20170428Comments & Request.pdf

Benjamin Otto, ISB No. 8292
Idaho Conservation League
710 N 6th St., Boise,ID 83701
[phone],Bxt. 12
botto@idahoconservation. org
David Bender, WI Bar# 1046102
Admittedpro hac vice
Earthjustice
3916 Nakoma Road
Madison, WI 5371I
(4ts) 977-s727
dbender@earthj ustice. org
BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ) CASE NO. rpc-E-t7-01
IDAHO PowER COMPANY FOR )
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A DECLARATORY ORDER REGARDING
PROPER CONTRACT TERMS,
CONDITIONS, AND AVOIDED COST
PRICING FOR BATTERY STORAGE
FACILITIES
) Comments of Idaho Conservation League
) and Sierra Club and Conditional Request
) for Hearing
)
Idaho Conservation League ("ICL") and the Sierra Club submit these comments pursuant
to the Idaho Public Utilities Commission's (o'Commission") Modified Procedural Order issued
March 23,2017.ICL and Sierra Club oppose Idaho Power Company's request for a declaratory
order that would improperly restrict the contract terms and pricing for battery storage facilities
providing energy under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA").
Idaho Power's petition requests that the Commission o'issue an order determining the
proper contract terms, conditions and avoided cost pricing to be included in the [PURPA]
contracts [for] battery storage facilities." Pet. at 1. The Petition contends that battery facilities
should "be subject to the same 100 kilowatt... published rate eligibility cap applicable to wind
and solar generation" established in Order No.32262 and the corresponding two year maximum
contract term established in Order No. 33357. Pet. at 2. Thus, the Petition seeks to revise the
prior orders and extend the 100 kilowatt (kW) cap for published rates and 20 year contract terms
for wind and solar to battery storage facilities also.
The declaratory ruling procedure is not the appropriate process for modiffing the prior
orders to include battery storage. Furthermore, even if the correct procedure were used, the
Commission should decline to extend Orders 32697 and 33357. In fact, the Commission should
begin a new proceeding to rescind Order No. 33357 because it exceeded the Commission's
jurisdiction. Order 33357 deprived Qualiffing Facilities ("QFs") of their right to sell to Idaho
utilities by limiting contract length to less than the minimum length that would allow QFs to
finance their projects, in violation of federal law.
Moreover, substantial evidence now exists that the Commission's prior order limiting
contract lengths for wind and solar QFs larger than 100 kW to two years has effectively
eliminated all such projects within Idaho. During the same period, jurisdictions outside Idaho
that rejected similar constraints on QFs continue to experience new QF development. This
evidence demonstrates that longer contracts would allow QF projects a reasonable opportunity to
attract capital but the current two-year contracts do not. The Commission cannot find on the
record in this case that battery storage QFs can attract the necessary capital if also limited to only
two-year contracts. In fact, the Commission should revisit its prior findings in Order 33357.
Conditional Request for Hearing: To the extent that the Commission does go forward
and considers whether to limit the length of contracts for battery storage facilities, it must hold a
hearing and make findings that the contract term allows reasonable opportunity for QFs to attract
financing for viable projects. No hearing is needed if this Commission rejects the Petition.
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I. A Declaratory Ruling Is Not the Appropriate Procedure For the Relief ldaho Power
Requests.
There is no specific statute authorizing the Commission to issue declaratory rulings.
Rather, that authority derives (if at all) inherently from other authorities of this Commission. See
Pet. at 5 (citing "Title 6l of Idaho Code and the Idaho Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of
lg33'as the basis for the requested reliefl.r That inherent, derivative, authority must yield to
specific statutory procedures when provided by the legislature; otherwise the specific statutory
procedures become superfluous. Here, the legislature provided a process for rescinding, altering
or amending prior orders. Idaho Code $ 6l-624. That procedure controls and should not be
ignored in favor of an extra-statutory declaratory ruling proceeding.
The Petition in this case effectively asks the Commission to alter or amend its Order
Numbers 32697 and33357 to include battery storage QFs to the limited category of "wind and
solar" QFs subject to a 100 kW limitation for published avoided cost rates and longer contract
terms.2 While the Petition contends that battery storage facilities' qualification for the published
avoided cost rates and contract length were not determined by Order Nos. 32697 and33357,Pet.
atT,the Petition also concedes that the Commission "previously directed that published avoided
cost rates be distinguished by resource type." Pet. at 3 (citing Order No. 32697 at l5; Order No.
32802 at 5-8.) That distinction by resource type was specific to solar and wind only below 10
MW. Order No. 33357 at25 (limiting "IRP based contracts" to two years but allowing longer
contracts for published avoided cost rates); Order No. 32697 at 14 (rejecting at 100 kW limit on
I The Declaratory Judgments Act applies specifically to'ocourts of record," Idaho Code $ l0-1201, which
are specifically defined and do not include this Commission. Idaho Code $$ l-101, l-102.
2 As the Petition concedes, this Commission does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the storage
facilities are qualifling facilities; that determination lies exclusively with FERC. Pet. at 6 ("QF status is within the
exclusive jurisdiction and properly before FERC, not this Commission, for determination.") Therefore, the only
question is whether the Commission's prior orders should extend to battery storage along with the wind and solar
QFs specifically addressed in the orders.
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the published avoided cost rate oofor resources other than wind and solar" and subjecting only
wind and solar QFs under 10 aMW to IRP based contracts); Order No. 32176 at 9 (temporarily
suspending published avoided cost rates for facilities larger than 100 kW "for wind and solar
only"). Petitioner thus argues to now extend those orders to battery storage facilities because the
generation profile of the storage facilities is "nearly identical, and generally matches" that of a
solar generating facility, and some are located on the same site as a prior proposed solar facility,
and, therefore, should be treated the same as a solar facility. Pet. at 4,7-10. That requires a
revision to the categories adopted in Order Number 32697, and consequently Order No. 33357.
Idaho Code $ 6l-624 provides the procedure for doing so. Idaho Power should have filed a
complaint under that statute, and a hearing should be held as provided by that statute, rather than
proceeding under the current petition for declaratory ruling.
II.The Commission Should Not Extend Its Prior Orders to Cover Battery Storage
Facilities and Should,Instead, Rescind The Contract Length Limits From Order
No. 33357 As Exceeding The Commission's Jurisdiction.
A. The Delegation to the Commission to Implement Certain Portions of PURPA
and FERC's Regulations Does Not Extend to Dictating Maximum Contract
and Enforceable Obligation Lengths.
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This Commission's authority is broad when implementing those powers specifically
given to it by PURPA and FERC's regulations. But there is no basis to assume, as the
Commission did in Order No. 33357, that the Commission's jurisdiction and authority to
implement PURPA grants it authority to impose any policy, obligation, or limit on the rights
conveyed under PURPA whenever FERC's rules fail to expressly prohibit the Commission from
doing so. Such assumption ofjurisdiction unless specifically denied runs contrary to the
structure of PURPA and the law against assumed agency jurisdiction. Moreover, even where the
Commission has jurisdiction and authority to act under PURPA, it must do so to implement
FERC's rules, not to contradict or limit them, nor to adopt policies directly contrary to those
FERC seeks to implement.
l.The Commission's Delegated Authority to Implement PURPA is
Specific To Determining Avoided Cost Rates, Determining When A
QF's Enforceable Obligation Arises, and Deciding Which Procedural
Mechanisms To Use.
States have broad authority under PURPA and FERC regulations to determine avoided
cost rates based on the factors identified by FERC, to determine whether and when an obligation
is enforceable under state contract law, and to decide the manner in which to implement FERC's
regulations (i.e., through rulemaking, orders, or adjudicating individual cases). Independent
Energt Producers Assoc. v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm'n.,36 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir.1994);
Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho Pub.Utilities Comm'n,l28Idaho 609,612,917 P.2d766,769
(1996); A.W. Brownv. Idaho Power Co.,l2l Idaho 812,814,828P.2d 841, 843 (1992). These
authorizations to the states to implement PURPA do not imply additional authorization to dictate
limits to the rights of QFs. Cf, Independent Energt Producers Assoc. Inc.,36 F.3d at 856-57
(rejecting argument that a state's discretion to set avoided cost rates or that the listing of
considerations in 18 C.F.R. $ 292.304(e) implies authority to impose additional conditions on the
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QF);Conn. Light&PowerCo.,70 FERC 61,012,61,027 (1995)("PURPAgavethestates
responsibility only for 'implement[ing]' the Commission's rules." (emphasis original)). As the
Idaho Supreme Court made clear in ldaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission,the
Commission has only those powers "specifically granted to it," with no presumption of
additional jurisdiction. l}2ldaho 744,639P.2d442,448 (1981) (citing WashingtonWater
Power Co. v. Kootenai Environmental Alliance,99ldaho 875,879,591P.2d 122,1,26 (1979);
United States v. Utah Power & Light Company,98 Idaho 665, 570 P.2d 1353 (1977); Lemhi Tel.
Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,98 tdaho 692,571P.2d753 (1977)).
The Commission's prior Order No. 33357 exceeded the Commission's authority
delegated under PURPA by limiting QF's rights under 18 C.F.R. $292.304(d)(2)(iD to two
years. There is no statute, regulation, FERC order, or case providing such authority. Order No.
33357 is therefore beyond the authority delegated to the Commission. The Commission should
not compound that extra-jurisdictional order by extending it further to battery storage QFs larger
than 100 kW, as sought in the Petition.
2. Case law Provides Broad Discretion Onty Within Specific Areas, Not
Wide Ranging Authority to Impose Limits In Areas Not Specilically
Delegated.
None of the cases cited in the Commission's prior orders recognize sweeping power to
dictate all terms of a QF's right to sell power unless explicitly addressed by FERC's rules. In
Order No. 33357 the Commission cited ldaho Power,3 l6 P3d at 1280, 1284, 1286, Afton
Energt v. Idaho Power Co., 107 Idaho 781, 785-8 6, 693 P.2d 427 , 431-32 (1984) (Afton t/I[),
Rosebud,l28Idaho at627,917 P.zdat784;andA.W. Brown,121 Idaho atBl4,828P.2dat843,
and claimed that those cases provided implicit authority to impose any limits or restrictions on
QFs unless specifically denied that power by FERC regulations. Order No. 33357 at 12; Order
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No. 33419 at 7. Under that premise, the Commission then stated that the relevant question was
whether FERC has specifically directed the Commission to impose a minimum length of
contract. Id. But, those cases are not nearly so sweeping and the conclusion the Commission
drew from them of virtually unlimited power unless expressly limited by FERC is unsupported.
The cases cited in Order Nos. 33357 md334l9 recognize only that the Commission has
discretion in the manner in which FERC rules are implemented and the details of what a QF has
obligated itself to do and when it's obligation is enforceable. Idaho Power,l55 Idaho at782,
784,316 P.3d at1280,1284. The ldaho Power court stated:
State agencies that regulate utilities are required to implement FERC rules, but
they have discretion in determining the manner in which the rules will be
implemented, and they may comply by issuing regulations, be resolving disputes
on a case-by-case basis, or by other action reasonably designed to give effect to
FERC's rules.
155 Idaho at786,316 P.3d at 1284 (citing FERC v. Mississippi,456 U.S. at 751); see also Id. at
782,316 P.3d at 1280 (same); Afton, 693 P.2d at 431-32 ("FERC's regulations interpret
t$210(0] to require that state 'implementation may consist of the issuance of regulations, an
undertaking to resolve disputes between qualiffing facilities and electric utilities... or any other
action reasonably designed to implement such subpart...' "). The ldoho Power court's citation
to FERC v. Mississippi,456 U.S. at 767, similarly refers to the Supreme Court's statement that:
[I]t has always been the law that state legislative and judicial decisionmakers must
give preclusive ffict to federal enactments concerning nongovemmental activity,
no matter what the strength of the competing local interests. This requirement
follows from the nature of governmental regulation of private activity.
"[I]ndividual businesses necessarily [are] subject to the dual sovereignty of the
government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside," when regulations
promulgated by the sovereigns conflict, federal law necessarily controls. This is
true though Congress exercises its authority "in a manner that displaces the States'
exercise of their police powers," or in such a way as to "curtail or prohibit the
States'prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may
consider important,"----or, to put it still more plainly, in a manner that is
"extraordinarily intrusive." Thus it may be unlikely that the States will or easilyIPC-E-17-01 April2T,2016
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can abandon regulation of public utilities to avoid PURPA's requirements. But this
does not change the constitutional analysis: as in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Recl. Assn., "[t]he most that can be said is that the ... Act establishes a program
of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits established by
federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory
programs, structured to meet their own particular needs."
FERC,456 U.S. at766-67 (emphasis added) (internal citations omiued). Thus, the cases the
Commission relied on to find authority to limit QF's rights under l8 C.F.R. 5292.304(d)(2)(ii)
actually provide that, within the requirement of 16 U.S.C. $ 823a-3(f), the state can decide the
method of implementing FERC's rules within the limits established by FERC.
The cases the Commission cited also recognize a second, limited, scope of state
authority: to make a fact-specific determination as to legally enforceable obligation formation.
The ldaho Power case specifically involved the Commission's determination that an enforceable
obligation was not formed before a grandfathering date for prior published rate qualification.
155 Idaho at786. For that purpose the court quoted Power Resource Group, Inc. v. Public
Uility Commission of Texas,42F.3d23l,2381Sft Cir. 2005) and. Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho
Public Utilities Commission,l2S Idaho 609,623-24,917 P.2d766,780-81 (1996), for the
proposition that:
"[S]tates must provide for legally enforceable obligations as distinct from
contractual obligations, but [i]t is up to the states, not [FERC], to determine the
specific parameters of individual QF powff purchase agreements, including the
date on which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred under State law."
Idaho Power,l55 Idaho at786,316 P.3d at1284.
Power Resources Group also involved a state commission making a determination of
when an enforceable obligation arose. 422F.3dat238. Addressing that specific authority of the
state, the court quotedWest Penn Power Company, 7l FERC 61,153,61,495 (1995), that "[i]t is
up to the States, not [FERC], to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power
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purchase agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred
under State law." West Penn, in turn, also involved a state's determination of when an
enforceable obligation was incurred for purposes of determining the point in time to calculate
avoided cost rates. Id. at 61,494. The reference to "determin[ing] the specific parameters of
individual QF power purchase agreements" refers to the Pennsylvania Commission's prior "fact-
based determinations" of "the time a legal obligation for the sale of power is incurred." Id. at
61,494-95.3 The same quote is found in Rosebud Enterprises, which upheld this Commission's
determination that a QF was entitled to indicative pricing as of a specific, historic, date. 128
Idaho at623-24,917 P.2d at 780-81. According to the court, "Conferment of grandfathered
status on qualiffing facility is essentially an IPUC finding that a legally enforceable obligation to
sell power existed by a given date. Such a finding is within the discretion of the state regulatory
agency." Id.
These cases all address the recognized authority of a state commission to determine when
an enforceable obligation is created. But that specific authorization from FERC does not also
confer an expansive authority to limit a QF's rights under 18 C.F.R. 5 292.304(dx2xii) to only
two years. No decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, nor of FERC, grants that authority to this
Commission. Cf. Afton Energl, Inc., Case No. U-1006-199, Order No. 17478 at $ II (August 3,
1982) (agreeing with Idaho Power's argument that the Commission's'oauthority (and, indeed, the
duty) to require a utility to purchase power from a qualiffing [facility]" does not mean that the
Commission has jurisdiction to dictate the terms of that contract).
3 There may be misperception about the phrase "to determine the specific parameters of individual QF
power purchase agreements" in West Penn Power because of the different meanings of the word "determine."
However, it is clear from the context of the discussion in West Penn, as well as the statutory structure in 16 U.S.C. $
823a-3(a), (b) and (0 that FERC means that it is the state's role to make factual findings, calculate, or ascertain the
parameters of agreements, not to establish limits for power purchase agreements different from those provided in
FERC's rules. See WEBSTER's NEw WoRLD Cor-r-pce DICTIoNARY 375 (3'd Ed.)
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Therefore, under the actual holdings of the cases cited in prior Commission Order Nos.
33357 and33419, the Commission is authorized to impose a maximum two-year time limit on
QFs' right under 18 C.F.R. S 292.304(dx2)(ii) to sell to utilities under predetermined long-term
avoided costs if that limitation is a "manner" of implementing PURPA, a determination of when
an enforceable obligation is formed, or falls within another specific authorization from FERC
through which the Commission has discretion to limit a QF's rights under 18 C.F.R. $
292.304(d)(2)(iD. We respectfully suggest that it is none of these and, therefore, request that the
Commission not only reject the Petition's request to extent Order No. 33357 to battery storage
QFs over 100 kW, but open a proceeding to revisit the Order and eliminate the restrictions that
order places on the right of QF solar and wind developers under l8 C.F.R. 5 292.304(dX2Xii) for
projects greater than 100 kW.
B. Even if FERC Had Delegated Authority To Impose Maximum Contract or
Obligation Lengths, The Commission Must Still Exercise Any Discretion
While Doing So Within The Limits Set By PURPA and FERC.
1. The Commission's Explicit Intent In Limiting QF Rights Under 18
C.F.R. $ 292.304(dx2xii) Conflicts With FERC's Intent In Adopting
That Provision.
When it adopted the two year maximum for avoided cost projections under l8 C.F.R. $
292.304(d)(2xii), the Commission first recognized that when adopting regulations under 16
U.S.C. $ 823a-3(a) and (b), FERC "acknowledged that avoided costs calculated when the parties
energy into [a] contract might result in avoided costs over the term of the contract being greater
than actual avoided costs at the time of delivery" Order No. 33357 at23; Order No. 33419 at 6-
7.4 But,rather than accepting FERC's determination that long-term avoided costs are
o While this Commission cited l6 U.S.C. $ 82aa-3(b) for its "finding" that 2}-year avoided cost contracts
"are inconsistent with the public interest," Order No. 33419 at 7, that statute actually gives FERC, and not this
Commission, the authority to determine what is in the public interest and determine whether to allow long-term
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nevertheless just, reasonable and in the public interest, this Commission disagreed with FERC's
conclusions. Id. In direct contrast to FERC's conclusions, this Commission concluded that
short-term contracts with frequently adjusted avoided costs are more accurate, and therefore
preferable and in the public interest. Order No. 33357 at23s; Order No. 33419 at 7. This
directly conflicts with FERC's findings under 16 U.S.C. $ 823a-3(a) and (b) that long-term
avoided cost contracts are in the public interest, even iflong-term avoided cost projections turn
out to be incorrect compared to time-of-deliver avoided costs, because locked-in long-term rates
are necessary to realize Congress's purpose of encouraging QF development. New York State
Electric and Gas and rejected by FERC. 71 FERC n 6l ,027 * 14-* 1 5 ( I 995) ("NYSEG").
In fact, the Commission's conclusions in Order No. 33357, that long-term avoided cost
contracts are not in the public interest because the Commission has historically over-projected
avoided costs compared to time-of-delivery avoided costs, and that frequent renewal of short-
term contracts ensures more accurate avoided costs, is essentially the same as the argument made
by the utility in NYSEG and rejected by FERC. The utility company in N)'SEG argued that
avoided cost contracts. l6 U.S.C. $ 82aa-3(b) provides that the "rules prescribed under subsection (a) shall ensure"
that avoided cost rates are'Just and reasonable... and in the public interest..." The "rules prescribed under
subsection (a)" are the rules that FERC adopts. l6 U.S.C. $ 823a-3(a). Nothing in that statute gives this
Commission authority to determine that FERC's rules are not in the public interest. To the contrary, once FERC
determined that long-term contracts with long-term projected avoided costs are in the public interest in l8 C.F.R.
292.304(d)(2)(ii), this Commission's role is to implement that policy decision. l6 U.S.C. $ 823a-3(f).
t The Commission's reasoning that because the parties agreed that zero variable cost resources (i.e., wind
and solar) drive down marginal energy costs over time, the avoided cost rates calculated before those resources are
built must have been too high, is also incorrect. Order No.33357 at22-23 (claiming this conclusion is "axiomatic").
The Commission's reasoning ignores the fact that future avoided costs are lower because of additional wind and
solar generation. That is, it is actually "axiomatic" that adding zero variable cost resources cause the generation
curve to shift to the right, which drives down future avoided costs because after the wind and solar are built the load
and generation curyes intersect at a lower marginal cost. The avoided cost rate for the next wind or solar project is
based on what the marginal capacity and energy costs would be without that generation. Future avoided cost rates
will be based on the marginal energy and capacity costs after that generation has forced costs down. Therefore, the
fact that wind and solar built today result in lower future avoided costs does not mean that avoided cost projections
made today-before the wind and solar cause marginal price reductions-are wrong. In any event, the Commission
cannot refuse to provide QFs long-term avoided cost projections they are entitled to under l8 C.F.R. $
292.304(2)(d)(ii) even if the Commission believes it incorrectly projected such avoided costs in the past.
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contracts with QFs must include "protective measures to ensure" that over the length of a
contract, long-term avoided cost projections included in contracts do not exceed avoided costs at
the time of delivery. Id. at *3. This is essentially the same as this Commission's conclusion that
short-term contracts with frequent renewals, limiting the availability of long-term avoided cost
rates, is more accurate than long-term avoided cost contracts and QFs should be limited to short-
term contracts. Order No. 33357 at23; Order No. 33419 at 7. FERC rejected that argument in
NYSEG, explaining that its rules acknowledge and accept that long-term avoided costs may
prove incorrect when compared to avoided costs at the time of delivery, but finding those
concerns are outweighed by the competing interest of promoting QF development:
At the time [FERC's] regulations were promulgated, the Commission anticipated
that avoided costs could change over time and balanced the relevant competing
interests. The Commission intended the regulations described above "to reconcile
the requirement that the rates for purchases equal the utilities' avoided cost with
the need for [QFs] to be able to enter into contractual commitments based, by
necessity, on estimotes offuture avoided costs." The Commission recognized that,
if the avoided cost of energy at the time it is delivered is less than the price
provided in the contract, a utility may be required to pay a rate for purchases that
would subsidize the QF at the expense of the utility's other ratepayers. However,
the Commission also was:
cognizant that in other cases, the required rate will tum out to be lower
than the avoided costs at the time of purchase. The Commission does not
believe that the reference in the statute to incremental cost of alternative
energy was intended to require a minute-by-minute evaluation of costs
which would be checked against rates established in long-term contracts
between [QFs] and electric utilities.
Many commenters have stressed the need for certainty with regard to return on
investment in new technologies. The Commission agrees with these latter
arguments, and believes that, in the long run, "overestimations" and
"underestimations" will balance out. ... The import of [18 C.F.R. 5 292.304(b)(5)]
is to ensure that a [QF] which has obtained the certainty of an arrangement is not
deprived of the benefits of its commitment as a result of changed circumstances.
This provision can also work to preserve the bargain entered into by the electric
utility.
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Id at *14-*15 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, FERC recently
reconfirmedin Windham Solar LLC and Allco Finance Ltd.,that:
[FERC's regulations] pertaining to legally enforceable obligations "are intended
to reconcile the requirement that the rates for purchases equal to the utilities'
avoided cost with the need for qualiffing facilities to be able to enter into
contractual commitments, by necessity, on estimates of future avoided costs" and
has explicitly agreed with previous commenters that "stressed the need for
certainty with regard to retum on investment in new technologies." Given the
"need for certainty with regard to retum on investment" coupled with Congress'
directive that the Commission 'encourage' QFs, a legally enforceable obligation
should be long enough to allow QFs reasonable opportunities to attract capital
from potential investors.
157 FERC 61,134 !f8 (Nov. 22,2016) (quoting Order No. 69, FERC Stats. & Regs. fl 30,128 at
30,880; 16 U.S.C. $ 824a-3(a); I 8 C.F.R. S 292.304(dX2)); see also JD Wind I , LLC,l30 FERC
61,127,61,631 (2010) (long-term avoided cost contracts or enforceable obligations are consistent
with PURPA even where costs turn out to be different than projected); W. Penn Power Co.,1l
FERC at 61,495-96 ("As we confirmed in [NYSEG], the provisions of section 292.304 allowing
long-term fixed rate contracts for QFs - 'lock-ins'... mean what they say... in promulgating the
regulations, we expressly considered and rejected the argument now made by West Penn that
changed circumstances would require resetting of established rates to match the latest avoided
cost determinations.").
Moreover, the Commission's requirement of frequent review of avoided costs for QFs,
consistent with the time period for reviewing utility costs in IRP and rate cases, directly
contradicts Congress and FERC's decision that QFs should not be subjected to the same type of
periodic cost-of-service reviews as regulated utilities. 45 Fed. Pteg.12214,12222 (Feb. 25,
1930) (quoting Conf. Report on H.R. 4016,H. Rep. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)).
The fact that the Commission's Order No. 33357 intends to limit a QF's right to long-
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calculations, attempts to impose this Commission's policy preferences over those of FERC
means that this Commission exceeded its jurisdiction. See e.g., Windham Solar LLC,l57 FERC
61,134l|fl 5-6 and n.7 (2016) (rejecting a state rule effectively precluding the QF from obtaining
a long-term avoided cost determination and, instead, forcing the QF to accept short-term, real-
time, pricing rates). Attempts to undo policy decisions made by FERC-rather than
implementing FERC's policy decisions-exceeds the Commission's jurisdiction and authority.
Cf Tri-State Generation and Transmission Assoc.,155 FERC n il,269 at lffl 17-19 (2016)
(finding that a decision ostensibly within the discretion of the utility, when intended to frustrate a
QF's rights set forth in a prior FERC order, violated PURPA); FLS Energ Inc.,l57 FERC fl
6I,211nn24-26 (frnding Montana Commission's policy, while not explicitly prohibited by
FERC rules, nevertheless violated PURPA because it indirectly achieved what the state is
prohibited from doing directly).
Because Order No. 33357 exceeded the Commission's jurisdiction and authority, the
Commission should not seek to extend it to battery storage QFs larger than 100 kW. Rather, it
should open a new proceeding and revise or revoke Order No. 33357.
2. Order No.33357 Denies QFs Their Right Under PURPA To A
Contract or Enforceable Obligation With Avoided Costs
Predetermined Over A Sufficient Period of Time To Allow Projects
To Be Financed and Viable.
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FERC rules providing QFs the right to sell to a utility based on long-term avoided cost
rates determined before a QF project is built recognize that QFs must be able to evaluate the
financial feasibility of their project with reasonable certainty, which requires estimating the
expected returns based on the known price that the utility will pay. 45 Fed. Reg. at 12,218,
12,224. Therefore, while long-term, locked-in, avoided cost rates impose a risk on utilities that
future electricity costs may be less than the long-term rate projected at the time the QF was
developed, FERC nevertheless found such long-term avoided cost rates to be in the public
interest because PURPA was intended to promote altemative generation from QFs, which
requireslong-termpricecertainty. NYSEG,71 FERC6I,027,*14-*16andfn.49-50(rejecting
argument that long-term avoided costs must be limited or redetermined based on short-term,
time-of delivery avoided costs, citing the regulation's intent to balance avoided cost accuracy
with "the need for [QFs] to be able to enter into contractual commitments based, by necessity, on
estimates of future avoided costs." (quoting 45 Fed. Re5.12,214,12,224 (Feb. 5, 1980). FERC
has recently confirmed that QFs are entitled to a long-term avoided cost contract sufficiently
long to allow it a reasonable opportunity to attract capital to be viable.
[T]he Commission has long held that its regulations pertaining to legally enforceable
obligations 'are intended to reconcile the requirement that the rates for purchases equal to
the utilities' avoided cost with the need for qualiffing facilities to be able to enter into
contractual commitments, by necessity, on estimates of future avoided costs' and has
explicitly agreed with previous commenters that 'stressed the need for certainty with
regard to return on investment in new technologies.' Given the 'need for certainty with
regard to return on investment' coupled with Congress' directive that the Commission
'encourage' QFs, a legally enforceable obligation should be long enough to allow QFs
reasonable opportunities to attract capital from potential investors.
Windham Solar LLC and Allco Finance Ltd.,157 FERC 61,134 fl 8 (Nov. 22,2016) (quoting
Order No. 69, FERC Stats. & Regs. fl 30,128 at 30,880; 16 U.S.C. $ 824a-3(a); 18 C.F.R. $
2e2.304(d)(2)).
IPC-E-17-01
Comments of Sierra Club and Idaho Conservation League
Page 15
April27,2016
FERC was clear inits Wtndham Solar order that FERC's rules entitle QFs to contracts
that are at least long enough to allow QFs a reasonable opportunity to attract capital. Id.
FERC's determination that QFs must be provided the long-term income certainty needed to
make those project viable is consistent with Congress's intent in enacting PURPA to counteract
the reluctance of traditional utilities to purchase power from and sell to non-traditional facilities
and to remove financial barriers imposed upon alternative energy sources by state and federal
utility authorities. Indep. Energt Producers Ass'n,36 F.3d at 850 (citing FERC,456 U.S. at
750-51). This Commission must implement that determination by FERC. 16 U.S.C. $ 823a-3(f).
There is nothing in the record in this case to support a finding that two years is sufficient
time to allow a battery storage QF to attract capital. Therefore, even assuming that the
Commission has authority to restrict a QF's right under l8 C.F.R. 5 292.304(dx2xii) to two
years, it can still only do so after a finding (based on a record supporting it) that two years is
sufficient to allow a QF to attractthe capital needed to make the project viable. There is no such
evidence in this docket. Moreover, there was no such finding and no evidence to support such
finding in Docket IPC-E-I5-01 that wind and solar QFs can attract capital with a contract term of
only two years. The Commission cannot extend Order No. 33357 to battery storage QFs in this
docket and should open a new proceeding to revisit Order No. 33357.
A new proceeding to revisit Order No. 33357 would show that wind and solar QFs are
not viable with contracts of only two years. In fact, development in Idaho dropped off after the
Commission limited QFs' rights under l8 C.F.R. 5 292.304(dx2)(ii) to five and then two years.
As of January 20,2015, there were thirfy-six proposed solar PURPA projects in Idaho
proposing power purchase agreements to Idaho Power. Each was at least I MW and each
proposed a}0-year PPA. See Exhibit 3 of R. Allphin in Docket IPC-E-I5-01 (filed January 30,
IPC-E-17-01
Comments of Sierra Club and Idaho Conservation League
Page 16
April27,2016
2015) (attached hereto as Exhibit A). But after this Commission's February 6,2015, Order No.
33222, which limited wind and solar QFs larger than 100 kW to five year contracts on an interim
basis, effective February 5,2015, and Order 33357 further limiting those QFs to two years, not a
single one of the proposed QFs obtained a contract with Idaho Power. See IPC Resp. to SC/ICL
Data Req. 1.3 (attached hereto as Exhibit B). The limited contract term is the only change that
this drop off can be attributed to. Notably, all thirty-six proposed solar projects as of January 20,
2015, post-date Order No. 32176, which limited published avoided cost rates to solar projects
under 100 kW. Therefore, the drop off cannot be attributed to the lower avoided costs provided
through the IRP methodology. Moreover, since the Commission limited QFs to five year
contracts on February 5,2015, and then two year contracts in August, 2015, no wind and only a
handful of solar QFs larger than 100 kW sought indicative pricing in Idaho and none progressed
to a contract. See IPC Resp. to SC/ICL Data Req. 1.6 (Exhibit 86). However, other QFs not
subject to the two-year maximum contract-a hydro and a biomass project--did progress to a
contract. [d.
That the two-year contract limit is responsible for making wind and solar QF
development infeasible in Idaho can also be seen by comparing Idaho to other states in the region
that rejected utility requests to make similar dramatic contract term reductions and QFs have
continued to develop projects. In Idaho Power's Oregon service territory, the Oregon
Commission did not limit QF's right to long-term contracts and also refused to deny solar QFs
smaller than 3 MW the benefit of a published avoided cost rates. Oregon Public Utilities
Commission, Docket UM 1725, Order 16-129 at 8 (Or.PUC March 29,2016); in Docket UM
6 Srhibit B contains only the non-confidential, redacted version of IPC's production request.
IPC-E-17-01 April27,20l6
Comments of Sierra Club and Idaho Conservation League
Page 17
1734,Order 16-130 at p. 8 (Or.PUC, March 29,2016). QFs have been developed and continue
to be developed in Oregon.
The Utah Public Service Commission rejected a request by PacifiCorp sister utility,
Rocky Mountain Power, to limit QF contract terms to three or five years. In the Mqtter of the
Application of Roclqt Mountain Powerfor Modification of Contract Term of PURPA Power
Purchase Agreements with Qualifiing Facilities, Docket No. 15-035-53 (January 7,2016). The
Utah Commission instead adopted a fifteen-year contract term. Consequently, solar QFs
continue to be able to finance and develop viable projects in Utah. According to Rocky
Mountain Power in Utah, there are approximately 50 potential projects representing over 2,200
MW of QF development in Utah. See In the Matter of: RoclE Mountain Power's Notice and
Request for Extension of Deadlines Related to Schedule 38, Removal from QF Pricing Queue.
Sections 1.8.9 and 1.8.10.e., Docket No. 17-035-13 (Utah Pub.Serv.Comm.); In the Matter of:
Roclqt Mountain Power's 2016 Avoided Cost Input Changes Quarterly Compliance Filing,
Docket No. 16-035-29, QF Queue & Partial Displacement Calculation, March 31,2017 (Utah
Pub.Serv.Comm.)
The Wyoming Commission also rejected requests to limit QF contract terms in that state
to only three years . In re Application of Roclqt Mountain Power for Modification of Contract
Term of PURPA Purchase Agreements with Qualifuing Facilities, Docket No. 20000-481-EA-15
(Record No. 14220), Mem. Opinion, Finding of Fact, Decision and Order (Wy.P.S.C. June 23
20t6). QF developers continue to build projects in Wyoming. See e.g.,In the Matter of the
Power Purchase Agreements between Roclcy Mountain Power and Boswell Springs, LLC,Docket
No. 14697 (Wy.Pub.Serv.Comm.) (80 MW QF Project PPA); In the Matter of the Contract
Filing of Roclgt Mountain Power, a Division of PacifiCorp, For a Purchase Power Agreement
IPC-E-17-01
Comments of Sierra Club and Idaho Conservation League
Page l8
April27,2016
with Sweetwater Solar, Inc.,Docket No. 14368 (Wy.Pub.Serv.Comm.) (80 MW solar QF Project
PPA).
Of those commissions asked in 2015 to limit QF contracts to two to five years, only
Idaho did so. And, only Idaho saw wind and solar QF development stop. This further confirms
that longer term contracts with prices known at the outset are necessary to allow QFs to develop
viable projects and limiting contracts to only two years of known avoided cost rates makes QF
project infeasible.
Conclusion
The Commission cannot use the declaratory ruling procedure in this case. Moreover, the
Commission cannot extend Order No. 33357 to battery storage QFs because that order exceeded
the Commission's jurisdiction. Even if the Commission had jurisdiction to limit QFs' rights
under 18 C.F.R. g 292.304(2xd)(ii), it cannot do so without first holding a hearing and making a
record that affected QF projects are viable with only two year contracts. For the same reasons,
the Commission should revisit Order No. 33357 for wind and solar projects.
Respectfully submitted on April 27, 2017.
/s/ David C. Bender
David Bender
Earthjustice
3916 Nakoma Road
Madison, WI 53711
ustice.org
M
Benjamin J Otto
Idaho Conservation League
710 N 6th St.
Boise,ID 83701
botto @ idahoconservation. or g
IPC-E-17-01
Comments of Sierra Club and Idaho Conservation League
Page 19
April2T , 2016
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifu that on thrs2Tth day of April20l6,I delivered true and correct
copies of the foregoing COMMENTS to the following persons via the method of service noted
Hand deliverv:
Jean Jewell
Commission Secretary
Idaho Public Utilities Commission
427 W. Washington St.
Boise,ID 83702-5983
(Original and seven copies provided)
Electronic Mail:
Donovan Walker, Lead Counsel
Idaho Power Company
P.O. Box 70
Boise,Idaho 83707
dwalker@idahopoer. com
dockets@idahopower. com
Brian Lynch
Black Mesa Energy LLC
Po Box 2731
Palos Verdes, CA940274
[e-mail]
Pater J Richardson
Richardson Adams PLLC
515 N 27m St
Boise,ID 83702
[e-mail]
David Bender
Earttrjustice
3916 Nakoma Rd
Madison, WI 53711
dbender@earthj ustice. org
Benjamin J Otto
Idaho Conservation League
710 N 6ft St.,
Boise,lD 83702
botto @idahoconservation. org
amin J. Otto
Exhibit A
BEFORE THE
IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
cAsE NO. IPG-E-I5-01
IDAHO POWER COMPANY
ALLPHIN, DI
TESTIMONY
EXHIBIT NO.3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
72
13
L4
15
16
t7
18
19
zo
7!
22
21
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
E ho Pomrcomp.ny
Propor.d PURPA SoLr - & of ,enu.ry 20, m15
ldeho
Project Iame Proiect Deuelopcr MWac Term
(Yearc)State
E{timstcd
Ope6tlon
ll.i.
E3tlmated Oblltatlon
(includes integration)
Ertlmat.d 2 Yrat
OUlgatlon (lncludes
16t.ratl.nl
Projecl A1 Developer A 80 20 ldaho ruolh6 st94,O97,771 59,903,s6s
Proiect 42 Developer A 28 20 ldaho t2lorlt6 s67,354,580 s3,418,565
Proiect A3 Developer A 30 20 ldaho rzl3ut6 ss8,538,038 S2,s61,sr2
Proiect A4 Developer A 30 20 ldaho 12l3rh6 ss7,091,198 s2,435,zLO
Proiect 81 Developer B 20 zo ldaho ro/3olt6 s48,1U,629 s2,441,832
Pro.iect 82 Developer B 20 20 ldaho 10/30/r6 S47,758,118 S2,413,450
Project Cl Developer C 20 20 ldaho 12l3rlt6 ss3.382,245 s2,318,923
Project C2 Developer C 20 20 ldaho t2l3rh6 ss3,283,030 52,137,229
Proiect C3 Developer C 20 20 ldaho t2l3rh6 s49,203,964 s2,1s0,196
Project C4 Developer C 20 20 ldaho L2l3Lh6 s49,350,962 S2,148,ss8
Proiect C5 Developer C zo 20 ldaho t2l3rh6 s48,760,343 s2,084,543
Proiect C6 Developer C 20 20 ldaho 72l3tlt5 s51,485,s58 s2,208,705
Pro,ect C7 Developer C 20 z0 ldaho t2l3th6 s51,493,788 52,178,763
Proiect C8 Developer C 70 20 ldaho tzl3ut6 s51,3s5,245 s2,169,s41
Proiect Cg Developer C 20 20 ldaho 12l3tlL6 s51,797,624 s2,1iA,386
Proiect C10 Developer C 20 z0 ldaho 12l3th6 s48,438,230 s2,048,049
Proiect Dl Developer D 6 20 ldaho plsrlL6 s13,4s0,419 s652,511
Proiect DZ Developer D 7.5 20 ldQho 12l3L/16 S16,8r3,024 5815,639
Pro,ect D3 Developer D 10 20 ldaho t2l3rlL6 s2?,4t7,366 s1,087,s19
Proiect D4 Developer D 10 z0 ldaho L2l3th5 522,417,366 s1,087,519
Proiect E1 Developer E 13 2A ldaho !2l}tlt6 s?:9,L42,s75 s1,413,r,5
Project E2 Developer E 20 20 ldaho 12/3th6 s44,834,73r s2,17s,038
Poect E3 Developer E 13 20 ldaho ]2l3llrs $29,t42,575 sr,4t3,775
Project E4 Developer E 20 20 ldaho 12131116 s44,O77,867 s2,113,543
Project E5 oeveloper E 20 20 ldaho t2l3rl15 543,264,238 s2,047,3L7
Project Eo Developer E 20 20 ldaho r2l7ut6 s43,764,23A 52,047,377
Proiect E7 Developer E 20 20 ldaho r2l3LlL6 s43,264,8e 52,A47,3L7
Project E8 Developer E 20 20 ldaho nlsrlrs 543,264,238 52,U7,3L7
Project E9 Developer E 20 20 ldaho L2l3Ll16 s42,3s6,002 5r,972,s77
Project E10 Developer E 20 20 ldaho Lzl3rl16 s4t,372,O78 91,893,106
Project El1 Oeveloper E 20 20 ldaho t2l3th6 s41,372,078 s1,893,106
Prorect El2 Developer E 13 20 ldaho t2l3Ut6 s26,891,8s1 s1,230,s19
Project Fl Developer F 70 20 ldaho t2l3th6 s138,908,195 55,14s,735
Projest 61 Developer G 3 20 ldaho r2l3Ut6 ss,863,804 s2s6,151
Proiect H1 Developer H 1 20 ldaho r2l3il16 51,818,839 s74,315
Project l1 Developer I 20 20 ldaho tzl3LlL6 536,376,776 5L,4f,6,292
Subtotal 75s s1,711,94L939 sr8,862s15
Exhibit No. 3
Case No. IPC-E-15-01
R. Allphin, IPC
Page 1 of2
1?
38
39
40
4L
42
43
44
45
46
47
rl8
Subtotal
Total
130 5390,547,080 921,74t,148
885 5a102,489,019 s103,508,5er
Exhibit No. 3
Case No. IPC-E-15-01
R. Allphin, IPC
Page2ol2
ldrho PowrCompany
PropGld PURPASoLT -& of Jrnuary Zl, 20ilt
Oraron
Project Name ProJest Developct MWAC Term
(Years)State
Schcduled
Opcrctlon
Dat.
E3timat.d obli8etbn
(lndudes lntefationl
E3tlmatcd 2 Yeal
ObliSatlon (lnclude.
lnt.rEtlonl
Proiect Jl Developer,10 20 Oregon 06.lLsh6 s30,282,970 s2,004,849
Project 813 Developer E 20 20 Oregon tzl3LlL6 54L,372,078 s1,893,r06
Pro,ect K1 Developer K 10 20 Oregon r2l3,'/16 s31,889,203 s2,084,319
Project K2 Developer K l0 zo OreSon ru3il16 s31,889,203 s2,084,319
Pro,iect K3 Oeveloper K 10 zo Oregon 12l3llrs s31,889,203 s2,084,319
Project K4 Developer K 10 zo Oregon pl\lL6 531,889,203 52,084,319
Project K5 Developer K 10 2A Oregon tzl3LlL6 531,889,203 s2,08431e
Proiect Ko Developer K 10 20 OreBon r2l3th6 53r,889,203 s2,084,319
Pro,ect X7 Oeveloper K 10 20 Oregon L2l3th6 s31,889,203 s2,084,319
Proiect K8 Developer K 10 20 Oregon L2l3th6 s31,889,203 s2,084,319
Proiect K9 Developer K 10 20 Oregon LZl3!h6 s31,889,203 52,084319
Proiect K10 Developer K 10 20 Oregon L2l3rl16 s3r,889,203 s2,08431e
DONOVAN E. WALKER (lSB No. 5921)
ldaho Power Company
1221 West ldaho Street (83702)
P.O. Box 70
Boise, ldaho 83707
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
dwalker@ idahopower.com
Attorney for ldaho Power Company
BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF
IDAHO POWER COMPANY FOR A
DECLARATORY ORDER REGARDING
PROPER CONTRACT TERMS,
CONDITIONS, AND AVOIDED COST
PRICING FOR BATTERY STORAGE
FACILITIES
Exhibit B
CASE NO. |PC-E-17-01
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S
REDACTED RESPONSE TO THE
FIRST SET OF DATA REQUESTS
OF THE IDAHO CONSERVATION
LEAGUE AND THE SIERRA CLUB
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
COMES NOW, ldaho Power Company ("ldaho Power" or "Company'), and in
response to the First Set of Data Requests of the ldaho Conservation League and the
Sierra Club to ldaho Power Company dated April 4, 2A17, herewith submits the
following information :
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S REDACTED RESPONSE TO THE FIRST SET OF DATA
REQUESTS OF THE IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE AND THE SIERRA CLUB - 1
REQUEST NO. 1.3: For each of the projects identified in Allphin Exhibit 3 filed in
Docket No. IPC-E-I5-01, please state the current status of the project, including but,not
limited to:
(1) whether the project proponent obtained a contract or legally enforceable
obligation;
(2) the date of the contracl or legally enforceable obligation; and
(3) The date on which the project either first produced electricity transferred to
ldaho Power or is projected to first produce electricity to transfer to ldaho Power.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1.3:
(1) None of the proposed projects that were the subject of Allphin Exhibit No.
3 obtained an ESA with ldaho Power.
(2) N/4.
(3) N/4.
The response to this Request is sponsored by Michael Darrington, Energy
Contracts Leader, ldaho Power Company.
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S REDACTED RESPONSE TO THE FIRST SET OF DATA
REQUESTS OF THE IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE AND THE SIERRA CLUB.5
REQUEST NO. 1.6: Please provide the following:
(1) Each potential QF that has requested an energy sales agreement since
February 5,2015;
(2) The fuel or generation source for each potential QF that requested an
energy sales agreement since February 5, 2015;
(3) The nameplate generation size of each potential QF that requested an
energy sales agreement since February 5, 2015;
(4) Each potential QF that submitted a written request for indicative pricing
since February 5, 2015;
(5) The fuel or generation source for each potential QF that submitted a
written request for indicative pricing since February 5, 2015;
(6) The nameplate generation size of each potential QF that submitted a
written request for indicative pricing since February 5,2015;
(7\ Each potential QF that has requested an energy sales agreement since
August 20,2015;
(8) The fuel or generation source for each potential QF that requested an
energy sales agreement since August 20,2015;
(9) The nameplate generation size of each potential QF that requested an
energy sales agreement since August 20,2015;
(10) Each potential QF that submitted a written request for indicative pricing
since August 20,2015;
-(11)-The fuel or generatr-on sourcd for-reac-h-Folenaia-f QF-th-at-subrn-tted a-
written request for indicative pricing since August 20, 2015;
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S REDACTED RESPONSE TO THE FIRST SET OF DATA
REQUESTS OF THE IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE AND THE SIERRA CLUB.9
(12) The nameplate generation size of each potential QF that submitted a
written request for indicative pricing since August 20,2015; and
(13) The approximate location of each QF identified in response to subparts
1-12, above.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1.6: The table below lists the projects that have
submitted either a Schedule 73 (ldaho) or Schedule 85 (Oregon) QF ESA Application
('Application"), arranged by date the Application was deemed complete. Projects
identified by name executed an ESA with ldaho Power that was filed with the applicable
state's public utilities commission. Allothers remain confidential.
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S REDACTED RESPONSE TO THE FIRST SET OF DATA
REOUESTS OF THE IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE AND THE SIERRA CLUB - 1O
Project Name or
C onfi d ential Ide ntifrer
Date Schedule 73 or
Schedule 85 Application
Received, Including
Request for an
Indicative Pricing
Prooosal
Date of
Request for
Draft
Energr Sales
Agreement
Facility
Type Location Nameplate
(Mw)
Proiect D5 211712015 N/A Solar Idaho 10.00
Proiect D6 2/17n0t5 N/A Solar Idaho 10.00
Proiect D4 31212015 N/A Solar Idaho 10.00
Proioct D3 3Dn0t5 N/A Solar Idaho 10.00
Baker Citv Hydro 3/sl20t5 31512015 Hydro Oreqon 0.24
Proiect D2 3t20l20ts N/A Solar Idaho 7.50
Proiect Dl 3t20120r5 NIA Solar Idaho 6.00
Project Ml 4l7Dol5 412712075 Solar Oreson 5.00
Malheur River Solar 4/7l20ts 4127l20ts Solar Oregon 10.00
Olds Ferry Solar 4l7DAts 4127l20ts Solar Oregon 5.00
Project M5 4nntts 412712015 Solar Oregon 10.00
Project M6 4/7/2015 4127l20rs Solar Orecon 10.00
Arcadia Solar 4lt6t20t5 711412015 Solar Oregon 5.00
Little Valley 4l2',il2015 7lr4l20t5 Solar Oregon 10.00
Jamieson Solar 4127l20ts 7/1412015 Solar Oregon 4.00
EvergJeen Solar 412'il201s 7tr4l20ts Solar Oregon 10.00
Moores Hollow Solar 4127l20ts 711412015 Solar Oregon 10.00
John Day Solar 4t27/20ts 7lt4/2015 Solar Oregon s.00
Project N2 412712015 N/A Solar Oregon 10.00
Project Ql 412712015 7lt4l20rs Solar Oregon 5.00
Project Q2 412712015 7lt4nus Solar Oreqon 5.00
Fairway 5/612015 4127D015 Solar Oreqon 10.00
North Goodine Main 5lt6120rs slt6l2015 Hydro Idaho t.22
Proiect Rl 6ltsl20ts N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proiect R2 6lt5/2015 N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proiect R3 611s/201s N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proieot R4 6ltsl201s N/A Solar ldaho 0.10
Proiect R5 6lts12015 N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proiect R6 6lt5l20t5 N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proiect R7 611512015 N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proiect R8 6lt5t20t5 N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proiect R9 611512015 N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proieot Rl0 6115t2015 N/A Solar Idaho 0.10
Proiect Sl 813112015 N/A Solar Idaho 16.00
Project T1 9lts/201s t0/29t201s Solar Oregon 10.00
Proiect Ul 613120t6 71712016 Solar Idaho 20.00
Proiect U2 613Dvt6 7l'il2016 Solar Idaho 20.00
Proiect U3 6Bn0t6 71712016 Solar Idaho 20.00
Proiect U4 61312016 717/2016 Solar Idaho 20.00
Brush Solar 712712016 712U2016 Solar Oreson 2.75
Vale I Solar 7121t20r6 7/2u2016 Solar Oregon 3.00
Morgan Solar 815nDrc 81512016 Solar Oregon 3.00
SISW LFGE 8lrU20t6 tt/1712016 Biomass Idaho s.00
Project T5 tt/212016 1lrU20t7 Solar Oregon 15.00
The response to this Request is sponsored by Michael Darrington, Energy
Contracts Leader, ldaho Power Company.
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S REDACTED RESPONSE TO THE FIRST SET OF DATA
REQUESTS OF THE IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE AND THE SIERRA CLUB. 11