian,9T Idaho II3 (1975). Formal complaints fall under the IPUC Quasi-Judicial proceedings; therefore Discovery is authorized per IDAPA 31.01.01.221-240. In fact, all parties to a proceeding have a right of discovery of all other parties to proceedings per IDAPA 31.ALU.222. Discovery during IPUC proceedings is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States Supreme Court has held that discovery serves l) as a device, along \Mith the pre-trial hearing under FRCP 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues, thus civil trials in the Federal Courts no longer need to be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear. consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial. Furthermore, the US Supreme Court held that knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper Iitigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise. see Hickman v. Taylor,329 a.S, 495 (1947). Mr. Mendez has been denied the opportunity to conduct discovery during the formal complaint proceedings and in the process his constitutional right to Due Process has been violated. Procedural errors do not render an order of the IPUC vulnerable to attack unless those errors results in a denial of due process to a party. see cf. Market Street Ry. Co. v. California RR. Comm'n, 24 Cal.2d 378, I5A P.2d196 (1944), ,Aff d 324 U.S. 548, 65 S.Ct. 770, yglEd.l LTI (1945). In reviewing findings of fact we will sustain a commission's determination unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against its conclusion or that evidence is strong and persuasive that the comrnission abused its discretion. see Intermountain Gas. Co, v, ldaho Public Utilities Commission,9T ldaho II3 (1975). If the IPUC violates the Due Process rights of companies represented by Attomeys including those of Intermountain Gas, then it should come as no surprise that it also violates the Due Process rights of low-income people representing themselves during their Judicial proceedings. In the case of Intermountain Gas. Co. v, Idaho Pubtic Utilities Commission,9T Idaho II3 (1975); the Idaho Supreme Court held that the Commission denied due process to utility by ordering it to divest its retail appliance business, in absence of giving utility an opportunity to meet issue of whether continuation of business was in the public interest; 'we hold that Intermountain may initiate new proceedings to introduce into evidence the results of a lead-lag study and that the Commission must take such a study into consideration in determining the working capital allowance.' Mendez notes that the Idaho Supreme Court held that the IPUC violated the Due Process rights of Intermountain Gas despite the fact that the case shows significant discovery taking place. The IPUC in their judicial function is required to seek the truth thru all relevant facts and evidence. Discovery provides for the disclosure of all available facts and evidence. Central to Mr. Mendez complaint is l) that the utility company and the IPUC assert that he APPLIED for services when he reactivated his service on October 2018 and therefore, the l4 dollar account initiation fee is valid, and 2) that the utility is manipulating charges as best illustrated by years 201 5 and 2016 when the customer charge was still $2.50 and when the 'usage' shows as four therms for June to September. l'here was a charge of $5.54 for 2015 and a charge of $5.34 for 2016. In addition, Mendez notes that the Commission and the utility supplied differing bill amounts for Mr. Mendez in their responses to his complaint. which the Commission found that staff submitted bills that showed the original billed amount without accrued interest for late payment (presumably after ex-pa*e communications with utility). There is nothing during the formal complaint proceedings that would suggest that the Commission final order was based on upon substantial evidence. By, stating that people apply for services after I 0 days of non-service the relevant inquiry becomes how does people apply for service with utilities under the IPUC jurisdiction? What are the requirements of the application process by utilities? These questions can be resolved thru discovery. The utility has a duty to disclose how the application process worked for Mr. Mendez in 2003 and 2018. Specifically, provide evidence that he applied both times and what was diff'erent (if any) from 2003 and 2018 with respect to a signed application requirements from residential customers. The billing information provided as exhibits pertain to numbers on spreadsheets but discovery will require utility to produce the actual billing statements showing that in some there is accrued interest from late payment. The Commission makes mention of some previous Orders, however, people have to guess what they are since none have been provided during these proceedings and most certainly, there is no reference on where to find them. 'fhe records shows that the Commission made a Final Order on 512312019 that is not based upon substantial f'acts and evidence, since no discovery has taken place that would resolve the issues in question, The Order by the Commission is the result of arbitrary decision making that substantially prejudiced Mr. Mendez. Furthermore, the Commission is violating IC 6I-315 by allowing utility to charge an unlawful fee to customer's that voluntarily disconnect service and by allowing fbr manipulation of fees. The utility for its part are violating both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the ldaho Consumer Protection Act both laws prohibit unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce. see State ex rel. Kidwell v, Master Distributors, Inc., l0l Idaho 447 (1980). For the reasons set above, Mendez request the Commission Order No. 34336 be VACATED. DATED: June I l,2Al9 uil, \^^-r Raul Mendez CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on June I 1.2019 I served a copy to: Edward Jewell PO Box 83720 Boise. ID 83720 o o a By United States mail By delivery Preston Carter cotll 601 w.st.secretary@puc. idaho. gov Boise. ID 83702 Raul Mendez Typed/printed name Signature /) I