20181206Plaintiff Reply to IPC Response 46.pdf

Peter J. Richardson, ISB# 3195
515 N. 27th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone [phone] I
Facsimile: [phone]
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Robert C. Huntley, ISB# 2188
R. HUNTLEY LAW, PLLC
815 West Washington Street
Boise, ID 8701
Telephone (208) 388- I 230
Facsimile: [phone]
Attorney for Plaintiffs
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
FRANKLIN ENERGY STORAGE ONE, LLC,
FRANKLIN ENERGY STORAGE TWO, LLC
FRANKLIN ENERGY STORAGE THREE,
LLC, FRANKLIN ENERGY STORAGE
FOUR, LLC
Case No.: I : l8-cv-00236-REB
PLATNTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF TO IDAHO
POWER'S RESPONSE TO FRANKLTNS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[DKr.38]VS.
Plaintifß,
PAUL KJELLANDER, KRISTINE RAPER
ERIC ANDERSON, in their official capacity as
Commissioners of the IDAHO PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION,
Defendants,
IDAHO POV/ER COMPANY,
Defendant-lntervenor
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction.
and,
I
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 1 of 14
II The Idaho Commission's Determination of the Franklin Projects' QF
Status is an Intrusion into FERC's Exclusive Jurisdiction
A. The IPUC Impermissibly Determined Plaintiffs' QF
Status
IIL As-Applied vs. Implemented -- A.K.A. One Cannot Apply
an Implementation Plan that Does Not Exist
Overview of the As-Applied vs. Implemented
Analysis.
Moving the Goal Posts
Idaho Power is Judicially Estopped From Making its As-Applied Argument
Because it Initiated this Controversy by Asking the IPUC
to Implement PURPA for Battery Storage Facilities.
I
2
aJ
A
J
B
C
D
4
Idaho Power Initiated the Proceeding Below as an Implementation Proceeding...5
.6
IV. Idaho Power Fails to Grasp the Concept of Preemption and Misstates the Black Letter of
the Applicable Legal Standard. ............8
V. Franklin Does not Assert a Flawed Application of the IPUC's Implementation of PURPA
- Rather it Asserts a Flawed Implementation of PURPA. ..........9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Coalition for Competitive Electricity v. Zibelman, 2'72 F. Supp. 3d 554, 567 -568 (SD NY2017). ......e
Exelon t(ind, I, LLC v. Nelson, 166 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 2014)7
Indep. Energlt Prods. Ass'n, Inc. V. Cal. Publ. Utils. Comm'n,36 F.3d 848, 859
(ree4).......J
Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 194 L. Ed2d 414
9
Luz Dev. and Fin. Corp.,51 FERC T
61,078.
(20r6).
..........2,3,9
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment
ii.
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 2 of 14
Occidental Chem Corp. v. La. PSC,494 F.Supp .2d 401 (MD LA
2007).
Power Res. Group v. Klein,422F.3d23l,23515th Cir
200s)..
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Diamond State Tel. Co.,468 A.2d 1285 (Del. 1983)
Russell v. Rolfs,893 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir
8
5
aJ
4
7
le90)..6,7
Tenn. Power Co.,77 FERC n6l,l25
(1ee6).
utah Power & Light v. IPUC 107 Idaho 47 (1984). ..........5
OTHER
Moores Federal Practice (2d Ed.
l e88)...
Plaintifß' Reply Brief to ldaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment
iii.
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 3 of 14
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs respectfully lodge this Reply Brief to ldaho Power's Response to Franklins'
Motion for Summary Judgment.l Idaho Power's first two issues dealing with the statute of
limitations ("time-barred) and collateral estoppel are fatally reliant on the Idaho Power's assumed
(albeit non-existent) jurisdiction of the IPUC's determination of Franklins' QF status. These first
two issues have been fully briefed by Plaintiff s in their Response Brief to Idaho Power's Motion
for Summary Judgment. The Power Company's third argument inaccurately asserts the IPUC's
decision is permissible as an application of a preexisting implementation plan - this argument is
addressed below. In its fourth argument, Idaho Power makes the unsupported assertion that the
IPUC did not determine Franklins' QF status. Idaho Power Company's procedural arguments rely
entirely on this inaccurate assertion. Although this 'implementation vs. "as-applied"' issue is
addressed in Plaintiffs' Response Brief to Idaho Power's Motion for Summary Judgment, we do
however, provide a synopsis of our response to the Power Company's denial that the IPUC
determined the QF status of the Franklin Projects here due to the central role it may play in the
Court's analysis. Finally, almost as an afterthought, Idaho Power attempts, but fails to refute
Franklins' impossibility argument, this issue is also addressed below. In short, Franklin will
address Idaho Power's "'as-applied" vs. as-implemented' argument and its attempt to refute
Franklin's impossibility argument in this Reply, but we begin with a review of the central
j urisdiction question.
il.
THE IDAHO COMMISSION's DETERMTNATION OF THE FRANKLIN PROJECTSO
QF STATUS IS AN INTRUSION INTO FERC's EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
I Herein "Idaho Power's Response."
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgrnent -- I
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 4 of 14
A. The IPUC Impermissiblv Determined Plaintiffs' OF status
The Idaho Commission's lack of subject matter jurisdiction is central to Idaho Power's
arguments. Although Defendants and Defendant-lntervenor all concede FERC's exclusive
jurisdiction to make QF classifications, the Idaho Commission's intrusion into FERC's jurisdiction
to classify QFs and determine their status is clearly evidenced by its orders. In its original order
in this matter the IPUC ruled:
FERC confirmed that energy storage facilities are not renewable resources/small power
production facilitates per se. Id.l2l For this reason, in order to qualify as a PURPA
resource, the primary energy source behind the battery storage must be considered. I/e
must, then, Iook to Franklin's (sic) and Black Mesa's primary energy sources in order ro
determine their eligibility under PURPA. The primary energy source for Franklin and
Black Mesa is solar generation... Accordingly, we find it appropriate to base Franklin's
(sic) and Black Mesa's eligibility under PURPA on its primary energy source --- solar.3
To parse the operative language from the Idaho Commission's decision is to highlight its active
and blatant determination of the QF status of the Franklin projects:
We must. . .determine their eligibility under PURPA. ... [and] we base Franklin's (sic) and
Black Mesa's eligibility under PURPA on ... solara
When given the opportunity to reconsider its original order the IPUC 'doubled down' on its
intrusion into FERC's exclusive authority to make QF eligibility determinations:
In the Final Order [33785, DKT no.4-6], we ... looked to the primary energy source of
Franklin's (sic) battery storage QFs to determine the projects' eligibility to particular
avoided cost rates and contract terms.
The IPUC's active determination of Franklins' "eligibility under PURPA" contradicts Idaho
Power's assertion that the IPUC "assume[d] Plaintiffs' QF status."s Had the IPUC actually
"assumed" the QF status of the Franklin projects it would have paid deference to FERC's
2 Citing to Luz Dev. and Fin. Corp.,5l FERC 1[61,078.3 Idaho Power Original Order no. 33785 at pp. ll -12. DKT. no. 4-6. Emphasis provided.
4 Id.
5 Idaho Power Response at p. L
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- 2
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 5 of 14
unequivocal holding in Luz that "energy storage facilities. . . aÍe arenewable resource for purposes
of QF certifîcation"6 and to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Indep. Energy Prods. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cal.
Publ. Utils. Comm'n, 36 F.3d 848, S59 (1994) that "the state may not . intrude into the
Commission's IFERC] exclusive jurisdiction to make QF status determinations."
FERC, thus, has exclusive jurisdiction to determine QF status, including fuel input/usage
standards. As a result, the Idaho Commission's decisions were made without jurisdiction to do so.
For this reason alone, and for the reasons addressed in Plaintiff s Response Brief to Idaho Power's
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Power Company's res judicata, collateral estoppel, statute of
limitations arguments must all fail.
III.
..AS-APPLIED'' VS. IMPLEMENTED _ A.K.A. ONE CANNOT APPLY AN
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN THAT DOES NOT EXIST
A. Overview of the "as-apþlied"vs. lmolemented Analvsis
There is no single dehnition of how to distinguish the difference between an "as-applied"
action of a state PUC or an implementation action. Regardless, however, the distinction between
an "as-applied" claim and an implementation claim is jurisdictional under PURPA. That is an "as-
applied" claim is properly brought in state court, while an implementation claim is properly
brought in federal court. The primary distinguishing factors in deciding whether a challenge to
a state PUC's action is an "as-applied" challenge is whether the decision is fact-based (e.g. the
collection and calculation of avoided cost data) rather than policy based (such as determining the
appropriate avoided cost methodologies or general policies and guidelines), Tenn. Power Co.,77
FERC n 61,125 (1996). Strong evidence of a policy-based implementation action is one that
applies to multiple, or an entire class of QFs. Whereas an "as-applied" action typically will only
6 Luz supra at pp. l0 - 1 1.
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- 3
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 6 of 14
be applicable to a single QF. That is an "as-applied" action is one when "the state agency's
...implementation plan...applies to or affects an individual petitioner." Power Res. Group v.
Klein, 422F.3d231,235 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, of course, the IPUC's decision is designed to affect
an entire class of QFs, to wit: all battery storage QFs.
B. Moving the Goal Posts
It is initially important to recall that this entire case was initiated by Idaho Power for the
sole purpose of altering the status quo established by the IPUC's implementation of PURPA. Prior
to Idaho Power's Petition for a Declaratory Ruling, the IPUC had, through a series of individual
orders,T implemented PURPA for two broad classes of QF: (l) wind/solar QFs and (2) "all other"
QFs, with the former entitled to just two-year contracts and the latter entitled to twenty-year
contracts.
Relying on the IPUC's then existing implementation plan, Plaintiffs sought twenty-year
contracts for their battery storage QFs from the Power Company. Instead of complying with the
PUC's implementation plan by tendering twenty-year contracts for these "other" than wind/solar
QFs, Idaho Power sought to change the IPUC's implementation plan by lodging its Petition for
Declaratory Order with the Commission. Thus, as Franklin approached the goal line (tendered
twenty-year contracts) and after having complied with all IPUC and Power Company requirements
for obtaining twenty-year contracts, the IPUC moved the goal posts out of reach. It did so by
changing its implementation plan from all-QFs-other-than-wind-or-solar-are-entitled-to-twenty-
year-contracts to all-QFs-other-than-wind-or-solar-or-battery-storage-QFs are entitled to twenty-
year contracts. The Commission moved the goal posts because Idaho Power, not satisfied with
7 The IPUC has never formally promulgated rules implementing PURPA. Rather, it implements
PURPA on case by case, decision by decision basis, relying on the precedential effect of its
orders over time to develop its implementation 'plan' or 'scheme.'
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- 4
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 7 of 14
the status quo under the IPUC's then existing implementation plan, sought to amend the IPUC's
implementation plan by moving battery storage QFs from the "all other category" and expanding
the wind/solar category to now read wind/solar/battery storage QFs. Changing the rules in the
middle of the game is not only unfair and illegal - it can only be accomplished by "implementing"
new/amended regimens implementing PURPA. An application (e.g. "as-applied") of the IPUC's
implementation plan would have resulted in the Power Company tendering twenty-year contracts
to the Franklin Projects. In the regulatory arena this (moving the goal posts) is also known as
'retroactive ratemaking' and the practice is universally prohibited by public utility laws across the
country, Idaho included.8
C. Idaho Power initiated the proceeding below as an implementation proceeding
Idaho Power's Petition to the IPUC for a Declaratory Order, (the initiating pleading in this
case) made two important concessions that debunk its claims that the IPUC was simply engaged
in an "as-applied" exercise. In its Petition for Declaratory Order before the IPUC, Idaho Power
admitted that it was asking for a new implementation plan for battery storage facilities. Second, it
requested that its proposed new implementation plan apply to an entire class of QFs, as opposed
to a single QF. In fact, the Power Company cited the large number of energy storage facilities as
a primary reason for the IPUC to amend its implementation of PURPA to include battery storage
QFs in the "other" category. Idaho Power's Petition for Declaratory Ruling to the IPUC pled that:
Idaho Power has now received, in a little over two weeks' time, multiple requests for a
total of 148 MW from proposed battery storage facilities and disagrees with the Proposed
Battery Storage Facilities asto the proper application of the Commission's implementation
of PURPA with regard to published avoided cost rate eligibility and the maximum contract
term applicable to such projects.e
8 "A pervasive and fundamental rule underlying the utility rate-making process is that rates are
exclusively prospective in applicatiorì...." Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Díamond State Tel. Co., 468
A.2d 1285 (Del. 1983). See also Utah Power & Light v. IPUC,l07 Idaho 47 (1984).
e Idaho Petition for Declaratory Order atp.7. Dkt. no. 38-7 atp. 20. Emphasis provided.
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to ldaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- 5
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 8 of 14
Idaho Power's request clearly did not apply to a single, or even a couple QFs. tdaho Power's
request to change the Commission's implementation plan was, in fact, designed to be generally
applicable to "multiple" QFs in the broad class of "battery storage facilities." In addition, the
Power Company's use of the phrase "proper application of the Commission's implementation" is
a misnomer in that it was actually asking the Commission to change its implementation plan which
heretofore was clear and unambiguous in its "application" to either wind/solar QFs or "all other"
QFs.
Additional evidence that the Power Company was seeking an implementation order from
the IPUC and not an application of an existing plan is its request that the Idaho PUC, "extend the
100 kW published rate cap to battery storage QFr."'o Of course 'extending' (e.g. broadening) an
existing rule (the 100 kW rate cap) to an entirely new (and heretofore unknown to the IPUC) class
of QFs is not, by definition, an application of an existing rule (a.k.a. not an "as-applied" action.)
Thus, the Power Company's claim that the IPUC was merely applying an existing implementation
plan must fail.
D. Idaho Power is Jrrdici allv Estoooed From Makins its "as-annlied"Argument Because it
Initiated this Controversy by Askine the IPUC to Implement PURPA for Battery Storaqe
Facilities
Idaho Power is playing fast and loose with the Court by now arguing the Idaho Commission
was merely engaged in an "as-applied" analysis. The Power Company initiated this case at the
IPUC by arguing just the opposite. Thus, the concept ofjudicial estoppel precludes Idaho Power
from arguing here against its own position in the lower tribunal. In Russell v. Rolfs,893 F.2d 1033
(9th Cir. 1990), Judge Trott outlined the basic parameters ofjudicial estoppel:
to Id. atp. 13. Dkt no. 38-7 atp.26
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- 6
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 9 of 14
'The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, sometimes referred to as the doctrine of preclusion of
inconsistent positions, in invoked to prevent a party from changing its position over the
course ofjudicial proceedings when such positional changes have an adverse impact on the
judicial process. See lB Moore's Federal Practice para.405[8], at238-42 (2dEd. 1988).
The distinction between an "as-applied" vs. an implementation decision is an important one in that
federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over PURPA implementation challenges and
state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over PURPA "as-applied" challenges.ll Idaho Power now
asserts this matter belongs in state court based on its representation to the Court that the IPUC
engaged in an "as-applied" analysis, yet its Petition for Declaratory Order before the IPUC argued
just the opposite. Idaho Power initiated this entire proceeding by petitioning the Idaho
Commission to issue a declaratory order implementing PUfuPA for battery storage facilities.
In its Petition for Declaratory Order that initiated this docket before the IPUC, Idaho Power
makes multiple references to the fact that it was requesting the IPUC to implement PURPA for the
energy storage class of QFs. First, Idaho Power admits that the Commission had never
implemented any PURPA policy with respect to battery storage facilities:
The status of and applicability of the Commission's implementation of PURPA with regard
to proposed battery storage facilities was not considered and/or addressed in the
Commission's determinations as to published rate eligibility cap, differentiation of
applicable avoided cost rates to different generation technologies, or its determinations
regarding other contractual terms and conditions, such as contract term.
In short, Idaho Power asserted (admitted) that the Idaho Commission had no implementation plan
in place for battery storage QFs. In addition, Idaho Power asserted to the Idaho Commission that:
[it] seeks a determination from the Commission as to the proper avoided cost rates, as well
as the proper contractual terms and conditions applicable to the Proposed Battery Storage
Facilities Schedule 73 requests for PURPA pricing and contracts.l2
tt Exelon Wind, I, LLC v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 388 15tr' Cir. 2014).
12 Idaho Power Petition for Declaratory Order at p. 5. Dkt. no. 38-7 at 19
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- 7
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 10 of 14
The determination of proper avoided cost rates, contractual term and contractual conditions are
quintessentially implementation functions, as applied claims are found when the Commission
"failed to adhere to its own implementation plans."l3 The Idaho Commission had already
implemented a plan for wind/solar and "all other" QFs, but clearly had no implementation plan
specific to battery storage QFs. Thus, an "as-applied" request would not have requested the IPUC
make an initial determination as to avoided cost rates or contract term or contract conditions. An
"as-applied" request would have simply asked the Commission to impose its already implemented
avoided cost rates, contract term and contract conditions, e.g. "adhere to its implementation plans."
More damaging, however, for ldaho Power's position is that it explicitly conceded (quoted above)
in its petition to the IPUC that the Commission had never implemented PURPA for energy storage
QFs. Thus, Idaho Power is judicially estopped from asserting now that the Idaho Commission was
engaged in an "as-applied" exercise rather than responding to its request to implement a new
regime for battery storage QFs.
IV.
IDAHO POWER FAILS TO GRASP THE CONCEPT OF PREEMPTION AND
MISSTATES THE BLACK LETTER OF THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Franklins' Brief succinctly observed that it is physically impossible to comply with the
IPUC's new implementation plan and FERC's definition of an energy storage QF. According to
the IPUC, an energy storage QF using solar energy for 5lo/o of its energy inputs will be deemed a
solar QF for PURPA implementation purposes. However, energy storage facilities, such as the
Franklin QFs, have the ability, and are specifically allowed by FERC, to vary the sources of
renewable energy inputs. Thus, one day the primary energy input may be solar and the next day
the primary energy input may be wind or geothermal or biomass or hydro. Each change in the
t3 Occidental Chem Corp. v. La. PSC,494 F.Supp.2d40l,410 (MD LA2007)
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- 8
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 11 of 14
primary energy input, according to the Idaho implementation scheme will result in a potentially
different avoided cost rate and different contract term and different contract conditions. Pursuant
to the new IPUC implementation scheme, one day Franklins' QFs may be entitled to a twenty-year
contract (primary energy input biomass for example) and the next day they will be entitled to a
two-year contract (primary energy input wind for example) and the following day they may revert
to a twenty-year contract (primary energy input waste energy for example). Clearly an absurd
result on its face, but hardly an extreme example of the real-world operational ability of an energy
storage QF. FERC has unequivocally ruled that the magnitude and variety of renewable energy
inputs to a battery storage QF is irrelevant to its eligibility as a QF under PURPA.T4 Thus, the
Idaho implementation scheme is impossibly at odds with the Federal definition of an energy
storage QF which definition is completely indffirent as to the magnitude of any individual
renewable energy input to the energy storage QF.
Idaho Power's Response does not address this impossibility hurdle. Instead, it argues that
the concept of Federal Preemption does not apply to orders of the IPUC or apparently even to
FERC orders either. Idaho Power complains that, "Plaintiffs do not challenge a state law; instead,
they challenge the IPUC's decision ..."15 and that "Plaintiffs do not identify a single federal law
that is in conflict with the IPUC's decision..."l6 The Power Company's arguments are simply
wrong. PUC orders (not just "state law") that conflict with FERC orders (not just federal law) are
subject to federal preemption.lT
ta Luz, supra at pp l0 I I.
15 Idaho Power Response at p. 20.
t6 td.
r7 Hughes v. Talen Energt Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297, 194 L. Ed 2d 414 (2016),
Coalitionfor Competitive Electricity v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 567-568 (SD NY 2017).
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to ldaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- 9
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 12 of 14
V FRANKLIN DOES NOT ASSERT A FLAWED APPLICATION OF THE IPUC's
IMPLEMENTATION OF PURPA - RATHER IT ASSERTS A FLAWED
IMPLEMENTATION OF PURPA
Idaho Power wrongly asserts that "the gravamen of Plaintiff s challenge is that the IPUC
improperly applied its own PURPA implementation plan."l8 Plaintiff s would have been satisfied
had the Idaho Commission applied its implementation plain that was in existence as of the time
the plaintiffs made their request for PURPA contracts with Idaho Power. The Commission in
response to Idaho Power's Petition for Declaratory Order, however, devised a new implementation
plan that is fatally flawed in that it attempts to place the IPUC in the shoes of FERC by making
QF eligibility determinations under PURPA and it denies the very existence of battery storage
QFs. Thus, Idaho Power's assertion (cited above) is misleading at best. The text of the Franklin's
complaint atparagraph 13, reproduced below, is clear on this point:
The Defendant's ruling is based on their finding that that (sic) energy storage systems are
not distinct QFs but, instead are defined by the nature of the source of their energy input.
This ruling contravenes an express FERC ruling on the nature of energy storage QFs. The
Defendant's ruling deprives the Franklin Energy Storage projects of their right to the ldaho
Commission's more favorable contract terms and rates available to all "other" QFs and
instead restricts them to the less favorable contract terms and rates that are available, under
the Idaho Commission's implementation of PURPA, to just solar and wind QFs.
The implementation action at issue here is the Commission's improper classihcation of all battery
storage facilities rather its acceptance of battery storage facilities at face value pursuant to their
status as FERC certified energy storage QFs. Had the Commission properly implemented PURPA
by deferring to FERC's jurisdiction to classify QFs, the result would have been an application of
the Commission's pre-existing implementation plan. However, the Idaho Commission did not
improperly apply its existing implementation plan - it created a new implementation plan that
improperly classifies the Franklin Energy Storage QFs as solar QFs.
18 Idaho Power Response at p. 15. Dkt no. 38 atp.20.
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- l0
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 13 of 14
DATED this 30th day of November 2018.
/s/ Robert C. Huntley, Esq
/s/ Peter J. Richardson, Esa.
Attomeys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of November 2018,I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the
CM/ECF system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons.
Brandon Karpen bra4¡!,qIlkaæ_çn aøp a uc . i daho. g
ScottZanzig s c ott.zanzi s(d a g. i daho. go v
Steven B. Anderson sb_ê@asblaw.corn
Wade L. Woodard wlw(¿Ðarhlaw.cqrtt
Donovan E. V/alker dwa I ke r@,i dahop o w_e r. ç qg1
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Idaho Power's Response to its Motion for Summary Judgment -- l1
Case 1:18-cv-00236-REB Document 46 Filed 11/30/18 Page 14 of 14