20060815final_order_no_30109.pdf

Office of the Secretary
Service Date
August 15 2006
BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF
MAGIC WIND LLC TO DETERMINE
EXEMPTION STATUS
ORDER NO. 30109
CASE NO. IPC-05-
MOTION TO DETERMINE EXEMPTION STATUS
On August 4, 2005, the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (Commission) in Case
No. IPC-05-, Order No. 29839, reduced the eligibility cap for avoided cost published rates
for non-firm wind projects from 10 aMW to 100 kW, required individual negotiation for larger
wind qualifying facilities (QFs), and established criteria for assessing QF contract entitlement.
Reference Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURP A). By Commission Order No.
29872 the date for grandfathering eligibility was changed from July 1 , 2004, the Notice of
Petition date, to August 4, 2005, the date ofInterlocutory Order No. 29839.
On October 20, 2005, Magic Wind LLC (Magic Wind) filed a Motion to Determine
Exemption Status seeking a Commission determination that Magic Wind was exempt from the
rate eligibility cap established in Order No. 29839. The Motion was accompanied by the
supporting affidavit of Armand Eckert.
On November 4, 2005, Idaho Power Company (Idaho Power; Company) filed a
response to Magic Wind's Motion contending that the Company was without sufficient
information to verify the truth or falsity of the factual allegations contained in the affidavit of
Armand Eckert and was therefore denying same and requesting that the Motion be denied.
Following Idaho Power s response, there was an informal stay of proceedings.
The Commission in this Order determines that Magic Wind qualifies for an
exemption from the rate eligibility cap established in Order No. 29839 for purposes of its
contract negotiations with Idaho Power.
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY ORDER
In Case Nos. IPC-04-8 and 04-, Order No. 29632, the Commission established a
90/110 performance band" requirement, a provision that defines the range of predictability
required for published rate eligibility. Under PURP A contracts submitted by Idaho Power and
ORDER NO. 30109
approved by the Commission, the prIce to be paid for energy purchases outside of the
performance band is equal to 85% of the Mid-Columbia (Mid-C) market index price for each
month. In Order No. 30000, Case No. P AC-05-9 (Schwendiman) the Commission approved
an alternate mechanism (PacifiCorp Method) for pricing energy deliveries that are outside the
90/110 performance band." The Schwendiman Agreement includes a computed set of fixed
rates (Non-Conforming Energy Purchase Prices) as a substitute for market-based rates.
On April 26, 2006, Magic Wind requested a Declaratory Order from the Commission
declaring that Magic Wind is entitled to receive from Idaho Power a Purchase Power Agreement
that uses a "Modified PacifiCorp Method" to establish fixed prices for surplus energy outside the
90/110% performance band.Reference Order. No. 30000, Case No. PAC-05-
(Schwendiman); Reference IDAPA 31.01.01.101 - Petition for Declaratory Order. The
Commission in this Order determines that Magic Wind is not entitled to a contract with fixed
prices for surplus energy outside the 90/110 performance band.
Under a proposed Agreement submitted by Magic Wind to Idaho Power on April 5
2006, Magic Wind submitted an Idaho Power template contract that was modified to include a
PacifiCorp Method establishing fixed prices for energy deliveries outside the 90/110
performance band, albeit proposing a different calculation of variable O&M expense (Modified
PacifiCorp Method). Magic Wind asserts that the Company has agreed that Magic Wind is
exempt from the rate eligibility cap of Order No. 29839.
Idaho Power by letter response dated April 25, 2006 states its belief that the draft
contract presented by Magic Wind on April 5, 2006 fails to acknowledge the role that market
prices play in determining the cost Idaho Power is likely to incur should the Magic Wind project
fail to perform in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. The change that Magic Wind
proposes, Idaho Power contends, eliminates consideration of market prices and the determination
of costs Idaho Power will incur if Magic Wind does not provide the monthly amount of energy it
agreed to provide. Idaho Power notes that the Commission Order No. 30000 stated it was not
precedential. Idaho Power concurs that Magic Wind is exempt from the rate eligibility cap of
Order No. 29839. Idaho Power contends that the Company has fully satisfied its mandatory
purchase obligation under PURPA by offering to purchase the generation from Magic Wind'
proposed wind farm by entering into a firm Energy Sales Agreement in the form previously
signed and tendered by Magic Wind on June 14 2005. Reference October 20 2005, Affidavit of
ORDER NO. 30109
Armand Eckert, p. 2.It is Idaho Power s belief that elimination of market prices from
consideration will shift costs and risks to customers that should be appropriately borne by Magic
Wind and that such shift is inconsistent with PURP A. As a result, Idaho Power proposes to
utilize the template contract it has signed with numerous QFs similar to Magic Wind.
On June 2, 2006, the Commission in Case No. IPC-05-34 issued Notices of
Petition for Declaratory Order and Modified Procedure. The deadline for filing written
comments was June 26, 2006. Pursuant to subsequent notice the deadline for reply comments
was extended from July 3 to July 10, 2006.
Initial comments were filed by Magic Wind LLC , Idaho Power Company, Energy
Vision LLC, Renewable Northwest Project and NW Energy Coalition, and Commission Staff.
Reply comments were filed by Idaho Power, Magic Wind and Energy Vision. Idaho Power and
Magic Wind agree that the matter is fully submitted based upon the written filings of record.
Neither party requests a hearing.
Comments filed by the parties in Case No. IPC-05-34 can be summarized as
follows:
Magic Wind
In the time since the Commission approved the 90/110% performance band in
November 2004, Magic Wind contends that the market method has proved troublesome to
project developers. Some financial institutions and other capital sources, all of whom put a value
on predictability of potential liability, have, it states, worried that the relative unpredictability of
future market prices creates a risk that is difficult to quantify, thus making their investment less
certain of recovery. Others, it states , have worried that a reduction of market price by a
seemingly arbitrary 15% results in payments less than avoided costs, and in violation of PURP
As a result, Magic Wind contends that project developers and some utilities, have
explored options to the market method that would honor the spirit and intent of the 90/110
performance band, but would reduce the uncertainty inherent in the market method and result in
payments more consistent with the full avoided cost concept. E., Schwendiman (P AC-05-9).
Magic Wind rejects Idaho Power s contention that the "elimination of market prices from
consideration will shift costs and risks to customers.This argument, Magic Wind contends
ORDER NO. 30109
was advanced by Idaho Power in the Schwendiman case and was refuted by PacifiCorp in reply
comments filed in that case.
Magic Wind recalculates surplus energy prices for Idaho Power using a Modified
PacifiCorp Method approach making an adjustment for variable O&M expense and correcting
for what it perceives to be an error in the application of the seasonal adjustment factors used by
Idaho Power in calculating QF monthly payments.
Idaho Power
Idaho Power is not willing to modify its purchase offer to include the revised rates
Magic Wind is seeking. Reference Exhibit D - Motion for Declaratory Order. The Company
contends that the rates Idaho Power offers comply with its obligations under PURPA. 16 U.
~ 824(a)-3(b). The Company states that it has offered to purchase electric capacity and energy
from Magic Wind in accordance with a legally enforceable obligation containing rates, terms and
conditions that the Commission has previously determined to be just, reasonable and non-
discriminatory .
The first question presented by Magic Wind's Petition, Idaho Power contends, is
can a QF require the utility to accept alternative rates, terms and conditions solely because the
QF believes those alternative rates, terms and conditions are more favorable to the QF." Idaho
Power does not believe that PURP A or the Orders of this Commission require such a result.
Idaho Power characterizes Magic Wind's proposal as doing away with the remedy
fashioned by the Commission in the U.S. Geothermal case (Order No. 29632) when a
generates an amount of energy that is outside the 90/110% performance band.
Idaho Power queries whether QF developers should be permitted to unilaterally
select or cherry pick the rates, terms and conditions to be included in QF contracts. The ultimate
outcome of granting Magic Wind's Motion, Idaho Power contends, may well be a mandatory
standard form one-size-fits-all contract applicable to all three utilities (Idaho Power, Avista and
PacifiCorp). Such a standard form contract requirement, Idaho Power notes, was previously
considered and rejected by the Commission in Case No. U-I006-200, Order No. 18190, wherein
the Commission adopted a "freedom to contract" approach.
Idaho Power believes that it is important that any remedy to be applied when a QF
generates outside of the 90/110 band be based on market prices. Idaho Power s reasoning is that
regardless of whether a QF under- or over-delivers, in all likelihood Idaho Power will use the
ORDER NO. 30109
wholesale markets to make up the shortfall or dispose of the excess. As an alternative to the
approved US. Geothermal method, Idaho Power recommends that the QF be paid full price for
energy delivered up to 110% but require the QF to reimburse Idaho Power for the costs Idaho
Power incurs to replace an energy delivery shortfall. This approach, it states, has been approved
by the Commission and is consistent with normal commercial practices and industry standard
measurement of costs for failure to deliver in wholesale energy purchase and sale transactions.
Commission Staff
Staff agrees that Magic Wind should be exempt from the rate eligibility cap of Order
No. 29839. Staff believes that the Modified PacifiCorp Method provides a reasonable alternative
for pricing power that falls outside of the 90/110% performance band. Staff believes that a
consistent pricing methodology should be offered by all three utilities - Idaho Power, PacifiCorp
and Avista. Staff disagrees with Magic Wind's proposed seasonalization adjustment.
Staff believes that Idaho Power is correct in its belief that establishing fixed prices to
surplus energy will fail to acknowledge the connection between market prices and the cost that
Idaho Power is likely to incur should the Magic Wind project fail to perform as projected. Staff
notes, however, that fixed price PURP A contracts, whether intermittent or not, currently have no
connection between market prices and the price that Idaho Power actually incurs. The risk that
long-term fixed prices for PURP A contracts are inaccurate compared to market is already borne
by ratepayers, Staff contends. Moreover, discount price risks would occur only if a forecast
proves inaccurate , and today, Staff contends, there is no way to determine whether the overall
Mid-C price will turn out to be higher or lower than the discounted price. Staff does not believe
that customers will face any greater risk under the fixed surplus energy prices contained in the
Amended Agreement than under the 85% or Mid-C pricing method. Staff believes that the
surplus energy prices are a reasonable proxy for Mid-C market prices and represent a fair price
to be paid for energy that cannot be delivered predictably. In addition, unlike market prices, they
offer a fixed, known set of prices that will be paid over the life of the contract for energy
deliveries outside of the 90/110% performance band.
Energy Vision LLC
Glenn Ikemoto on behalf of Energy Vision LLC provides analytical support for
Magic Wind's variable O&M adjustment to the PacifiCorp Method. Mr. Ikemoto further
believes that PacifiCorp s fixed price approach to pricing energy outside the 90/110 band from a
ORDER NO. 30109
long term planning perspective will provide greater benefits to customers than Idaho Power
market-based approach.
Renewable Northwest Project (RNP) and NW Energy Coalition (NWEC)
RNP and NWEC support use of the PacifiCorp Method for Magic Wind and Magic
Wind's proposed adjustment for variable O&M costs.
RNP and NWEC contend that the contract terms demanded by Idaho Power are
inconsistent with PURP A regulations, unreasonable, and result in wind power qualifying
facilities (Wind QFs) receiving less than full avoided costs for their power deliveries.
RNP and NWEC support a pricing method that eliminates speculation about the
future price of energy and capacity. The published rates, they note, are by Commission Order
reasonable and economic rates. Under the PacifiCorp Method, any deliveries outside the 90/110
band always will be purchased for the discounted "surplus energy prices" stated in the paragraph
7.2 of Magic Wind's proposed agreement. The best that can be said for Idaho Power s market-
based terms, they contend, is that they "might sometimes" result in payments for deliveries
outside the band that are less costly than payments under the published rates.
RNP and NWEC contend that the market-based price for out-of-band deliveries used
by Idaho Power is unlawful under PURP A regulations. Their argument is that the 90/110 band
does not comply with either of the two available pricing alternatives of 18 C.R. Section
292.304(d)(2). The requirement that out-of-band deliveries in certain months be priced at the
discounted Mid-C non-firm monthly average price, they contend, is a clear example of "avoided
cost calculated at the time of delivery" as provided in Section 292.304(d)(2)(i) of the FERC'
rules rather than a "projected" avoided cost, pursuant to Section 292.304( d)(2)(ii). Yet deliveries
within the 90/110 band, priced at the published rates, are a clear example of a "projected"
avoided cost. In short, rather than comply with FERC regulations which give the QF the choice
of "either" of the options under 18 C.R. Section 292.304( d)(2), Idaho Power would extend
Wind QFs no choice, RNP and NWEC argue, but to accept a hybrid version of both options. Yet
the QFs deliveries, they note, still must be made to Idaho Power as a "legally enforceable
obligation." RNP and NWEC recommend that the Commission discontinue the use of what they
contend is an unlawful pricing method.
Further, RNP and NWEC argue that the 15% discounting of the Mid-C non-firm
average, purportedly to compensate for assumed transaction costs, does not account for energy
ORDER NO. 30109
deliveries by QFs during times when a utility is acquiring expensive marginal energy resources
from the market, or dispatching high cost peaking resources. At such times, they argue, any
delivery of energy to the utility s system is available for use by the utility at very low marginal
costs, or likely can be resold on the market at a substantial net gain.
RNP and NWEC recommend that the Commission seek alternatives to the 90/110
performance band. Both PacifiCorp s and Idaho Power s versions of the 90/110 band, they
contend, unduly discriminate against Wind QFs because they impose a requirement (the monthly
forecast of production provided months ahead) that Wind QFs cannot accurately meet with any
known forecasting method, and because they impose a price penalty for failing to meet that
forecast, which Wind QFs cannot avoid. They cite FERC rulemaking dockets on imbalance
provisions for intermittent resources.
RNP and NWEC contend that the 90/110 band is an example of a public policy that
seemed reasonable when adopted, but has proven to be ineffective. As pertains to wind, the
90/110 band, they state, is nothing more than an inaccurate and ever changing price reduction; its
penalties are unbalanced, unfair and fail to provide significant value to utility operations.
RNP and NWEC contend that better contracting alternatives exist that would offer
terms that are similarly rigorous to the 90/110 band (Order No. 29880) and also create more
useful planning information for utilities. Currently Idaho Power contracts with Wind QFs do not
require short term forecasting. RNP and NWEC contend that the combined use of a mechanical
availability guarantee (MAG) and high quality short term forecasting would create both a high
level of performance by the QFs, while also offering utilities accurate tools for dispatch.
Lastly, RNP and NWEC argue that it may be appropriate to require more certainty
for QFs to meet commercial operation dates, so that utilities can make better long term planning
decisions in reliance upon expected future QF power deliveries, e., through the use of
liquidated damages assessing financial penalties if the Wind QF fails to meet its on-line date
(Pacifi Corp/Schwendiman).
Reply Magic Wind
Magic Wind in reply states that Idaho Power misapprehends its request. Magic Wind
asks only that the Modified PacifiCorp Method be available as an option to QFs; it does not seek
to replace the market-based method. Magic Wind does not seek a return to mandatory standard
ORDER NO. 30109
form contracts nor does it seek a one-size-fits-all approach. Instead it favors "freedom to
contract. "
Magic Wind disputes Idaho Power s contention that if the Company s current
market-based method complies with PURP A, that it need not offer any other choices to QFs; and
that to prevail Magic Wind must first prove the current market-based method is illegal.
crafting implementation policies and practices, Magic Wind contends that the Commission has
the authority and discretion to authorize any contract terms, so long as they are not inconsistent
with PURP A.
Magic Wind disputes also Idaho Power s contention that the Modified PacifiCorp
Method shifts risk to ratepayers. This argument, it states, was made also by Idaho Power in the
Schwendiman case and was refuted by several parties including Staff and PacifiCorp. Staff in
this case, it notes, makes a similar point. Moreover, Magic Wind contends that the Modified
PacifiCorp Method will likely incent QF projects to provide more accurate forecasts of projected
deliveries by eliminating the excessive economic distortion caused by market price volatility.
Magic Wind has reviewed Staff s proposed application of seasonalization factors and
the resulting rates and concurs in the Staff methodology, which for convenience Magic Wind
refers to as the Staff Modified PacifiCorp Method. See Staff Comments Attachment B.
Reply Energy Vision
Energy Vision contends that by reducing the uncertainty of price, you will get a more
accurate forecast. Increasing uncertainty, it contends, will increase the cost of financing. Absent
any clear differences in ratepayer impacts, Energy Vision recommends that the Commission
allow the Modified PacifiCorp Method, since it provides the lowest level of uncertainty for both
parties.
Energy Vision concurs in the correctness of Staff s contention that the existing
seasonality factors already account for system reliability differences and its recommendation to
spread the capacity prices over all three seasons.
Reply Idaho Power
Idaho Power disputes Magic Wind's contention that continued use of the U.
Geothermal market-based method for pricing out-of-band deliveries will discourage the
development of wind QFs. Since the U.S. Geothermal decision, Idaho Power notes that it has
ORDER NO. 30109
signed, and the Commission has approved, 22 QF contracts totaling 229 MW of QF capacity. Of
that total, 14 contracts totaling 187 MW are with wind projects.
The Company further disputes RNP and NWEC's contention that the market-based
method for pricing out-of-band deliveries is a violation of PURP A. The method, it states, is not
a computation of avoided costs, rather it is a measurement of damages. If a QF performs as
agreed, it receives published rates based on "projected" avoided costs. By disconnecting from
current market prices, Idaho Power argues that the fixed price Schwendiman remedy moves
away from a contemporaneous measurement of the actual costs Idaho Power may incur when a
QF fails to perform. Such a move, it contends, is counterintuitive in light of Northwest utilities
active use of wholesale energy markets to balance loads and resources and shifts financial risk
from QF developers to the utility s customers.
Idaho Power notes that PacifiCorp in the past has recommended that the Commission
use the simple cycle combustion turbine (SCCT) methodology the utility has implemented in
Utah to set avoided costs in Idaho. To date, the Commission has declined to do so. The only
time a SCCT has ever played a role in establishing a purchase price for QF resources, Idaho
Power states, was when Schwendiman and PacifiCorp negotiated the Schwendiman contract.
Idaho Power believes that this is further evidence that the Schwendiman contract must be viewed
as a stand-alone arrangement.
Idaho Power is uncertain as to why Staff believes it is preferable to create a proxy for
Mid-C market prices when the US. Geothermal remedy utilizes actual Mid-C prices that are
current and readily available.
Idaho Power disputes the contention of Magic Wind and others that the
Schwendiman remedy will result in better QF estimates of monthly energy production. The
Company further notes that neither the 90/110% performance band nor Schedule 86, as framed
by Magic Wind and Idaho Power, are at issue in this proceeding.
Idaho Power states that it has now been able to confirm the derivation of rates
computed by Magic Wind and the revised rates computed by Staff. The case, it now contends
does not as it earlier recommended need to be bifurcated. If at the conclusion of the comment
period the Commission ultimately determines that it is in the public interest to order Idaho Power
to offer the Schwendiman remedy in further QF contracts, the purchase rates applicable to QF
ORDER NO. 30109
deliveries outside the 90/110 band, the Company contends, should be the rates recommended by
Staff. Reference Staff Comments Attachment B.
Commission Findings
The Commission has reviewed and considered the filings of record in Case No. IPC-
05-34 including Magic Wind's Petition for Declaratory Order and the related comments and
recommendations of Magic Wind, Idaho Power, Energy Vision, Renewable Northwest Project
NW Energy Coalition and Commission Staff. We have further reviewed Order No. 29632 in
Case Nos. IPC-04-8 (US. Geothermal) and 04-10 (Lewandowski) and Order No. 30000 in
Case No. P AC-05-9 (Schwendiman). The Commission is informed and we find that no party
requests a hearing. We continue to find it reasonable to process this case pursuant to Modified
Procedure, i., by written submission rather than by hearing. IDAP A 31.01.01.204.
In the U.S. Geothermal/Lewandowski Order the Commission established a 90/110
performance band" requirement, a provision that defines the minimum degree of predictability
required for published rate eligibility. Under PURP A power purchase contracts the price to be
paid for energy purchases outside of the 90/110 performance band (surplus energy) is equal to
85% of the Mid-Columbia (Mid-C) market value price for each month. The Commission
Order was generic, applicable to Idaho Power as well as A vista and PacifiCorp and provides a
uniform, consistent methodology for all three utilities.
In the Schwendiman Order No. 30000, the Commission approved an alternate
mechanism (PacifiCorp Method) for pricing energy deliveries outside the 90/1 00 performance
band. The PacifiCorp Method includes a computed set of fixed rates (non-conforming energy
purchase prices) as a substitute for market-based rates. The Schwendiman Agreement was
submitted as a negotiated contract.
Magic Wind seeks a Commission Order declaring that Idaho Power is required to
accept the PacifiCorp Method (with some modification) for pricing energy purchases outside of
the performance band. Idaho Power has declined, insisting instead on the continued use of the
US. Geothermal market-based method.
The pricing method for energy deliveries outside of the 90/110 performance band
was a method approved by the Commission following a fully litigated proceeding involving
Idaho Power, Avista and PacifiCorp. As reflected in our Order
ORDER NO. 30109
The Commission finds that a legally enforceable obligation translates into
contractual obligations of both parties. To receive published avoided cost
rates for a QF it translates into an obligation or commitment to deliver its
estimated monthly production.
..
The Commission finds that energy delivered in excess of 110% should be
priced at 85% of the market or the contract price, whichever is less.
...
The Commission (finds it) reasonable when the QF fails to deliver 90%
the monthly commitment amount to price all delivered energy at 85% of the
market price, or the contract rate, whichever is less.
Order No. 29632, p. 20.
In Schwendiman, we stated:
The Amended Agreement terms we consider are presented in the context of a
negotiated and mutually accepted contract. We find the method for
calculating Non-Conforming Energy purchase prices to be just and
reasonable. Our decision in this case sets no precedent for future regulation
of such agreements and is intended to provide no basis for the amending of
existing contracts.
Order No. 30000, p. 10.
We continue to find the pricing method for energy delivered outside the performance
band established in U.S. Geothermal/Lewandowski to be fair, just and reasonable, and the Mid-
market to be a good measure of the value to the utility of non-conforming energy deliveries. We
continue to find the discount appropriate as a generic measure of related transaction costs. We
find RNP and NWEC's argument that the market-based price for out of band deliveries
established in U.Geothermal/Lewandowski is unlawful under PURP A regulations to be
misplaced and unpersuasive. The record does not support the contention of the parties that
without change from a market-based to a fixed price method for pricing non-conforming energy
deliveries QFs will be unable to obtain project financing.
The Schwendiman Agreement was a negotiated and mutually acceptable agreement.
In this case the negotiating parties are not in agreement. We note further that Magic Wind
previously submitted to Idaho Power for approval a signed Agreement containing the US.
Geothermal/Lewandowski terms. We decline to direct Idaho Power to accept the Schwendiman
type method for pricing energy deliveries outside the 90/110 performance band.
ORDER NO. 30109
We note that Idaho Power agrees that Magic Wind is entitled to exemption status
from the rate eligibility cap established in Order No. 29839. Staff does not object to such a
determination. We find it reasonable to approve such an exemption as it pertains to Magic
Wind's contract negotiations with Idaho Power.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Idaho Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction over Idaho Power Company,
an electric utility, pursuant to the authority and power granted it under Title 61 ofthe Idaho Code
and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURP A).
The Commission has authority under PURP A and the implementing regulations of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to set avoided costs, to order electric
utilities to enter into fixed term obligations for the purchase of energy from qualified facilities
(QFs) and to implement FERC rules.
ORDER
In consideration of the foregoing and as more particularly described above, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED and the Commission does hereby determine that Magic Wind LLC
qualifies for an exemption from the rate eligibility cap established in Order No. 29839 as pertains
to its contract negotiations with Idaho Power Company.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and the Commission further declares that Magic Wind
LLC is not entitled to receive from Idaho Power a PURP A QF purchase power agreement that
establishes fixed prices for surplus energy outside the 90/110 performance band using the
Modified PacifiCorp Method." Reference Order No. 30000, Case No. P AC-05-
THIS IS A FINAL ORDER. Any person interested in this Order may petition for
reconsideration within twenty-one (21) days of the service date of this Order. Within seven (7)
days after any person has petitioned for reconsideration, any other person may cross-petition for
reconsideration. See Idaho Code ~ 61-626.
ORDER NO. 30109
DONE by Order of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission at Boise, Idaho this 15+1--
day of August 2006.
p A a:or&L
Commissioner Smith Separate Concurring Opinion
MARSHA H. SMITH, COMMISSIONER
ENNIS S. HA SEN, COMMISSIONER
ATTEST:
OJ.A/
Barbara Barrows
Assistant Commission Secretary
bls/O:IPC-05-34 sw
ORDER NO. 30109
COMMISSIONER MARSHA H. SMITH
SEP ARA TE CONCURRING OPINION
CASE NO. IPC-05-
ORDER NO. 30109
Although I concur in the result reached in this Order my objections to the
performance band previously adopted by the Commission have not changed.This case
however, is a question of which contract terms may be required, not whether the performance
band is appropriate. I find it persuasive that Magic Wind previously signed and submitted to
Idaho Power a contract with the terms that Idaho Power is now offering.
Jl~
MARSHA H. SMITH, COMMISSIONER