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HomeMy WebLinkAbout20120301Comments.pdfBenjamin J. Otto (ISB No. 8292) 710 N 6th Street Boise,ID 83701 Ph: (208) 345-6933 x 12 Fax: (208)' 344-0344 bottoCPidaoconservtion.org R~, r-CEI\IFO.... J l',._ 2312 MAR -I PH 4: 25 Attorney for the Idao Conservtion Le . " BEFORE TH IDAHb PUBUC UTITIS COMMISSION IN TH MATrROF TH ) APPUCA TION OF IDAHO POWER ) COMPANY FOR AUTORIl TO ) CONVRT SCHEDUL 54-FID ) COST ADJU~TMENT.FROM A PILT ) SCHEDULE TO ANONGOING, ) PERMANENT SCHEDULE ) CASE NO. IPC-E-ll-19 COMMENTS OF TH IDAHO CONSERVATION LEGUE The Idao Conservtion League (ICt) urges the Commission to make the Fixed Cos Adjustment (FCA) permanent. The basic premise of the FCA-to remov a dicentive to promote energ conservtion leadig to forgone recovery of approved fixed cosremais unchanged 1 Durg the pilot stakeholders debated which causs of changig ener consumption the mechanism should capture. 2 Maitaiing the curnt FCA, which captur al non-wether related changes in consumption, best aligns the utiltys financial intere with ratepyets intere in controlling energ bils. Algning thes interests wi help dose the gap between cunt achievements in energ efficiency and the vat untappd economic potential avaable in Idao. Introducton Durg the FCA'pilot, vaous paries have rad a host of isue regadig both the mechanics and the policy underpinnings of the FCA.3 The Compay and Staff have relved r See Order 30267 at 13, IPC-E-04-15, (Initiating the FCA pilot)(Mar 12, 2007); Order 32251, IPC-E-ll-03, (FCA Rates for 20ll - 2012).2 See Order 31063, IPC-E-09-28, (convert the FCA from pilot to permanent)(Mar 23,2010). 3 See Order 31063,'IPC-E-09-28, (Idao Power request to conver the FCA frm pilot to peranent statu)(April 29, 2010). ICL Comments IPC-E-ll":J9 1 Marh 1,2012 some isue su as usg the mos cunt numerica inputs to caculate the rate and whether to alocte the FCA rae to the afeced cl setely or individuay! The prar unresolved issue is whether the FCA should continue to capture forgne fixed costs due to al non-weather related factors that effect consuption, or be liited to facors dily attributable to, Idao Power's activities. Durg the püot period the PUC staff, ICL, and othrs have strued with now to address the fact the cunt FC captur chage in fixed coss reovery beyond Compay spnsored effciency efforts. 5 After reg mecisms that attempt to islate the impas to .fixed costs recovery of Compay spnsored efficiency efforts, ICL believ that ratepyers are better served by approvig the cunt FCA mechis. Th Washigton UTe's effort to islate the impacts of Compay spnsored effciency from other facors is grt example of how complex and contentious thi typ of mecis is Furher, a 2011 rert by the ACEEE debes how liiting the FCA to Compay spnsored pros reais the dicentive towads broader effciency efforts like buidig co and applice standads and do not addes tneutiltys incentive to incre saes' Instead of incrg complexity and crting a dicentive towads broad basd energ efficiency, ICL reommends the Commison maitai the cuent FCA. Capturg al non- weather related chge in energ consumption algns the utiltys fmanci interes with ratepayets interes in controlling energ bil and provides a vauable risk mitigtion tool that benefits shholders Below ICL explas how ratepayers ca sh in thes benefits. 4 See Staff Comments at 5. IPC-E-I0-07. (pCA Rates for 2010-201 I)(ay 6, 2010)(Staff support using the enery fore in the concuent PCA as opposed to either test year ,or lreing yea ener us data.); Or 31081 at 5, IPC-E-1O-07. (May 28.2010). .See Staff Comments at 5 - 6, IPC-E-0-28; ICL Comments at 8, IPC-E-09-28; ICL Comments at 5, IPC-E-IO-07 at 5, (pCA Rate for 2010 - 2011)(ay 5, 2010). 6 See ACEEE Balancing Interests: A Review of Lost Revenue Adjustment.MeclianÍ$1fs for Utilty Energ Effcienc Prams at 8 - I I. (Septembe 201 1 XAvailable at: htt://acee,.orWresearch- reportuII4).ICL Comments 2 Marh 1',2012 IPC-E-II-19 I. The Fied Co Adjustent in Context! Instead of recounting the ful hiory and mechaics of the FCA, fiv points se the stage for ICL's comments below. The FCA: (I) is one pa of a larr regatory struur; (2) algns i reguation ~th the Commission policy to broadly support energ conservtion; (3) foc the utilty on ~öntroUig,costs; (4) limits utilty cost recovery to approved fixed coss; and (5) rewds ratepayers wha.increas their energ efficiency. Becaus ratepayers benefit from each of thes features, the Commision should continue the curent FCA. TheF(JAis one par of a larr regatory structure necess to levl the playig field for demand side and supply side resurces. As long as Idao Power collects a portion of fixed costs through volumetric rates, they face a structur diincentiv to pur actua reducions in consumption reges of the caus Allowig the utilty to collect forgone fixed costs due to changes in, constiption merely remove thi disincentiv. But the FCA doe not, and canot, address other issues that provide a positive incentive to grow the utilty rate ba, pricipay the abilty to ear a retur on capital invetment.7 The Commission ca better control utilty capital investment tmough Iiitegrted resurce planning, rate caes and certificate of public convenience proceedings.,.Proviclgapositive incentive for demand side resource on pa with supply side ., 'f.'.:; . I. ,.' resources ra different issues that are best hadled throug other proceedigs for example the Idao Powerpemand Side Resource proposa approved in IPC.E-IO-27. Th FCA is a nece, but not sufficient, means to level the playing field. The FCA is an important tool to enact the stated policy of thi Commision-to "digen tly and vigorously pur al avaable, cost effective DSM, conservtion, and pricig options that cauldpotentialy diplace or defer the need for additional futur peakg 7 Reguatory Assisance Project, Revenue Regulation and Decopling: A Guie to Theor and Applicationat~6,(June 201 I) (explaiing the Averch Johnson effect is real and is best managedthroug "sound integted resurce planning that identifies the lea-cost long-term acquition strategy(. ) ")(Avable at: http://bit.ly/RAPdecouple). iICL Comments 3 Marh I, 2012 IPC-E-II-19 : generation.'" Traditional reation miss incentiV with thi poli go. Th FC aligns reguation with thi go by reovig a struur dicentiv whe maitaiingtheabitty to establish consumption basd price sial Th Retory Asance Projec (RAP) revewed severa alternatives to trational retion and conclud "Some of thes provide nealy the sae benefits to utilty shholders as deuplig, but al of them fal short of the ful rage of benefits that renue decoupg prvide paicuytho for consuers and th~ envionment. '" There ar two ba options to remove the struur dicentive created bytraditional regation - regning rates or instituting a trag mechais. Rates could be redesigned to separte fixed and vale ch so caed straght fixed/vaable rates Idåo.Powér.calculates that fixed cos reprent 71.7% of the total reenue reuiement for the resntia clas and 79.0% of the smal commerc cl10 As a ret, under a straght fixedvale rate scheme the fixed cha would dwa the volumetric ch leavig ratepayers with a very wea consumption basd price signal. Wea consuption bas price signal hider the Commisson's diective to pur pricing options that dilace or defer new genetltion sourcesll Accrdigly, ICL and the PUC Staf have consiently oppod movig in thi diion by steeply rag the fixed cutomer cha for the redentia cla. The other option is to institute a trag mechais that wi tru up any difference between the fixed cos authorid by the Commison and those actuaytonected1:rythe utilty. , 8 Order 30201 at 12, IPC-E-06-o9, Evand Andre CPCN (Decembe 15,2006); Order 32426 at 21, IPC-E-I1-D8, Idaho Power Geneal Rate Case (Decmber 30, 2011)("Wecontinue our commitment that the Compay should pur al cost-effecive energefficiencies.")9 RAP at 41; See also NARUC Decouplingfor Electric and Gas Utilties:FrequentlyAsked Questions at 4, (2007) ("Furhermore, as did abve, there are other method that remove the througput dicentive, althoug reenue decoupling may be balce the removal of utilty dincentives to energ effciency whie prervg cuomer incentives to deploy energ efficien .". 10 II See Order 30201 at 12. ICL Comments IPC-E-11-19 4 Marh 1,2012 Whe more complex than a straght fixed/variable rate, this option alows for a strong consumption' basd price signal whe providig the utilty with a better opprtunity to reover its approved fixed costS.12 These benefits outweigh the complexity of the FCA. TheFCA ~. focus the Company squaely on controlling costs. Under traditional reguation, the utilty ca increas revenue in three ways cut costs, add customers or increas saes. The FCA removes Idao Power's abilty to increa reenue by increasing saes beus the true up mech.wisnlretums to customers any fixed cost revenue that exceeds the authonzed amount. In~ea~~,tht utilty can only increas revnue by increasing customers or cutting costs.13 Since new customers nrig their own new cøs, the single best way to increas renue is to cut cost. Cutting cost to improve effciency of aperations is in the interes of ratepyers and shaeholders but cutting cost by reducing qúaty of servce is a potential pitfal of the cost minimiztion objective. Fortunately, recent quaity of servce results for the Compay indicate that the FCA mechanism has not diinished quaty of servce, but the Commision is wi to continue monitorig quaity of servce as a çomplement to implementing the FCA mechaism. Theriechanics of the FCA are workig as intended, providig surhar when consumption declines and credits when consumption increass. As a result, the FCA ensur , Idaho Powercòllects the revenue approved by the Commision, no more and no les Without the FCA IdaøPo-wercan' over collect fixed costs merely by increasing saes By liiting reovery to '" approved riXe4cQsts,'the FCA diectly beneUts ratepayers. The FCA rewards ratepayers who become more efficient. If overa energ consumption increass thedFCAprovides a credit to customers but their bils increas as they buy more energ. If consumption declies the FCA leads to a surchar, but only up to the approve fied costs. Customer bils should remai stable or declie becaus payig for les energ offsets the surchare. 12 See NARUC at 4~ 13 See NARÚG~t 9; RAP.at 45 - 46. ICL Comments IPC-E-l1-19 5 Marh 1,2012 And, to the extent cusomers increas their effciency, their bils declie evn more. Under this scheme, the FCA rewa the effcient ratepayer more tha the inefficient. Th is goo public policy as long as al ratepyers have the opprtunity to beome more efficient and thereby reduce total bils. Tody ratepayers have more opportunities to p~icipate in efficiency progrs than before. Since the adoption of the FC pilot Idao Power ha expade the suteoferierg efficiency progrs for redential cuomers from sen prs to twelve.14 .Over this same time, the portion of total energ savigs from Compay progrs attributable to the resdential sector grew from 13.65% to 22.84%.15 Ratepayets abilty to control their energ use only increaes when Idao Power supports other conservtion mea like buidig ,codes appliance standa eduction prs, financig mechaisms, and supportive tax policy. The Commision ca algn the utiltys financi interest with the ratepyets intere in controlling energ bil by continuig the curnt FCA that captut al poble ways in which a utilty ca foser or hide reucions in energ consumption. II. The FCA Beefts Ratepers By Alning Utity Incenties and MitigatgRi The FCA ca dicty benefit ratepayers in two priar ways. Fir~ Iëtepyets 'benefit when the utiltys fmancia interets algns with ratepayer's intere in controlling energ bils. Th benefit comes from both incred utilty spnsored progrs as well as ihcomplementar public policies and pros. Second, in the eyes of invesors the FCA is a risk mitigation tool that ca reduce the revenue volatilty ri to the Compay ledig to a lower over revenue 14 Idaho Power 2007 DSM Repor at 10 (March 2008); Idaho Power 2010 DSM Report at .18 (March 2011).IS ld.. at 55-56 (Showig tota savigs of 91,145,000 kwh and residential savigsòf12.440,682 kwh); ld.. at 129-130 (Showig total savigs of 187,626,344 kwh and resdentia savigs of 42,850,839 kw). .. ~arh:l,2012ICL Comments IP-E-II-I9 6 requiementførratePayers16 As the FCA çatures more factors that influence ener" , :.'.., consumption, it fosters both benefits by removig the diincentive towads broad bas efficiency efforts ann by increasing the mechanis's vaue as a nsk mitigation tooL For thes reasons, a robust FCA best serv the public interest. Upon initiating the pilot the Commision stated: "Te annua FCA true-up mechanism asures a more stable utilty recovery of fixed costs that are now recovered in the energ rate componentf.i~'17 A: recent treatise by the Reguatory Assisance Project (RAP) considered thi revenue stabilizing feature and explais the potential benefits to ratepayers as "Econ~mic theory supports the notion that risk mitigation is vauable to inveors andth~t tliatVaue wi (eventuay) be revealed in some way in the market- .'¡ throug a lo;wef cost of equity, a lower cost of debt, or a lower requi equity" ' capitalizatiön ratio. Any of these wi eventuay produce lower rates for consamers, in retur for the nsk mitigation measure.n18 Whe the treatise cites each element of rik-cos of equity, cost of debt, and capital structure-RAP concludes that the diference is in the timing. Investors may take year to recognize the benefits of risk mitigation thrug lower costs of equity or debt. Meawhie the Commission ca limediately reduce the equity ratio without disturing the utiltys authoried" ' rate of retur¡andtherebydeliver immediate brnefts to ratepaye RAP explais the underlyig theory as: "Byreduclng volatilty, the utilty needs les equity to provide the sae asurce that bond covera~ratios and other fmancial requiements wi be met."19 ICL ages with RAP that, 16 RA at 3'i;: NARUC,at 9 ("As noted before, decouplig ca reduc risk for the utilty byensurg that its revnues and retur on investment remai stable. A lower ri-profie should make the cost of capital lower for the utilty. ' For investors, this ca be realizd thrug an increase in the utilty's debt/equity ratio, a decrease in the reur on equity, improve debt ratings and creditrequ.ements. "). 17 Order 30267' at 13, IPC-E-04-I5.IS RA at 39; NARUC at 9. 19 RA at 39. .; ICL Comments IPC-E-II-19 7 Marh 1,2012 in contra to reucg the retur on equity, reducing the equity ratio: "is more diectly reflective of the nsk mitigation that decouplig actuay provide - that is stabiltion of earings with respct to factors bend the utiltys control."io Indudig all non-weather related chges in consuption in the FCAremöves the disincentive towa broad bad energ effciency and maximiz its vaue as a ns,mitigation tool. Mr. Cavaag and Mr. Youngblood both refer to the reduced revnue volatilty as a benefit to the Compay of the FCA.21 The Commision ca sh thi vaue with ratepayers by reducing Idao Power's ratio of equity to debt to reflect thi reduced ri. The Commision can. accomplish thi by orderig Ida Power to ise debt rather tha equity for new capital or payig a dividend and replacig the equity with debt. III. Ratepers Beef if th FC Caures Al Non-Wea Reled Chges in Consumption Electing to addres the diincentive towads brod ba energ effciency thr~~ a trackig mechais is the fir step in creating a sound regtory scheme. Uke:ma$t,thigs in life, the dev is in the detai and the spifc design of a fixed cost trackigmechaispl is a prie example. Trackg mechaiss ca rage from "ful decouplig," which captures consumption chages reges of caus, to "limited deouplig." al know as lost revenue adjusments, which captures only spc caus of chgig consuption.22 Where a spcific mechaism falls withi thi rage depends on how retors dea with four priar factors that influence electncity consumption: (1) weather, (2) the number of cusomers, (3) the consumption patterns of individua cusomers and (4) economic conditions in the servce terrtory. Once a factor is included or exclud, the Commison mus examine whether additional retory actions are necess to addres chages is nsk alloction or to promote specific policy goa. Curently the 20 RA at 39.21 Cavanag Dirt at 4; Youngbloo Dirt at 12. 22 RA at 11 - 13; NARUC at 5. ICL Comments IPC-E-11-I9 8 Marh 1,2012 FCA exdudes weather related changes in consumption and includes the othe thr factors. Exdudig factors (rom the FCA works agast the public interes by faig to remov the utilty disincentive'iowad$ broad bad energ efficiency and reducing the vaue of the FCA as a risk mitigation tóol. Accordigly ICL recommends the Commission continue the curnt PeA as thei 'I.. ".. ¡',"¡,: : i best means to~gilthe utilty's fmancial interests with ratepayets interests in controllg energ bils. Weather: Deviations from the asumed weather patterns usd to set rates ca increas saes, due to extreme weather, or decrease sales, due to les extreme weather and consequently les heating and coolig lo~ds.When Idao Power initialy proposed the FCA they stated: "Te Compay historicaly has asumed riks asiated with weather-related change in saes we sek no chage in that risk alocation, which obviously does not afect the Company's incentiv to promote and invest in energy efficiency."23 Exdudig weather drven chages in consumption expo utilty and ratepayei:s"tothirisk.Weather normaltion methods mitigate this ri to some extent by smoothig out revenue volatilty between years. ICL supports exdudig weather from the FCA, which maitais historica rik alloctions mitigated throug weather normalizing metho Number of Customrs: Establishig rates requies asumptions about the number of cusomer on the syem in the future. If cusomer counts decline compared to the asumed levl the util recovers les revenue.l1Qwevr~ the utilty should alo incur les expense since the cuomer either remove or does not brig some of their fixed costs with them. On the other had, if cusomer counts increas the utRity could recover more renue, but they also incur more coss. Regadles Idao Power has little abiJtyto influence the number of customers on the syem. More importantly, I., , 23 Gale Direct,åt 10, IPC-E-04-15 (implementing the FCA pilot) (Janua 30, 200).ICL Comments 9 Marh 1,2012 IPC-E-11-19 the sheer number of cuomers ha no impact on overa energ efficiency. Instead,maximizing the efficiency of al cuomers reges of vitage, is the be way to achievthe Commission's goal of deferrg or dilacig more expesive supply side reures Durg the pilot period the Staff expred concern that new cusomerS have different consuption patterns tha exising cuomers 24 ICL sumits that it is not at al clear that new cusomers have a meaningfl dierence from exiing cuomers Whe ga spce heating is certainly on the ri so is centra ai conditioning. New homes ar buit to higher standads but tyicaly ar larr tha avera, meaing more spce to cool and light. Whe new cuSomers may trigger the need for lie extensions or other infraructur, the Commission. ca more directly addr this iss thrug the lie extension policy tha the FCA. Addtionållý, ifth~ Justification for treating new cusomers diferently is their lower cansuption tha average, tIi$o holds true for exising cusomers who beome more effcient. iiístead of addig complexity to the FCA by requig a sepate rate for new cuomers ICL submits a better approh is to requie reguar updates, such as every thid yea, to the cost of servce study inputs and resuts iid to calculate the FCA. Treating new cuomers the sae as exising cusomers avoids complexity and maximizes the benefits of the FCA by liiting dicentives and increasg the rik mitigation vaue. Conumti Patter of Indivual Custom: Idao Power ca influence on thi factor more tha any other. The Compay can influence consumption patterns diectly thrug DSM progrs and more broadly ~hrough mareting, eduction, and rate deigns. Idao Power ca also influence còinplementar state or federa policies suh as buidig codes, appliace standa fmancig mechånisi:s,~nd tax policy.2s Idao Power's "enhace commitment," made when the FCA pilot pro be, 24 Lobb Dirt at 8, IPC-E-0IS; Staff Comments at 8-9, IPC-E-9-28. 25 Whe chge in the ecnomy and wether ca also'. reduc individua energ consumption, the FC ca include or exclud the factors on a macro s,e instea of the individua sce. ICL Comments IPC-E-II-I9 10 March 1,2012 captures thes broader efforts.26 Regadles of the caus, reducing per capita consuption benefits ratepayers in the short term by reducing overa bil and in the long ru by avoidig expensive generation resources. Desite these benefits, the priar unresolved issue thi Commison faces is whethertheFCAshould continue to captur al non-weather related chage in consuption. Indudig only changes in consumption directly attributable to Compay progs often leads to contentious and complicated proceedigs. The Washigton UTC's cuent effort to develop andiipleinent mandated conservtion targets is a prie example. Typicay," "'!" ,.1' i stakeholders'c9mf'qrtwlththis factor decl,es along with the abilty to accurtely meaur the energ savigs. Capturg changes in consumption 4i.e to a utilty incented new furace is relatively eas tqnieasure and relatively uncontroversia. By contrat, chge attributable to conservtion minded rate designs ar had to measure and thus quite controveial To the extent the FCA excludes changes not dictly attributable to Company progrs, ratepaye mis the benefits of removig the disincentive towads broad energ conservtion efforts and the vaue of the FCA as a rik. mitigation tool. The Commission ca bet serve the public interest by capturg al non-weather related changes in consumption in the FCA. Doing so avoids expensive and contentious proceegs and removes Ida0Pnwer's disincentive towadsbroader efforts to conserv energ. With the Company, the~ebroade~ efforts include conservtion minded rate designs suc as the ye round three-tier rate applicable to residential customers. Excludig rate desgn drve chage in consumption from the FCA creates a disincentive to establish thes rates. Idao Power ca also influence complementar state policies that promote energ efficiency like buidig cod and tax policy. Whe Idao Power ca and should take a more active role in broadly promoting energ effciency, excludig thes revenue impacts from the FCA, or eliminating the mechais altogether, wiaider rather than bolster thi effort. 26 Order 30267 alB - 14, IPC-E-04-1S, (Approvig the FCA pilot pro)(March 12, 2007).ICL Comments 11 Marh 1,2012 IPC-E-II-19 The Commison ca incent Ida Power to pur their enhaced commitment more so tha tody. One option is to make a portion of the FCA revery at ri. For example, when Idao Power as to tru up acua revenue to authori renue, some amount of the forgone revenue, say 75%, could be asd with addtional amounts alowed dependig on,dtmonstrable step taken to enac the enhace commitment. Demonstrable steps could indude:a record of lobbyig efforts on applicale state and federa policies, conveing buidig code traing and enforcement seons for counties and cities incred eduction efforts,ard c1sigf.ingrates not jus to "sh usge to lower cost time period" but to reuce overa us.27 Høwever,this proposa adds additional complexity to the mechaism, and becaus the tru impact of these efforts is dicult to quatif, dedig on an approprite "at ri" amount is likely to be contentious Instead, the cunt FCA delivers more benefits ratepyers by reucing complexity, removig the disincentive for brod bad energ effciency, and maximizs the FCA's risk mitigation vaue. 'T Commision ca be serve ratepyers by approvig the curent FCA. Ecoom Conitio in the Servce Terrtor Th factor is the most controvers of the four. Lie weather conditions, the utilty ha little abilty to influence thi facor. Hisoricay, Idao Power ased the riSK ,of èconomy-.'.' i ':, ....,.,' i related chage in consuption. The FCA, in its curnt form, chages tlû, aloctiò4.However, thi chage is not inhently unfai or unjus and ca actuay benefit cusomers. Attempting to exclud economy-related chage in consumption is highy complex and doe not necesy benefit ratepyers Weather normalization method ca mitigatet~e impact of weather related chage in consumption and are a common featur of utiltyreation. But normaliztion method to exclude economy-related chages in consumption ar rae and highy 27 See Idao Power 2012 Time Varint Pring Implementati Plan at 2, IPC-E-12-o5, Tariff Advi 12-02 Tim Variant Pring Scheduls (Febru 22, 20 12)(ICL acknowledges that inverted bloc rates ca drve lower consuption not jus shiing of consumption. But the specifics of the time of us rates may or may not dr down consumption.) ICL Comments IP-E-II-I9 12 .Marh 1,2012 complex. Without the abilty to reduce revenue volatilty causd by economic conditions thug normalization, the utilty and ratepyers remai fuly expose to thi risk. Ths higher rik profie traslates into a higher overa renue requiment for ratepayers. Indnpïg economy-related chages in consumption in the FCA ca beefit both the utilty and ratepayers. A 2011 report by the ACEEE desribes how liiting the FCA to Compay sponsored progrs reais the disincentive to support broader effciency efforts like buidig codes and appliance standads and does not addres the utilty incentive to increa saes28 Because c~anges in economic conditions ca have a lar impact on consumption, includg this factor in the fCA,increases its vaue as a rik mitigation tool. Capturg al economic-related changes in energ consumption algns the utilty's fmancial interest with ratepayets intere in controlling en.ergbils and maximizes its vaue as a ri mitigation tool. Conclusion ICL ures the Commission to maitai the curent FCA. Induding al non-wether related changes in consumption benefits ratepayers becaus it is simple, limits the diincentive towards broad bas energ conservtion, and maximizes the mechanism's rik mitigation vaue. Ratepayers ca share the risk mitigation vaue of a robus FCA if the Commison reuces the ratio of equity to debt, which ((is more directly reflective of the risk mitigation that decouplig actuay provides - that is, stabiliztion of earings with respect to factors bend the utilty's control. "29 A robust FCA is the best means to align utilty incentive with the ratepyers interet in energ conservtion whie accomplishig the Coml1ÏSon's goal to ((digently and vigorously purue all avaable, cost'~ffective DSM, conservtion,:~d pricing options that could potentialy dilace or 28 See ACEEEBaiancing Interests: A Review of Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanisms for Utilty Energy Effcienc Programs at 8 - 11, (September 2011)(Available at: htt://aceee.org/reseach-reportuI14). 29 RA at 39. ' ICL Comments IPC-E-ll- I 9 13 Marh 1,2012 defer the need fot' newt and expensiv, generation resources. 30 For these rens, the Commission ca be serve ratepayers by makg the cunt FC a permaneiit mechaism. Refuly sumitted thi I-day of March, 20 II,&~ Benjamin Otto Idao Conservtion League 30 Ordr 30201 at 12, IPC~E-06-o9, Emnder Andrew CPCN (December 15, 2006); Order 32426 at 21, IPC-E-ll-oS, ldiho Power Geral Rate Case (Decmber 30, 201l)("We continue our commitment that the Compay shuld purue al cos-effecive energ effciencies.n) ICL Comments IPC-E-II-I9 14 Marh It 2012 CERTIFCATE OF SERVICE I hereby ceify that on this 1st day of Marh 2012, I deliver tre and co copies of the foregoing COMMNTS OF THE IDAHO CONSERVA nON LEAGUE to th followig via the methodof.$ervice noted: Jean Jewell Commission Secretar (Origial provided) Idao Public Utilties Commision 427 W. Washigton St. Boise, ID 83702.:5983 Electronic Mai Idaho Power Jasn B. Wilams Lisa D. Nordstrom Idao Power Company 1221 West Idao Street Boise, ida083 7()7-0070 jwiliams CPidaopower.com InordstromCPidaopower.com Michael J. Youngblood Zacha L. iìars. . Idao Po~erCoripany P.O. ox 70' ' " Boise, Idaoá3707 myoungblood€Pidaopo'wer.com zharsCPidaopower.c()m NWEC Nancy Hirsh NW Energ COalition 8ll 1st Ave., Suite 305 Seattle, WA 98104 Ph: (206) 621-0094 nancynwenergy.com Micron ,.. Richard E. · Malgren Sr. Asst. Genera Counsel Micron Technology~ Inc. 800 South Federa Way Boise. ID 837 t6 remalmgrenCPIpicron.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Thorvald A. Nelson Freerick J. Schmidt Holland & Har LLP 6800 South Fiddler Gree Cirle, Ste. 500 Greenwood Vilage, CO 801 I 1 Tnelson~hollandharcom fschmidt~ollandhar.com &~..~...... Benjamin J. Otto March 1,2012 Benjamin J. Otto (ISB No. 8292) 710 N 6di Stree Bois,ID 83701 Ph: (208) 345-6933 x 12 Fax: (208) 344-0344 bottoCPidaonservtion.org Attorney for the Ida Consetion le BEFORE TH IDAHO PUBIlC UT COMMISSION IN TH MATIR OF TH ) APPIlCATION OF IDAHO POWER ) COMPANY FOR AU1HORIl TO ) CONVRT SCHEuæ 54-AX ) COST ADJUSTENT-FROM A PILT ) SCHEDULE TO AN ONGOING, )PERMAENT SCHEDULE ) CASE NO. IPC-E-1l-19 COMMEN OF TH IDAHO CONSERVATION LEGUE,. ,:",.,. i Exit 1 Ida Power Compay Resnse to Sta Producton Reques ,14 ICL Exhibit I Mah 1, 2012 IDAHO POW COMPANY Development of Fixed Cost Adjultmnt Rate . 2011 Test Year, Table I ,Class Cost of Service Functionalized Costs Based UponGRC Settlement Stipulation .IPC.E.11..& . Filed September 23,2011 ICL Exhibit I March 1,2012 i