20021018Respondent's Brief.doc

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF JAY HULET’S
COMPLAINT REGARDING IDAHO
POWER COMPANY’S IRRIGATION BUY-
BACK PROGRAM
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SUPREME COURT
DOCKET NO. 28262

IPUC CASE NO. IPC-E-01-25

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF OF
THE IDAHO PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION

JAY HULET,

Complainant/Appellant,

v.

IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,

Respondent on Appeal,

and

IDAHO POWER COMPANY,

Respondent/Respondent on Appeal,
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APPEAL FROM THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
Commissioner Dennis S. Hansen Presiding

James G. Reid
Charles L. Honsinger
Ringert Clark Chartered
455 S Third Street
PO Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773

Attorneys for Complainant-Appellant
Jay Hulet

Alan G. Lance
Attorney General

John R. Hammond
Deputy Attorney General
472 W. Washington Street
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0074

Attorneys for Respondent on Appeal
Idaho Public Utilities Commission

Barton Kline
Monica Moen
Idaho Power Company
PO Box 70
Boise, Idaho 83707-0070

Attorneys for Respondent-Respondent on Appeal Idaho Power Company

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITY iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

A. Nature of the Case 1
B. Course of Proceedings 1
C. Statement of Facts 2

1. The Historical Context. 2
2. The Irrigation Buy-Back Program. 3
3. Mr. Hulet’s Complaint and Order No. 28860. 4
4. The Evidentiary Hearing. 6
5. Final Order No. 28950 on Reconsideration. 11

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 13

IV. ARGUMENT 14

A. Standards of Review 14

Substantial and Competent Evidence. 14
Interpretation of Contract Language. 16

1. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Mr. Hulet did not satisfy all the eligibility requirements of the RFP and should not be allowed to participate in the Irrigation Buy-Back Program. 17

a. The intent and meaning of the RFP is discerned by reading the RFP sections together. 18

b. There is substantial and competent evidence (albeit conflicting) that Idaho Power advised Mr. Hulet of the eligibility requirements for the Program consistent with the intent and meaning of the RFP. 23

c. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is not applicable because of Idaho Power’s representations and positions about the eligibility requirement of the RFP have not charged. 25

2. There is substantial and competent evidence to support a Commission finding that submitting a bid by a time certain was not a meaningless act. 27

3. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that inclusion of Mr. Hulet’s Oreana farm in the Program would violate the anti-discrimination provisions of Idaho Code § 61-315. 29

CONCLUSION 30

Appendix 1 – Idaho PUC Order No. 28677

Appendix 2 – Idaho PUC Order No. 28699

TABLE OF AUTHORITY

CASES

Application of Hayden Pines Water Company, 111 Idaho 331, 336, 723 P.2d 875 (880) (1986) 15
Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 445, 835 P.2d 677, 680 (Ct. App. 1992) 22
Boise Water Corp. v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 534, 537, 916 P.2d 1259, 1262 (1996) 14
Bouten v. Magnuson, 133 Idaho 756, 992 P.2d 751 (1999) reh’g denied (2000) 12, 24
Bunker Hill Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 101 Idaho 493, 616 P.2d 272 (1980) 17
Bunker Hill Co., 98 Idaho at 252, 561 P.2d at 394 17, 18
City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway, Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 151, 879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994) 26
DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1996) citing Pollard Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, 115, 645 P.2d 344 349 (1982) 22
Eagle Water Co. v. Idaho PUC, 130 Idaho 314, 318, 940 P.2d 1133, 1137 (1997) 14, 26
Grever v. Idaho Telephone Company, 94 Idaho 900, 901-02, 499 P.2d 1256, 1257-58 (1972) 17
Hayden Pines, 111 Idaho at 336, 723 P.2d at 880 (1986) quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 261, 715 P.2d 927, 931 (1985) 16
Idaho Power Co., v. Congeneration, Inc, 129 Idaho 46, 50, 921 P.2d 746, 750 (1990) citing Bunker Hill Co., v. Washington Water Power Co., 98 Idaho 249, 252, 561 P.2d 391, 394 (1977) 17
Industrial Customers of Idaho Power v. Idaho PUC, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d at 789
14, 15, 16, 25
Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794 quoting Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Honeycutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985) 15
Key Transportation v. Trans Magic Airlines, 96 Idaho 110, 112-13, 524 P.2d 1338, 1340-41 (1974) 26
Lemhi Telephone Company v. Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co., 98 Idaho 692, 696-97, 571 P.2d 753, 757 (1977) 17
Lethrud v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995) 16
Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 695, 963 P.2d 372, 378 (1998) 26
Nez Perce Roller Mills v. Public Utilities Commission, 54 Idaho 696, 34 P.2d 972 (1934) 16
Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999) 26
Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 624, 631, 917 P.2d 781, 788 (1996) 15, 16
Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 128 Idaho 609, 618, 917 P.2d 766, 775 (1996) 15
Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988) 27
Tommerup v. Albertson’s, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 7, 607 P.2d 1055, 1061 (1980) 26
Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 376, 597 P.2d 1058, 1066 (1979) 15
Washington Water Power Company v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 101 Idaho 567, 575, 617 P.2d 1242, 1250 (1980) 16
STATUTES

Idaho Code § 61-315 6, 13, 14, 22, 29
Idaho Code § 61-501 5, 17
Idaho Code § 61-612 5
Idaho Code § 61-626 26
Idaho Code § 61-627 26
Idaho Code § 61-629 14, 16

REGULATORY CASES

Order Authorizing Temporary Increase in Generation in Light of Electricity Exigencies in Western United States, 95 FERC ¶ 61,181 (May 8, 2001) 2

IDAHO PUC ORDERS

Order No. 28699 13, 29
Order No. 28860 2, 4, 5, 13, 21, 30
Order No. 28892 2, 6
Order No. 28912 2
Order No. 28950 2, 11, 30

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article V, Section 9 of the Idaho Constitution 14

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent on Appeal, Idaho Public Utilities Commission, believes the statement of the case set forth in the Appellant Hulet’s brief is incomplete and offers its own statement of the case below.
A. Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from two final Orders of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) that dismissed Mr. Hulet’s formal complaint against Idaho Power Company (Idaho Power or the Company) that alleged it wrongly excluded him from participating in the Irrigation Buy-Back Program (the Program). R. at 1-8. See also R. at 24-30, 102-111.
B. Course of Proceedings
In response to the energy crisis in the spring of 2001, Idaho Power implemented the Irrigation Buy-Back Program. The purpose of the Program was to reduce or conserve power by soliciting large irrigation customers (i.e., large power consumers) to voluntarily reduce their energy consumption during the 2001 growing season in exchange for compensation from the Company. Tr. p. 67. The Commission approved the Program and authorized Idaho Power to pay these customers to reduce their consumption between March 1, 2001 and November 30, 2001 (the “irrigation season”). R. at 118-19. To participate in the Program, an eligible irrigation customer was required to submit a bid to Idaho Power by no later than February 28, 2001. R. at 61-62. The Program also provided that late offers would be rejected. R. at 62. Mr. Hulet did not submit a bid.
On June 19, 2001, Mr. Hulet, proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint requesting that the Commission order Idaho Power to include his Oreana farm into the Program. R. at 1-8. On August 13, 2001, Idaho Power filed an Answer to the Complaint. R. at 9-23. After reviewing the pleadings (that did not include a request for a hearing), the Commission entered final Order No. 28860 dismissing Mr. Hulet’s Complaint in its entirety. R. at 24-30.
On October 11, 2001, Mr. Hulet filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Order No. 28860. R. at 33-37. The Company filed an Answer to this Petition on October 18, 2001. R. at 38-45. On October 30, 2001, Mr. Hulet filed a “Petition to Rescind” Order No. 28860. R. at 46-47. On November 8, 2001, the Commission entered Order No. 28892 granting Mr. Hulet’s Petition for Reconsideration in part, for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing. R. at 48-50. In Order No. 28912 the Commission set the evidentiary hearing for January 15, 2002 and established deadlines for discovery and the filing of prefiled testimony. R. at 51-53. After the hearing, the Commission entered Order No. 28950 on February 12, 2002 that denied Mr. Hulet relief and affirmed the dismissal of his Complaint in its entirety. R. at 102-11. On February 15, 2002, Mr. Hulet filed a timely Notice of Appeal. R. at 112-14.
C. Statement of Facts
The history of this case is set out in the Commission’s final Order Nos. 28950 (R. at 102-111) and 28860. R. at 24-30. These Orders are included in Appendixes 1 and 2 to the Brief.
1. The Historical Context.
In a normal water year Idaho Power generates a majority of its power from its hydropower facilities. In the spring of 2001, Idaho began experiencing its second worst drought conditions in about 75 years. These drought conditions, forced Idaho Power to purchase more power than usual from the regional wholesale power market. At the same time western power prices were extremely volatile and were at unprecedented highs due in large part to chronic supply shortages in California and poor hydro conditions throughout the West. R. at 118, 124. To address this two-pronged problem, Idaho Power initiated several load reduction programs in early 2001 like the Irrigation Buy-Back Program. The purpose of the Program was two-fold – to reduce electrical consumption and reduce the total costs of purchasing power from the volatile wholesale power market. Tr. at 67, LL. 14-21; R. at 124.
2. The Irrigation Buy-Back Program.
Idaho Power implemented the Buy-Back Program by soliciting bids from 1,700 of the Company’s largest irrigation customers, each who had historically consumed more than 100,000 kilowatt hours (“kWh”) per growing season. R. at 124. The Company sent these customers a Request for Proposals (RFP) that detailed Program requirements, an Offer Form Worksheet and a bid form. R. at 124. Section 2.4 of the RFP required bidders desiring to participate in the Program to submit written bids to the Company on or before February 28, 2001. R. at 61-62. This section also advised bidders that late bids would be rejected. Id. Section 3.7 of the RFP required successful bidders to keep their “metered service points” connected during the full term of the Program. R. at 65. Section 4.1 states, “[t]he agreement between Idaho Power and the Bidder will run from the date that Idaho Power accepts Bidder’s offer until November 30, 2001.” R. at 67. Section 4.2 of the RFP states:
The basis for the payment to Bidders will be the difference between the annual Base Consumption Amount and the annual Actual Energy Consumption Amount. Idaho Power will pay Bidder monthly for the portion of the Offer Energy Reduction actually provided during that month. For each month in which the Bidder actually reduces its energy consumption from the monthly Base Energy Consumption Amount by at least 95% of the OER for the equivalent calendar month, Idaho Power will multiply the reduction amount by the accepted offer price and pay Bidder 75% of that amount. The remaining 25% balance will be retained by Idaho Power and paid to Bidder prior to November 30, 2001, after confirmation that the Bidder has delivered the full Offer Energy Reduction and has otherwise fully performed the Agreement between Idaho Power and the Bidder. Idaho Power will deduct from any payment to Bidder any balance owing to Idaho Power which is in arrears.

RFP, Section 4.2.
To promote and answer questions about the Program, Idaho Power held 12 public workshops across southern Idaho on February 22 and 23, 2001. R. at 125. Mr. Hulet attended the public workshop held in Nampa on February 22, 2001. Tr. p. 25, LL. 6-8.
The Company received nearly 900 bids from approximately 500 irrigation customers. R. at 125. The Company accepted approximately 364 bids at a 15¢ per kWh price. R. at 125. Based on these bids Idaho Power estimated the Program would procure a 409,973,664 kWh savings in energy consumption over the 2001 irrigation season. R. at 125. The Company also stated that 136,300 acres would be taken out of production. R. at 124-126.
3. Mr. Hulet’s Complaint and Order No. 28860.
Mr. Hulet has two farms in Owyhee County (Murphy Flats and Oreana) and takes irrigation service from Idaho Power. R. at 2. On February 17, 2001, he received a package of information from Idaho Power soliciting bids for its Buy-Back Program. R. at 2. Mr. Hulet did not submit a bid for his Oreana farm. R. at 4. Consequently, Idaho Power did not allow Mr. Hulet to join the Program. Id.
In Count I of his Complaint, Mr. Hulet alleged that Idaho Power representatives wrongly represented that he could not submit a bid to join the Program because the power bills for his two farms were unpaid and in arrears. R. at 4. Mr. Hulet alleged this erroneous information forced him (to his detriment) to transfer responsibility for electric service for his Murphy farm to his son Blaine so his son could submit a bid for this farm. Id. Mr. Hulet also argued this false information caused him to not submit a bid for his Oreana farm and he consequently suffered serious financial harm from not participating in the Program. Id. Mr. Hulet requested that his Oreana farm be entered into the Program. Id. He did not seek a hearing.
Idaho Power filed a timely Answer on August 14, 2001 and denied its employee told Mr. Hulet that he could not submit a bid because of his arrearage. R. at 12. Rather, the Company stated Mr. Hulet was properly advised of the terms and conditions of the RFP and the Program. R. at 11. Idaho Power asserted that its employee Mr. Liechty consistently informed Mr. Hulet that he could submit a bid but that the Company would not accept such a bid until his past due bills were paid in full. R. at 12. Idaho Power alleged the condition regarding the payment of past due bills was applied consistently to all customers who submitted bids for the Program. Id. Idaho Power also stated Mr. Hulet’s unpaid arrearage for electrical service was approximately $526,000. R. at 13. Thus, even had he submitted a timely bid, which he did not, Idaho Power would not have accepted it until the arrearages were paid in full. Id. Idaho Power noted that Mr. Hulet failed to submit a bid by the February 28 deadline. Id. The Company also stated that the Commission had denied similar requests to submit late bids into the Program. R. at 13-14.
On September 28, 2001, the Commission entered final Order No. 28860 dismissing both counts of Mr. Hulet’s Complaint. R. at 24-30. The Commission found it had jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 61-501 and 61-612 to resolve his Complaint. R. at 28. The Commission determined Mr. Hulet received the RFP and accompanying documents on February 17, 2002, but did not submit a timely bid for the Program. Id. The Commission stated Mr. Hulet knew February 28 was the deadline for bids to be submitted to Idaho Power. Id. The Commission noted it had denied previous, similar requests to submit late bids to be retroactively included in the Program. Id. Thus, the Commission found that allowing Mr. Hulet to participate in the Program despite his not having submitted a timely bid or any bid at all would violate the anti-discrimination provisions of the Public Utilities Law. Idaho Code § 61-315. R. at 28-29. See also R. at 142.
Mr. Hulet filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration and requested an evidentiary hearing before the Commission. R. at 34. He argued the Commission erroneously determined that requiring Idaho Power to accept his Oreana farm into the Program would violate the anti-discrimination provisions of Idaho Code § 61-315. He asserted that his case was distinguishable from previous cases because his failure to submit a bid was the result of erroneous information provided by the Company. R. at 35. Mr. Hulet also argued it would have been a “meaningless act” to submit a bid to Idaho Power. R. at 35-36. Finally, Mr. Hulet argued a question of fact existed because the parties disagreed on what representations were made to him regarding his eligibility to submit a bid. R. at 36.
Idaho Power filed a timely Answer to Mr. Hulet’s Petition. 39-45. In Order No. 28892 issued November 8, 2001, the Commission granted his Petition for Reconsideration in part and scheduled a hearing to receive evidence regarding his allegations. R. at 48.
4. The Evidentiary Hearing.
Mr. Hulet testified Mike Liechty, employed by Idaho Power as an agricultural representative, contacted him in mid to late February about the Program. Tr. p. 21, LL. 20-25. Mr. Hulet claimed Mr. Liechty said he “would be unable to submit a bid because of my outstanding past due accounts with Idaho Power. [Liechty] also explained to me that I would need to come up with a deposit of approximately $180,000 to participate in the program.” Id. Mr. Hulet said he was unaware of this requirement. Tr. p. 22, LL. 1-7. Rather, he believed the last sentence of Section 4.2 of the RFP allowed him to payoff his past due balance from any payment he would receive through participation in the Program. Tr. p. 22, LL. 4-7; p. 23, LL. 1-2. Mr. Hulet requested clarification on this provision. Based on Mr. Liechty’s representations, Mr. Hulet understood “that [he] could not use funds from the Irrigation Power Buy Back Program to pay my past due power accounts.” Tr. p. 23, LL. 4-9.
Mr. Hulet testified he attended the public workshop in Nampa on February 22. He claimed Mr. Liechty again told him he could not submit a bid unless his unpaid power bills were paid. Tr. p. 25, LL. 6-21. Mr. Hulet alleged Mr. Liechty again made this representation to him on February 23, 26 and 27, 2001. Tr. p. 27-29. Mr. Hulet claimed that as a result of Mr. Liechty’s representations, he did not submit a bid for his Oreana farm. Tr. p. 32, LL. 4-6. Hulet asserted at the hearing that the only relief he was seeking was inclusion of his Oreana farm in the Program. Tr. p. 38, LL. 19-22.
Mr. Hulet admitted he was in arrears to Idaho Power after the 2000 irrigation season and, consequently, his irrigation pumps were not turned on for the 2001 irrigation season. Tr. p. 37, LL. 8-17. Mr. Hulet also conceded he did not receive anything in writing from Idaho Power that specifically prevented him from submitting a bid for the Program because of his unpaid bills. Tr. p. 41, LL. 15-23. Mr. Hulet affirmed, despite the alleged misinformation given to him by Mr. Liechty, that he believed the RFP would allow him to submit a bid into the Program even though he was in arrears. Tr. p. 42, LL. 8-25; p. 43, LL. 6-25. Mr. Ihli, who works for Mr. Hulet as assistant manager for Hulet Farm Management Company, provided testimony substantially identical to Mr. Hulet’s and was present with Mr. Hulet for his discussions with Mr. Liechty. Tr. pp. 46-62.
Idaho Power sponsored two witnesses. Mike Liechty and Maggie Brilz who is employed by the Company as its Pricing Director. Ms. Brilz was involved with the creation and implementation of the Company’s Program. Tr. p. 67, LL. 7-10. She said Idaho Power did not accept any late bids for the Program. Tr. p. 77, LL. 20-23.
In general, Ms. Brilz and Mr. Liechty testified that customers whose service had previously been terminated due to non-payment of utility bills were required to pay the arrearages in full, plus a deposit (as security for the current irrigation year) prior to having their offers accepted by Idaho Power. Tr. p. 69, LL. 14-18; p. 99, LL. 7-11. Mr. Liechty testified he worked with Hulet on numerous occasions between July 2000 and January 2001 attempting to collect his unpaid irrigation bill that exceeded $526,000 by January 2001. Tr. p. 97, LL. 15-22. Mr. Liechty also stated that prior to the bidding deadline, he never advised Mr. Hulet that he could not submit a bid because of the past due accounts. Tr. p. 105, LL. 16-22. Mr. Liechty also testified that he provided Hulet with the same information about the Program as he provided to all other irrigation customers. Tr. p. 106, LL. 10-15.
Mr. Liechty claimed that on several occasions he advised Mr. Hulet and Mr. Ihli that for a bid to be accepted all metered service points would have to be “on” which meant that Mr. Hulet would have to bring his past due accounts current, plus pay a deposit. Tr. p. 99, LL. 6-10; p. 100, LL. 6-15; p. 105, LL. 11-15. Ms. Brilz claimed this position was consistent with RFP Section 3.7 that states, “[m]etered service points included in accepted offers must remain connected for retail electric service during the full term of the Program.” Tr. p. 70, LL. 4-8. She explained “must remain connected” meant metered service points must be physically connected to Idaho Power’s system so that energy can flow through the lines. Tr. p. 86, LL. 3-6. The connection provided the means for monitoring program status and insuring that bidding irrigation customers could actually provide the energy reductions promised because they had the ability to irrigate during the 2001 season. Tr. p. 76, LL. 10-16. Customers whose service was terminated for non-payment did not have metered service points that were connected. Id.
Ms. Brilz and Mr. Liechty both testified the terms of the Program did not prevent an irrigation customer with electric bill arrearages from submitting a bid. Tr. p. 74, LL. 9-13; p. 108, LL. 1-15; p. 120, LL. 9-17; p. 121, LL. 8-11. During the public workshops (which Mr. Hulet and Mr. Ihli attended in Nampa), Company representatives explained that irrigation customers with past due balances were required to pay their arrearages and a deposit prior to having an offer accepted. Tr. p. 71, LL. 1-2; p. 72, LL. 1-3; p. 98, LL. 19-24. Failure to pay the past due amounts and the deposits would mean that their metered service points would not be connected, and thus they would not be eligible to participate in the Program. Tr. p. 72, LL. 3-6; p. 99, LL. 23-25; p. 100, LL. 1-3.
Ms. Brilz testified that approximately 40 irrigation customers of nearly 500 who submitted timely bids had past due account balances with the Company. Tr. p. 88, LL. 2-4. She said these customers were contacted by the Company and informed of the amount they would need to pay prior to having their bids accepted by the Company. Tr. p. 72, LL. 13-17. Idaho Power required these customers to pay the arrearages and deposits within a reasonable time prior to having their bids accepted by Idaho Power. Tr. p. 88, LL. 2-11; 92, LL. 11-15. She claimed that all customers with outstanding balances were treated the same, including Mr. Hulet. Tr. p. 72, LL. 18-25; p. 74, LL. 4-8. Of the 40 customers with outstanding balances, she said only 4 failed to make the payments and thus had their bids rejected. Tr. p. 89, LL. 3-11.
Ms Brilz and Mr. Liechty also took exception to Mr. Hulet’s interpretation of provision 4.2 of the RFP. Ms. Brilz testified that Section 4.2 only applied to customers whose offers were accepted and participated in the Program. Tr. p. 77, LL. 7-19. She stated that this provision referred to withholding buy-back payments for past due balances generated by a Program participant during the 2001 growing season, not past due balances generated for previous irrigation seasons. Id. Mr. Liechty also told Mr. Hulet that he could not use Program payments to pay his 2000 arrearages. Tr. p. 109, LL. 16-20. In fact, Liechty testified that Idaho Power never contemplated that payments made after a bid was accepted could take care of arrears from a previous season. Tr. p. 116, LL. 24-25; p. 117, LL. 1-3.
On rebuttal Mr. Hulet presented two witnesses: Boyd Christensen of Blackfoot and George Grant of Owyhee County. Both have farming operations and are irrigation customers of Idaho Power. Tr. p. 126, L. 25; p. 127, LL. 1-5; p. 133, LL. 22-25. Mr. Grant testified that he irrigates property in Owyhee County through a lease-purchase agreement with Jay Hulet. Tr. p. 126, LL. 20-25; p. 127, LL. 1-5. Grant and Christensen both testified that they each submitted a timely bid despite the fact that they were in arrears on their power bills from the previous season. Tr. p. 128, LL. 1-10; p. 133, LL. 22-25; p. 134, LL. 8-9. Mr. Grant initially believed he could submit a bid and have it accepted because he too thought Section 4.2 of the RFP allowed him to use Program payments to offset his arrearages from the previous season. Tr. p. 128, LL. 16-25; p. 129, LL. 1-12. However, Mr. Grant testified that he became concerned that his interpretation of this language might not be true and, thus his bid would not be accepted. So he paid his arrearages in full after submitting his timely bid. Tr. p. 129, LL. 17-23. Mr. Grant’s concerns were created by a combination of factors. Tr. p. 129, LL. 23-25; p. 130, L. 1. First, he talked with “[Jay] Hulet and his concerns about being able to participate or not and when we further read the [RFP] and there’s some other language in here that talks about being connected, I start[sic] confusing what does that all mean and I got concerned about it[.]” Tr. p. 130, LL. 1-5. As a result, Mr. Grant contacted Ms. Brilz who referred him to Mike Liechty and “we took care of it then.” Tr. p. 138, LL. 7-11. After learning that he could not payoff his past arrearages with Program payments, Grant testified that he paid the arrearage and was then accepted into the Program. Tr. p. 130, LL. 8-13.
5. Final Order No. 28950 on Reconsideration.
On February 12, 2002, the Commission entered final Order No. 28950 that dismissed Mr. Hulet’s Complaint in its entirety. R. at 102-111. The Commission first found that:
After reviewing the evidentiary record in this case, the Commission finds there is substantial and competent evidence that Mr. Hulet was reasonably barred from participating in the Irrigation Buy-Back Program. It is undisputed that Mr. Hulet did not submit a bid to Idaho Power by the February 28, 2001 deadline.

R. at 109. (App. 1).

The Commission also rejected Mr. Hulet’s two arguments concerning the RFP language and the representations by Mr. Liechty. His first argument was that the last sentence of Section 4.2 would allow him to deduct past due balances owed from the payments he would receive by participating in the Program. In denying this claim, the Commission found that:
When Mr. Hulet asked Mr. Liechty about this provision, Hulet testified that Liechty told him that Section 4.2 did not apply to past due power bills but only to bills incurred during the 2001 irrigation season. Tr. at p. 23. By his own admission Mr. Hulet was apprised before the bid deadline that Section 4.2 was not applicable to his arrearage situation. His employee, Mike Ihli, was also apprised of this. Id. at pp. 52-53. Consequently, we find that Mr. Hulet’s argument regarding Section 4.2 is not persuasive.

R. at 109. (App. 2) (emphasis added).
Mr. Hulet’s second argument was that Mr. Liechty represented he could not submit a bid until his unpaid power bills were paid in full. Mr. Hulet claimed this information induced him to not submit a bid. The Commission found this argument was without merit. The Order states:
We next turn to Mr. Hulet’s allegations that Mr. Liechty told him on at least four occasions that Mr. Hulet could not submit a bid unless his unpaid power bills were paid. Tr. at pp. 25, 27-29. For his part, Mr. Liechty denied the allegation. He testified that he advised Mr. Hulet and Mr. Ihli the past arrearages would have to be paid before a bid could be accepted. In other words, he testified that he did not say a bid could not be submitted – simply that it would not be accepted until such arrearages were satisfied. Mr. Liechty also noted that some irrigators with arrearages did submit timely bids. In addition, Ms. Brilz stated that approximately 40 irrigators who had arrearages did submit timely bids. The Company eventually accepted most of these 40 bids once the arrearages and necessary deposits were paid.

As the trier of fact, it is the Commission’s obligation to weigh conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. Bouten v. Magnuson, 133 Idaho 756, 992 P.2d 751 (1999) reh’g denied (2000). After reviewing the conflicting testimony, we find Mr. Liechty’s testimony more persuasive and credible and accord greater weight to it. In large part we give greater weight to his testimony than to Mr. Hulet’s or Mr. Ihli’s because the circumstances surrounding this matter and the RFP document convince us that a reasonable person would have known that it was essential to submit a bid before the February 28, 2001 deadline in order to participate in this Program regardless of their account status. Even Mr. Hulet’s rebuttal witness, George Grant, testified that he submitted a timely bid to participate in the buy-back program despite the fact that he was in arrears to Idaho Power. Grant said he discussed these issues with Mr. Hulet and submitted a bid while Hulet chose not to.

. . . Consequently, the Commission finds that a reasonable person would not have believed that he or she was prohibited from submitting a bid into the Program because the customer had arrearages owed to Idaho Power.

R. 109-10. (App. 2) (emphasis added).

Consistent with its previous findings regarding the anti-discrimination provisions of Idaho Code § 61-315, the Commission reiterated that it:
has consistently denied previous requests to allow late bids or be retroactively included into this Program. We held that to do so would violate the anti-discrimination provisions of Idaho Code § 61-315. See Order No. 28699 at p. 20. The Commission also found that the various individual circumstances presented in these previous requests did not justify the Commission requiring Idaho Power to accept their bids. Id. In its initial denial the Commission found that it must decide Mr. Hulet’s Complaint similarly. Based upon our record it would be inappropriate to grant Mr. Hulet treatment that has previously been denied to others.

R. at 110. (App. 2).

Based on these findings the Commission determined Mr. Hulet failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Commission should vacate Order No. 28860. Accordingly, his Complaint remained dismissed in its entirety.
Following issuance of this Order Mr. Hulet filed his Notice of Appeal.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Mr. Hulet did not satisfy all the eligibility requirements of the RFP and was not allowed to participate in the Buy-Back Program.

a. The intent and meaning of the RFP is discerned by reading the RFP sections together.

b. There is substantial and competent evidence, albeit conflicting, that Idaho Power advised Mr. Hulet of the eligibility requirements of the Program consistent with the intent and meaning of the RFP.

c. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is not applicable because Idaho Power’s representations and position about the eligibility requirements of the RFP have not changed.

2. There is substantial and competent evidence to support a Commission finding that submitting a bid by a time certain was not a meaningless act.

3. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that inclusion of Mr. Hulet in the Program would violate the anti discrimination provisions of Idaho Code § 61-315.

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Standards of Review
The standards of review on appeal from an Order of the Commission are well settled. Article V, Section 9 of the Idaho Constitution provides the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review on appeal any order of the Commission. Boise Water Corp. v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 534, 537, 916 P.2d 1259, 1262 (1996). Idaho Code § 61-629 defines the scope of the Supreme Court’s limited review and states in relevant part:
No new or additional evidence may be introduced in the Supreme Court. . . . The review on appeal shall not be extended further than to determine whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order appealed from violates any right of the appellant under the constitution of the United States or of the state of Idaho.

Idaho Code § 61-629. See also Industrial Customers of Idaho Power v. Idaho PUC, 134 Idaho 285, 288, 1 P.3d 786, 789 (2000); see also Eagle Water Co. v. Idaho PUC, 130 Idaho 314, 318, 940 P.2d 1133, 1137 (1997). Hulet has not asserted the Commission violated his constitutional rights. Consequently, the question on appeal is whether the Commission “regularly pursued its authority.”
Substantial and Competent Evidence.
In 2000, the Supreme Court most recently recognized the degree of deference that must be given to decisions of the Commission. In Industrial Customers, the Court stated review of Commission determinations as to “questions of law” is limited to a determination of whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority and whether the constitutional rights of the appellant have been violated. Industrial Customer, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d at 789. Regarding “questions of fact,” the Court stated that where the Commission’s findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record, the Court must affirm those findings and the Commission’s decision. Id; see also Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 624, 631, 917 P.2d 781, 788 (1996).
In Industrial Customers, this Court described the appropriate test for substantial competent evidence as follows:
The “substantial evidence rule” is said to be a “middle position” which precludes a de novo hearing but nonetheless requires a serious review which goes beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity. Such a review requires more than a mere “scintilla” of evidence in support of the agency’s determination, though “something less than the weight of the evidence.” “Put simply”, we wrote, “the substantial evidence rule requires a court to determine ‘whether [the agency’s] findings of fact are reasonable.’’’

Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794 quoting Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Honeycutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985) (citations omitted).
The Commission’s findings of fact are to be sustained unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against its conclusions or that the evidence is strong and persuasive that the Commission abused its discretion. Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d at 789; Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 376, 597 P.2d 1058, 1066 (1979). The Court will not displace the Commission’s findings of fact when faced with conflicting evidence, “even though the Court would have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 609, 618, 917 P.2d 766, 775 (1996); Application of Hayden Pines Water Company, 111 Idaho 331, 336, 723 P.2d 875, 880 (1986). Thus, the Commission’s findings of fact in this case are entitled to a presumption of correctness and the burden is on Mr. Hulet to show those findings are unsupported by the evidence. Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 292, 1 P.3d at 793; Nez Perce Roller Mills v. Idaho PUC, 54 Idaho 696, 34 P.2d 972 (1934).
The “Commission as the finder of fact, need not weigh and balance the evidence presented to it but is free to accept certain evidence and disregard other evidence.” Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794. This Court must view the facts and inferences of the Commission in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the Commission. Lethrud v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995). Simply put, findings of the Commission must be reasonable “when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the [Commission’s] view.” Hayden Pines, 111 Idaho at 336, 723 P.2d at 880, quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 261, 715 P.2d 927, 931 (1985).
The Commission’s findings need not take any particular form so long as they fairly disclose the basic facts upon which the Commission relies and support the ultimate conclusions. What is essential are sufficient findings to permit the reviewing Court to determine that the Commission has not acted arbitrarily. Rosebud, 128 Idaho at 624, 917 P.2d at 781; Washington Water Power Company v. Idaho PUC, 101 Idaho 567, 575, 617 P.2d 1242, 1250 (1980).
If the Supreme Court finds that the Commission has not “regularly pursued its authority,” then the Supreme Court shall set aside the Commission’s Orders in whole or in part. Idaho Code § 61-629. If an Order or a portion of an Order is set aside, the Commission upon its own motion may alter or amend the Order appealed from to meet the objections of the Court. Id.
Interpretation of Contract Language.
The Idaho Legislature has vested the Commission with the jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do “all things necessary to carry out the spirit and intent of the provisions of the Public Utilities Law.” Idaho Code § 61-501; Grever v. Idaho Telephone Company, 94 Idaho 900, 901-02, 499 P.2d 1256, 1257-58 (1972). Generally, the construction and enforcement of contract rights is a matter that lies in the jurisdiction of the courts and not the Commission. Lemhi Telephone Company v. Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co., 98 Idaho 692, 696-97, 571 P.2d 753, 757 (1977); Bunker Hill Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 101 Idaho 493, 616 P.2d 272 (1980). However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule. The Supreme Court allowed the Commission to interpret imprecise contractual language between two parties because “the parties agreed to let the PUC settle this dispute and since there is substantial evidence in the record to support the commission’s decision, it will not be disturbed on appeal.” Idaho Power Co., v. Congeneration, Inc, 129 Idaho 46, 50, 921 P.2d 746, 750 (1990) citing Bunker Hill Co., v. Washington Water Power Co., 98 Idaho 249, 252, 561 P.2d 391, 394 (1977).
1. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Mr. Hulet did not satisfy all the eligibility requirements of the RFP and should not be allowed to participate in the Irrigation Buy-Back Program.

Mr. Hulet first argued the “plain meaning” of the last sentence of Section 4.2 of the RFP would allow him to use Program payments to pay off his past due balance from the 2000 season. Brief at 5. This sentence states, “Idaho Power will deduct from any payment to Bidder any balance owing to Idaho Power which is in arrears.” R. at 67. Hulet also asserted that Mike Liechty’s representations to him about this provision were contrary to this alleged plain meaning. Mr. Hulet contends he relied on them and they were one cause for his failure to submit a bid. Brief at 7. Idaho Power did not object to the Commission considering and resolving this question. The Commission found these arguments unpersuasive based on the language of the entire RFP and testimony of the parties. R. at 109.
In addition to the arguments above Mr. Hulet for the first time raises the argument that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars Idaho Power from asserting a position different than what he alleges the plain meaning of the last sentence of Section 4.2 of the RFP provides.
a. The intent and meaning of the RFP is discerned by reading the RFP sections together.

The intent and purpose of Idaho Power’s RFP offer was to solicit bids from eligible irrigation pumping customers to reduce their energy consumption during the 2001 irrigation season. Tr. p. 67, LL. 11-21. The RFP contained requirements irrigation customers needed to meet to be eligible to have their bid accepted by Idaho Power and to receive payments for their reduced consumption. First, Section 2.4 required irrigation customers desiring to participate in the Program to submit bids by no later than February 28, 2001 and stated that no late bids would be accepted. R. at 61-62. Mr. Hulet did not submit a timely bid for his Oreana farm. Tr. p. 38, LL. 7-8. Ms. Brilz testified that the Company did not accept any late bids. Tr. p. 77, LL. 20-23.
Section 3.7 of the RFP contained another important eligibility requirement. R. at 65. It states “[m]etered service points included in accepted offers must remain connected for retail electric service during the full term of the Program.” Id. Ms. Brilz testified this Section required an irrigator’s metered service points to be physically connected to the Company’s system so that energy could flow through the lines. Tr. p. 86, LL. 3-6. She stated irrigators with unpaid bills from a previous year are disconnected from the system for non-payment. Id. at LL. 7-12. She explained that disconnected customers do not meet the connection requirements of Section 3.7 of the RFP until such time as they had paid their arrearages in full. Tr. p. 87, LL. 7-10. Service then would be reconnected once past due balances and any required deposits for the current year were paid. Tr. p. 70, LL. 14-17. She stated that requiring metered service points to be “on” provided the Company with the assurance the customer truly had the ability to irrigate during the 2001 growing season and therefore had the ability to provide actual energy reductions. Tr. p. 76, LL. 10-14. From the Commission’s perspective there was no reason to pay an irrigator to reduce his 2001 consumption if that customer was already disconnected from the network. In other words, a customer already disconnected for unpaid bills was simply not consuming and a incentive payment to conserve was not necessary.
Mr. Liechty’s testimony was consistent with Ms. Brilz’s. Tr. p. 98, LL. 7-13; p. 99, LL. 2-10; p. 100, LL. 6-15; p. 105, LL. 11-15. Mr. Liechty consistently represented to Mr. Hulet that to participate in the Program his metered service points would have to be “on” and his points would not be turned “on” until he paid his account arrearage and a deposit. Id. Mr. Hulet admitted he owed a past due balance to Idaho Power for the 2000 season and also that his metered service points were disconnected at the time the Program was started. Tr. p. 37, LL. 8-17. Thus, had Mr. Hulet submitted a bid he would not have met the requirements of Section 3.7 until he paid his arrearage in full and a deposit.
In response to questions from the Commission about Section 4.2, Mr. Liechty stated Idaho Power did not intend to allow payments an irrigator would receive after being accepted in the Program to be credited against past arrearages. Tr. p. 116, LL. 8-25; p. 117, LL. 1-3. Mr. Hulet conceded Mr. Liechty told him the last sentence of Section 4.2 would not allow the use of Program payments to cure his arrearage from the past season. Tr. p. 23, LL. 3-8. See also Tr. p. 52, LL. 16-25; p. 53, LL. 1-5; p. 109, LL. 16-21. Hulet did not bring his account current. Tr. p. 37, LL. 14-16. Particularly compelling on this issue is the testimony of Idaho Power employee and witness Ms. Brilz who helped create and implement the Program. She corroborated Mr. Liechty’s representations about Section 4.2 and stated:
The provision referred to by Jay Hulet in paragraph 4.2 applied to customers whose offers were accepted and who met the criteria for having a payment made to them by Idaho Power for energy reductions provided. This provision referred to the withholding from program payments past due balances generated by a Program participant during the 2001 growing season, not past due balances generated during previous irrigation seasons.

Tr. p. 77, LL. 7-19.
When Section 3.7 and 4.2 are read together it is clear the last sentence of 4.2 does not provide the meaning Mr. Hulet alleged. A customer that was not connected to the system because of an arrearage from 2000 could not use Program payments to defray the arrearage because they would not be eligible to participate until they paid the balance in full. It must also be remembered this eligibility requirement was in addition to the requirement of submitting a timely bid. Mr. Hulet was not eligible to participate in the Program because: 1) his account was not current (i.e., he was not connected); and 2) he failed to submit a timely bid.
Ms. Brilz claimed all customers with outstanding balances were treated the same. Tr. p. 72, LL. 18-25; p. 74, LL. 4-8. Further, the representations about Sections 3.7 and 4.2 made to Mr. Hulet were made to other customers who wished to participate but had account arrearages from a previous season. Tr. p. 70, LL. 1-2; p. 72, LL. 1-6. She also stated of the 500 customers who submitted timely bids, 40 had account arrearages from a previous season. Tr. p. 88, LL. 2-4. The Company required these customers to pay their past due amounts prior to having their bid accepted. Tr. p. 72, LL. 20-22; p. 88, LL. 2-11. She claimed these 40 customers were given a reasonable amount of time after the bidding deadline to cure these arrearages so they could participate in the Program. Tr. p. 92, LL. 11-15. Only four of these customers failed to have bids accepted because their accounts were not brought current. Tr. p. 89, LL. 8-11.
Mr. Hulet’s rebuttal witnesses George Grant and Boyd Christensen submitted timely bids into the Program despite having arrearages from the past season. Tr. p. 137, LL. 21-25; p. 138, L. 8; p. 134, LL. 8-9. Mr. Grant, who leased ground from Mr. Hulet in Owyhee County, expressed concern that his initial understanding of the last sentence of Section 4.2, like Mr. Hulet’s, was incorrect. Mr. Grant became concerned after talking with Mr. Hulet and focusing on the language “that talks about being connected.” Tr. p. 130, LL. 1-5. However, Mr. Grant contacted Idaho Power for clarification and was advised he could not use Program payments to cure an arrearage from a prior season. Tr. p. 130, LL. 6-13; p. 138, LL. 7-11. Mr. Grant paid his arrearages and was accepted into to the Program. Tr. p. 130, LL. 8-13.
In Order No. 28860 the Commission found that Mr. Hulet received the RFP and was aware of the bidding deadline. R. at 28. The Commission also found Mr. Hulet based upon his own admission failed to submit a timely bid. R. at 28. The Commission concluded Section 2.4 of the RFP required irrigation customers to submit bids to participate in the Program by no later than February 28, 2001. Id.
Because Mr. Hulet did not submit a bid he was not eligible to participate in Idaho Power’s Program. R. at 28-29. Ms. Brilz stated that the Company did not accept any bid that was submitted after the deadline. Tr. p. 77, LL. 20-23. In its Order on Reconsideration the Commission found that submission of a timely bid was a condition precedent to participation in the Program. R. at 109. The Commission also found it had consistently denied previous requests of irrigation customers to submit late bids and be retroactively included in the Program finding that to do so would violate the anti-discrimination provisions of Idaho Code § 61-315. R. at 28-29. See also R. at 110, 142. The Commission also found the arguments Mr. Hulet made in an attempt to be included in the Program did not justify allowing him into the Program. R. at 29.
Based on the foregoing there is substantial and competent evidence that the last sentence of Section 4.2 of the RFP should not be construed as Mr. Hulet alleges. Rather, the evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that Section 4.2 only applied to customers whose offers were accepted and who met the criteria for having a payment made to them by Idaho Power for energy reductions provided. In other words, this provision referred only to withholding buy-back payments for past due balances generated by a Program participant during the 2001 growing season, not past due balances generated for previous irrigation seasons. Because Mr. Hulet did not cure his arrearage or submit a timely bid, he was not “eligible” to participate. The Commission interpretation and determination of the meaning of this provision is consistent with the analysis used to determine the meaning of ambiguous contract language. See Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 445, 835 P.2d 677, 680 (Ct. App. 1992); DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1996) citing Pollard Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, 115, 645 P.2d 344 349 (1982). There is substantial and competent evidence support the Commission’s findings that Section 4.2 does not allow customers to pay off past due balances from the 2000 season with 2001 Program payments.
As discussed previously, Mr. Hulet also alleged Liechty’s representations regarding the last sentence of Section 4.2 were contrary to what he alleged was the plain meaning of this sentence. Mr. Hulet contended he relied on this information from Mr. Liechty and as a result did not submit a bid. As discussed above, based on the substantial and competent evidence in the record the last sentence of Section 4.2 of the RFP did not contain the meaning Mr. Hulet alleged. Rather, as evidenced by the record Mr. Liechty’s representations regarding Section 4.2 were at all times consistent with the true meaning of this provision. Tr. p. 23, LL. 3-9; p. LL. 16-25; p. 53, LL. 1-5; p. 109, LL. 16-21. As such, it is clear that Mr. Hulet’s argument regarding these representations made by Mr. Liechty cannot provide a justifiable excuse for his failure to submit a timely bid for the Program.
b. There is substantial and competent evidence (albeit conflicting) that Idaho Power advised Mr. Hulet of the eligibility requirements for the Program consistent with the intent and meaning of the RFP.

Although Mr. Hulet acknowledges he did not submit a bid, he asserts that Mr. Liechty wrongly represented he could not submit a bid for the Program because of his arrearage. Brief at 7. See also Tr. p. 21, LL. 20-25; p. 52, LL. 7-12. Mr. Hulet contends this allegedly false representation caused him to not submit a bid by the February 28, 2001 deadline. Brief at 5; R. at 4. The Commission found there was substantial and competent evidence (albeit conflicting) that Idaho Power did not represent to Mr. Hulet that he could not submit a bid at all due to his past due utility bills.
At the evidentiary hearing Mr. Liechty denied ever advising Mr. Hulet that he could not submit a bid due to his account arrearage from the previous season. Tr. p. 105, LL. 16-22. Rather, he consistently represented to Mr. Hulet “that for a bid to be accepted under the Program, all metered service points included in the bid would have to be ‘on,’ which in Jay Hulet’s situation, would mean bringing the accounts current as well as paying any required deposits.” Tr. p. 99, LL. 6-10. See also Tr. p. 100, LL. 6-15; p. 105, LL. 11-15. Mr. Liechty also testified that he attempted to figure out a way that the Program could work for Mr. Hulet. Tr. p. 109, LL. 1-6. Mr. Liechty also averred that the language of the RFP and accompanying documents did not prohibit an irrigation customer with an account arrearage from submitting a bid. Tr. p. 108, LL. 1-15; p. 120, LL. 9-17; p. 121, LL. 8-11. Mr. Hulet admitted he was in arrears to Idaho Power at the time the Program was. Tr. at 37, LL. 8-17. In response to questions from the Commission, Mr. Hulet conceded that he had not received anything from the Company in writing telling him that he could not submit a bid because of his arrearage. Tr. p. 41, LL. 14-23.
Maggie Brilz’s testimony corroborated Mr. Liechty’s. She stated nothing in the terms of the Program would prevent an irrigation customer with electric utility bill arrearages from submitting an offer into the Program. Tr. p. 74, LL. 9-13. As previously mentioned, approximately 40 irrigators with arrearages submitted bids to participate in the Program. Tr. p. 88, LL. 2-4; p. 105, LL. 23-25; p. 106, L. 1. Ms. Brilz stated these customers were required to pay their past due amounts prior to having their offer accepted but that the Company gave these customers a reasonable period of time after the bidding deadline to bring their accounts current so they could participate in the Program. Tr. p. 72, LL. 20-22; p. 88, LL. 2-11; p. 92, LL. 11-15.
Based on this record as the trier of fact it was the Commission’s obligation to weigh conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. Bouten v. Magnuson, 133 Idaho 756, 992 P.2d 751 (1999) reh’g denied (2000). After reviewing the conflicting testimony, the Commission found that Mr. Liechty’s testimony more persuasive and credible due to its consistency with Program requirements and the Company’s record of receiving bids from irrigation customers who had arrearages and working with them to pay those arrears so that they could be included in the Program. R. at 110. Thus, the Commission accorded greater weight to it. Based on this greater weight, the Commission was convinced that a reasonable person would have known that it was essential to submit a bid before the February 28, 2001 deadline in order to participate in this Program regardless of their account status. Id. Even Mr. Hulet’s rebuttal witnesses, George Grant and Boyd Christensen, testified that they submitted timely bids to participate in the Program despite the fact that they were in arrears to Idaho Power. Mr. Grant even stated he discussed these issues with Mr. Hulet and he still chose not to submit a bid.
The Commission also noted approximately 40 irrigators who had arrearages owed to the Company for past utility service submitted timely bids to Idaho Power for its Program. R. at 110. Of this number, only four had their bids rejected because they could not timely clear their past due account balances or make the required deposits. Id. Consequently, the Commission found that a reasonable person would not have believed that he or she was prohibited from submitting a bid into the Program because the customer had arrearages owed to Idaho Power. Id.
Based on the foregoing, substantial and competent evidence the Commission determined Mr. Liecthy did not tell Mr. Hulet that he could not submit a bid because of his arrearage. This finding should be affirmed on appeal as Mr. Hulet failed to demonstrate that the clear weight of evidence is against the Commission’s decision or that the evidence is strong and persuasive that the Commission abused its discretion. Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d at 789.
c. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is not applicable because of Idaho Power’s representations and positions about the eligibility requirement of the RFP have not charged.

Finally, Mr. Hulet next now argues the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars Idaho Power from asserting a position different from the alleged plain meaning of the last sentence of Section 4.2. Brief at 6. Mr. Hulet insists that Mr. Liechty’s verbal representations are contrary and inconsistent to this plain meaning of this sentence. Consequently, he argues Idaho Power should be estopped from “changing” the interpretation of Section 4.2.
Mr. Hulet’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the argument of quasi-estoppel is being raised for the first time on appeal. It is well settled that an issue not presented to the Commission on reconsideration will not be considered on appeal by this Court. Key Transportation v. Trans Magic Airlines, 96 Idaho 110, 112-13, 524 P.2d 1338, 1340-41 (1974); Eagle Water Co. v. Idaho P.U.C., 130 Idaho 314, 316-17, 940 P.2d 1133, 1135-36 (1997); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999); Idaho Code §§ 61-626 and 61-627.
In the alternative, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is not applicable because the elements of the test have not been met. This Court has defined this test stating:
[T]he doctrine of quasi-estoppel requires that the offending party: 1) must have gained some advantage or caused a disadvantage to the party seeking estoppel; 2) induced the party seeking estoppel to change its position to its detriment; and, 3) it must be unconscionable to allow the offending party to maintain a position which is inconsistent from a position from which it has already derived a benefit.

City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway, Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 151, 879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994). Quasi-estoppel unlike equitable estoppel does not require misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other. Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 695, 963 P.2d 372, 378 (1998). However, to apply the doctrine of quasi-estoppel in the absence of reliance, it must be shown that “the act of the party against whom estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to himself or produced some disadvantage to another.” Tommerup v. Albertson’s, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 7, 607 P.2d 1055, 1061 (1980). Quasi-estoppel is essentially a last-gasp theory under which a party can point to no specific detrimental reliance due to another’s conduct may still assert that that party is estopped from asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would be unconscionable for them to do so. Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988) (emphasis added).
In this case, the second and third elements of the test are not satisfied. As to the second and third elements, Idaho Power representations did not induce Mr. Hulet to change his position (i.e., not bid). As shown in the evidence above and as found by the Commission, Idaho Power has never taken an inconsistent position on the meaning of Section 4.2 of the RFP. The Company has maintained timely bids must be submitted; metered service points must be turned on (i.e., not disconnected for arrearages); and Program credits cannot be used to cure past arrearages. As the Company’s witnesses testified, 40 customers with arrearages from the previous season submitted timely bids.
There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the Company’s position regarding either the issue of arrearages and the meaning of Section 4.2 has remained consistent. Consequently, the second and third prong of this doctrine have not been met. For these reasons, Mr. Hulet’s argument must fail.
2. There is substantial and competent evidence to support a Commission finding that submitting a bid by a time certain was not a meaningless act.

As previously discussed, Mr. Hulet alleges Mike Liechty told him he could not submit a bid unless his account arrearage was paid in full. Mr. Liechty denied making this representation, but did tell Mr. Hulet it was unlikely his bid would be accepted unless he cured the arrearage. Mr. Hulet alleges either scenario would require him to do a “meaningless act” of submitting a bid. Brief at 8-10. He maintains that Idaho law does not require a person to do a meaningless act to protect a right. Id. at 7. Meaningless, because he believes his bid would not be accepted in either case. Id.
Mr. Hulet’s argument is misplaced. Contrary to his assertion, it is clear that there was a meaningful purpose to submitting a timely bid. Submitting a bid would not have been a meaningless act. Had Mr. Hulet submitted a timely bid this act would have indicated his intent to participate in the Program. As was evident, Idaho Power would have given him a reasonable period of time to bring his account current after the bid deadline.
Requiring all irrigation customers to submit bids by February 28, 2001 served important purposes. This Program started at a time when irrigators were making decisions and commitments about the upcoming irrigation season. Thus, the Commission recognized that it was necessary to expedite its implementation so that the Company could quickly quantify the interest in this Program through evaluating bids that were submitted by the deadline. R. 118. By setting this deadline the Company was also able to know the exact number of bids that would be accepted, accurately estimate the total amount of kWh that could be saved through acceptance of these bids, the cost for purchasing these energy reductions and the acreage that would be taken out of production by county as indicated in accepted bids. R. 125-26. The acquisition of this information allowed the Company and the Commission to compare whether this Program would provide a better alternative and thus a benefit to the Company and its customers compared to the alternative at the time, purchasing power on the western regional wholesale power market. R. at 126. Through this analysis it was determined that the costs of utilizing this Program could be substantially less than other alternatives. Id.
Based on the foregoing, there is substantial and competent evidence demonstrating that timely submission of a bid had several meaningful purposes and did not constitute a meaningless act. Accordingly, the argument must fail.
3. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that inclusion of Mr. Hulet’s Oreana farm in the Program would violate the anti-discrimination provisions of Idaho Code § 61-315.

Mr. Hulet alleges the Commission erred when it found inclusion of his Oreana farm in the Program would violate Idaho Code § 61-315. Brief at 10. Rather, Mr. Hulet contends Idaho Power’s violated Idaho Code § 61-315 by misrepresenting Program requirements and his bidding status to him. Id. Thus, he argues inclusion of his Oreana farm in the Program will not result in a preference being granted to him that others were denied. Id.
The record does not support Mr. Hulet’s argument. He did not submit a timely bid for the Program. R. at 4; Tr. p. 38, LL. 7-8. Idaho Power witnesses testified that all customers with outstanding balances were treated the same, Tr. p. 72, LL. 18-25, and were provided the same information about the Program as Mr. Hulet. Tr. p. 106, LL. 10-15.
Mr. Hulet’s circumstances are not distinguishable from those previous complaints where the Commission denied late bidders from participating in the Program. R. at 141-42. In Order No. 28699 the Commission found that these irrigation customers had not presented circumstances that would justify acceptances of their late offers to participate in Idaho Power’s Program. R. at 142. Furthermore, the Commission reasoned that requiring Idaho Power to accept these late bids would violate the anti-discrimination provisions of Idaho Code § 61-315. Mr. Hulet has also failed to present circumstances that would justify his acceptance into the Program. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that to allow him into it would grant Mr. Hulet a preference that was not given to other irrigation customers with late bids. This decision was based on the substantial and competent evidence in the record. R. at 110. Accordingly, Mr. Hulet’s argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
There is an abundance of competent and substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s findings that Mr. Hulet did not satisfy all of the eligibility requirements of the RFP and could not participate in Idaho Power’s Irrigation Buy-Back Program. Although there was conflicting evidence regarding some of Mr. Hulet’s allegations, the clear weight of the evidence supports the Commission’s findings. Consequently, the Commission has regularly pursued its authority in denying Mr. Hulet and dismissing his Complaint in its entirety. Accordingly, the Commission’s Order Nos. 28860 and 28950 should be affirmed.

DATED at Boise, Idaho this 18th day of October 2002.

John R. Hammond, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General

Attorney for the Idaho Public Utilities Commission

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE THIS 18TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2002, SERVED THE FOREGOING RESPONDENT’S BRIEF OF THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES, IN SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.  28262, IPUC CASE NO. IPC-E-01-25, BY MAILING TWO COPIES THEREOF, POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING:

BARTON L KLINE
MONICA MOEN
IDAHO POWER COMPANY
PO BOX 70
BOISE ID 83707-0070
JAMES G. REID
CHARLES L HONSINGER
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED
455 S THIRD ST
PO BOX 2773
BOISE ID 83701-2773

SECRETARY

On October 9, 2001, James G. Reid and Charles L. Honsinger filed a Notice of Appearance with the Commission on Mr. Hulet’s behalf. R. at 31-32.

Order Authorizing Temporary Increase in Generation in Light of Electricity Exigencies in Western United States, 95 FERC ¶ 61,181 (May 8, 2001).
Count II of his Complaint alleged that Idaho Power released information about his account to third parties without his authorization. R. at 5. Mr. Hulet did not seek reconsideration as to Count II of his Complaint. R. 103. Accordingly, this Appeal is limited to Count I.
This was consistent with the requirements for the provisions of service contained in the Company’s Schedule 24 of I.P.U.C. No. 26, Tariff No. 101 as referenced by the RFP. R. at 59; Tr. p. 98, LL. 12-13.
The parties presented this issue to the Commission. The Commission developed a substantial record in this case. The Commission also developed an extensive record concerning this Program as it reviewed all stages of its implementation during 2001. For these reasons the Commission has jurisdiction to resolve this issue and was also in the best position to do so. See Bunker Hill Co., 98 Idaho at 252, 561 P.2d at 394.

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