20130826Zamora Testimony & Exhibit A.pdf

Brad M. Purdy
Attornev at Law
2ol9 N: 17ft st.
Boise,Idaho 83702
(208) 384-t2ee
Cell: [phone]
Fax: [phone] I
August 23,2013,
Jean Jewell
Secretary, Idaho Public Utilities Commission
472W. Washington St.
Boise,ID 83702
Re: Case PAC-E-I3-04 - Community Action Partnership Association of Idatro's Testimony of
Christina Z,amora
Dear Ms. Jewell:
Enclosed are an original and nine (9) copies of Community Action Parhership Association of
Idalro's Testimony of Christina Z,amorain the above-captioned proceeding. Also included is a
CD of the Testimony and Exhibit A for the court reporter.
The parties will be served electonically and hard copy today.
Sincerely,
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25 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA
Brad M. Purdy
Attorney at Law
Bar No. 3472
2019 N. 17'h St.
Boise,ID. 83102
[phone] (Land)
[phone] (Fax)
[e-mail]
Attorney for Petitioner
Community Action Partnership
Association of Idaho
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF PACIFICORP DBA ROCKY MOUNTAIN
POWER TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH
INTERESTED PARTIES ON ALTERNATIVE
RATE PLAN PROPOSALS
BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
CASE NO. PAC-E-13-04
COMMUNITY ACTION PARTNERSHIP ASSOCIATION OF IDAHO
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I.INTRODUCTION
Q: Please state your name and business address.
A: My name is Christina Zamora. I am the Executive Director of the Community Action
Partnership Association of Idaho (CAPAI) headquartered at 5400 W. Franklin, Suite G,
Boise, Idaho, 83705. I am testifying on behalf of CAPAI.
Q: Please describe CAPAI's organization and the functions it performs relevant to its
involvement in this case.
A: CAPAI is an association of Idaho's six Community Action Agencies, the Community
Council of Idaho and the Canyon County Organization on Aging (CCOA),
Weatherization and Human Services, all dedicated to promoting self-sufficiency through
removing the causes and conditions of poverty in Idaho's communities.
Q: What are the Community Action Partnerships or "Agencies?"
A: Community Action Partnerships ("CAPs") are private, nonprofit organizations that fight
poverty. Each CAP has a designated service area. Combining all CAPS, every county in
Idaho is served. CAPs design their various programs to meet the unique needs of
communities located within their respective service areas. Not every CAP provides all of
the following services, but all work with low-income people to promote and support
increased self-sufficiency. Programs provided by CAPs include: employment preparation
and dispatch, education assistance child care, emergency food, senior independence and
support, clothing, home weatherization, energy assistance, affordable housing, health care
access, and much more.
II. SUMMARY
Q: Please summarize your testimony in this case?
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A:My testimony focuses on significant concerns that CAPAI has regarding the manner in
which this case has been processed, and the impact that the procedure employed has had
on the outcome embodied in the proposed settlement agreement and the ability of CAPAI
to fully and effectively participate in this case as a formal party.
Does CAPAI oppose the proposed settlement stipulation pending before the Commission
in this case?
Ordinarily, the answer to that question would be much simpler. The fact is that, from a
purely technical and financial standpoint, it might well be that the proposed settlement is
in the best interests of all ratepayers, including low-income. This standpoint is very
limited, however, and might be more than offset by other considerations. The practical
aspect to the question and answer, however, is far more complex. It is CAPAI's position
that the procedure employed in this case is unlawful, detrimental to the public interest,
and might well lead to additional procedural transgressions of an equal or greater severity
as those included in this proceeding.
What is the basis of CAPAI's opposition to the procedure employed in this case?
There are numerous facts that form the basis for CAPAI's opposition. Because it had
reason to believe that this matter might proceed to hearing on procedural grounds, and
because those grounds are intertwined with CAPAI's Motion to Compel responses to its
discovery requests submitted to Rocky Mountain, CAPAI provided a very detailed
discussion of its procedural concerns, specifically related to this case, in the Brief in
Support of Motion to Compel, and related Affidavit of CAPAI's legal counsel, that were
submitted to the Commission on July 30,2013. In order to avoid repetition and avoid
engaging in an analysis in my testimony that comes across more like an attorney's legal
briel I adopt by reference and incorporate in my testimony the aforementioned Brief in
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
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Support of Motion to Compel brief and Affidavit, a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
Q: Did you participate in the preparation of that brief?
A: Yes I did. Though I obviously worked with legal counsel and do not purport to possess
the knowledge of an attorney, I was very involved in drafting, reviewing and editing the
brief and have thorough knowledge of what it contains.
ilI. GENERAL NATURE OF RATE CASE PROCEDURAL CHANGES
Q: Putting aside CAPAI's concerns about the present case for the moment, does CAPAI
have overarching concerns regarding the general trend that the processing of general rate
cases has followed?
A: Yes. As this Commission is acutely aware, the frequency with which general rate cases
have been filed by Idaho's three largest electric public utilitiesl has increased remarkably
in recent years.
Please identify what concerns this recent trend causes CAPAI?
Though I can only speak for CAPAI, I suspect that the one of the primary concerns of
every party involved in any rate case and the Commission itself is that increasingly
frequent general rate cases are stretching the parties resources to their limits and made a
full and thorough participation in these cases increasingly challenging. This is certainly
true for CAPAI whose resources are subject to uncertainty due to changes in federal
funding levels which, in recent years, have decreased.
What has been the effect of this trend on CAPAI?
Without question, CAPAI has been stretched far beyond its financial, technical and
practical abilities to meaningfully participate in general rate cases. CAPAI is always
t Idaho Power, Avista, and Rocky Mountain Power.
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keenly aware and appreciative of the generosity shown by the Commission with respect
to its awards of intervenor funding over the years, but the amount of money available by
law as well as the legal requirement that expenses be funded by intervenors up-front,
have placed CAPAI's ability to continue its representation of the low-income customers
of Idaho's regulated utilities at risk. This case alone, due to the use of resources devoted
to compelling Rocky Mountain to respond to discovery in good faith and in accordance
with the law, has nearly exhausted CAPAI's resources not just for this case but for this
financial year and there are likely to other cases of interest to CAPAI yet this year, such
as Idaho Power's general rate case.
Q: Aside from the financial impact of nearly annual general rate cases, have there been other
developments that concern CAPAI?
A: Yes. As the frequency of rate cases has increased, CAPAI has noticed a very obvious
and significant transformation in the manner in which these rate cases are being handled
procedurally.
Q: Are you suggesting that the Commission itself has adopted a different general rate case
procedure than historically employed?
A: No. To my knowledge, the law regarding the manner in which general rate cases are
processed has not been changed and the Commission has not formally adopted any policy
to implement such changes. I am referring to the manner in which the parties to general
rate cases, including the utility in question, are processing rate cases, specifically in an
abbreviated fashion and at an expedited pace.
Q: Please explain your belief that rate cases are being processed differently as their
frequency increases.
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A: Though my experience in PUC matters is still somewhat limited, it is my understanding
Staff typically schedules settlement negotiations in every rate case relatively soon after
the case is filed and does so without ever contacting CAPAI to ascertain whether it is
prepared to discuss settlement and, if so, what dates are available to CAPAL CAPAI
only learns of proposed settlement after receiving notice from Staff and the date and time
have been set and are generally not subject to rescheduling.
Q: How does the foregoing procedure differ from what has historically been the case?
A: Though I have not been intimately involved in rate case procedure long enough to have a
historical perspective, a simple review of recent rate cases on the Commission's website
reveals several things. First, settlement discussions have not always taken place in
general rate cases and when they have, it has typically been long enough after the initial
filing of the utility's application and the issuance of the initial Notices and associated
Order by the Commission to allow all parties the opportunity to thoroughly examine the
filing, engage in formal discovery and otherwise communicate with the Company
regarding numerous matters relevant to the filing and, in the case of Staff, even conduct
fairly thorough audits of the Company's books sufficient to formulate a position on the
many issues inherent in any rate case, particularly those involving revenue requirement,
rate spread and rate design.
Q: How does this compare with your understanding of the settlement of rate cases in recent
years?
A: My understanding is that not only have there been settlement negotiations in every
electric rate case since 201 I involving all three major electric utilities, but that Staff has
settled every one of those cases. I do not know the last time that Staff chose to litigate an
electric rate case.
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Q: Is there anything inherently wrong with Staff agreeing to most if not all rate case
settlements?
A: In any given case, no. But for this to become what feels like a virtual certainty seems to
have crossed an important line.
Q: Do you know why Staff has settled all such rate cases in the past2-3 years?
A: Obviously, I do not know all of Staffs rationale for its choices other than what is stated in
testimony supporting a settlement stipulation. I find it difficult not to believe, however,
that one reason settlement has become a more common occurrence is that the sheer
magnitude of rate cases typically pending before this Commission have diminished
Staff's ability to apply the normal level of scrutiny an analysis to those cases it settles as
it historically has. In such a scenario, settlement, if it seems to be in the best interests of
ratepayers in general, becomes more appealing.
Q: How would you describe the typical rate case procedure since 2011?
A: First, it seems that by the time a utility actually files its rate case, it has already engaged
in meetings and/or other communications with Staff and larger customer class
representatives. This is certainly what occumed in this case. While this might enable
Staff to be better prepared for an expedited processing of a rate case, intervenors such as
CAPAI do not have the courtesy of having possession of such information and the time to
analyze it prior to the filing. What typically happens next is a very abbreviated course of
discovery between Staff, the utility involved, and possibly larger industrial special
contract customers and the scheduling of the first of what will likely be 2-3 settlement
conferences. Although the case is still relatively young, Staff and larger, industrial
customers are typically prepared at the time of the first settlement conference to fully
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resolve the case. As I've already stated, based on rate cases since 2OIl, the final outcome
is that Staff settles the case, often well before the direct testimony deadline.
How would you describe CAPAI's preparedness by the time of the first settlement
conference?
Generally, CAPAI has not even had the opportunity to engage in discovery and is still far
from identifying areas of concern and issues, let alone formulated a position on those
issues.
Why is this?
There are numerous reasons including the fact that before it can even intervene in a case
before the Commission, CAPAI must obtain the necessary approval from its Board of
Directors. Because CAPAI is governmentally funded and because there can be strict
limitations on how CAPAI utilizes its funds, the assessment of whether it is financially
feasible or even permissible for CAPAI to intervene in a given case can be somewhat
protracted. Once the process of determining whether CAPAI is financially capable of
intervening in a case is complete and assuming that CAPAI decides to intervene, it then
must rely on its legal counsel and the limited time of its Staff to quickly come up to speed
on the issues raised by the rate case filing. Occasionally, but not always, CAPAI has an
employee who can participate in the case, but that employee's other obligations generally
command the vast majority of their time. CAPAI rarely has the financial ability to retain
an expert witness. By the time that the first settlement conference is conducted in general
rate cases, CAPAI has usually had little to no opportunity to conduct discovery, or has
submitted requests which have not yet been responded to. Thus, CAPAI is still engaged
in the process of issue identification and a risk/reward analysis of pursuing any given
objective. Suffice it to say, CAPAI is very far from being able to negotiate a settlement
Q:
A:
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of CAPAI's issues and positions that haven't even been identified or created at the time
that Staff schedules the first settlement negotiations.
Q: Doesn't the 60 day Notice of lntent period enable CAPAI to perform the requisite tasks
you've just outlined?
A: Only to an extent. A full assessment of the viability of intervention cannot be conducted
until CAPAI has seen the rate case Application to determine whether the interests of low-
income customers justify intervention in a rate case.
Q: Without revealing anything of substance that occurs during confidential settlement
discussions, can you describe the general tone of settlement negotiations?
A: The general tone in all settlement negotiations is that the utility in question seems highly
motivated to settle the case in its entirety as quickly as possible and with all parties
signatory to the settlement stipulation that results from the negotiations. The quid pro
quo for this is often that the utility will make certain concessions so long as the parties
wrap the settlement up and do so very quickly.
Q: Is there anything inherently wrong with a rapid resolution of differences between all
parties to a rate case?
A: In a vacuum, no. But that assumes that all parties have had ample opportunity to fully
assess their respective issues and positions and made a decision as to whether settlement
as proposed is in their best interests. It also assumes that all parties, including CAPAI,
have been given reasonable responses to discovery, kept in the loop on case
developments, and had the attention of Commission Staff that other parties have come to
expect.
If CAPAI is unprepared for settlement negotiations as you describe, what generally takes
place during the first discussions?
Q:
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A:
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CAPAI does its best to identify the major issues it can identify and to bring those issues
to the attention of the other parties.
Have there been problems in this regard?
Absolutely. In numerous cases, CAPAI has raised issues of interest or concern during
settlement only to be instructed by Staff and./or the utility that CAPAI's issues are of no
relevance to them and will not even be mentioned in the settlement stipulation nor
addressed during the settlement. When this occurs, CAPAI can either simply stand up
and walk out on the negotiations, or insist on stating its issues and positions on those
issues to a typically mute crowd. This is not to say that all other parties to all rate cases
do not occasionally support CAPAI and its positions. But it is fair to say that if the
utility, Staff and the utility's most heavily financed customer groups are all in agreement,
nothing of value will likely be accomplished during settlement. This marginalization is
very effective at isolating and shutting out a party such as CAPAI, but does not constitute
a good faith attempt to address issues of concern to all parties. Regardless of whether
this is a violation of any rule or law, it seems counter-productive to the concept of
settlement negotiations.
Are you familiar with the three general rate cases that took place in2011 involving Idaho
Power, Avista and Rocky Mountain?
To a limited extent, yes.
What is your knowledge of those cases?
My responsibilities in 201I included working on the various low-income weatherization
programs so I was well aware that funding and program design issues were at stake
during the 2011 cases. Although the Avista case settled with CAPAI joining in that
settlement, CAPAI was the only party to not join in the other two cases which ultimately
Q:
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went to hearing on the low-income issues. In addition, CAPAI also raised an issue of
importance whether the authorized rates of return of Idaho Power and Rocky Mountain
might be excessive given increasing cost recovery and other mechanisms that stabilize a
utility's earnings and make them more predictable.
What was the general outcome of those cases?
The Commission took no action regarding CAPAI's position on rate of return and, in
terms of low-income weatherization funding and program design, essentially segregated
that issue out and spun it off into a protracted workshop process in Case No. GNR-E-12-
01 (the "low-income workshop case"). The Commission otherwise ruled against CAPAI
in the 2011 cases.
Q: What was the result of the low-income workshop case?
A: On April 12,2013, the Commission issued Order No. 32788 effectively freezing low-
income weatherization funding levels for several years. The future existence of those
programs remains in doubt.
Q: In your mind, did the 2011 and workshop case rulings render CAPAI's involvement in
PUC cases pointless?
A: Obviously not, as evidenced by CAPAI's involvement in this case.
Q: What are the issues or concerns that maintain the importance to CAPAI of participation
in PUC proceedings?
A: First, it should not be overlooked that the residential class of every electric utility is its
largest in terms of customers and revenues generated. CAPAI is the only low-income
residential advocate and while CAPAI does not claim to represent the interests of the
entire residential class, many of those customers are low-income or in danger of
becoming so. Furthermore, it isn't unusual for low-income interests to be relevant to and
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simpatico with residential issues on the whole. Helping low-income customers be more
timely in paying their bills, reducing their arrearages, or keeping them connected to the
system as customers has benefits to the residential class and all ratepayers in general.
Q: Is low-income weatherization the only issue raised by CAPAI over the past decade or
longer?
A: Low-income weatherization is not the only issue CAPAI has brought to the
Commission's attention over the years. One example of an area of issues still important
to CAPAI and relevant to all residential customers in PUC proceedings is rate design.
Beginning with Avista's2012 general rate case (Case No. AVU-E-12-08), CAPAI
adopted a new strategy to its long-standing attempt to obtain low-income consumption
data and then use that data to, among other things, determine the impact that alternative
residential rate designs have on low-income customers. Historically, there was no actual
low-income consumption data available to CAPAI to utilize for purposes such as rate
design. The reasons for this are varied but typically were based on the utilities'insistence
that they maintain individual customer privacy. During Avista's 2Ol2 rate case, CAPAI
proposed that Avista gather low-income consumption data based on what CAPAI calls a
"low-income proxy group" which is simply a list of those customers receiving either
LIHEAP or low-income weatherization benefits. It is essential, of course, that customers
who receive both form of benefits are counted only once for inclusion into the proxy
group.
Q: What was Avista's reaction to this proposal?
A: Avista was quite willing to gather low-income consumption data by simply identifying
those customers who qualify for the proxy group, eliminate any double-counting, and
then collect their consumption data using their physical addresses without ever revealing
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their personal information. Upon obtaining this data, CAPAI and Avista worked together
in a collaborative and expeditious fashion to perform "model runs" which is simply a
term that CAPAI used to describe the process of establishing hypothetical rate designs
and then determine how implementation of those rate designs would impact the proxy
group compared to the existing residential rate design.
Q: What, if anything, did CAPAI learn from this process?
A: CAPAI learned a great deal, including the fact that, at least with respect to Avista,low-
income customers often consume more energy than their non-low-income residential
counterparts, in some cases substantially more. Based on this knowledge, CAPAI
challenged historical presumptions and reconsidered the impact that rate design changes
would have on low-income ratepayers. For example, if low-income customers have
higher consumption rates year-around, then increasing the utility's basic monthly
customer charge as typically requested by utilities could actually lower the majority of
low-income customers' monthly bills. Similarly, altering tiered residential rates by
changing the consumption levels that demarcate the different tiers, or by changing the
commodity pricing for existing tiers, or finally, by adding a third tier, could have positive
or negative consequences for low-income customers that might not have been assumed or
expected. CAPAI believes that the acquisition of this information is of value not only to
CAPAI and low-income customers, but to the utility, other residential customers, Staff,
and the Commission.
Q: Does the fact that the outcome of Avista's 2012 general rate case was productive and
beneficial enough for CAPAI to support that settlement in any way diminish the general
procedural concerns you have already discussed?
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A: Not at all. To a certain extent, the Avista case followed the same fast-track I've already
described. In fact, CAPAI joined in the settlement weeks after it was executed by the
other parties because CAPAI required sufficient time to make a thorough analysis of the
issues it deemed important and to determine whether the settlement was in the best
interests of the low-income. What saved that case from being unfair to CAPAI and
convinced CAPAI to join in the settlement was simply the willingness of Avista to work
cooperatively, productively and in a very prompt fashion to obtain the information
CAPAI sought. Avista made its technical experts and employees available not just to
respond to questions and provide data, but to work toward the common goal of simply
better understanding the truth.
IV. PROCEDURAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE PENDING CASE.
Q: Would you please summarize your concerns regarding the procedure employed in the
pending case?
A: First, this case is a very striking example of what the consequences of deviation from
established rate case policy can be, especially when done on an ad hoc basis. ln an
attempt to avoid re-inventing the wheel, I note that all of CAPAI's concerns regarding the
procedure followed in this proceeding are thoroughly articulated in CAPAI's Brief in
Support of Motion to Compel responses to CAPAI's discovery propounded to Rocky
Mountain. A true and correct copy of that Brief is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and is
incorporated herein by reference. Specifically, pages 2-12 of the brief outline every
procedural abnormality in this case to which CAPAI objects. I am incorporating
CAPAI's brief by reference in order to avoid re-inventing the wheel and turning what
should be testimony into a legal brief.
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Did you have any involvement in drafting CAPAI's Brief in Support of Motion to
Compel?
I was very involved and worked with CAPAI's legal counsel to construct the brief and am
very familiar with its contents.
Q: Without repeating everything contained in CAPAI's brief, can you generally outline the
procedural concerns you have regarding this case?
A: The procedural abnormalities of this case began before it was even filed. As noted in the
brief, Rocky Mountain conducted meetings, either in person or via other forms of
communication, with Staff and the Company's larger, non-residential customer groups.
CAPAI was not invited or included in these conversations and was completely unaware
that they had taken place until after the Company's filing. While there is no transcript of
these communications, they obviously advanced the knowledge of those involved
regarding what to expect in terms of the filing and better prepare for settlement
negotiations. Furthermore, the Company acknowledges that it was attempting to reach a
resolution on an alternative to filing a general rate case. Had these communications taken
place following the filing, they certainly would have been conducted as confidential
settlement negotiations. Because they occurred prior to filing, it is unclear what they are.
Q: Please describe the procedural concerns you have regarding the filing.
A: The filing itself is confusing, self-contradictory, and somewhat indecipherable. It
consists of two documents including a 60 day Notice of Intent to file a general rate case
and an Application to "initiate discussions with interested parties on alternative rate plan
proposals.". The Notice of Intent, by itself, seems to comply with the Commission's
procedural rules and is otherwise typical. My understanding is that the typical procedure
in general rate cases is that the 60 day Notice of Intent is filed followed by the filing of an
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Application for a rate increase at the end of that 60 day period. I further understand that
this Application must contain certain information and be properly captioned for what it is
The only application that Rocky Mountain filed in this case seems to be more in the
nature of an investigative proceeding to explore rate case alternatives that could apply to
any utility, not just Rocky Mountain and any future case.
What are your concerns regarding the Application filed with the Notice of Intent and
what it led to in this case?
A: Though my experience in this area is still limited, it seems that, through the filing of the
Application given an unusual title and not in conformity with rules applicable to rate case
applications, Rocky Mountain, in reality, used this as a means of end-running existing
rules regarding rate cases and negotiating a rate case prematurely and in violation of law.
As such, the Application Rocky Mountain did file could be characterized as a rate case
application in disguise.
Q: The term "rate plan" has been used in this case to describe Rocky Mountain's Application
and the outcome of the case it initiated. Does this have any significance to you?
A: No. Though I'm not yet well-versed in proper rate case procedure, it is a general truth
that labels are always trumped by substance. Regardless of how the Company worded or
labeled its Application, all that matters is the substance of the filing and the outcome of
the case. The proposed settlement stipulation results in a rate increase. Calling it a "rate
plan" or an "alternative" procedure for increasing rates does not change the fact that its
resulted in an increase to the Company's rates.
Q: How would you respond to a contention that the "rate plan" proposed in this case is not a
general rate increase subject to the otherwise applicable rules and laws?
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Q:
A:
Q:
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My response is that avoiding applicable law by use of labels is a dangerous path to go
down and that will likely lead to a de facto changing of or disregard for the law by use of
labeling and procedural gamesmanship. Adherence to procedure that was legally
established is of great importance. Once a utility is allowed to alter that procedure
without going through the proper legal process throws the door open wide for further and
possibly more serious deviations from established law.
Without asking you to give a legal opinion, what is your understanding as to proper rate
case procedure?
A thorough answer to that question is set forth in CAPAI's brief. I am under the belief
that once a procedure has been established, whether through legislation or the
administrative rulemaking process, it is the law and must be adhered to unless and until
changed according to the process just outlined. Regardless of how this case was labeled
or described in the Application, the only salient fact is that it resulted in a rate increase.
As noted in CAPAI's brief and stated in paragraph 7 of the settlement stipulation itself,
the outcome of this case, if the settlement stipulation is approved, would be: a "base
revenue requirement for all schedules will be increased."
Does the Commission's Notice of Application and Order No. 32761 provide any insight
into the nature of the Application in this case?
Yes. Page 2 of the Commission's Notice of Application states: "the Commission finds it
reasonable to initiate a case so that parties can engage in settlement discussions in an
effort to avoid or narrow issues in a general rate case." It is significant that the
Commission's Notice speaks more in generic than case-specific terms referring to "a"
general rate case as opposed to the specific case at hand. Furthermore, the Commission's
statement of the scope of the case initiated by the Application is to "avoid or narrow
DTRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA l7
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issues," not to avoid existing law by allowing the parties in a case opened for the purpose
of narrowing or avoiding issues to actually settle a general rate case, especially when the
60 day Notice of Intent had not even expired and a formal rate case application had not
been filed and the Company was prohibited by a previous rate case settlement from even
filing for a rate increase until May 31,2013, as stated in CAPAI's brief.
Q: What are your specific objections to the fact that the settlement stipulation proposes a rate
increase?
A: As stated in the brief and earlier in my testimony, CAPAI's objections to the requested
rate increase include: 1) the fact that discussions regarding a possible settlement of Rocky
Mountain's rate proposal and the procedure by which that settlement might be arrived at
began between select parties prior to the case even being filed and ending in a stipulation
agreed to in principle in May and formalized in writing in early June, 2013; 2) the parties
did not wait the required 60 day period before a rate case was even considered, and; 3)
the rate increase stemming from an application filed on March l,2OI3 violates the
Company's agreement in a prior case to not file for a rate increase prior to May 31,2013.
Q: Is there anything else that you find troubling about the outcome of this proceeding?
A: Yes. It seems quite peculiar that the parties do not appear to have discussed
"alternatives" to a general rate case as the Notice of Application, Order No.32761, and
the Application itself stated was the intent and purpose of the case. The stipulation
contains no discussion of alternatives to the normal rate case process and there are
certainly no alternatives identified, let alone analyzed in the stipulation. The case was
treated from the outset to the settlement stipulation exclusively as a rate case, nothing
more nor less.
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA 18
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Regardless of CAPAI's concerns about the procedure employed in this case, and without
divulging anything of substance of a confidential nature, did CAPAI participate in the
settlement negotiations?
CAPAI did participate with the hope of better understanding what was and remains a
perplexing filing and procedure and to urge the parties to comply with all applicable
laws. CAPAI also desired to continue its publicly-stated goal of obtaining from Rocky
Mountain the same manner of low-income consumption data and impacts of alternative
residential rate designs that it had obtained from Avista, though the data would obviously
be different and so might the conclusions to be drawn from that data. CAPAI has, in past
years, advocated for residential rate design changes for Rocky Mountain and felt
particularly compelled to determine whether the assumptions built into its proposed
changes were supported by fact.
Did CAPAI seek to obtain the data and rate design alternatives you've described from
Rocky Mountain?
Yes, though not without considerable strife and expense and with only partial success.
Unlike Avista, Rocky Mountain simply refused to provide CAPAI the most critical data i
sought through discovery requests unless and until CAPAI joined in the settlement
stipulation. All of this is set forth in the brief and affidavit. To this day, it seems
perplexing that Rocky Mountain refused to respond to CAPAI's discovery, particularly
when CAPAI had repeatedly pointed out that the data and conclusions drawn from that
data might well bring CAPAI and the Company together on certain issues.
What was Staffs position or role in terms of the discovery dispute?
Staff basically took no position in the matter.
Did Rocky Mountain ultimately respond in full to CAPAI's discovery requests?
Q:
A:
Q:
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA 19
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A: No. To this date, Rocky Mountain still has not provided the entirety of the information
sought by CAPAI. Unlike the data responses provided by Avista, Rocky Mountain has
simply provided an Excel spreadsheet that is largely undecipherable. CAPAI is in the
process of attempting to make any sense out of what little information the Company has
provided and determine the impacts of various rate design alternatives.
Q: To the extent Rocky Mountain provide anything in response to CAPAI discovery request
No. 6, when was that information provided?
A: It was not provided until August 12,20l3,less than four days prior to the original
testimony prefile deadline (the Commission extended the deadline by one week for
CAPAD. The discovery request was submitted to Rocky Mountain, however, in April,
2013. Despite countless assurances of numerous form, the Company, after four months,
still has not fully responded to CAPAI's discovery. Furthermore, Rocky Mountain
refused to respond to CAPAI's discovery requests unless and until CAPAI withdrew its
Motion to Compel, before even seeing the responses, and unless and until CAPAI joined
in the settlement stipulation, thereby waiving its rights to oppose any aspect of the
proposed rate case settlement.
Q: Does the fact that Rocky Mountain ultimately responded, at least in part, to CAPAI's
discovery requests diminish the concerns that CAPAI has in this case?
A: No. CAPAI utilized limited resources simply trying to convince Rocky Mountain to
respond to the discovery requests. Had the Company done so when it promised, which
was April through May, CAPAI could have utilized its limited resources more effectively
and been prepared to take a position on rate design one way or another. This loss cannot
be recovered.
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA 20
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V. SUMMARY
The manner in which this case was processed, if permitted to stand, will almost
certainly lead to even more egregious violations and de facto changes in general rate
case procedure. To the best of CAPAI's knowledge, none of the numerous states in
which PacifiCorp operates has condoned the procedure for obtaining a rate increase
employed in this case. It would set a bad precedent and send the wrong signal to Idaho
Power and Avista. CAPAI has heard that other states are considering alternatives to
general rate case procedure, but is not aware of any state that considers simply calling the
case something it isn't and violating existing law without going through the proper
channels to be a valid alternative. For all the reasons outlined in this testimony and
CAPAI's brief, the procedure employed in this case is in violation of the law and, by
virtue of that law, Rocky Mountain's Application should considered withdrawn and not
result in a rate increase.
When the Commission chose to break out low-income weatherization from the
2011 rate cases into a separate docket, CAPAI fully and in good faith participated in that
process. It seems to be one thing to break out something such as LIWA, but to
effectively eliminate existing rate case procedure, and through the use of marginalization
of CAPAI and Rocky Mountain's uncalled for behavior in terms of refusing to respond to
discovery related to rate design issues and effectively prevent CAPAI from raising rate
design issues is another matter and should not be permitted. Rate design is a legitimate
general rate case issue regardless of whether other parties wish to address it. If the
settling parties can see their way fit to address issues of concern to special contract and
large industrial customers, then they can certainly accommodate a good faith discussion
of CAPAI's rate design issues.
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA 27
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Regardless of whether the rate increase proposed in the settlement stipulation is in
the best interests of all ratepayers, nothing is worth the cost of allowing parties to
unilaterally ignore existing law or effectively rewrite the law on an ad hoc basis. Should
the Commission deem it appropriate to allow for very limited rate cases in which issues
such as revenue requirement, rate spread or rate design are not fair game, then it should
accomplish this by means of obtaining the necessary legislative changes or engage in
administrative rulemaking.
CAPAI doesn't have the ability or funding necessary to determine whether the
proposed settlement is in the best interests of ratepayers and, because of Rocky
Mountain's refusal to comply in good faith with CAPAI's legitimate discovery requests
regarding rate design, CAPAI has not even had the time to fully analyze that issue and
determine whether the existing rate design is fair in light of the concessions that Rocky
Mountain took from the proposed settlement and all other salient facts.
Does this conclude your direct testimony?
Yes, it does.
Q:
A:
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA 22
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.\2-d
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on thel:lday of August, 2Ol3,I serued
the foregoing document on the following by first-class U.S. postage and via electronic
Ted Weston
Rocky Mountain Power
201 South Main, Suite 2300
Salt Lake Ciry, UT 84111
ted.weston @ pacifi corp.com
Daniel E. Solander
Rocky Mountain Power
201 South Main, Suite 2300
Salt Lake Ciry, UT 84111
daniel. solander @pacifi corp.com
Data Request Response Center
PacifiCorp
825 NE Multnomah, Suite 2000
Portland, OP.97232
datarequest @ pacifi com.com
Neil Price
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Public Utilities Commission
41 2 W, Washingto n (837 02)
P0 Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0014
neil.price @ puc.idaho. gov
Randall C. Budge
Racine, Olson, Nyc, Budge & Bailey
201F,. Center
P0 Box 1391
Pocatello, lD 83204-139 I
E-Mail : rcb @ racinelaw.net
Brubaker & Associates
16690 Swingley Ridge Rd., #140
Chesterfield, MO 63017
bcollins @ consultbai.com
James R. Smith
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA
a copy of
mail.
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Monsanto Company
P.O. Box 816
SodaSprings, ID 83276
Jim.r.smith @ monsanto.com
Eric L. Olsen
ASSOCIATION, INC: Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey
(Exhibit Nos. 30 1-400) 201E. Center
P0 Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 I
[e-mail]
Anthony Yankel
29814 Lake Road
Bay Village, OH 44140
tony@.yankel.net
Benjamin J. Otto
Idaho Conservation League
710 N. 6th st.
Boise,lD 83702
botto @ idahoconservation.org
Ronald Williams
Williams Bradbury, P.C.
1015 W. Hays St.
Boise, ID 83702
ron @ williamsbradbury.com
Don Schoenbeck
RCS, [nc.
900 Washington St., Suite 780
Vancouver, WA 98660
[e-mail]
Tim Buller
Agrium,Inc.
3010 Conda Rd.
Soda Springs, ID 83276
[e-mail]
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA
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25 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA ZAMORA 25
Brad M. hmdy
Attorney at Law
BarNo.3472
2019 N. rf sr
Boise; ID. 83702
(208) 384-129 (tand)
(208) 384-8sll (Far)
[e-mail]
Attorney for Petitioner
Community Action Parhership
Association of Idaho
DfiBff /4
t li - n,)I t ' :'l
BEFORE TEE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
TNTTmMATTTROTTHEAPPLICATTON )
OF PACIFICORP DBA ROC'KY I\IOUNTAIN )
POWER TO TMITAIE DTSCUSSTONS WrrH )
INTERESTED PARTIES ON ALTERNATTVE )
RATE PLAI\I PROPOSALS
The Community Action Parhership Association of Idaho (*CAPAf) submits this brief in
support of its Motion to Compel filed with this Commission prsuant to Rules 221-225of the
Commission's Rules of Procedrrre, IDAPA 31.01.01.000 (hereinafrer generally refened to as
"Procedural Rules'), and Rules 26 atd37 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedrlre.
L INTRODUCTION
Though this motion is limited to arequest for an Order compelling reE)onses to discovery
propounded by CAPAI to PacifiCorp, the highly unusual nature of this unprecedented filing
exacerbates the consequences of PacifiCorp's refusal to respond to legitimate discovery and
constitutes a zubstantial diminution of CAPAI's rights as a party. Thus, a detailed background of
the nature and procedural history of this case is essential to a full understanding of the motion.
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. PAC.E-13-04
COMMT'I{ITY ACX{ON PARTI\IER.
SM ASSOCIATION OF IDAEO'S
BRIEF tr\T ST]PPORT OF MOTION
TO COIIPEL
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
IL BACI(GROUIYD
A. PacifiCorp's Initid Pleadings
1. Notice of Intent to File e General Rate Case.
This case rnnas formally initiated by PacifiCorp on March l,20l3 through the filing of
two documents: l) a Notice of tntent to File a General Rate Case, and;Z) an Application The
Notice of Intent is a single pge letter with a subject line that reads: "Re: Notice of Intent to File
a General Rate Case." [Emplusis AddedJ The body ofthe letter starts as follows: *Pursuant to
the Idaho Public Utilities Commission's Rule of Procedure l2l,PacifiCorp dba Rocky Mountain
Power hereby files Notice of Intent to file a eeneral rafie case. [Emplwsis Added]. This Notice is
being filed at least fl) days before the Company intends to file a general rate case." [Emphasis
AddedJ. Sixty days from March l,2ll3would actually be April 30, 2013. PacifiCorp notes in
itsNotice of Intent, however, that:
This Notice is being fiIed at least 60 days before the Company intends to
file a eeneral rate ca3€. Rrsuant to OnderNo.32432,rcsulting from a
stipulation betweenparties inCase No. PAC-E-ll-l2,the Compmy will
not file a general rale case before May 31, 2013, any rate change
resulting from the case will not be ef,fective before Jaouary 1,2014.
[Emphasis Added].
Rule 122 of the Commission's Procedural Rules, IDAPA 31.01.01.122 requires all
utilities with gross annual revenues from retail customers in Idaho exceeding three million
dollars ($3,000,000.00) to file a notice of intent "at least sixty (60) days before filing a general
rate case." The rule firther provides that tbe if the application itself is not fiIed within 120 days
after filing the Notice of Intent the Notice will be considened withdrawn- unless properly
supple,mented. PacifiCorp has never supplemented its Notice of Intent in the manner required by
Rule 122 for the Notice to remain valid beyond 120 days.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
PacifiCorp s Notice of Intent is unique in many respects. Thoqgh the first paragraph is
relatively routine and appears to satisff the requirements ofProcdural Rule 122 for a general
rate case, the second paragraph ofthe Notice takes an rmusual and unpreoedented tum by which
the Company seeks immediate aod CIftaordinary procdural and zubstantive relief ftom the
Commission
'The Company is filing an Application to respectfully requesting [sr4
that the Commission open a docket, Notice the Application, and establish
an intervention deadline for interested persons to intervene with the
intentto participde indiscussions thatmay leadto Fn agree,ment on an
alternative rateplfln solution otherthanthe Company filing a genemal
ratg case.'r
[Emplwsis AddedJ.
Thus, PacifiCorp'sNotice of Intent explicitly and rcpededly states the Company's
intention to file a general rate case and that said filing cannot occur prior to May 31, 2013, but
then takes an unexpected trrn and seeks immediate processing of the accompanying Application
for what se€,m to be other prqposes. For numerous reasons, Notices of Inte,nt to File a General
Rate Case are not accompanied by Applications and do not seek immediate procedural relief
from the Commission. PacifiCorp, nonetheless, requested the Commission to immediately
'lrlotice the Applicatiot'' the Notice of Intent and initiate a proceeding whose
stated purpose is actually an attempt to avoid filing a general rate case, an obvious contradiction
with the stated and formal prypose of a Notice of Intent.
PacifiCorp also requested ttrat the Commission establish an intervention deadline
specifically for those urho have "ttre intent to participate in discussions that may lead" to the
avoidance of a general rate case. Ordinarily, intervention deadlines established by the
Commission do not specify what an interyenor's "intenf'must be in order to intervene. The
Proceduml Rules contain no specific "intent" for intervenors so long as the intervention petition
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
contains all of the elements set forth in Produral Rule 72. Regardless, the Notice of Intent in
this case seerul to be seeking two contradictory things; a general rde case md a case limited to
the objective of discussing howto avoid a ge,neral rate case.
One could imagine any number of scenaios of how this case, onoe noticd by the
Commission, would turn out. One obvious possibility is that the parties might have &afted a list
of possible alternatives to a general rate case as the very wording of the initial filing and the
Commission's Notice of Application suggesL That list could then have been provided to the
Commission and the parties could have proposed a particular procedurc by which to handle the
Application for a general rate case that PacifiCorp would then file no sooner thzm May 31, 2AB.
The last thing that CAPAI envisiond howwer, was that the prtis would simply and
unilaterally disregard all Procdural Rules pefiaining to general rate call not draft any
particularprccedural alternative forthe Commission's consideration, andnegotiate the
confidential settlement of a general rate inqnease that didn't and couldnt lawfully even exist yet.
It is hard to imagine that this is what the Commission eirvisioned. CAPAI is the only party not to
execute the settlement stipulation and has made clear its deep concems about the potential,
negative repercussions ofprocessing a case in this manner unless and until such time as the
appropriate legislative changes are made to the Idaho Code and/orproperadministrative
rulemaking is completed altering the existing procedure prescribed for general rafie cases.
Paragraph 4 of PacifiCorp's Application states that, prior to the filing the Company had
already 'met informally with the majority of its customer representatives including Commission
Staff, PacifiCorp Idaho Indusfrial Customers, Idaho lrrigation Pumpers Association and
Monsanto to discuss the concepts of a rate plan that could possibly avoid the necessity...of
prosecuting a general rate case." Application ot p. 2. CAPAI was not invited to join in these pre-
4BRIEF IN SI.'PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
filing discussions and had no idea tbat they had even taken place mtil after March 12,2013,
uihen the Commission issued a Notice of Appli,cation md Onder No . 32761. In fact, it was not
until April lg,zll3during the first sgttlement confer€,ncs, thd CAPAI became aware of the
details ofthe contnoversial proceeding tlrt was being proposd-
2. Application of Rocky Mountein Power
(e) Applicetion is Pnemature, Confrring and Invelid
PacifiCorp's March l,zll3fiting is firrther muddled by the inclusion ofthe "Applicdion
of Rocky Mountain Powed'with the Notice of Inteqt the former being every bit as peculiar and
rmprecedented asthe latter. The confirsion begins withthe Application's captionwhich
characterizes the case as: *In the matter of the application of Rocky Mormtain Power to initiate
discussions wilt intsr€std parties on alternative rate plan pro1rcsals." This is quite different
from thet5pical captionused in general rate case applications.
Rather thau outline the details of the general rate increase sought by th Compann as is
required by Rule l2l,theApplication actualty discusses why a general rate case cannot eve,n be
filed until May 31, 2013. The Application concludes with the following highly unusual prayer
for relief :
WHEREFORE, Rocky Mountain Powerrespecffirlly requests that the
Commission open and notice a docka and set an intervention deadline
that would formally noti$ interested parties of Rocky Mountain Power's
intent to engoge in sefilement discussions, pursuant to IPUC Rule 273,1
withthe desire to reach agreement on terms that would allowthe
Company to avoid filing a ge,neral rate case in 2013 and ortend the
existing rate plan for an additional pedod oftime.
Application at pp. 2-j.
I A rule stating that the Commission may "inquire ofthe parties' as to whether settlement in an ongoing proceeding
are in progress or contemplated and/or inviting settlement of c€rtain issues or the entirety of a peirding case
BRIEF IN SI.'PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
The precedingrequestis improperon its face because itrquests thatthe Commission
limit what is stated to be a general rate case to *settlement discussions" involving only those who
have the "intent to €ngage" in such discussions '\ilith the desire to reach agroem€nt on terms that
would allow the Company to avoid filing a gene,ral rate case in 2013." An interested person who
wished to participae in any general rde case that might be conducted but who was not interested
in devising ways to deviate from existing law and policy regarding general rate case procedure,
would not eve,lr seem to be welcome by virhre of the notice language requested by PacifiCorp.
This illushates &e potential for confirsion and an waiver of rights by parties who
might not have interve,ned onthe basis tbatthe case at hand is aprecursorto, or something other
than, the actual rate case which would presumably be filed roughly three months later.
The simultaneous filing of an Application with a Notice of Inteirt is patently
cormterproductive and in violation of hocedrral Rules. One of the primary prnrposes of a Notice
of Intent is to give the public and potential intervenors advance notice of a general rate case
which typically involves a considerable inveshment of resources and preparation- It makes no
ssnse, therefore, to file an application simultaneously with the Notice of Intent when that
application might, as it did in rhis case, result in aproposed general rate increase prior to the
expiration of at least 60 days time.
The atypical p,rocedure adopted in this case is troubling because there is no way of
knowing to what extent the public was confused by this filing and whether parties who might
otherwise have intervened but chose notto believing that this was something other than a rate
case if, for no other reason, than the capion of the Application itse[ and the wording of the
Notice of Intent and Application which could be interpreted in numerous different ways. Indeeq
CAPAI itself was uncertain whether a rate increase could laufirlly be permitted without a proper
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
application filed no sq)ner than May 31,2013. To be cautious, CAPAI petitioned to intervenp in
this case, even though it had no "intenf'to seek an alternative to a ge,neral rate case and even
though the filing seemed to be a violation of Procedrral Rules, simply out of fear that faihne to
intervene would likely be deemed a failure to interve,ne in the gene,ral rate case rhat PacifiCorp
explicitly implied would be filed no sooner than May 31,2013. In frct" CAPAI's corrcenrs were
well-founded. Had it not intervemed when it di{ it would have had no say ueatsoerrer in the
outcome ofthis case. As it is, even though it intervend, CAPAI's full parties' rights were
diminished by virtue ofthe inappropriate ppcedure ofthis case combined with PacifiCorp's
refusal to respondto fiscovery
Finalln CAPAI anticipates that PacifiCorp will arguethat, as characterized inthe
Application's Prayer for Reliet the setlement stipulation in this case does not constitrte a
general rate increase br[ rafiher, an *entension of an existing rate plan for an additional period of
frme." Application at pp. 2-3. T\e very terms of the settlement stiptilation being proposed refute
any such contention. For enample, paragraph 2 of the stipulation stiates: *[t]he following
Stipulation reprcsents m agreement between the Parties on a newtwo year rate plan." Stipulation
at p.2 fEmphosis Added]. Furthermore, paragraph 7 of the Stipulation begins: *The Pades agree
that base revenue requirement for all schedules will be increasd by the rmiform percentage
amount of 0.77Yo." At its core, this Stipulation is no different than any other general rate case
increase negotiated butprocessed in compliance with the Procedural Rules applicable to general
rate cases.
(b) tr'eilure to File Pnoper Application Rcsults in Dismissal of Case.
Procedural Rule 122 provides, in part:
If the general rate case [i.e., "Rule l2l application'] described in the
notice is not filed within one-hundred twenty (120) days ffi61filing of
BRIEF IN SI.JPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
the notice of intent to file a general rate case, by operation of this rule a
notice otintent to file a e€neral rate case will be cossidercd withdralm
rmless it is stryplememed with a written stateme,lrt that the utility stil
int€Nds to file a gene,ral rate case ofthe kind dqscribed in its notice of
intent to file ageneral rate case.
Emplusis Added
To this day, PacifiCorp has never actually filed what constitutes an application for a
general rate case in compliance with the nrmerour requirements of Procedural Rule 121
including among other things, the specific details of the proposd rate increase, proposed tariffs
with the necessary changes ma*d on the existing tariff, justification of the rate increase in the
form of testimony and exhibits, as well as financiat statements, oo$ of c4ital and appropriate
cost of service studies an( ifthe utility in question op€rates in more than one jurisdiction as
PacifiCorp does, ajuridictional se,puation of all inveshents, rovenues and e>rpenses allocated
:
or assigned in whole or in partto Idaho intrastate utility business regulated by this Commission
showing allocations or assignments to ldaho, and so on.
Becarxe mone than 120 days have passed since the filing ofthe Notice of Intent filed on
March \2A13 and no general rate case application, as defined by Procedtnal Rule l2l, among
others, has yet been file{ pursrant to Rule 122, therefore, PacifiCorp's filing is technically
deemed withdrawn and the proposed settlement stipulation is legalty null and void.
(c) Application Violated 20ll Settlement Stipuletion
In addition to the rnappropnate timing or lack of actual filing of the Application, by
virtue of hocedural Rule 122, and the fact that the case was deemed withdrarvn, the March I
Application also violated the 20l l PacifiCorp settlement. That Stipulatio& filed October 18,
z0ll,provides in part:
19. The Parties agree that in recognition of the tw'o-year rate plan
covered by this Stipulation, Rocky Mormtain Powerwill not file another
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
general rate case before May 31, 2A13, with new rates not effective prior
to January 1,2014,
Stipiation ot p. 6.
Regarrdless of how PacifiCorp s Application in this case is worded or chmacterize4 it led
to the immediate processing ofthe ryplication, including the conducting of discovery and two
settlement conferences, and ended in an agreement and proposal, prior to lday 31, 20l3,to
increase rates. Though the settlement stipulation was not filed until June 3, 20l3,the stipulation
was obviouslynotnegotiatd, formalized in awritten stipuldior, circulafed forcomments and
revised, and executed by dl paties in the span ofthree days. Thuq it had largely been resolved
prior to May 31, 2013 nd,therefore, constitutes an effective violation ofthe settlemelrt
ageement executed in PacifiCorp's 2011 general rate case.
B. Procrcdural Abnormalitics of Case
1. PacifiCorp Filing Mislcading end Noticc Issued by Commission Was Not
Complied With.
On tvlarch l2,zll3,only eleven days afterthe Company's filing the Commission issued
aNotice of Application and OrderNo. 32761commencing the processing of PacifiCorp's
Application. The Commission's Notice of Application states:
Based upon our review of the Application and Staffs recommendation,
the Commission finds itreasonable to initiate a case so thatparties can
engage in settlement discussions in an effort to avoid or narrow issues in
a g€n€,tal rate case.
Notice of Application at p. 2 [Emplwsis AddedJ.
Though CAPAI does not presume to know what the Commission's intentions were
regarding the language contained in the Notice of Application and Order 32761, the Notice does
seem to state on its face that, while the discussions betw'een the parties might "avoid" or
BRTEF IN ST'PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
"namouf issues, it seems to suggsst ^\at a ge,neral rate case will still be filed. The Company's 60
day Notice of Intelrt was made rougbly 90 days before the date on urhich it could file the rarc
case, and the Commission issued a Notice of Application a mere l l days after the filing, so
perhapsthe Commissionwasproviding the parties anopportunityto sheamlinethe rate case that
would ultimately be filed and conducted.
Regardless, CAPAI questionswhetherthe Commission anticipated thattheparties to this
proceeding would not simply avoid or namow issueg but go much firther and actually settle a
ratecasethathafulyetklfildandprcposeageneralrateincreasetotheCommission It
seetrxl thatthe settlement stipulation proposing a general rate insrease eppears on the strrface to
have been an abuse of a process for a purpose other than statod in the Notice of Inteot, in
violation of an existing settlement agre€ment, in contradiction to the Commission's Notice of
Application and Order 3276t,and in violation ofnumenous Commission Procedural Rules.
2. PrivatePre-FilingDiscussionsSeekinglnputonFiling
Paragraph 4 of the "Application of Rocky Mormtain Powed' states:
Company representdives have met informatly with the majority of its
customer re,prese,ntatives including Commission Staff, PacifiCorp Idaho
Industial Customery Idaho Irrigation Pumpers Association and
Monsanto to discuss the concepts of a rate plan that could possibly avoid
the necessity and associated expenses for all parties ofprosecuting a
general rate case.
It was not until sometime after the Commission issued its Notice ofApptication and
Order No. 32761that CAPAI even became awane that the Company had made its filing an4
prior to that filing, had already discussed the substance of it with the Commission Staffand a
select group ofthe Company's largest customer Soups. CAPAI, the Idaho Conservation League,
and the Snake River Alliance have all been regular intervenors in PacifiCorp filings in recent
years but were not listed in paragraph 4 of the Application as having been involved in these pre-
BRIEF IN SI'PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL l0
filing discussions. CAPAI certainly had no knowledge thatthe discussions mentioned by
PacifiCorp wene ev€,n taking place, let alone what they involved.
Thus, the Commission Staffand PacifiCorp's largest Idaho customer goups knew of
what procedural plans the Company had in mind at some point in time prior to ffts filing date of
March 1,2013- Upon inquiring informally of the natwe of such plans following March 1,
CAPAI was informedthat the Companywould circulate something inunitingpriorto the first
settlement conference conducted on April 19,2013. No such document was ever rweived by
CAPAI and it was't rmtil April 19 that CAPAI had any idea of what PacifiCorp unas actually
seeking in this case and what positions had been developed by those parties ufu were privy to
the pre-filing discussions. By that point in time, those parties were already well prepred to
begin litigding this case while CAPAI could not seem to get a shaight answer as to what the
case was even about and how it was possible to have a Notice of Intent simultaneously filed with
anApplication tbat purportedly existd onlyto investigate rate case alternatives md not execute
a settleme,nt resulting in a general rate increase.
The Company has never proffered any explanation of why it discussed the zubstance of
its rate case filing with certain regular intervenors but not others. It is very concerning that
substantive discussions were held betrveen select groups of customers and the Commission Staff
prior to the filing of what was obviously an rmprecedentd and potentidly controversial case and
one thathas resulted in aproposed rate increase but withoutprcper noticeto the public and in
violation of existing policy and law. Whether non-Company parties foresaw this scenario, the
fact is that PacifiCorp, with the implicit or explicit acquiescence of all those who joined the
settlement, bas effectively re-written the Commission's hocedural Rules and created an entirely
new procedurc for processing general rate increases, but without ever defining and first
l1BRIEF IN SI.'PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
proposing that newprocedrre to the Commission for its conside,ration as, possibln the
Commission anticipated. The new procedure adoptod dudng this case simply soems to be that a
utility can file a case that seeks at two mr*ually o(clusive objectives, but the parties can then
engage in confidential settlementnegotiationsrcsuhi_ng inaprwiously unknownthird objective
being selected and presented to the Cornmission for approval. Such a procedure is dangerously
abbreviated and negotiated in confidential settlement discussions thereby entirely shutting out
the general public on amatter of tremendous importance.
Regardless ofufre,ther Procefur,al Rule 272 prohibits the Commission Staffftom
engagng in non-noticed and exclusionary pre-filing discussions that ultimately led to a
settlement stipulation, the very nature of zuch private discussions ae dangerous and create very
real opportunities for abuse of process in the future. Most importantly, it certainly does not
instill much faith in a general publicwho, especia[y of late, seems increasingly skeptical of its
ability to influence Commission decisions. Finally, this matterwas simply too important and
controversial to allowforprivate meetings that werenot noticed to the public and from which
even regular interrrenors srrch as CAPAI were shut out CAPAI respectfrrlly hopes that the
Commission shongly discourags any future filings and conversations of this nature.
III. MOTION TO COMPDL
A. Standerds forMotions to Compel
Regarding discovery, the Commission's Procedtral Rules operate in conjunction with the
Idaho Rules of Civil Proccdure. To the extent the latter conflict with the former, the
Commission's rules control. Commission Procedural Rule 221 enumerates the general scope of
discovery that may be conducted. Rule 222 grafisthe right to discovery to *all parties to a
proceeding." Pursuant to Rule 225, production requests or written interrogatories and requests
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 12
for admission 'hay be taken in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for any
purpose allowed by statute, Idaho Rule of Civil Pr,ocedrnt, nrle ofthe Commission, order or
notice. . .." With rcspect to requests for production/interrogatorieq the only exceptions to the
foregoing allourable scope of discovery inchdes discovery used to obtain statements of opinion
or policy not previously unitten or publishod . Rule 225(I)(a)-(b).
CAPAI notes that, historically, parties have adopted the practice of lumping
interrogatories and r€qrrcsts for production under the same heading of 'lroduction requests."
Regarding the ge,neral scope of discovery p€mitted by the ldaho Rules of Civil hocedure, Rule
26OXt) thereof provides, in parfi
Unless othennise limited by order of the court in acrcordance with these
rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) Parties may obtain
discovery regmding any matter, notprivilegd which is relevant to the
zubject mdter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party *kiog or to the claim or defense
of any other parfy, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or othertangibl6 things
and the identity and location ofpersons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not glormd for objection that the information
sougbt will be inadmissible at the tial if the information sought appears
reasonably calsulated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidelrce.
Pursuant to Commission Procedural Rule 221(03), unless othernise prcvided by order,
notice or the Procedural Rules, a party to whom discovery has been propounded has fourteen
(la) days to object or explain why a question cannot be answered according to this rule and
twe,nty-one (21) days to answer. As noted trelow, the CAPAI discovery subject to this Motiorl
and to which PacifiCorp has not yet reslnnded, was prolrcunded on April 29,2013.
In the event that a party refuses to respond to discovery, I.RC.P. 37(a) provides that the
propounding party may file a motion to compel a restrDrrse to the discovery in question. Rule
37@)@) also provides for an award of expenses ofthe motion to compel in the event it is
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 13
granted. Commission hocedural Rule 232 provides that *[t]he Commission may impose all
sanstions recognized by the Public Utilities Lawforfailure to complywith an order compelling
discovery.
B. Infomation Sought by CAPN and PacifiCorp's ReftEal to Respond.
1. Explanation of Data Soughtby CAPN
Since AVISTA's 2012 gercralrate case, AW-E-12-08, CAPAI has been making a
concerted effort to obtain and anallze low-income consumption data in an attempt to, anrong
other things,. obtain a better understmding based on empirical evidence, of how differing rate
residential rate design alternatives affect the poor. There is nothing inhereidy contnoversial
aboutthis objective. To the contrary, it might resolve what have historically been differences of
opinion betrneen CAPAI, the utility in question, and other parties. More importantln it provides
the Commission with befier inf,omation inmaking its nrlings on rate design issues.
The point of seeking low-income consumption data, therefore, is not sole$ forthe purpose of
bolstering CAPAIs positim on any given issue in a given case, but to ediry CAPAI, the Commission,
Staffand all others interested in zuch matters as to howrate design decisions can have a significant
impactonthe poor.
CAPAI's quest for the data described is, frankly, the result of unzuccessful efforts over
the years to obtain low-income data fiom public utilities. Historically, and for various reasons
includingprivacy concenr, utilities have not idelrtifie{ gatherd, orprovided to CAPAI or
others certain information related to their low-income customers. CAPAI's pursuit of low-
income consumption data therefore, stems from this lack of effort to obtain suoh information
without violating the privacy of the customers involved.
The manner in which low-income consumption data is sought in this case and has been
obtained in otherproceedings is generally as follows. First, CAPAI defines low-income
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL l4
customers in its discovery reques0s trrough the use of a "low-income pro)ry goqp.' This proxy
group consists of all recipients ofeither LIHEAP or utility-frmdd low-ircome weafiherization,
butcormtscustomersufroreceivemultiplebenefitsonlyoncetoavoiddouble-counting. The
utility involved can idemti$ these customqs with relative ease and speed and, using their
physical addresses, collecttheir actnl consumption data such as how many kilowatt hours are
consumed for any given month or s@son. At no point during this process is the identity of any
person for whom consumption.lata is collected and disseminated by the utillty ever revealed.
CAPAI is well aware thatthe low-income prorry group does not constitutethe entirety of
any utility's low-income customem as that term is defined for purposes such as quali$ing for
LIHEAPbenefits. Itisavirfualc€rtaintythattherearefarmorelow-incomecustomerswho
quahry as such than those u/bo actually seek and obtain benefits. Just the same, the low-income
proxy goup does reflect low-inoome consumption charactedsticsto some extent and is the best
data source that CAPAI has thus far conceived that does not violate custome,rs'privacy rights.
CAPAI will gladly consider for ways to improve upon the pro)ry goltp, orpossibly a
different means ofobtaining lour-income consumption data altogether that any entity wishes to
propose, especially the Commission or its Staff
Once the low-income pro)ry group data is obtaind, the next step is to utilize this
consumption data by assessing the impact that varying rate design alternatives would have on
low-income customers'bills. This requires what can be characterized by different names zuch as
"model runsn or "bill impact nnalyses.n These firnctions are not difficult nor rmduly time-
consuming and have been perfor,med by other utilities zuch as AVISTA and even PacifiCorp
itself in its pending Washington state general rate case.2 Exarnples of such model runs would be
to make different changes to the narious components of whatever existing residential rate design
2 WUTC DocketNo. LrE-13m43.
BRTEF IN SI.JPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 15
the Company has in place and then asc€rtain howthose chmges would impactalow-income
customer's monthly bills. Incide,ntally, CAPAI is lemning that as these t,"es ofmodel nurs are
being anallze{ they appear to be revealing information useftl not just to low-income customer
advocateg butto all residential class customers
For example, in discovery requestst a utility could be asked to perform amodel run where
a two-1iercd system is replaced with thrce tiers, the oonsrmptiol h€ak point by which.the tiers
are delineated could be changed (e.&, a first tier block could be attered fiom usage up to 800
kVb/month to 1000 kWh/month), the e,nergy rate pncing within differcnt tiers could be changed
(e.g., change from 8 csrts/kWh to 9 ce,nts in a given tier), the tiers could be flipped to declining
rather than iaslining block rates, or the basic charge could be adjustd.
Concerning the Company's basic monthly charge, the discorery requests also will
provide empiricat information regarding the effects of changes to this rate component on the
poor. This is but one example of the tpe of data sought by CAPAI from PasifiCorp and the
benefits that such knowledge brings.
CAPAI has previously sought and obtained from AVISTA the very same information in
seeks in this case and which is now subject to this Motion in AvlsTA's}}l}general rate case.
AVISTA was able to turn around CAPAI's discovery requests within a few days. The
information obtained convinced CAPAI to join the settle,ment stipulation proposd in that case.
More relevant to this Motion to Compel, thevery inforrration soughtby CAPAI in this
case has been sought and obtained from PacifiCorp's Washington utility, Pacific Power & Light
in the Company's ge,neral rate case pending in that state by the Energy Project which, somewhat
like CAPAI, is an umb,rella organization that serves Washington's commtmity action agencies.
Doclret No. IfE-130043. CAPAI notes that the infomration provided by PacifiCorp in the
BRIEF IN ST]PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
Washington proceeding was sponsored by the same PacifiCorp employee listed as the sponsor to
the reqponses to CAPAfs discovery inthis case, Ms. Joelle Stewad. Thuq Ms. Steurard has
already performed the very same model ru in Washington that CAPAI seeks in ldaho.
Incidentalln tbe achnl data and model nrn restrlts provided by PacifiCorp inthe lVashington rate
case is of no use to CAPAI because customer consrmptionvaries significantly from region to
region and utility to utility (i.e., Pacific Power & Light and Rocky Momtain Power). The
Company did not object or rcfuse to respond to the identical discovery requests in Washington
and was able to quicHy provide a thorough t€sponse.
2. Specifics of CAPN discovery and PacifiCorp Responscs/Refrsal to
Respond.
The following sectionoutlinesthe general procedurat steps inthe discovgry process that
occurred leadingto the current Motionto Compel. As discussed below, CAPAI submitted
discovery request Nos. l-6 to PacifiCorp, with subparts. PacifiCorp has responded to all
requests but No. 6(b) which CAPAI considers extrremely important. Thus, this Motion to
Compel is limited to Request 6(b). Request 6(b) keys offof rquest 6(a) so the entirety of
RequestNo. 6 is as follows:
6. Using the Company's low-income proxy group, and based on actual
monthly test year data as referred to in Request No.4, please make the
following rate design model nrns:
a- Calculate the effects on the low-income customer pro)ry
group's monthly bills ifthe Comlmny's monthlybasic charge were
increased from its current level to $10, $15 and to $20, (assuming no
changes to the existing commodity rates for the Residential class's two-
tiered rate). In responding to this requesL please make the requested
calculations at existing rates during the test year.
b. Assuming no change to the Company's existing monthly basic
charge, calculate the effects on the low-income proxy groups' monthly
bills in comparisonto non-lowincome residential customers (using test
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 17
year actual monthly consrmpdon) if the existiagtwo-tiercd rate desigp is
changed such that the consumpion amormt of the first tier is increasod
from the existing 700 kWh summer block to 8fi) kWh/month, 1000 kWh
and 12ffi kWb- Please provide the same data forthe winter block of
1000 kwh if the block were changedto 800 kWh, 1200 kWh and 1400
kwb-
Without divulgng anything confideirtial and of substance discussed during the two
settlement hearings, it is fair to say thal, as erly as Apil lg,zOl3,CAPAI made clear its
ongoing effort to obtain the type of low-income on dara described above and obtained
from other utilities in other proc€edings and that it needed to obtain the same tlpe of dara in this
case in order to decide whether joining in the settlemexrt was in the best intercsts of its
constihre,nts. It was ageed in this case tbat, as part of an effort to enpedite PacifiCorp's
ambitious time frame for obtaining a settlement pnorto May 31, 2013, CAPAI could submit its
discovery requests in an informal maoner to PacifiCorp senior qrecutive Mr. Ted Weston who
would attempt to provide a prompt response.
On April 29,2013,ten days after the conclusion of the first settle,me,nt confere,nce,
CAPAI zubmitted its discovery requests Nos. l{, with subpaits, to PacifiCorp via an email and
attachment to that email from CAPAI's legal cormsel to Mr. Ted Weston as previously discussed.
A tue and correct copy of CAPAI's email is included as Exhibit nA" to the Affidavit of Brad M.
hrdy (hereinafter refemed to as "the Affidavit'), filed contemporaneously herewith. The actual
discovery requests attached to the April 29 eri:mril as a Word document are included as Exhibit
'Bn to the AfEdavit
On May 2,2013,the date of CAPAI's second settlement conference, PacifiCorp
responded to CAPAIs discovery requests l-5 with two separate emails, from Mr. Weston. A
tnre and correct copy of this email is attaphed to the Affidavit as Exhibit 'C." In Exhibit C, Mr.
Weston informed the rmdersigned that the Company was still working on its response to
BRIEF IN SI.]PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 18
discovery rcquest No. 6. In the interest of orpediencn and because they are not subject to this
Motion, the actual discovery rcspons€s to CAPAIs request Nos. l-5 are not attached to the
Affidavit
As the month ofMay progresseq PacifiCorp drafted and cir,culated a proposed settlement
stipulation seeking comments from the parties. On }Iay L6,2OL3,CAPAI, through legal
cotrnsel, provided its comments to the proposed settleme,nt stipulation and re,minded the
Company that it had not yet responded to discovery requestNo. 6 and that said response was
necessary for CAPAI to determine ufietherthe proeosed stipulation rms acceptable. CAPAI
articulate4 in no uncertaint€rms, its ongoing coneenrs the procedural abnormalities of
this case and proposed that a condition precede,nt to the settlement should be included providing
for a formal hearing to allow for public participation in the p; CAPAI never received a
respoose from any party qpecific to its May 16 email.
On May 2g,2[l3,PacifiCorp, through its emptoyee Ms. Kaley McNay, emailed its
rcsponse to CAPAI's discovery requestNo. 6. A tnre and correct copy of the email and attached
Word docrrment containing the discovery response are attached to the Affidavit as Exhibits "D"
and nE,' respoctively. Though the Company responded to request 6(a). PacifiCorp's response to
request 6(b) is as follows:
The Company has not performed the two-tier€d rate designanalysis [sic]
requested by CAPAI. As specifid in paragraph 18 ofthe Stipulation if
CAPAI is partyto the Stipulationthe Company agreesto participate in a
collabomtive rate design Prosess to evaluate alternatives.
Inthe week or sothat followe4 PacifiCorp continuedto refuse to respond to request 6@)
unless and rmtil CAPAI executed a settlement stipulation and only then would a response to the
request be provide through an undefined "collaborative effort" or'technical workshop" as Mr.
Weston has referred to it The precise datg location and other logistics of this wod<shop were
BRIEF IN SI.JPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
nevetr specified and it is not clearwhether CAPAI werwould have received the information it
was seeking even had itjoined the settlement and the workshop been conducted. Regardless,
and as itmade clearto the Company and all otherparties, CAPAI needed the information sotrght
byrequest 6(b) before it coulddet€rmine whetherthe settlementagrwmentwas inthe best
interests of its constituents. The promise of yet another 'workshop" at some future point in time
was not a sufficient response to a legitimate discovery requesf especially rrrhen it required
CAPAI to agree to a rate increase before it had the necessary informatioq is simply a baseless
refusal to respond to legitimate discovery without qpecifying any particular legal basis for zuch
refusal.
Had CAPAI accepted PacifiCorp's termsr CAPAI would have been barred ftom
challenging the proposed rate increase if the informailion disclosed by the workshop revealed that
the rate increase was not fair,iust md reasonable. Thus, CAPAI was effectively forced to
relinquish its rights as a party to be entitled to engage in discovery regardless of the fact that the
Compaoy did not place similar conditions on the discove,ry requests of any other party to the best
of CAPAfs knowledge. To this day, PacifiCorp has yet to provide a specific legal grormds for
its refusal to respond to request 6(b).
C. CAPN Singled Out by PacifiCorp for Unequal Trcatment Depriving CAPAI of its Full
Party Rights
The,re has been a significant amount of discovery submifred to PacifiCorp by the other parties
thoroughty and p'romptly rcsponded to by the Company. To the best of CAPAIs knowledge CAPAI is
the only party to whom the Compny has refused to fully respond to its discovery. CAPAI is also the
only party to decline to join in the settlement until such time as the Company provided CAPAI with the
information CAPAI needed to decide whether to join in setle,ment Up mtil the very end of May when
the Settlement Stipulation was being executed by the other parties, CAPAI was given the distinct
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 20
impressiononnumeronsoccasionsthatdiscoveryrequd6(b)woildberespondedto. Itwasntuntilthe
end of May vfren the Company lftely had fte signatures of all dher parties, or the assurance of those
signatrnes, that PacifiCorp reversed is position and refirsed for the first time to respond to request 6(b).
Nonethelesg the Company continuedto prossur€ CAPAltoexecute the settle,ment stipulation despite
PacifiCorp's refusal to respond to discovery requests ftd CAPAI had indicated back in April, 2013 were
essential to CAPAI in determining whether to join the sefilement
CAPAI was told that the Cmpany would only rcspond to request 6(b) UCAPAI joined in the
Settlement This tactic is heafff-hands4 and in violdion ofthe Commission's Pnocedural Rules. Adding
this to the unlaufirl manner in whie,h this case has been handld fiom the time before it was even file4
the Company has clearly not behaved in a fair and reasonable menner tornrard CAPAI. To deny CAPAI
substantive information that it needs in order to decide ufrether to wen join the setflement is simply
taking alrcady bad behavior another step in the vnong dfuection.
D. PacifiCorp Has Failed toAssertAny Legal Blslr forRefusal to Respnd
To this day, PacifiCorp has technically not even proffered a legal basis for its objection to
CAPAIs request No. 6(b) other thrn to state that it is not required to perform the model nrns requested by
CAPAT The Company does not cite my administrative rules, statutes, case law, or even offer a practical
reason why it is not required to respond to CAPAI's discovery. CAPAI is not obligated to spoculate what
the Compan/s legal basis is and until zuch time as it does, CAPAI's Motion should be granted simply
because the Company has refirsed forno stated neason and in bad faith to fairty engage CAPAI and honor
its rights as a formal party to this case.
CAPAI notes that requesting utilities to perform model nms or similar analyses is something that
parties to proceedings before this Commission have done through discovery requests for at least decades.
One example is the cofilmon practice of asking a utility to perform cost of service model runs or make
other calculations regarding revenue requirement rate spread, rate design, or any numaer of other areas
involving models. CAPAfs "model" in this case is simply a request to perform basic algebraic
calculations of rate impacts resulting from rate design alternatives based on infomtation that only the
BRIEF IN SI]PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 2I
Company possesses" Because PacifiCorp is the only entity capable of ohainingthe infcmation sought
by CAPAI and because said information is se,nsitive and the privacy of individuals involved must be
maintaine4 and because it is in the best if not only position to perform the model runs requested by
CAPAI, any claim that &e Company is not required to provide such information is simply inconsistent
with historical procedure and the Commission's Procedural Rules ad is inconsistent with the fact that
AYISTA promptly provided this informdion to CAPAI and PacifiCorp did so itself in its Washington
rate case, though fo a different operating division.
IV. SI'MMARY OT CAPAPS CONCERNS AI{D MOTION TO COMPEL
To summarize, PacifiCo,rp met in privab with Stafrand the Compaq/s largest customers pnor to
filing a mrnn€f,'of proceeding that is unprecedented and defies labeling. It is a rate case, yet ifs not. A
Notice of Intent to File a General Rate Case was fild yet it wam't It was tneated as a general rate case
in certain r€spects, butnot in others, yctresuhed in ageneral rate increase that was ex@itiously
brokered. Technicalty, an application fc a general rate case hae not yet even been filsd in this
proceeding. Assuming the Commission considers the initial pleadings and Notices to have initiatd a
general rate case, then such pleadings and Notices were a violation of the 20llsettlement stipulation
because it was filed priorto May 31, 2013. Nonetheless, the parties agreed to a ge,neral rate increase prior
to May 31,2013 through conlidential seiltle,ment negotiations which, apparently, is theirproposed
"alternative" to a general rate case. The r€trsal of PacifiCorp to rcspond to legitimate and relevant
discovery reque$s essential to CAPAIs ability to determine whether to join in this highly questionable
settleme,nt is the proverbial insultto injury.
Regarding PacifiCorp's refusal to respond to CAPAI discovery, CAPAI made it clear to the
parties early in this proceeding that the information sought by that discovery was essential to CAPAI to
determine whether PacifiCorp's existing rcsidential rate design was fair, just and reasonable and,
therefore, whetherto join in the proposed settlernent. Procedural Rule 124 automatically puts at issue
matters such as revenue requirement rate ryread, and rate design. CAPAI further notes that during the
months ihd have passd since the discovery was first propoundd especially the past two months whem
BRIEF IN SI'PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 22
thematterhas satidlewaitingforhearing fre Companyhadmoretrrn ample opponunitytoprovide the
sameinformationthattookitsWashingSondivisionseveraldaystop,rovide. TheCompanyhasyetto
even offer a legal basis for its refirsal to respond 1s rhis discovery. CAPAI respectfrrlly submia that ftis
motion could and should be granted on that basis alone.
CAPAI fully acknowledges that thisMotion entends well beyond the narrow issue of atypical
Motion to Compel, but believes that tbe refirsal of PacifiCorp to rrspond to CAPAIs discovery is a clear
maniMtion md qmptom of a much targer systemic problem that deserrres to be firlty addressed in all
of its aspects, legal, fac0nl and ofterwise. Failrre to do so very well might resuh in very bad precedent
being established and a domino effect that will carry the consequences of this case far outside its
parameters. Regardless of whether Statradamantly believes that it has negotiated an end result in terms
of a rate increase that is in the best interests of all ratepayers, no such end resuh is worth establishing the
precedent that will be set iftte settlement $ipulation is approved in fris case.
CAPAI has beeir increasingly concerned about the increased ftequencywith rttich general rate
cases are being filed and the increasingly abb,neviated marmer in which they are being processed. CAPAI
understands that the Commission's legal authority and powers are limited in terms of discouraging
utilities from filing general raie cases- CAPAI is also aware ofthe subshntial demand on Commission
resouroes that nearty annual general rate oase filings by Idaho's three largest public electric utilities has
had, but this case has followed a path that substantially distances not only the general public from the
ability to provide meaningful input to the Commission but parties such as CAPAI as well. If the
Commission believes it wo,rthwhile to forrna$r implement a major change to the manner in which general
rate cases are handle4 then it certainly po$sesses the legal authority to initiate and engage in an
administative rulemahing procedure for that purpose. To authorize such major change to general rate
case procedure through inference and by the approval of an unlawful, ad hoc, confidential, and hastily-
conceived process and product such as the proposed settlement stipulation in this case is not something
the Commission must accept. Public percepion does matter and the process employed in arriving at the
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL
pending rate case settlemen! regardless of how favorable it might be to ratepayers, is cerainly not going
to bolsterpublic confidence in tre ratemaking process.
V. CONCLUSION
CAPAI reqpectfulty requests that PrcifiCorp be roquired to respond ftlly and in good faith to
CAPAIs discovery requestNo. 6(b).
DATED, this 30th day of July, 2013
BRIEF IN SI.JPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 24
CERTMCATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersrgne4 hueby certifi that on the 30th day of Juln 2013, I serrred a copy of
the foregoing document on the following by electronic mail and U.S. Postage, first class.
Ted Weston
Rocky Morurtain Power
201 South Mai& Suite 2300
SaIt Lalce City, IIf 8411I
ted. weston@nacifi corp. com
Daniel E. Solander
RockyMountain Power
201 SouthMaiq Suite 2300
salt Lake City, tJT 84111
daniel. solander@nacifi corp. com
Electronic Service Onlv:
Data Request Response Ce,nter
PacifiCorp
[e-mail]
Neil Price
Deputy Attonrey General
Idaho Public Utilities Commission
472 W, Washington (837 02)
P0 Box 83720
Boise, ID 837204074
neil.price@f uc.idaho. eov
Randall C. Budge
Racine, Olson, Nyc, Budge & Bailey
201E. Center
P0 Box l39l
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 I
E-Mail : [e-mail]
Bnrbaker & Associarcs
16690 Swingley Ridge Rd., #140
Chesterfield, MO 63017
[e-mail]
JamesR. Smith
Monsanto Company
P.O. Box 816
SodaSprings,ID 83276
Jim.r.smith@monsanto. com
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL 25
EricL. Olsen
ASSOCLATION,INC: Racine, Olson,Nye, Budge & Bailey
(E:rhibit Nos. 30 l-400) 201 E. Center
P0 Box 1391
Pocacllo,ID 8320+1391
[e-mail]
Anthony Yankel
29814 lake Road
Bay Village, OH 44140
tonv@..vankel.net+
Benjanlin J. Otto
Idaho Conservation Lepgue
710N.66 Sr
Boise,ID 837(D
[e-mail]
Ronald Williams
Williams Bradbury, P.C.
l0l5 W. Hays Sr
Boise,ID837V2
ron@wil liamsbradbury.com
Don Schosnbeck
RCS,Inc.
900 Washington St., Suite 780
Vancouver, WA 98660
dwstOr-c-s-inc.com
Tim Buller
Agrium,Inc.
3010 CondaRd.
Soda Springs,ID 83276
[e-mail]
Ken Miller
Snake RiverAlliance
Box 1731
Boise,ID 83701
E-Maih kmiller@,snalteriveralliance.org
BRIEF IN SI]PPORT OF CAPAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL