HomeMy WebLinkAbout200507201st response of IPC to Windland.pdfBARTON L. KLINE , ISB # 1526
MONICA B. MOEN , ISB # 5734
Idaho Power Company
1221 West Idaho Street
P. O. Box 70
Boise , Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 388-2682FAX: (208) 388-6936
E-mail: BKline~idahopower.com
MMoen ~ idahopower.com
Attorneys for Idaho Power Company
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BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTiliTIES COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF
IDAHO POWER COMPANY FOR AN
ORDER TEMPORARilY SUSPENDING
IDAHO POWER'S PURPA OBLIGATION
TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS TO
PURCHASE ENERGY GENERATED BY
WIND-POWERED SMALL POWER
PRODUCTION FACiliTIES.
CASE NO. IPC-E-O5-
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'
RESPONSE TO WINDLAND
INCORPORATED'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REOUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO
IDAHO POWER COMPANY
COMES NOW , Idaho Power Company ("Idaho Power" or "the Company
and in response to Windland Incorporated's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests For
Production to Idaho Power Company dated July 13 , 2005, herewith submits the following
information:
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO.: In the Petition, you state that in addition to the
wind qualifying facility ("OF") contracts you have already entered into and those certain
other applications before the Commission for further wind OF contracts, you have had
contacts from developers intending to pursue new wind- OF projects with a nameplate
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO WIND LAND INCORPORATED'
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO IDAHO POWER COMPANY Page
capacity of 193 MW. Please provide the following in response to this Interrogatory:
(a) The county and state where each of these proposed projects while be
located;
(b) The MW and nameplate capacity of each of these proposed wind OF
projects;
(c) The date when each of these projects Will be completed and
operational;
(d) The date when official application was made to Idaho Power
Company to enter into an c;:tgreement to purchase power from each
proposed wind OF project; and
(e) The time when you reached agreement to purchase power from each
of these wind OF projects.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGA TORY NO.Idaho Power objects to
Interrogatory No.1 on the grounds that it requires the Company to provide detailed
information that OF wind developers filing interconnection requests with Idaho Power
regard as valuable trade secrets. Wind developers are very concerned about having
detailed information about their projects, such as location and size disclosed, as such
disclosure can provide competitors with valuable competitive information regarding
potential wind sites and wind resource development. Idaho Power is willing to state that
164 MW of the 193 MW of potential OF wind project capacity would come from projects
located in the state of Idaho.
Rather than provide more detailed information , the Company hopes that
this description of how the 193 MW amount was developed will suffice.
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO WINDLAND INCORPORATED'
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO IDAHO POWER COMPANY Page 2
In June of 2005 Idaho Power management requested that Randy Allphin
the Company s Manager of OF contracts , determine an amount of wind project capacity
that would present a realistic estimate of potential OF wind resources that might be
presented to the Company for purchase. As might be anticipated, Mr. Allphin receives
many inquiries from wind power developers located both in Idaho and outside of Idaho
seeking information regarding the possibility of selling the output of potential OF wind
projects to Idaho Power. Some of those projects will proceed to actual development
and some will not. Mr. Allphin was directed to review his database of information and
develop a tabulation that constitutes a realistic estimate of wind project capacity that
might be presented to the Company for purchase via OF contracts. The 193
amount is the product of that analysis. The total capacity amount of potential OF wind
resources presented by OF wind developers to Mr. Allphin exceeds the 193 MW by a
considerable amount. A number of OF wind projects were eliminated by Mr. Allphin
because, in his judgment, they believed they were not sufficiently firm or sufficiently
developed to constitute wind projects that might realistically be expected to be
presented to the Company. Mr. Allphin exercised his judgment and experience in
developing the 193 MW amount. A redacted version of Mr. Allphin s analysis is
enclosed.
The response to this interrogatory was prepared by John R. Gale, Vice
President of Regulatory Affairs, Idaho Power Company, in consultation with Barton L.
Kline, Senior Attorney, Idaho Power Company.
INTERROGATORY NO.2: In the Petition and John R. Gale s Direct
Testimony, you assert that the bids in response to the 2005 RFPs were not reflective of
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO WINDLAND INCORPORATED'
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO IDAHO POWER COMPANY Page 3
market prices for wind generation and were unduly influenced by prices and contracts
available to wind resources under PURPA Please state all facts and support for this
assertion and identify all documents supporting such assertion.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGA TORY NO.2: Please see Mr. Gale s direct
testimony on pages 10 and 11. A copy of the Montana Commission Order No. 6633(b)
which is referenced in Mr. Gale s testimony in which the Montana Commission
addresses the Judith Gap Wind Project is enclosed.
The response to this interrogatory was prepared by John R. Gale , Vice
President of Regulatory Affairs, Idaho Power Company, in consultation with Barton L.
Kline, Senior Attorney, Idaho Power Company.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.Please produce a copy of each
and every document received from or submitted to expert witnesses in relation to all of
your assertions raised in your Petition iii this matter.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Idaho Power
has not utilized any outside expert witnesses in this case.
The response to this request for production was prepared by Barton L.
Kline, Senior Attorney, Idaho Power Company.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.Please produce a copy of each
and every document or exhibit identified in or related in any way to your answers to
Wind land's Interrogatories.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.See response to
Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2.
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO WINDLAND INCORPORATED'
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO IDAHO POWER COMPANY Page 4
The response to this interrogatory was prepared by Barton L. Kline, Senior
Attorney, Idaho Power Company.
DATED: This 20th day of July, 2005.
Barton L. Kline
Monica B. Moen
Attorney for Idaho Power Company
IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO WINDLAND INCORPORATED'
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO IDAHO POWER COMPANY Page 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of July, 2005, I served a true
and correct copy of IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO WINDLAND
INCORPORATED'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION upon the following named parties by the method indicated below , and
addressed to the following:
Scott Woodbury
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Public Utilities Commission
472 W. Washington Street
O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0074
swoodbu ~ puc.state.id.
Peter J. Richardson
Richardson & O'Leary PLLC
515 N. 27th Street
O. Box 7218
Boise, I D 83707
peter ~ richardsonandolearv. com
James T. Carkulis
Exergy Development Group of Idaho LLC
1424 Dodge Avenue
O. Box 5212
Helena, MT 59604
Richard L. Storro
Director, Power Supply
A vista Corporation
1411 E. Mission Avenue
O. Box 3727, MSC-
Spokane, W A 99220-3727
dick.storro ~ avistacorp.com
R. Blair Strong
Paine , Hamblen , Coffin , Brooke & Miller
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane , WA 99201-3505
r. blai r. stron~ainehamblen .com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, Page
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 334-3762
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 938-7904
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (509) 495-4272
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (509) 838-0007
Dean J. Miller
McDevitt & Miller LLP
420 W. Bannock Street
O. Box 2564
Boise , ID 83701
oe ~ mcdevitt-miller.com
Jared Grover
Cassia Wind LLC and
Cassia Gulch Wind Park LLC
3635 Kingswood Drive
Boise, 10 83704
Armand Eckert
Magic Wind LLC
716-B East 4900 North
Buhl, ID 83316
Glenn Ikemoto
Energy Vision LLC
672 Blair Avenue
Piedmont, CA 94611
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acbell.net
Bob Lively
PacifiCorp
One Utah Center, 23rd Floor
201 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84140
bob.livel
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acificor com
Lisa Nordstrom
PacifiCorp
825 N.E. Multnomah , Suite 1800
Portland, OR 97232
lisa.nordstrom
(g?
acificor com
William M. Eddie
Advocates For the West
1320 W. Franklin Street
O. Box 1612
Boise, 10 83701
billeddie
(g?
rmci. net
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, Page 2
. Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 336-6912
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
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FAX
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S. Mail
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FAX
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S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (510)217-2239
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S. Mail
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FAX (801) 220-2798
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S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (503) 813-7252
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 342-8286
Troy Gagliano
917 S.W. Oak Street , Suite 303
Portland, OR 97205
David Hawk, Director
Energy Natural Resources
R. Simplot Company
999 Main Street
O. Box 27
Boise ID 83702
dhawk
(g?
simplotcom
R. Scott Pasley
Assistant General Counsel
J. R. Simplot Company
999 Main Street
O. Box 27
Boise, I D 83702
~asley
(g?
simplotcom
William J. Batt
John R. Hammond , Jr.
Batt & Fisher, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500
O. Box 1308
Boise, ID 83701
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battfisher.com
jrh (g? battfisher.com
Michael Heckler
Director of Marketing & Development
Windland Incorporated
7669 W. Riverside Drive, Suite 102
Boise, ID 83714
mheckler(g?windland.com
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 389-7333
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 389-7464
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail'
FAX (208) 331-2400
Hand Delivered
S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 375-2894
BARTON L. KLINE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, Page 3
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:;Tr; ~Q./UJ PUBLICj iLll1t.S COf1HISSrON
TT A CHMENT TO
RESPONSE TO
INTERROGATORY NO.
An :1 DACO R PCa mpa ny
Cogeneration and Small Power Production
IPUC Case No. - IPC-e-005-
Peter Richardson - Production Request 1, item 2
Pro ect Name or Reference Plant Size (kW
IPUC A roved A reements
Fossil Gulch Wind Park 10,500
Thousand Springs Wind Park 10,500
Pilgrim Stage Wind Park 10,500
Tuana Gulch Wind Park 10,500
Oregon Trails Wind Park 10,500
Horseshoe Bend Wind Park 000
61,500
US Geothermal Raft River #1 10,000
Total 71,500 71,500
Status Resource Type
IPUC Approved
IPUC Approved
IPUC Approved
IPUC Approved
IPUC Approved
IPUC Approved
Wind
Wind
Wind
Wind
Wind
Wind
IPUC Approved Geothermal
Agreements Pending IPUC Approval
Burley Butte Wind Park 10,500
Golden Valley Wind Park 10,500
Total 21,000 21,000
Pending IPUC Approval
Pending IPUC Approval
Wind
Wind
Developers intending to Pursue AgreementsConfidential #1 3,000Confidential #2 3,000Confidential #3 10,000Confidential #4 3,000Confidential #5 3 000Total Biomass 22,000
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Biomass
Biomass
Biomass
Biomass
Biomass
22,000
Confidential #6 30,000
Total CHP 30,000 30,000
Confidential #7 10,000
Confidential #8 10,000
Total Geothermal 20,000 20,000
Confidential #9 500
Total Hydro 500 500
Confidential #10 000
Confidential #11 10,500
Confidential #12 10,500
Confidential #13 10,500
Confidential #14 10,500
Confidential #15 30,000
Confidential #16 10,000
Confidential #17 25,000
Confidential #18 18,000
Confidential #19 18,000
Confidential #20 000
Confidential #21 10,000
Total Wind 193,000
Total Intending to
Pursue Agreements 267,500
Confidential CHP
Confidential
Confidential
Geothermal
Geothermal
Confidential Hydro
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
Confidential Wind
7/20/2005 IPca Wind Petition data
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TT A CHMENT TO
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INTERROGATORY NO.
Service Date: March 31, 2005
Docket D2005.
Final Order No. 6633b
REGARDING PROPOSED JUDITH GAP WIND POWER
PUR CHASE AGREEMENT
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
ABLE OF CONTENTS
APPEARANCES.......................................................................................................................
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................
LEGAL BACKGROUND......................................................................................................... 3
PRELIMINARY LEGAL MATTERS
....................................................... ......................
........ 5
Data requests..........................................................................................................................
Confidential information........................................................................................................ 7
Dismissal of intervenors.................................................................................................... ..... 8
NORTHWESTERN ENERGY'S APPLICATION................................. ................................
Prefiled testimony of Patrick R. Corcoran ........ ....................................................................... 9
Prefiled testimony of Steven E. Lewis (Lands Energy Consulting) ........................................
Prefiled testimony of Mark D. Thompson..................................................... ................... ......
Market outlook.................................................................................................................
Resource needs assessment....... ....................................................................................... 20
Modeling.... .................................... ................................... ................ ............................... 23
Judith Gap wind project.......................................................
................ ............................
INTERVENOR PREFILED TESTIMONY ..........................................................................
Prefiled response testimony of John W. Wilson (for Montana Consumer Counsel)................
Prefiled response testimony of Ann Gravatt (for Renewable Northwest Project).................... 27
Prefiled response testimony of Elliot Mainzer (for Renewable Northwest Project) ................
Prefiled response testimony of Michael J. King (for PPL Montana)....................................... 32
Prefiled response testimony of W. Kent Palmerton (for PPL Montana).................................. 35
Prefiled response testimony of William A. Pascoe (for Exergy)............................................. 39
Public comments ............. ...... ..........
........................ ........................................ ...
.... ............... 42
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES FINDINGS .................................................................................
The RFP process..................................................................................................................
Price
............................. ............................. ..... ................................................... .... ...............
Integration costs...................
................................................................................................
Integration cost cap
..............................................................................................................
Portfolio analysis
............................................... ........ ................... .....
................................... 55
Transmission congestion and reliability costs
......................................................................
Quantity and term of the Judith Gap power purchase agreement ........................................ 62
Other non-price considerations
............................ ........................ .... ...... ...... ....... .....
............ 62
Renewable Energy Credits (green tags)
........ """"".'.".". .....
""""."'.""."""'.""".""""""" 63
FINDINGS OF FACT .............................................................................................................
CONCLUSIONS OF LA W.....................................................................................................
ORDER
............ ..... .......... ... ...... ...... ........................ ................................... ... ....... .... ................
Service Date: March 31 , 2005
DEP ARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
IN THE MATTER OF the Application of
NorthWestern Energy for Advanced Approval
Of Certain Proposed Electricity Power Supply
Purchase Agreements
UTILITY DIVISION
DOCKET NO. D2005.
ORDER NO. 6633b
FINAL ORDER REGARDING PROPOSED
J!ill!TII GAP WIlW POWER PVRC:gASE AGREEMEN,I
APPEARAN CES
FOR THE APPLICANT:
NorthWestern Energy
Ross Richardson, 116 West Granite, Butte, Montana 59701
Dennis Lopach, 208 North Montana Avenue, Suite 104, Helena, Montana 59601
FOR THE INTERVENORS:
Exergy Development Group, LLC
Marjorie L. Thomas, Dick and Thomas, P., 17 South Main Street, P.O. Box 645, Butte,
Montana 59703
Susan Callaghan, Susan Callaghan, P., 17 South Main Street, Butte, Montana 59701
Montana Consumer Counsel
Robert A. Nelson, Montana Consumer Counsel, 616 Helena Avenue, Room 300, P.
Box 201703, Helena, Montana 59620-1703
Renewable Northwest Project, Natural Resources Defense Council, Human Resource
Council - District XI and Montana Environmental Information Center
Charles E. Magraw, 501 8th Avenue, Helena, Montana 59601
PPL Montana, LLC
Michael J. Rieley, 24 West Sixth Avenue, Suite 4A, P.O. Box 1211 , Helena, Montana
59624
Carl Gilmore II, Preston Gates Ellis, LLP, 925 4th Avenue, Suite 2900, Seattle
Washington 98104-1158
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 2
Before:
Greg Jergeson, Chairman
Brad Molnar, Vice Chairman
Doug Mood, Commissioner
Robert H. Raney, Commissioner
Thomas J. Schneider, Commissioner
Commission Staff:
Eric Eck, Utility Division
Will Rosquist, Utility Division
Kate Whitney, Utility Division
Leroy Beeby, Utility Division
Al Brogan, Staff Attorney
INTRODUCTION
In this order the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC or Commission) considers
and issues its decision on an application from NorthWestern Energy (NWE) for approval of an
electric power supply agreement between it and Judith Gap Energy, LLC (Judith Gap).2. On February 7 2005, NWE filed an application with the Commission asking that the
PSC make the following findings on a power purchase agreement between NWE and Judith Gap
Energy and on a power purchase agreement between NWE and NorthWestern Corporation
Colstrip Unit 4: (1) the agreement is in the public interest; (2) the agreement resulted from a
reasonable effort by the default supplier to comply with the objectives in ~ 69-419, MCA, and
the Default Supply Resource Planning and Procurement Rules, ARM 38.8201-29; and (3) the
price, quantity, duration and related terms of the agreement are reasonable.
Due to the expiration of the federal production tax credit at the end of 2005, NWE
requested the Commission consider the wind power purchase agreement between NWE and
Judith Gap on an expedited basis. NWE stated in the application that approval by the
Commission is required no later than March 31 2005. The NWE application was noticed on
February 9,2005. The Commission decided to bifurcate the docket and consider the power
purchase agreement between NWE and Judith Gap Energy (wind contract) fIrst, followed after
March 31 by the Colstrip 4 contract. Procedural Order No. 6633 was issued on February 25,
2005 establishing an extremely expedited schedule for consideration of the wind contract and
setting a public hearing for March 17, 2005. The Commission granted intervention to Montana
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 3
Consumer Counsel (MCC), Exergy Development Group (Exergy), PPL Montana (PPL), and
Renewable Northwest Project (RNP), Natural Resources Defense Council, Human Resource
Council - District XI, and Montana Environmental Information Center (Environmental & Low
Income Group). The Commission limited the scope of this phase of the proceeding to issues
directly related to the wind contract and prohibited access to proprietary information by Exergy
and PPL. The hearing was held March 17 and 18, 2005. A satellite public hearing was held in
Billings March 28, 2005.
Briefs
NWE, MCC, Environmental & Low Income Group, Exergy and PPL submitted post-
hearing briefs in this Docket.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
NWE is a default supplier of electricity under Montana law. ~~ 69-208(3) and
210(1), MCA. As part of providing default supply service NWE may apply to the Commission
for "advanced approval of a power supply purchase agreement." ~ 69-421(1), MCA.6. Section 69-421 , MCA, reads in pertinent part as follows:
(1) A default supplier may apply to the commission for advanced approval
of a power supply purchase agreement that is:
(a) not executed; or
(b) executed with a provision that allows termination of the
agreement if the commission does not find the agreement reasonable.
(3) (a) The commission may approve or deny, in whole or in part, an
application for advanced approval of a power supply purchase agreement.
(b) The commission may consider all relevant information known
up to the time that the administrative record in the proceeding is closed in
the evaluation of an application for advanced approval of a power supply
purchase agreement.
(c) A commission order granting advanced approval of a power
supply purchase agreement must include the following findings:
(i) advanced approval of all or part of the agreement is in
the public interest;
(ii) the agreement resulted from a reasonable effort by the
default supplier to comply with the objectives in 69-419 and the rules
adopted pursuant to 69-419; and
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 4
(iii) the price, quantity, duration, and other contract terms
directly related to the price, quantity, and duration of the power supply
purchase agreement are reasonable.
(d) The commission order may include other findings that the
commission determines are necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter to the contrary, if the
commission has issued an order containing the findings required under
subsection (3)( c), the commission may not subsequently disallow the
recovery of costs incurred under the agreement based on contrary findings.
(6) Nothing limits the commission s ability to subsequently, in any future
cost recovery proceeding inquire into the manner in which the default
supplier has managed a power supply purchase agreement as part of its
overall portfolio. The commission may subsequently disallow default
supply costs that result from the failure of a default supplier to reasonably
administer power supply purchase agreements in the context of its overall
default supply portfolio management and service obligations.
Section 69-419, MCA, reads in pertinent part:
(1) The default supplier shall:
(a) plan for future default supply resource needs;
(b) manage a portfolio of default supply resources; and
(c) procure new default supply resources when needed;
(2) The default supplier shall pursue the following objectives in fulfilling
its duties pursuant to subsection (1):
(a) provide adequate and reliable default supply services at the
lowest long-term total cost;
(b) conduct an efficient default supply resource planning and
procurement process that evaluates the full range of cost-effective
electricity supply and demand-side management options;
(c) identify and cost-effectively manage and mitigate risks related
to its obligation to provide default electricity supply service;
(d) use open, fair, and competitive procurement processes
whenever possible; and
(e) provide default supply services at just and reasonable rates.
The Commission s administrative rules adopted pursuant to ~ 69-419 are at
ARM 38.8201-28.
In considering the NWE application the Commission, guided by
~ 69-421 (3)( c), MCA, must determine 1) whether advanced approval of the Judith Gap
agreement is in the public interest; 2) whether the agreement resulted from a reasonable
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 5
effort to comply with the objectives of 9 69-419 and related administrative rules; and 3)
whether the price, quantity, duration and related terms of the agreement are reasonable.
PRELIMINARY LEGAL MATTERS
Data requests
10.On March 14, 2005 , Exergy filed an Objection to Staff Action Resolving
Discovery Disputes. Exergy asserts that Commission Staff narrowed the scope of the
inquiry too much.
11. The Commission, at a regularly scheduled work session on March 4, 2005,
granted Exergy s petition to intervene subject to conditions that precluded Exergy or its
counselor outside experts from having access to confidential information and that
restricted the proceeding to items directly connected with the Wind Contract.
12.Exergy asserts that the information sought in XRG-, XRG-2 and XRG-3 is
relevant to NWE' s assertion that capacity from dispatchable resources is available to
integrate wind power and thus directly related to the wind contract." First, Exergy
mischaracterizes the information requested. Exergy asked for information regarding
criteria for providing firm resources to cover peal loads (XRG-l), reserve margin used in
peak load planning (XRG-2) and hourly peak loads and sources of supply for serving
those loads (XRG-3). This information is not directly related to the Wind Contract. This
is information that relates to the operational policies and conditions of the default supply.
Second, Exergy mischaracterizes NWE's position on resources necessary to integrate
wind power. In a File Memorandum dated March 5 2005 by Mark Thompson, and
provided to all parties in response to PSC-007, NWE described possible methods of
integrating wind power. Only some of the methods relied on dispatchable resources
being available to NWE.
13. Exergy asserts that the information sought in XRG-17, XRG-18 is about how
ancillary services are provided currently provided to default supply, is relevant for
comparison purposes and should be available from NWE Default Supply even though
NWE is functionally separate from NWE Transmission. The Commission does not need
to consider the questionable relevancy of the requested information. NWE is required by
FERC to maintain NWE Transmission as functionally separate, see Order 888, 61 FR
DOCKET NO. D2005.ORDER NO. 6633b Page 6
540 (May 10, 1996), and to adhere to standards of conduct, see Order 889 61 FR
737 (May 10, 1996) and Order 2004, 68 FR 69 134 (Dec. 11 , 2003). The standards of
conduct limit the information that NWE Transmission can share with NWE Default
Supply unless the information is released to the public. Although functional separation
creates a separation that is not supported by a legal entity analysis, the Commission
concludes that functional separation provides a basis for limiting access to information.
14.Exergy asserts that the information sought in XRG-21 is about how NWE
plans to provide ancillary services in the future and is relevant to the costs of wind
integration. XRG- 21 asked for "studies or documents. . . that discuss alternatives NWE
may be considering for future provision of Imbalance, Regulation, Load Following and
Contingency Reserves for the default supply." XRG-21 is not restricted to information
regarding the provision of ancillary services related to the Wind Contract. Rather, XRG-
21 seeks information about NWE's planning and operational strategy in serving the
default supply. This information is not directly related to the Wind Contract.
15. Exergy asserts that the information sought in XRG-42 "addresses energy
imbalance costs for generators and how they might be determined in the future." XRG-
42 requested "a complete copy of the Generation Imbalance tariff filing by NWE'
transmission function with FERC, which has been withdrawn" and requested a detailed
description of "the reasons for withdrawing the filing." The tariff is a public document
and is available on FERC's website under Docket ER04-1106-000 and the reasons for
withdrawal are explained in the Unopposed Motion of NorthWestern Corp. to Partially
Withdraw Tariff Filing filed in FERC Docket ER04-11 06-002. If Exergy needs to
examine the documents to determine that they are relevant to the Wind Contract, they are
available without placing a burden on NWE. There is no showing that the documents are
directly related to the Wind Contract.
16. Exergy asserts that the information requested by XRG-44 "deals with how
NWE currently provides ancillary services for the control area which is relevant. XRG-
44 asked for "monthly Control Performance Standard Surveys" and for "NWE's current
LIO value." These are data that reflect various measures of Area Control Error (ACE).
ACE is "the instantaneous difference between actual and scheduled interchange, taking
into account the effects of frequency bias (and time error or unilateral inadvertent
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 7
interchange if automatic correction for either is part of the system s AGC).WECC
MORC Definitions at p. 1. This data is neither related to how NWE currently provides
ancillary services nor directly related to the Wind Contract.
Confidential information
17. Exergy asserts that for information deemed confidential there was no prima
facie showing that provided a clear legal basis for confidentiality. Exergy s assertion is
incorrect. On February 9, 2005, NWE filed a Motion for Protective Order seeking
protection of specific information regarding parties from whom NWE received bids or
responses to the RFP, including the identity of the bidder, the quantity, term, location of
delivery of the power, prices and pricing structure of all bids or responses; specific
information regarding NWE's evaluation of bids; and NWE's detailed load statistics. On
February 17, 2005, the Commission issued Protective Order No. 6633. The Commission,
in considering NWE's Motion for a Protective Order, made an independent determination
that NWE had made a prima facie showing that information described is confidential
information as defined in ARM 38.5001(1).
18.Exergy asserts that the Commission erred in denying its counsel and outside
expert access to confidential information in accordance with ARM 38.5023. PPL
asserted a similar continuing objection. The Commission recognizes that under normal
circumstances an intervenor s counsel is granted access to confidential information and
counsel is permitted to provide an unaffiliated expert access to confidential information.
However, the Commission may waive the application of any of its procedure rules when
justice requires. ARM 38.305. The Commission carefully considered the interests of
the private intervenors 1 that it could protect and the interests of NWE and other bidders in
maintaining the confidentiality of asserted trade secrets. The Commission reached a
careful, reasoned balance of the competing interests.
19.The Commission determined that the private intervenors have a protectable
interest in an open, fair and competitive process, see ~ 69-419(2)(d), MCA, and an
interest in presenting their views and arguing their positions to the Commission. The
Commission determined that if the process is fair, open and competitive, the private
intervenors do not have a protectable interest in having their bid selected and that the
1 "Private intervenors" means intervenors other than the Montana Consumer Counsel.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 8
property interests of NWE and the other bidders outweigh the private intervenors' interest
in access to confidential information.
20.The Commission allowed the private intervenors to engage in discovery
regarding all non-confidential information directly related to the Wind Contract. The
Commission allowed the private intervenors to present their respective cases and to cross-
examine witnesses. The only restriction placed on private intervenors was to prohibit
access to the confidential information of others. In its decision limiting the private
intervenors' access to confidential information , the Commission specifically waived
ARM 38.5023.
21. The Commission and the MCC had access to the confidential information and
used it in the performance of their functions.
22. The Commission ovelTules Exergy s Objection to Staff Action Resolving
Discovery Disputes.
Dismissal of intervenors
23. At the close of the technical hearing, NWE renewed its motion that Exergy and
PPL be dismissed from the proceeding. The Commission carefully considered the
appropriateness of allowing Exergy and PPL to intervene subject to certain conditions.
At the time of the renewed motion, no party had offered any additional evidence or
reasoning that would support dismissal of these intervenors. As discussed above, the
private intervenors have certain limited protect able interests. Intervention subject to the
restrictions is appropriate. The Commission denies NWE's renewed motion to dismiss
Exergy and PPL from the proceeding.
NORTHWESTERN ENERGY'S APPLICATION
24.A copy of the agreement between NWE and Judith Gap Energy is included with the
application. A summary of the agreement and a project description are provided by NWE at
pages 3-6 of the application. Under the agreement, NWE would purchase from Judith Gap the
energy from a 135-150 MW wind farm at an average price of $31.60/MWh2 of delivered energy
(with the federal production tax credit and pending state property tax reduction for wind
2 NWE's response to an MCC data request (MCC-13) indicated the con-ect annual average price of the wind contract
is actually $31.71/Mwh.
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 9
facilities). The contract term is 20 years. The estimated capacity factor is 370/0 or greater and the
annual estimated energy to be produced is 437,562 MWh, which is about 7% of the annual
default supply resource requirement. Judith Gap Energy will provide a performance guarantee of
$8 million for liquidated damages.
25.The wind farm will connect directly to NWE's system via a new substation on a NWE
230KV line that runs through the project. Judith Gap will arrange and pay for the
interconnection to the NWE transmission system in accordance with an agreement between the
parties.
Prefiled testimony of Patrick R. Corcoran
26.Mr. Corcoran, NWE's policy witness, recounted NWE's (and its predecessor Montana
Power Co. 's) activities as the default electricity supplier over the past few years leading up to
this application. As part of this background information, he noted that NWE conducted a wind
RFP in 2002, which resulted in the selection of the bid by Wind Park Solutions, now known as
Judith Gap Energy LLC. He said Wind Park was ultimately asked to re-bid into the 2004
Request For Proposals (RFP).
27. According to Mr. Corcoran, NWE's 2004 RFP and this application for advance
approval are steps to implement the default supply plan that was the subject of PSC review last
year. He said NWE proceeded on the assumption that NWE's plan is generally acceptable in the
areas the Commission did not address in its comments on the plan in August 2004. Mr.
Corcoran said NWE has addressed in this advance approval application the following concerns
identified by the Commission in its plan comments last year:
Too-complex modeling:According to Mr. Corcoran, the complex portfolio modeling
and analysis for a 20-year period using NWE's PCI/GentraderQY software was complemented in
this filing by a simpler modeling version that was used by Lands Energy Consulting when it
conducted its RFP review.
Lack of long-term focus: Mr. Corcoran said both NWE and Lands Energy incorporated
a long-term focus into their RFP modeling, including a 20-year net present value analysis of each
bid and a 20-year analysis of the portfolios developed from the shortlisted RFP bids.
Post-2007 replacement of PPL baseload contracts: Mr. Corcoran pointed out that the
2004 RFP requested post-2007 resource bids.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 10
Best mix of resources: Mr. Corcoran said NWE used the RFP results to repeat the
modeling that had been conducted for the 2004 default supply plan using actual bid information
and that the resulting analyses and updated default supply plan support the inclusion of the
proposed resources, including wind, in the portfolio.
28.Mr. Corcoran stated that NWE's resource decisions reflected in this filing are based on
the updated default supply plan that resulted from the RFP modeling using actual resource costs
from the bids.
29. According to Mr. Corcoran, NWE conducted its 2004 RFP process in compliance with
PSC rules. He described the role of Lands Energy Consulting, an independent flfm hired by
NWE, in administering the RFP process, analyzing the 53 conforming bid proposals, and
developing and forwarding to NWE a "blind" preliminary shortlist. Mr. Corcoran said NWE
then conducted its own analyses of the short-listed bids to select the ones to include on a final
list; at that point, Lands Energy supplied NWE the identities of the bidders chosen for final
analysis. Mr. Corcoran noted that the testimonies of Steven E. Lewis of Lands Energy and of
Mark D. Thompson ofNWE provide details of the RFP activities. He said NWE and Lands
Energy thoroughly documented their RFP activities and parties that review the documentation
will understand the process and the reasons for the decisions that NWE made.
30. Mr. Corcoran commented that NWE consulted throughout the process with its
Technical Advisory Committee, the members of which serve in an advisory-only role.
31. Mr. Corcoran described NWE's Energy Supply Board as the entity that made major
decisions in the RFP process. The Energy Supply Board is comprised ofNWE's chief executive
officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, corporate legal counsel, and Mr. Corcoran.
32. A summary of the resource selections made by NWE as a result of the RFP was
provided by Mr. Corcoran. He said NWE has executed contracts for four short -term (less than
18 months) resources, and explained NWE would not seek pre-approval of these contracts, but
will include them for review in annual electric tracker filings. The long-term resources selected
include the Judith Gap Energy wind proposal for 135-150 MW and the Colstrip 4 unit-contingent
baseload proposal for 90 MW that are the subjects of this advanced approval docket, as well as
the dispatchable Montana First Megawatts proposal and the PPL unit-contingent, off-peak, 50
MW baseload proposal, both of which are the subjects of ongoing discussions.
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 11
33. Mr. Corcoran claimed the Judith Gap Energy and Colstrip 4 proposals are consistent
with the resource needs identified in NWE's default supply plan. Exhibit PRC-l is a table that
Mr. Corcoran said illustrates how the resource selections tie to the plan.
34. Regarding the Judith Gap wind proposal, Mr. Corcoran commented its average price
of $31. 71/MWh of delivered energy (with tax credits and proposed state property tax reductions)
beat out the other wind bids priced at $38.50/MWh and higher. Mr. Corcoran said the Judith
Gap price would result in about $34.1 million (net present value) of savings over the next highest
bid over the life of the contract. He cautioned, however, that the full price of adding wind to the
portfolio will include the costs NWE will need to incur to "fIrm" the resource. Mr. Corcoran
said NWE expects the total cost to be consistent with alternative baseload resources. He added
that including a wind resource adds product diversity to the portfolio s resource mix.
35.According to Mr. Corcoran, the PSC must issue its order on the wind contract by
March 31, 2005, in order for the project, if approved, to proceed and remain binding.
36.Mr. Corcoran s testimony also included discussions of issues that are not subjects of
the March 17 hearing, such as RFP bids not selected, bids that involved NWE affiliates, default
supply policy issues, and NWE's decision not to replace the PPL baseload contracts at this time.
These issues, along with the request for advance approval of the Colstrip 4 contract, will be taken
up in the second phase of this Docket.
Prefiled testimony of Steven E. Lewis (Lands Energy Consulting)37. Mr. Lewis is a principal and employee of Lands Energy Consulting. Lands Energy
has provided consulting services related to the July 2, 2004 RFP issued by NWE. Previously
Lands Energy participated with EES Consulting on a dispatchable resource RFP in 2002 and
administered a wind resource RFP in 2003.
38.NWE contacted Lands Energy in March 2004 seeking its involvement in one or more
resource solicitations during 2004. Initial discussions contemplated two RFPs. The first would
be a pre-2007 RFP that would combine baseload and dispatchable products to be conducted
between March and July 2004. The second would be post-2007 individual baseload, wind and
DSM RFPs in the third quarter of 2004.
39.In order to evaluate industry accepted procurement practices for resource procurement
Lands Energy benchmarked or compared the activities of other utilities, and provided NWE with
a memorandum which contained detailed information on the processes and schedules these other
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 12
utilities used in their resource solicitations. The memorandum is attached to the testimony of
Mr. Lewis. (Exhibit (SEL-
40.After that memo was completed NWE informed Lands Energy that it had decided to
issue an all source RFP. Portfolio modeling done for the Default Supply Resource Procurement
Plan had concluded the default supply portfolio would achieve the best combination of price
mitigation and risk reduction through the addition of baseload resources, combined with wind
and dispatchable resources. An all source RFP would produce CUlTent information regarding the
resource options available to NWE, allowing selection of the best portfolio additions available.
NWE's staff, with input from its Technical Advisory Committee determined that it would be
preferable to conduct an all source RFP and solicit bids for all available resource options
available in the market at one time.
41.Lands Energy developed and managed the all source RFP for NWE. The firm
provided a draft of the RFP, provided process and document management services (which
included the management of all interaction with the bidders). Lands Energy performed the initial
review and analysis of the proposals, from receipt of the proposals through the preliminary
shortlisting of proposals. Lands Energy acted as an independent third party to review the
proposed terms and conditions of every contract that was negotiated with an affiliate pursuant to
the RFP.
42.NWE wanted to conduct the RFP evaluation process without NWE staff having
know ledge of the identity of bidders associated with specific bids. The identities of bidders
submitting proposals were "masked" or "blinded " with the intent that NWE' s bid review and
selection would be conducted in a fair, unbiased way.
43. Mr. Lewis explained the time line followed by Lands Energy in its management of the
RFP. The all source RFP was issued on July 2 2004. Responses were received on August 12-
2004. The proposals consisted of 9 intermediate term products and 35 long-term proposals.
Intermediate term products were defined in the RFP as energy and exchange products that would
commence delivery on or after October 2004, and would terminate before June 30, 2007.
44.On August 14, 2004 Lands Energy provided summary detail on the nine intermediate
term offers to NWE for review. On August 14 and 15, NWE conducted its review and analysis
of these offers, completed its selection and executed contracts during the following work week.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 13
45. On August 19 to September 5, 2004 long-term proposals were summarized in a
blinded" fashion and sent to NWE. On September 15, Lands Energy recommended that ten
long-term proposals be eliminated from further analysis. Bids were eliminated because they
were either not competitive or were non-conforming. The memo from Lands Energy explaining
the reasons for elimination is attached to the testimony of Mr. Lewis. (Exhibit (SEL-
46. On September 5-2004 Lands Energy categorized the remaining Long-Term
proposals into five resource types: wind, baseload and shaped, dispatchable, displaceable coal,
and other. They analyzed the proposals within each resource type for overall cost and value to
the utility using two simplified spreadsheet-based intrinsic model runs. These runs are attached
to the testimony of Mr. Lewis. (Exhibit (SEL-
47. During September 2004 NWE retained Global Energy Concepts to review the quality
of the wind data provided by bidders, and to assess the validity of energy projections arising
from the proposals.
48. Between September 29th and October 1 st the remaining proposals were then sorted into
three classifications based on their relative competitiveness (Tiers 1 , 2 and 3). Tier 1 proposals
were proposed for detailed analysis; Tier 2 proposals were suspended, but held in reserve; and
Tier 3 proposals were rejected as non-competitive. Tier 1 bidders were asked to review four to
five page bid summaries of their proposals, and then to affirm by October 6th whether or not the
summary details accurately reflected their proposals.
49. On October 31 st Lands Energy selected 14 of the 31 Tier 1 proposals for the
preliminary shortlist, based on an evaluation of both quantitative and qualitative factors. The
preliminary shortlist included the two top-rated proposals of each resource category, any
proposals for other product types that scored as well as the best of the ten top-rated proposals,
and any additional proposals that appeared to present a significant value. Additional proposals
were included in the preliminary shortlist for the following reasons: the amount of capacity and
energy proposed by the individual top-rated proposals was insufficient to meet the volumes
specified by NWE, or a proposal scored well enough to waITant further consideration even
though it may not have been among the top-rated in its category.
50.NWE assembled and compared portfolios of its existing resources with various
combinations of the proposals on Land's Energy s preliminary shortlist to determine those with
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 14
the best overall fit to the existing portfolio. At this time, the identity of the bidders remained
blinded" to NWE.
51. On November 19th NWE advised Lands Energy of its own shortlist of proposals for
further portfolio analysis. Lands then provided NWE the identities of the bidders it had chosen.
NWE, after its own extensive analyses, made its final selections and began contract negotiations.
52. The goal of the all source RFP was to solicit energy resources in three major
categories that would complement NWE's existing resource portfolio and reduce market risk at
the lowest possible price. The Default Supply Resource Procurement Plan specified amounts of
additional dispatchable, baseload and wind resources that were likely to be prefeITed from the
perspectives of cost and risk mitigation. The amounts identified in the plan were up to 450
of base load resources, 178-308 MW of dispatchable resources, and 150 MW of installed wind
capacity. The ultimate selection would depend on the competitiveness and impact to the overall
portfolio compared to other resources. Despite the identification of specific resources and
quantities, the RFP was clear that all resources would be considered.
53. A portfolio s strengths may arise from a combination of resources, rather than being
attributable to any single resource within the portfolio. The all source RFP provided assurance
that NWE had the best offers available in the market from which to construct competitive
resource portfolios.
54.Forty- four proposals were submitted by bidders. This was a very substantial response.
As Lands Energy began reading the various proposals, it became evident that several bidders had
included more than one product proposal in their bid packets. When the product proposals were
sufficiently different to warrant separate analysis, Lands Energy issued "sub bid" numbers to
those proposals. Because some bidders submitted more than one proposal, the 35 distinct long-
term offers were broken down into 60 proposals for modeling purposes. The increase in the
number of proposals for modeling purposes was in part due to the fact that some bidders offered
different prices, different terms or special pricing in the event of certain conditions, which
required separate analysis. Based only on the quantity of proposals received, Lands Energy
believes that this RFP provided a competitive sampling of the market.
55. Lands Energy evaluated the responses received in the all source RFP. The RFP rating
and review was separated into two phases. In the first phase, Lands Energy performed intrinsic
quantitative analysis of each proposal and compared the results with the other proposals within
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 15
the same resource category (baseload, dispatchable, wind, etc.
).
Lands Energy also performed a
qualitative (non-price) analysis of each proposal based on the criteria cited in the RFP. The
process for determining the qualitative assessment was discussed extensively with NWE and the
modeling subcommittee of the Technical Advisory Committee in order to ensure a fair
assessment of the non-price factors. In the second phase, NWE performed comprehensive
computer modeling of the best resource alternatives identified by Lands Energy. NWE'
modeling was designed to identify the proposals that would provide the greatest benefit to the
portfo lio.
56. The quantitative price review captured the price-related elements of each proposal,
such as the cost relative to proposed capacity and energy, the costs and benefits dispatchability,
the fIrmness of the product, the ability to remarket the energy, and the value associated with the
point or points of delivery. In the preliminary shortlisting process, the intrinsic spreadsheet
model that was used did not compute the value of ancillary services or lack thereof, nor the costs
and risks associated with integrating the resource into the Utility s portfolio. It was understood
that the stochastic modeling performed by NWE, using the PCI model as part of the final
selection process, would capture these values and the relative impact they would have on
different resource portfolios.
57. In order to develop the preliminary shortlist, resource proposals were compared
against one another only within each of the resource categories (baseloadlstandard shaped,
displaceable coal, dispatchable, wind and other). This told Lands Energy whether a proposal that
did not score at the top of its resource category warranted continued review. A resource with
specific qualitative strengths, but not at the top of its category in a pure price/value analysis,
might be included in the preliminary shortlist for additional consideration in order to ensure that
NWE had a good sample of resource alternatives. Lands Energy submitted price scores and
qualitative summaries to NWE and the Technical Advisory Committee for review and comment
prior to the completion of the preliminary shortlist selections.
58. In considering the qualitative areas of each proposal, the following key areas were
considered: 1) development risk; 2) experience of the project team; 3) site control; 4)
environmental review status; 5) permit status; 6) counterparty risk; 7) complexity of the unit and
technology risk and 8) NWE supplier diversity and counterparty concerns.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 16
59. Lands Energy recommended bid numbers 15, 7., 18 23.1.1 through 23.1.5 , IIA-
lIB, 30,, 23.2 through 23.4 23.23.45.1 and 45.2 for the preliminary shortlist.
60.On November 17,2004 NWE issued a memo indicating that it had selected bid
numbers 18 , 15 23.1.3,23.1.2 , 11 A, lIB and 23.8 from the Lands Energy preliminary
shortlist. NWE requested that Lands Energy forward the bid identification, bid binders and all
related material for those bids.
61.Affiliate bids were handled in the same manner as bids from non-affiliated bidders.
They were received on the same date and the identity of the bidder was not revealed to NWE
until the utility informed Lands Energy of its selection for contract negotiations. During the
evaluation process, affiliate bid summaries were identified by bid numbers assigned by Lands
Energy w hen bid detail was provided to NWE for its analysis. All bids went through the same
steps for price and non-price scoring. Affiliate bids were afforded the same opportunity to
refresh price as other bids. NWE did not alter its selections based on the identities of any of the
bidders.
62.Lands Energy performed two separate quantitative reviews that were used to screen
the proposals. The fIrst was a comparison of the proposal to the medium price forecast for
electricity prices. A memorandum summarizing this process is attached to the testimony of Mr.
Lewis. CExhibit CSEL-8))
63. The second quantitative review was based on the expected cost to serve the default
load with a portfolio comprised of NWE's existing long-term resources and each of the proposed
new resources. The details of this second portfolio analysis were summarized in the preliminary
shortlist recommendation provided to NWE and is attached to the testimony of Mr. Lewis.
CExhibits CSEL-9) and _CSEL-9a))
64. The price and value component of the quantitative review was weighted at a potential
maximum score of 70 out of 100 points. The qualitative or non-price selection criteria
comprised the remaining 30 points.
65.Since the preliminary shortlist provided to NWE was a reflection of the best proposals
in each category, Lands Energy s modeling was not designed to compare proposals to others in
different categories. The stochastic modeling performed by NWE is the preferred method for
comparing proposals of different resource types.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 17
66. Mr. Lewis provided two examples of portfolios used by vertically integrated utilities
to serve their load requirements. Puget Sound Energy maintains a resource portfolio comprised
of approximately 20 percent coal, 29 percent natural gas generation, and 45 percent hydro.
Seattle City Light has a portfolio made up of 0 percent coal, 5 percent natural gas generation, 89
percent hydro, 2 percent wind resources and the rest from miscellaneous resources.
67.A load serving utility uses its load factor as a measure of the variability of load it must
plan to meet. A lower load factor is an indication that the utility may require a larger percentage
of shaped or dispatchable resources to effectively meet the load variations.
68.Mr. Lewis stated that the NWE RFP conformed to standard industry practices. The
RFP was administered by an outside consultant; it was representative of the market with a broad
quantity of bidders and resource types; it followed PSC procurement rules, including the
treatment of affiliate bids and was a commercially reasonable process to attain the best bids
possible in the market at this time.
69. All bidders followed the same process, had equal access to information and were
evaluated with the same scoring criteria. This process treated all bidders fairly and without bias.
70.NWE is in somewhat of a unique position, in that nearly all its portfolio requirements
will need to be procured by mid 2007. Most other utilities already have a portfolio of long-term
resources under their control and are augmenting this existing portfolio with specific additions.
Mr. Lewis believes NWE' s selections reflect the need to arrange for a variety of resource types
as it continues to re-build its resource portfolio.
71. NWE did not accept all the offers proposed by bidders in its final selection. The RFP
did not obligate NWE to sign supply contracts as a result of the process, and it should be
expected that the buyer may define acceptable terms and conditions as part of the contract
negotiation phase.
Prefiled testimony of Mark D. Thompson
72.Mr. Thompson highlighted a substantial difference between NWE and other regional
utilities. NWE's Montana resource portfolio consists entirely of wholesale power purchase
agreements; the portfolio lacks physical generation resources and, therefore, is fully exposed to
changing conditions in regional energy markets. Mr. Thompson stressed the importance of
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 18
procuring resources by evaluating how individual resource options contribute to the portfolio as
a whole, especially with regard to overall cost and risk exposure.
73. Mr. Thompson described the economic trade-offs involved in balancing a portfolio
exposure to costs and risks. He used the analogy of a person choosing from among alternative
options for health care insurance by weighing the monthly premium costs against the annual
deductible; choosing the right alternative depends on an assessment of the person s health care
requirements and tolerance for uncertainty. He identified two primary risks inherent in the
current default supply portfolio: 1) the pending expiration of substantial baseload and heavy load
supply resources in June 2007, and 2) the absence of resources able to respond to variable on-
peak and super-peak supply requirements. These primary risks are directly related to wholesale
market conditions, a fact that is especially noteworthy given that about 85% of total default
supply load requirements must be acquired for the period beginning July 1, 2007.
74. In order to address the first primary risk (the baseload requirement post 2007), NWE
attempted to procure a replacement for the existing contracts with PPL, which provide about 3.3
million MWh per year (58% of total requirements) at a cost of $31.95 per MWh. According to
Mr. Thompson, NWE determined that many of the prices offered in response to NWE's RFP
were too costly. As a result, NWE chose to procure only one new baseload resource at this time
Colstrip 4.
75. In order to address the second primary risk (the lack of long-term on-peak and super-
peak energy supply), NWE determined that a combination of wind and dispatchable resources
should be procured. Mr. Thompson noted that other utilities in the Pacific Northwest have
implemented similar strategies and NWE's own modeling of portfolio costs and risks also
supports this strategy.
76. In addition to the two primary risks just described, Mr. Thompson also identified a
number of secondary risks inherent in default supply portfolio management. The secondary risks
include: 1) short-term weather impacts and associated load fluctuations, 2) customer migration
to/from choice, 3) imbalances between loads and resources, 4) unit contingency of resources, 5)
transmission constraints, and 6) counterparty performance. (See Thompson pp. 14-15) With
respect to transmission constraints, Mr. Thompson maintained that there are no operational
constraints that limit NWE's ability to import energy into Montana. Economic constraints, on
the other hand, can limit the amount of baseload resources the portfolio can incorporate cost-
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 19
effectively; the cost to transfer energy from Montana to the Mid-Columbia area is an important
consideration to the extent baseload energy supplies exceed load for significant periods of time.
Market outlook
77. Mr. Thompson testified that NWE cuITently procures about 250/0 of its annual energy
requirements in the short-tenn wholesale market. These short-tenn transactions involve
contracts of 18 months or less. According to Mr. Thompson, NWE has been successful at
outperforming the market since 2002. He noted that exposure to short-tenn wholesale market
prices increased from what it was in 2002 due to the expiration of a 100 MW baseload contract
and the return of 600 000 MWh of choice loads while at the same time wholesale market prices
increased about 27%. But default supply rate impacts over this period were about 1.4%. While
acknowledging its ability to manage and mitigate wholesale price fluctuations to some extent
through forward contracts and transmission opportunities, Mr. Thompson stressed that NWE
cannot mitigate market trends completely. He also indicated that the proportion of total MWhs
purchased in short-term markets substantially understates the risk associated with the CUITent
portfolio; although 28% of total energy is purchased in short-tenn markets, during super-peak
periods this exposure increases to 42%. Short-tenn market purchases occur primarily during
peak and super-peak periods when wholesale prices are the highest.
78. Mr. Thompson stated that today s wholesale electricity prices in the Northwest are
high, reflecting the effects of three consecutive below-nonnal hydro years, high natural gas
prices and the dominance of independent power generators (lPPs) that own baseload generation.
Mr. Thompson said world crude oil prices and the weak U.s. dollar are also influencing
wholesale electricity prices through their impact on domestic natural gas prices. According to
Mr. Thompson, it is possible the factors behind today s higher wholesale electricity and natural
gas prices will persist, but he also believes it is possible there will be a "pull back" from CUITent
levels. NWE must consider both CUITent and potential future market conditions as it makes
resource decisions. Mr. Thompson suggested that the Judith Gap project, as part of the set of
resources NWE is presenting in this filing, will provide value to the default supply portfolio
under low, medium and high market conditions.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 20
Resource needs assessment
79.NWE serves a total of 303 000 default supply customers, virtually all of which are
residential and small business customers. A specific breakdown of customers by category is
shown in Chart 1. Residents and small businesses represent 80% and 180/0 respectively.
Chart
0 7,218
175
NWE Default Supply
Number of Customers by Type
961
IJ Residential
. Small Business
0 Large Business
0 Other
80. Mr. Thompson testified that the total energy required to serve the default supply load
is about 5.8 million megawatt-hours (MWH) per year. The average annual on-peak load is about
780 MW with a seasonal peak of 1,100 MW. The average off-peak load is 450 MW. Default
loads fluctuate significantly from month-to-month, day-to-day and hour-to-hour, driven
primarily by generally predictable customer usage patterns and unpredictable weather conditions.
Over the course of a single day loads vary by hundreds ofMW according to customers
consumption habits. For example, the difference between the minimum (off-peak) and
maximum (super-peak) load on a single day in July can be as much as 600 MW. In November
the difference can be as much as 400 MW. Weather changes from day-to-day and from season-
to-season also produce large load variations. The difference between peak loads during the
month of July can be as much as 240 MW, and as much as 200 MW in November.
Exhibit MDT -RFP-2B provides graphic illustrations of the variability of NWE' s default
customer load.
81.A quantitative measure of the variability of the default supply load is the load factor.
Load factor is the ratio of average energy consumption to peak load during a specific time
period, usually one year.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 21
Mr. Thompson stated that NWE's default supply load has a load factor equal to 58%, which he
calculated as follows:
Annual energy consumption = 5,800,000 MWH
Peak load = 1 150 MW
Load factor = (5,800,000 MWH / 1 150 MW*8760 hours per year) = 58%
More even, or steadier energy consumption by customers would produce a higher load factor.
For example, Mr. Thompson testified that industrial customers typically have a load factor in the
90% range, while residential consumption patterns yield a load factor in the 45% range. Mr.
Thompson also asserted that the lower the load factor, the more expensive a load is to serve.
Chart 2 shows the annual energy consumption of various customer classes. This chart illustrates
the effects of class load factors; although the residential class makes up 80% of all default supply
customers, its low load factor results in a much smaller share of total annual energy
consumption, 38%.
Chart 2
Percentage of Default Supply Load by Customer Type
03%
Ii Residential
. Small Business
0 Large Bussiness
0 Other
.47%
82.Because utilities cannot generally produce electricity and store it for later use, NWE
must maintain sufficient resources to produce the required electricity as it is demanded by
customers. Mr. Thompson suggested that serving default customer loads, given its variability,
requires a combination of different types of resources. Baseload consumption is in the range of
300 to 550 MW. The baseload portion of the load requires power supply 24 hours per day, 365
days per year. Over and above the baseload consumption, a 200 MW intermediate load exists
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 22
during certain time periods throughout the year. Since the intermediate portion of the load is not
present all of the time, Mr. Thompson asserted that shaped or dispatchable resources that have
lower fixed costs and higher variable costs should be used to serve this portion of the load. The
top-most portion of the load is the peak and super peak portion. Mr. Thompson testified that this
portion of the load should be served through a combination of dispatchable resources and market
purchases. According to Mr. Thompson, understanding the default supply load and the
wholesale market during certain periods of each day is an essential part of portfolio planning
management.
83. The base component ofNWE's load requires about 4.2 - 4.4 million MWh of energy
per year, roughly 71 percent of total annual default supply energy requirements. The
characteristics of the intermediate and peak load suggest that it is not cost effective to acquire
additional baseload resources, even when they appear to be less expensive. There are both costs
and risks associated with accepting baseload energy that is not needed to serve loads because this
energy must be re-marketed, potentially at a loss. Pages 35-37 of Mr. Thompson s testimony,
and Exhibit MDT -RFP-6 graphically illustrate the hourly, daily and seasonal variation in default
supply loads.
84.Mr. Thompson stated that for the last two years NWE has analyzed the impact of
intermittent wind generation on the transmission system as well as its potential as a resource
within the default supply portfolio. These analyses included modeling actual hourly wind
generation patterns at various sites on NWE's system. NWE determined that some sites are
capable of producing energy which corresponds to late afternoon peak default supply load
periods. The price of wind generation is not subject to fuel cost escalation or other market
impacts and the raw cost of wind generation is low compared to market alternatives, thereby
providing a hedge against market purchases and/or the fuel costs associated with dispatchable
resources. Additionally, as a renewable resource, wind generation addresses one aspect of the
Commission s procurement guidelines. Finally, Mr. Thompson stated that wind sites in Montana
tend to demonstrate higher capacity factors than other sites in the Pacific Northwest.
85.With respect to the costs of integrating intermittent wind generation into the portfolio,
Mr. Thompson testified that NWE has determined that dispatchable resources are needed in the
portfolio for a number of reasons including to address variable and peak load requirements,
provide a portion of load following, provide operating reserves and back-up unit contingent
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 23
resources. If dispatchable resources are included in the portfolio, a limited amount of wind
generation can be reliably integrated internally for approximately $5.00 per MWh. Mr.
Thompson asserted that this internal integration cost estimate is consistent with costs identified
by BP A and PacifiCorp for internally integrating wind resources into their systems. NWE also
investigated the cost of procuring third party (external) wind integration services and determined
the range to be between $7.00 and $14.00 per MWh. However, Mr. Thompson stated that
because of some system flexibility, NWE believes the actual cost for third party integration
services will be $9.00 per MWh or less.
86. With help from its Technical Advisory Committee, NWE developed a policy for
evaluating potential avian impacts associated with proposed wind projects. Developers seeking
to sell wind generation to NWE must agree to follow the policy. The policy is included in Mr.
Thompson s testimony as exhibit MDT-RFP-l1 and requires developers to coordinate with, and
perform studies recommended by, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department. According to the
policy, before being selected a proposed project's site must pass a Potential Impact Index review.
Modeling
87.NWE uses both deterministic and probabilistic analyses in its portfolio modeling
work. Excel spreadsheets are used to quantify static portfolio impacts and screen resources
based on price comparisons. Probabilistic analyses are used to assess the myriad uncertainties
involved in long-term resource planning and acquisition. Monte Carlo simulation, which
underlies the PCI GenTrader(ID model NWE uses, is a type of probabilistic analysis. A Monte
Carlo study requires an analyst to assign probabilities to variables whose future values are
uncertain, for example default supply customer consumption, wholesale electricity prices and
natural gas prices. The probabilities are usually determined from a combination of historical
data and informed judgment. Computer software randomly combines possible outcomes using a
technique that mimics rolling dice.3 A single computer run may involve thousands of "rolls of
the dice." The results of these model runs are analyzed using statistical information on means
standard deviations and confidence intervals.
88.Mr. Thompson testified that the PCI GenTrader(ID model is an asset and portfolio
optimization model appropriate for detailed analyses of specific resource portfolios.
Integrated Resource Planning for State Utility Regulators, The Regulatory Assistance Project, June 1994. See
also NWE's Electric Default Supply Procurement Plan, Book 1, Tab 6. January 2004
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 24
GenTrader(ID focuses on risk and resource optimization rather than supply adequacy as the
AURORA model the NWPCC uses. According to Mr. Thompson, GenTrader(ID uses robust risk
quantification and modeling software and is used by such companies as AEP, Duke Energy,
CLECO, Entergy, OG&E, PG&E, TXU and Xcel.
89. GenTrader s(ID stochastic (meaning random) portfolio valuations result from Monte
Carlo analyses using over 5,000 simulations (rolls of the dice). Deterministic (intrinsic)
valuations are based on pre-set input values for variables such as electric prices, gas prices
loads, etc. GenTrader s(ID stress tests isolate specific variables and identify key risk drivers using
intrinsic calculations. The Company conducted stress tests using actual natural gas and
wholesale electricity market prices that occurred during the period 2000 - 2004. NWE uses a
risk-adjusted mean portfolio cost as a leading indicator of portfolio performance in the stochastic
modeling.4 Exhibit MDT-RFP-16 contains additional information on the GenTrader(ID portfolio
analysis model. Additionally, Mr. Thompson testified that NWE's modeling analyses
encompass a time period running from 2007 through 2017, thus addressing one of the
Commission s identified concerns with the analyses presented in NWE's 2004 default supply
plan.
90.NWE used both historical and forecast electric and natural gas prices in its portfolio
analyses. As already explained, NWE used historical prices from 2000 - 2004 in its stress tests.
NWE used four different price forecasts in the stochastic modeling to test the sensitivity of
portfolio performance against various market conditions. Mr. Thompson stated that all price
forecasts have been updated since the 2004 default supply plan to reflect higher electricity and
natural gas market prices. The primary price forecast NWE used is derived from the Northwest
Power and Conservation Council's (NWPCC) electricity and natural gas price forecast published
in December 2004. Based on the NWPCC price forecast, NWE developed a "Commodity
Trends" price forecast that it believes is a better reflection of actual price movements in a
commodity market. Rather than being linear over the forecast period, NWE's Commodity
Trends forecast moves up and down through the probability range established in the NWPCC
forecast. Mr. Thompson indicated that the result is a single price forecast that captures the
4 The risk-adjusted mean is determined by adding 70 percent of the stochastic mean portfolio cost to 30 percent of
the 95 percent confidence level portfolio cost. The affect is to adjust the mean cost upward more for portfolios that
have more risk.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 25
effects of high, medium and low priced years. Using the NWPCC price forecasts as the starting
point, NWE developed hourly prices for five separate price periods: mid-peak, super-peak, off-
peak, Saturday and Sunday. Exhibit MDT-RFP-19 provides additional detail on the Commodity
Trends price forecast, NWPCC's price forecasts and forecasts developed by other regional
utilities.
91. Exhibits MDT-RFP-20 and MDT-RFP-21 provide the results of the stress tests and
stochastic portfolio modeling for 7 and 13 portfolios, respectively. Mr. Thompson indicated that
hundreds of different portfolios were analyzed. Successive portfolios are designed to build on
one another in order to identify the effect of adding or modifying individual resources in a
portfolio.
Judith Gap wind project
92. According to Mr. Thompson, NWE selected the Judith Gap wind project because wind
contributes to the lowest cost -lowest risk portfolio and the Judith Gap project was clearly the
most attractively priced bid submitted in the all-source RFP. Mr. Thompson asserted that the
price negotiated with Judith Gap is the lowest price NWE has seen for wind projects in the
Northwest, based on publicly available information. In particular, Mr. Thompson believes the
innovative pricing structure will contribute to economically integrating the project into the
portfo lio.
93. Since the Judith Gap project was previously shortlisted following NWE's specific
wind RFP in 2003, NWE had already conducted significant due diligence on the project site.
And the fact that the project had received a transmission interconnection agreement provided
NWE reason to believe that the project could be physically and reliably interconnected to the
transmission system in a timely manner.
94. Mr. Thompson stated that the average annual price under the Judith Gap power
purchase agreement is estimated to be $31.71 per MWh over the term of the agreement (see
RDR MCC-013). He noted that this price includes a property tax pass through and assumes that
pending legislation will be approved and will reduce the property tax for wind projects. If the
legislation is not passed, the price would be about $2.00 per MWh more. The project would
consist of between 135 and 150 MW of installed capacity, at the developer s discretion, with an
estimated capacity factor of 37%. Annual energy production is estimated to be about 450,000
MWh, or about 7.7% of total energy requirements. The term of the agreement is 20 years.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 26
95. The Judith Gap project is dependent on receiving federal Production Tax Credits
(PTC). Mr. Thompson stated that in order to ensure that the project will be constructed in time
to be eligible for the PTC, NWE negotiated a substantial liquidated damages delay and/or failure
to deliver clause that requires Judith Gap to compensate NWE up to $8,000,000 if the project is
not operational in 2005. The power purchase agreement also specifies a 94% availability
guarantee with a financial penalty if the availability is not maintained.
INTERVENOR PREFILED TESTIMONY
Prefiled response tes imony of John W. Wilson (for Montana Consumer Counsel)
96. Dr. Wilson recommended approval of the Judith Gap project with conditions.
identified the following as positive features of the proposed Judith Gap wind resource: (1) it
would contribute to reducing the dominance of PPL Montana in the NWE control area, which
Dr. Wilson said is an important policy objective; (2) the pricing tenDS for this resource, which
shifts some of the wind timing risks away from default supply customers, are attractive
compared to other bids and, when combined with an economical firming resource, could help to
constrain future market price increases; (3) planning for the project is moving along and includes
findings of no significant negative impact by environmental agencies; and, (4) the addition of
Judith Gap would diversify the default supply portfolio.
97.Dr. Wilson noted that NWE assumes the recently approved Basin Creek resource will
provide 15% of the required dispatchable supply to firm the Judith Gap project and that the
remaining 85% would be provided by a lower cost combined cycle project, which Dr. Wilson
said was intended at one time to be the Montana Megawatts, Inc. (MMI) combined cycle unit in
Great Falls. However NWE has not submitted any other dispatchable resource proposal in this
filing. Dr. Wilson argued against approving the Judith Gap project without protecting default
supply customers from the risk of open-ended firming costs.
98. According to Dr. Wilson, MCC would have preferred NWE to submit the fJIming
resource (presumably. MMI) and wind proposal together to be considered by the PSC at the same
time. Since that did not happen, he recommended that, if the Commission approves the wind
contract, the approval be contingent on a $5.00/Mwh cap for fJIming costs. He pointed out that
NWE estimated the internal firming cost of wind with a companion combined cycle resource
such as MMI at $5.00/Mwh.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 27
99. Dr. Wilson also noted his minor concern that Section 2.18(b) of the proposed wind
contract provides for only 60 days to consider additional turbine capacity; he suggested
conditioning approval upon extending this period to 120 days, unless NWE demonstrates a
compelling reason for the 60-day limit.
100. Regarding the issue of the merits of wind site diversification versus a single-location
project, Dr. Wilson agreed with NWE's conclusion that the estimated benefits of site
diversification do not outweigh the price advantage of Judith Gap.
Prefiled response ~imony of Ann Gravatt (for Renewable Northwest Project)
101. Ann Gravatt is the Senior Policy Associate with the Renewable Northwest Project
(RNP). The March 31 st deadline within the Judith Gap contract is tied to the federal Production
Tax Credit for wind power. The credit expires on December 31 2005. In order to take
advantage of the credit, the Judith Gap project must be operating by December 31 , 2005. In
order to be operating by December 31, project construction must begin in the spring.
102. RNP believes that, if the March 31 st deadline is missed, Montana will lose the
opportunity to develop a wind project in 2005. The current RFP was issued in July 2004 and the
Judith Gap project was chosen. If this project is not completed in 2005, NWE and its customers
will lose the opportunity to reap the benefits of a wind project.
103. Montana has the best wind resource of the 11 Western states. It has been estimated
that Montana s wind resource could supply 15 percent of the nation s electricity needs.
However, Montana s wind resource is vastly underdeveloped in comparison to many of the
neighboring states, most with significantly less robust wind resources. Oregon and Washington
have a combined 503 MW of wind power operating and serving customers. Wyoming has nearly
300 MW of wind, and the Dakotas are rapidly developing their wind resource.
104. Renewable resources provide resource diversity, reducing risks associated with over-
reliance on any single source of electricity. Wind power has no fuel cost. Renewable resources
help to stabilize electric rates over the long-term. Given the increasing frequency of dry (or low)
water years and the record high price of natural gas, a diverse portfolio is essential for any
prudent utility.
105. Wind offers significant environmental benefits. Wind power does not create any
waste nor does it rely on the region s increasingly limited water supply.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 28
106. Renewable resources offer utilities risk mitigation benefits. They provide fuel cost
risk protection because renewables have no fuel cost. Renewables offer a fixed price for the life
of the project (20 years for Judith Gap). Wind power also offers protection against the risk of
future environmental regulation of carbon emissions.
107. A portion of the Judith Gap Project will be built on state land. The lease with the state
will generate approximately $50,000-$70,000 per year, money that will be used to fund public
schools and colleges.
108. Every major investor-owned utility in the Northwest and many public utilities are
planning to acquire wind power to serve their customers. This fact is the best indication that
utilities are recognizing the positive benefits that renewable energy can bring to a portfolio of
resources. In 2005, PGE will acquire 75 MW from the Klondike Project in Oregon. Puget
Sound Energy has announced its plans to purchase 380 MW of wind from two projects in
Washington, the 150 MW Hopkins Ridge Project, and the 220 MW Wild Horse Project. Both
projects are expected to commence construction in 2005.
109. The cost of wind power continues to decline dramatically, to the point that wind power
is cost competitive with other new generating resources today. PGE's acquisition of75 MW of
wind in 2005 was recently deemed to be "at market." Puget Sound Energy recently concluded
that the costs of wind power compared favorably with other new sources of generation.
110. The busbar cost of the Judith Gap Project is the lowest Ms. Gravatt is aware of in the
Northwest.
Ill. The 5th Power Plan by the Northwest Power and Conservation Council calls for the
development of almost 2 000 aMW (6,000 MW capacity) of wind power over the next twenty
years. The Western Governors' Association issued a Clean Energy resolution last June which
calls for 30 000 MWs of clean energy by 2015 in the 18 western states. These developments
indicate the growing interest in clean energy, like wind power, in the west.
112. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has identified the need to
eliminate transmission barriers for wind in order to facilitate competitive integration of new
resources. FERC is investigating changes to the imbalance portion of the Open Access
Transmission Tariff in order to eliminate penalties which are inappropriate for wind generators.
FERC is hosting a conference on conditional-firm transmission services and other new
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 29
transmission products that can help create more available transmission capacity to serve new
generators including wind resources.
response testimony of ElliotMainzer (for Renewable Northwest Project)
113. Mr. Mainzer is a manager for the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). In this
Docket Mr. Mainzer is appearing on behalf of the Renewable Northwest Project. He is the
Manager of Pricing, Transaction Analysis and Renewables within the Bulk Marketing Division
of the Power Business Line. BP A currently purchases the output of five wind projects located in
the states of Wyoming, Oregon and Washington with a total installed capacity of 198 MW. Mr.
Mainzer is responsible for assessing and managing the costs of integrating these wind projects
into the BPA control area. Mr. Mainzer has become familiar with NWE's transmission system,
its contractual generating resources, and the company s operational practices. On December 2
2004 Mr. Mainzer met with Ted Williams who is employed by NWE Transmission to discuss the
operational requirements of the NWE control area with respect to wind integration.
114. Wind integration refers to the process of incorporating the variable output of a wind
project into an electrical system in a manner which is consistent with control area reliability and
best utility practice. Unlike other generation technologies, such as gas turbines or coal facilities,
which operate at fixed levels of output for sustained periods of time, wind projects are
intermittent sources of generation. They only produce electricity when the wind in blowing.
When the wind is actually blowing, the output of the project can vary from moment to moment
due to changes in wind speed and intensity. Wind actually behaves more like an electrical load
than a source of generating capacity. Loads are constantly fluctuating up and down. Utility
operators use their generating resources to match these changes in load so generation and load
are in constant balance.
115. Utilities use a combination of dispatchable generating resources and market purchases
to meet the hour-to-hour changes in loads. This is referred to as load following. Utilities must
also manage very short-term fluctuations that occur on a minute-to-minute basis. This is referred
to as regulation. Utilities typically use generators which have "automatic generation control" or
AGC to provide regulation (i.e. the Basin Creek plant). These units respond automatically to
short-term changes in load/resource balance. All utilities are experienced in the provision of
DOCKET NO. D2005.2.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 30
load following and regulation service. Utilities that have studied the operational requirements of
integrating wind have not found it to be outside the scope of their common experience.
116. When considered alone, the output of a wind project may appear quite variable. When
introduced into a total resource system, much of this variability is diminished. An electrical
utility system is essentially a portfolio of loads and resources that is in a constant state of change.
Typically, variations in wind output are not highly correlated with movements in loads and other
system resources. As a result, actual effects on the system from changes in wind output are
offset by what is happening elsewhere on the system from changes in load and other resources in
the portfolio. Including a variety of resources in an electric utility s portfolio is called
diversification.
117. Diversification allows for a relatively volatile wind resource to be introduced into a
portfolio of loads and resources without dramatically increasing the variability of the entire
portfolio. A small wind project introduced into a large system may have next to no measurable
impact. As the amount of wind is increased relative to the size of the entire utility system, the
resulting increase in system variability becomes larger. At some point, this increase in
variability will require a utility to acquire additional regulating and load following capability in
order to maintain the system s load and resource balance. The benefits of diversification limit
the amount of incremental regulation and load following that a utility must procure, thus keeping
integration costs quite manageable.
118. All generating resources including wind must purchase operating reserves from the
control area operator. Operating reserves are a component of the process of incorporating wind
into a utility system.
119. Costs of wind integration have been studied by numerous utilities and others. BP A
has studied wind integration. In 2002 BP A contracted with Eric Hirst to conduct a study on the
impacts of integrating 1 000 MW of wind into the BP A control area. Prior to this study, BP A
was concerned that integrating a substantial amount of wind could have cost as much as
$20.00/MWh. The results of the study indicated that these costs would be below $5.00/MWh.
BP A now offers integration services to other utilities for $4.40-$6.00/MWh, depending on the
type of service required.
120. The various studies on wind integration have consistently concluded that there are
costs associated with integration, but those costs are relatively small, they are system-specific,
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 31
and they depend on the amount of wind generation within a utility s overall system. These
studies have concluded that the costs of wind integration are in the range of $1.50-$5.50/MWh.
One of BP A's integration services (Storage and Shaping Service) is priced at $6.00/MWh, which
is outside the cost range cited above, but the service has features that go beyond the basic
practice of simply integrating wind into a control area. BPA's more basic wind integration
service, which is similar in operational profile to NWE' s requirements, is priced at $4.50/MWh.
121. NWE's analytical methodology and cost estimates for wind integration are consistent
with the findings of other utilities across the United States. NWE's estimate for the amount of
additional regulation required to integrate the Judith Gap wind project (0 +/- 15 MW) is
consistent with other utility analyses, including those of BP A. NWE's analysis has also verified
that the variability in wind output is not highly correlated with the variability in their loads and
other resources, thus demonstrating the benefits of diversification in limiting integration costs.
122. NWE has wisely taken a multi-faceted, least-cost approach to wind integration.
proposes to use the combination of resources (dispatchable resources, market sales/purchases and
dynamic scheduling) that is most suitable to wind integration during any particular period, given
the nature of loads, market prices, wind output level and output variability. Mr. Mainzer agreed
with NWE's contention that dispatchable resources will complement a wind resource, ensure
greater control area reliability, and help limit market exposure to purchases of additional
firming" energy when the wind project is generating below forecasted levels. NWE's trading
capabilities will be useful in supporting wind integration. NWE has adopted an intelligent
strategy towards wind integration. Over time, the company will develop valuable expertise in
managing the output of a variable wind resource and will be able to further refine, and
potentially further reduce, the cost of integrating wind resources into their portfolio.
123. Mr. Mainzer points out that not knowing the precise integration cost of the wind
project is not something to be concerned about. The busbar price of a wind project is comprised
almost entirely of capital costs. These costs are fixed and known over the life of the project.
Since a wind project has no variable fuel costs and extremely small variable operating costs,
there is little uncertainty around the total cost of wind generation over the life of the project.
Integration costs can be narrowed down to a range, and, based on the experience of other
utilities, can be expected to fall within that range.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 32
124. Mr. Mainzer compared the busbar price of the Judith Gap project to other wind
projects and found that Judith Gap appeared to be a very competitive busbar price.
~led response testimony of MichaeJ J. King (for PPL)
125. Mr. King, an economic consultant with the firm National Economic Research
Associates, concluded the proposed Judith Gap contract does not meet the statutory requirements
for advanced approval and that the default supply procurement process is not working in
Montana and should be replaced with an alternative process. He recommended denial
advance approval of this contract.
126. According to Mr. King, NWE did not comply with any of the planning and
procurement objectives in 9 69-419(2), MCA. Following is Mr. King s discussion of specific
statutory objectives which he believed NWE failed to meet.
127. Mr. King argued that NWE's RFP process was not open, fair and competitive as
required by 969-419(2)(d). Mr. King argued NWE's process was not in accord with industry-
accepted procurement practices as expected by ARM 38.8212(1) because the process was not
truly anonymous, a substantial portion of it was not conducted by an independent third party, and
it did not incorporate a consistent and systematic rating mechanism to objectively rank bids as
required by ARM 38.8212(2)(c).
128. Mr. King claimed that, despite the fact that Lands Energy did not provide NWE the
identities of bidders with its preliminary shortlist, NWE knew before that time which bids were
from its affiliates. NWE would easily have identified Bidder 23 as PPL because all the long-term
bids from Bidder 23 were numbered 23.x and, in addition, the PPL slice-of-the-system bid
(numbered 23.9) that NWE invited PPL to bid into the RFP was the only slice bid NWE
received. Mr. King argued NWE was biased against PPL's bids as demonstrated by the results,
in which NWE included both of the preliminarily short-listed bids from its affiliates on its final
shortlist, but included just two of the ten PPL short-listed bids on the NWE final shortlist.
129. According to Mr. King, his concern that a substantial portion of the RFP process was
conducted not by an independent third party but by NWE is justified because, after Lands Energy
forwarded to NWE its preliminary shortlist of 20 long-term bids, NWE conducted all further
evaluation, negotiation and decision-making without the participation of Lands to ensure the
fairness of those activities. Mr. King commented that NWE should not be in the position of
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 33
evaluating bids when it has a stake in the outcome, as is the case when either affiliate
transactions are involved or its own generation projects (if NWE is allowed at some point to bid
its own projects into an RFP and subsequently rate-base them).
130. Regarding his contention that NWE's rating system for ranking bids did not comply
with ARM 38.8212(2)(c), Mr. King said NWE's testimony and responses to data requests do
not document any systematic or objective rating system. He added that the objective and
systematic rating requirement was violated because PPL's bids were held to a different standard
than other bids as evidenced by Mr. Corcoran s and Mr. Thompson s testimonies, which, Mr.
King claims, indicated that NWE compared PPL's post-2007 bid with its cun-ent and past prices.
131. Mr. King argued that NWE failed to satisfy the objectives at ~ 69-419(2)(a) and (b),
MCA, that it provide adequate and reliable default supply service at the lowest long-term cost
and evaluate the full range of cost-effective options. According to Mr. King, the energy costs
the Judith Gap project were specified in the contract, but NWE has not fully provided the long-
term costs of the Judith Gap project because it has not determined the costs of wind integration
possible transmission system reinforcements, and possible additional property taxes if the
proposed Montana legislation to reduce property taxes for wind facilities is not enacted. Mr.
King also contended that NWE did not conduct a cost-effectiveness test of the wind resource by
comparing its total long-term cost with the costs of alternative bids. According to Mr. King,
NWE analyzed the costs and risks of various portfolios, but presented in this filing only results
from irrelevant portfolios NWE does not intend to procure. Mr. King provided what he termed
to be a "risky and incomplete" estimated range of total cost of the Judith Gap resource at
$37.28-$41.11+/Mwh. (Exhibit MJK-3, page 18) He argued that a comparison of that estimated
cost range for an intermittent wind project with the value of $36.50IMwh assigned by NWE for
the shaped product specifically shaped to match default supply needs that NWE asked PPL to
bid, led to the conclusion that the total cost of the Judith Gap does not comply with the statutory
objectives that default supply be procured at the lowest long-term total cost and that cost-
effective options be evaluated.
132. Mr. King claimed the Judith Gap project will not provide default supply services at
just and reasonable rates as required by ~ 69-419(2)(e). Mr. King, reiterating his contention
that the cost estimate for the proposed wind project exceeds the value that NWE attributed to
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 34
PPL's shaped product, argued the wind project s higher cost will result in rates that are not just
and reasonable.
133. Mr. King argued NWE's modeling and analysis of Judith Gap do not comply with
ARM 38.8213. Mr. King claimed that, although NWE presented its modeling results of
individual portfolios, its analysis is irrelevant because it did not model the portfolio NWE
intends to procure. He said that even if the modeled portfolios contained the appropriate
resources, NWE would also have to compare the optimal portfolio with and without Judith Gap
to evaluate Judith Gap s contribution to the portfolio and to provide the necessary information to
conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis. Mr. King argued that because, in his opinion, NWE did
not present sufficient analysis to support the Judith Gap resource in the context of the preferred
portfolio, there is not a sufficient basis to grant advance approval of the project. Mr. King added
that NWE's portfolio analysis did not include the creation of an "efficient frontier" chart that he
said is typically included in portfolio modeling to compare the costs and risks of alternative
portfolios and conveniently identifies and compares efficient portfolios. NWE also frequently
used unproven or less than rigorous techniques and models, according to Mr. King, citing as an
example the power price curve NWE used in its portfolio analysis which, he said, was so flawed
as to result in a meaningless price series. He also expressed concerns about whether NWE
properly modeled market prices and price volatility and whether it was appropriate for NWE to
use inputs to its modeling resources that were not identified in the RFP.
134. Mr. King commented that that the procurement process and analysis conducted by
NWE had as their purpose reinforcing the case for the two affiliate transactions (the yet-to-be-
considered Colstrip 4 proposal and the yet-to-be-filed MMI project). He argued that if the
Commission pre-approves a large wind project like Judith Gap, it will have to approve some type
of wind integration services, such as those that could be provided by MMI. Mr. King
commented that NWE should have submitted with the Judith Gap filing the cost of wind
integration based on two alternatives - firm bids from third party services and the cost of MMI.
135. According to Mr. King, the Commission should deny advance approval of the Judith
Gap contract because NWE has not demonstrated it is in the public interest, or that the total
price, term and quantity of the proposed resource is reasonable, or that NWE reasonably
attempted to comply with the statutory requirements for default supply planning and
procurement.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 35
136. Mr. King said he believes the default supply procurement process is broken and
recommended the Commission consider alternatives to the existing default supply procurement
process. He suggested adoption of either an auction process such as the one used in New Jersey
or a competitive solicitation or RFP process, such as the one just enacted in Utah last month.
~ed response testimony of W. KentEIDmerton
137. Mr. Palmerton recommended the Commission deny the application for advanced
approval of the Judith Gap contract. Alternatively, he suggested deferring approval until NWE
completes various studies and proposes how to implement and pay for the studies
recommendations. According to Mr. Palmerton, the reliability of the NWE transmission system
could be jeopardized if the Commission grants pre-approval of the Judith Gap contract when
NWE has not sufficiently studied and mitigated the impacts and costs of that project
interconnection and subsequent operation. Mr. Palmerton stated that, even if NWE eventually
does perform the necessary studies, it may not have done so early enough to include costs in the
interconnection agreement and that the Commission will have lost its opportunity to evaluate
whether the costs of Judith Gap satisfy statutory requirements.
138. Mr. Palmerton began his argument that interconnection of a new generating resource
may cause adverse impacts by explaining that any generator increases flows on transmission
lines and subjects the system different flow patterns and system responses. The interaction of a
new generator when the transmission system is under stress may result in adverse impacts like
overloads and system instability. Network response changes over time as a result of load growth
and changes in transmission and generation. Mr. Palmerton said all of these impacts for future
periods should have been studied by NWE before an interconnection is allowed.
139. Mr. Palmerton was satisfied that NWE's revised 2004 Judith Gap facilities study and
the 2005 generator interconnection agreement addressed limited localized impacts and issues of
the proposed project. However, Mr. Palmerton expressed puzzlement that NWE did not provide
a series of high quality and comprehensive system impact studies. He commented that all NWE
produced related to system impacts were an outdated 2002 study that evaluated the
interconnection of the then-proposed WindPark project near Judith Gap, and a 2002 NWE study
titled "Project #4 Coexisting System Impact Study." He commented that the two studies were
nearly three years old and did not appear to incorporate any more recent changes, they did not
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 36
assess the present proposal for a single 230-kV interconnection, and that neither study was a
transmission service study.
140. Mr. Palmerton said NWE should perform more studies because the addition of any
resource to a transmission system can cause adverse impacts. He stated that wind is
uncontrollable, it cannot be dispatched to a given level, and its output may range from maximum
to zero. He commented that preliminary studies already project overloads on the system and he
expected a study to look ahead one to five years to ascertain that the interconnection would not
jeopardize the system.
141. Mr. Palmerton claimed that system impact studies in 2002 by NWE indicated that the
addition of WindPark would overload transmission lines or transformers. The study concluded
that system upgrades required to accommodate the full project output of 181.5 MW would
include reconductoring the entire Judith Gap - Harlowton - Broadview line, and upgrading the
Judith Gap transformer. Mr. Palmerton claimed that the second NWE study indicated similar
overloads and that NWE's transmission capacity would be exceeded at times when all generation
in Montana is at maximum output and customer load is light. In those instances, either
curtailment will occur or system improvements will be needed to accommodate maximum
delivery at all times. Simulated faults on the 230 kV line severely depress the voltage at Judith
Gap and at the connection busses for the project. For faults close to the project, generator
tripping would probably be necessary both to protect the generators and protect quality of service
for customers in the Judith Gap area.
142. Mr. Palmerton stated that the two studies both indicated the potential for overloads of
both transmission facilities and the Judith Gap auto transformer, and the need for a remedial
action scheme. However, the studies evaluated two different plans of service. Mr. Palmerton
noted that the proposed Judith Gap proposal apparently presents a third plan of service that limits
the value of the two system impact studies, but the new plan of service does not make system
overloads any less likely.
143. Mr. Palmerton commented that the most problematic situation created by wind would
be at or near conditions that would limit output or when it is very gusty and unpredictable.
stated that Judith Gap s output could be nearly 40 percent of the default supply load during
minimum load periods and 32 percent of minimum control area load. Mr. Palmerton said that
on average, the wind resource may be expected to be less during these times, the system should
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 37
be studied and planned to accommodate 100% of Judith Gap during minimum system loads.
Also even though the wind cut-off speed is not expected to occur often, such events need to be
studied for all system conditions.
144. Mr. Palmerton stated that these characteristics affect the transmission system because
as wind energy varies, other generators or net interchange from other control areas must make up
the difference. When a contingency is experienced on the system, wind cannot respond to the
needs with additional output, and may in fact move in the opposite direction from the needs of
the system. He asserted that small wind sources, less than 20 MW, could be accommodated.
145. Mr. Palmerton explained that when over speed cutoff occurs, generation drops to zero.
When this occurs, the transmission system responds immediately to any disturbance by trying to
accommodate the changes in flow. If all performs as designed, the transmission remains stable.
If the system is not planned for those contingencies, there could be a number of calamities that
could occur.
146. Mr. Palmerton stated that generation resources could be affected as well by those
system problems. Generators on the system will try to respond in a manner that prevents the
system from going down. This happens on an almost instantaneous and unplanned basis which
takes it toll on those other generators. The worst case is that the system can go unstable and
generators can be destroyed.
147. Mr. Palmerton stated that the studies provided by NWE are not current and that NWE
does not appear to have performed any additional studies relating to interconnection and
integration of Judith Gap and that the studies do not sufficiently describe potential impacts from
the project. Mr. Palmerton claimed NWE's relied on a nearly three-year-old 2002 impact study
that does not contain forward looking data and fails to address reactive margin requirements and
adjust for changes in the resource queue. Mr. Palmerton noted that the information disclosed
NWE does not contain any changes since 2002, but they may exist.
148. Mr. Palmerton said it is typical to include forward looking analysis in a system impact
study, and it is essential to know the problems that the interconnection of a new resource may
cause, not just today, but in the future. Mr. Palmerton said he expects NWE to prepare an
updated facilities study and added that NWE conceded that it needs to complete additional
system impact work. Mr. Palmerton said there is a good chance that the additional transmission
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 38
studies may cause NWE to spend money to alleviate adverse impacts, which, in Mr. Palmerton
opinion, is why NWE should design a comprehensive study plan.
149. Mr. Palmerton pointed out that that NWE has failed to follow numerous laws,
regulations, standards and guidelines for interconnecting to a transmission system and operating
that interconnection. Examples he provided were the WECCINERC planning standards, the
WECC minimum operating reliability criteria, the FERC's interconnection standards, and
Montana laws and rules requiring reliable default supply services (~ 69-419(2)(a), MCA) and
transmission constraints (ARM 38.8219).
150. Regarding the NERC/WECC planning standards, Mr. Palmerton stated NWE fails to
comply because NWE's system impact studies do not include all the information required in the
standards.
151. Mr. Palmerton argued that NWE's Judith Gap proposal will not comply with the
WECC minimum operating reliability criterion which requires NWE to maintain a minimum
operating reserve. According to Mr. Palmerton, NWE has admitted it will have to take
additional measures to comply due to the intermittent nature of wind, but Mr. Palmerton does not
believe NWE's planned measures to increase the predictability of the hourly wind availability
can eliminate the output variability. Mr. Palmerton contended that Judith Gap cannot avoid the
loss of its entire output during high wind conditions and, from an operations perspective, that
means the control area operator and transmission system must be able to withstand a sudden loss
of generation from 13 percent to 32 percent of its committed generation to serve fITm load. Mr.
Palmerton claimed other generators in the control area or across regional ties into the control
area will likely provide any response to a system contingency.
152. Regarding the FERC interconnection standards, Mr. Palmerton contended that NWE
failed to comply with them by either not perfonning system studies or producing the analysis.
He added that NWE failed to take into account the conclusions produced by its own studies that
indicate the presence of Judith Gap output, without mitigating measures, caused overloads on
system components and also required at a minimum coordination with other remedial action
schemes employed to address system impacts associated with operation of the Colstrip project.
153. Mr. Palmerton stated that the costs to remedy those limitations on the system are
difficult to detennine but, taking into account various possibilities such as installation of a new
230 kV line from Judith Gap to Great Fans, implementation of a remedial action scheme,
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 39
providing additional operating reserve, and compliance with various extra regional ancillary
support contracts, Mr. Palmerton concluded $10 million is not an unreasonable estimate of the
costs of transmission upgrades associated with Judith Gap.
154. Mr. Palmerton added that due to the variable operating conditions of Judith Gap and
taking into consideration the large size of Judith Gap generation relative to NWE default supply
load, NWE will have difficulty in maintains sufficient operating reserve without incurring
additional direct and indirect costs of operation.
155. Mr. Palmerton summarized his conclusions regarding the impacts of the wind proposal
on NWE's system and other affected entities by stating that NWE should perform a complex set
of system impact studies, evaluate the results, inform affected parties, perform further analyses if
necessary, determine a course of action and costs, implement it, provide for cost recovery and
monitor compliance on an ongoing basis. He contended that the reliability threat is that if Judith
Gap drops off-line, it will decrease the generation necessary to meet load and, in the worst case,
lead to widespread power outages. He commented that NWE's recent comments to FERC in
Docket AD04-13-000 indicate NWE is aware of the potential for increased costs to integrate
wind.
156. Mr. Palmerton said it is impossible to determine the total direct and indirect costs of
the Judith Gap contract, there are a number of potential risks that NWE has not even identified or
proposed to mitigate, that there is no way of knowing the burdens of Judith Gap may pose to
system reliability, and the large size of the project exacerbates the threats to reliability.
Prefiled response testimony of William A. Pascoe CfuLExergy)
157. Mr. Pascoe of Pascoe Energy Consulting recommended the Commission deny
approval of the Judith Gap contract at this time and establish a new procedural schedule that does
not limit the scope of the proceeding and participation of intervenors. Alternatively, he
suggested approval of a smaller 50-75 MW contract with Judith Gap and taking time to fully
explore wind integration costs before making decisions on the remaining wind portion of the
portfolio.
158. Mr. Pascoe did not disagree that adding 150 MW of wind power to the NWE portfolio
would be a good addition, but he said the wind component should be spread over multiple sites.
He argued that wind site diversity reduces risk and is important because of the intermittent nature
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 40
of wind resources and the wind integration costs that result. He commented that the 150 MW of
wind power proposed by NWE in relation to the size of its control area is much more than the
wind power currently integrated by PacifiCorp and BP A, and that those entities' wind resources
are spread over multiple sites and have the advantage of access to flexible hydroelectric
generation for wind integration purposes.
159. Mr. Pascoe argued that resource diversity results in lower levels of planning reserves
as demonstrated by loss-of-Ioad probability studies. He explained that most utilities include
reserves in their supply portfolios to provide reliable service during peak load periods. He noted
that NWE's portfolio management strategy apparently does not include carrying planning
reserves but NWE will instead rely on the market to cover peaks. Mr. Pascoe claimed that wind
site diversity would reduce the NWE portfolio s exposure to high prices and improve reliability.
160. According to Mr. Pascoe, another benefit of site diversity is that forecasting errors for
wind power should be smaller with multiple wind sites than with a single site because the
forecasting errors on multiple sites can be expected to be in opposite directions, at least some of
the time. Mr. Pascoe argued that better forecasts will result in lower overall portfolio costs.
161. Mr. Pascoe argued that site diversity will also result in lower costs for ancillary
services, identified by NWE as contingency reserves, energy imbalance, load following, and
regulation. Regarding contingency reserves, Mr. Pascoe asserted that they should be about the
same for a single wind site and for multiple sites with the same total installed capacity.
Regarding energy imbalance, load following and regulation, Mr. Pascoe explained utilities deal
with them by automatic generation control (AGC) and that, because site diversity results in lower
forecasting errors, there is a reduction in the amount of AGC capacity needed for energy
imbalance. AGC capacity needs are also reduced by the reduced volatility in overall wind output
that results from site diversity, he claimed. Mr. Pascoe said the information in his Exhibits
W AP-2 and W AP-3 support his claim that site diversity results in reduced volatility and that
Exhibits W AP-4 and W AP-5 support his claim that there is more improvement in volatility as
additional wind sites are added. According to Mr. Pascoe, reduced volatility results in reduced
ancillary service costs.
162. Mr. Pascoe disputed NWE's estimates of wind integration costs. He acknowledged
that NWE attempted to quantify these costs, including a review of the value of site diversity,
during the 2003 Wind RFP process, but asserted that NWE did not further address site diversity
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 41
in the 2004 Wind RFP. He argued that NWE witness Mr. Thompson s memo on wind
integration costs that was attached to NWE's response to PSC-7(b) reaches conclusions that are
not supported by the attached materials and that NWE significantly erred in its method of
quantifying ancillary service costs for wind integration, which led to an incorrect estimation of
load forecast errors and subsequent incorrect detennination of the necessary incremental AGC
capacity.
163. Mr. Pascoe provided his own estimates of internal and external wind integration costs
in his Exhibit W AP- 7. By his estimate, single-site wind integration costs from internal
resources would increase to $7.62/MWh and to $9. 12/MWh from external resources. He
asserted costs would be lower for multiple sites. According to Mr. Pascoe, analysis of capacity
factor information on an hourly basis demonstrates that site diversity significantly reduces hourly
volatility. In addition, he asserted the advantages of a single wind site cited by Mr. Thompson in
his wind integration memo may be offset by higher wind integration costs.
164. Mr. Pascoe expressed skepticism ofNWE's claim that lower costs result from relying
on internal rather than external sources for wind integration, citing as one reason that it appears
that NWE has not included capacity costs in its estimates of internal wind integration costs.
also claimed that NWE' s estimated costs for internal wind integration failed to account for
certain opportunity costs. Mr. Pascoe said that, since there is no hourly market for AGC, NWE
will have to obtain the AGC needed for wind integration either from internal sources or by
purchasing it from external sources, but he does not believe one can assume NWE will be able to
mix and match these two options.
165. According to Mr. Pascoe, the price differences between Judith Gap ($31.71/MWh)
and the next lowest bid ($38.50/MWh) are more than offset by the reduced integration costs that
would result from multiple wind sites. He also noted that it would be reasonable to assume a
reduction of $2/MWh in the next lowest bidder s price if the same assumed property tax
reduction had been applied to its bid that was applied to Judith Gap s. In his Exhibit W AP-
Mr. Pascoe provided two examples of the slightly lower "all-" wind power costs that he
calculated would result from diversifying to two wind sites versus the single Judith Gap site:
first, an example with costs calculated using prices provided by NWE in response to PSC-
with no property tax reduction assumed and, second, an example calculated the same way but
with the property tax adjustment of $2/MWh assumed for all prices except Judith Gap, which
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 42
price would already incorporate the reduction. Exhibit W AP-8 assumes a 28 percent reduction
in wind integration costs from diversifying to two sites, which Mr. Pascoe said is a reasonable
proxy for the reductions in volatility and integration costs that he maintained would result from
multiple sites. (According to Mr. Pascoe, by diversifying wind to more than two sites, even
more reductions in wind integration costs would be possible.
166. Mr. Pascoe said that, even though his calculations show only a slightly reduced cost
resulting from diversifying to two wind sites, there are other costs and uncertainties, such as
wind projects' capacity value and possible transmission and integration costs that point to
rejection of the proposed Judith Gap contract in favor of site diversity.
167. According to Mr. Pascoe, there may be significant costs that will ultimately be paid by
default supply customers if the Judith Gap project requires transmission upgrades, which could
be the case as there are more transmission requests in the same queue as the Judith Gap request
than there is available transmission capacity. Mr. Pascoe said there are other suitable locations
for wind resources that would not have to compete for transmission capacity.
168. Mr. Pascoe commented that his other concerns about the proposed wind project
include: the dilemma presented to the commission in considering a proposed wind contract
without having the opportunity to at the same time consider a dispatchable resource proposal
presumably the MMI gas-fired combined-cycle project; the change in ownership of the Judith
Gap project, which appears to constitute the same "flipping" of contracts that was a major issue
in Docket D2001.10.144 and is the subject of ARM 38.8212(2)(t); the dismissal of Exergy
bid by Lands Energy and NWE as nonconforming, without attempting to communicate with
Exergy to address its confidentiality concerns; the need for the Commission to consider the
economic development advantages of developing multiple wind sites; and, whether the rationale
for this extremely expedited proceeding was justified.
Public comments
169. The Commission received oral comments from over 40 individuals and
received written comments from several individuals and entities. The vast majority of the
members of the public supported the project. A minority of the public comments,
including about seven of the individuals offering oral comment, either opposed or had
questions about the project.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 43
170. The supporters generally supported the project for the economic development
it would bring to a rural area of Montana, for the environmental attributes of wind
energy, for beginning to develop Montana s wind resources and for introducing fuel and
corporate diversity into the default supply resources.
171. Most opponents and questioners generally ad vised the Commission to be
cautious do to uncertainty, to demand full disclosure from NWE and to avoid any
resource that benefited from favorable tax treatment described as a subsidy. Some
opponents and commenters suggested the Commission place restrictions on the
composition of the work force employed to build the project and to operate it after
construction. These individuals were specifically concerned that prevailing wages, use of
local area work force and union jobs be provided by the project. Other opponents
suggested the Commission should not approve a large project, but should require small
projects to spread any economic development benefits to more communities.
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES FINDINGS
172. As enumerated in the Legal Background section of this order, 969-421 , MCA(c)
requires the Commission to make findings in three specific areas when considering an advanced
approval application: (1) is the application in the public interest; (2) did the agreement result
from the default supplier s reasonable effort to comply with statutory objectives; and, (3) are the
price, quantity, duration, and other contract terms directly related to the price, quantity, and
duration of the power supply purchase agreement reasonable. Following is a discussion of the
issues raised in this proceeding and the Commission s findings.
The RFP process
173. NWE addressed this issue at length in its application and at hearing to support its
position that the 2004 RFP process that resulted in the selection of the Judith Gap wind proposal
was conducted in compliance with Montana law and PSC rules. The testimony and exhibits of
Mr. Lewis of Lands Energy and Mr. Thompson ofNWE described NWE's 2004 all-source RFP
process in detail and included documentation of it.
174. PPL, through its witness Mr. King, disputed NWE's claim that the RFP process that
resulted in the selection of the Judith Gap wind proposal complied with statutory and PSC rule
requirements. Mr. King contended the RFP process was flawed because, in his opinion, it failed
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 44
to comport with industry-accepted procurement practices in violation of ~ 69-419(2)( d), MCA,
which requires a fair, open and competitive procurement process. Examples he provided
evidence that NWE did not employ industry-accepted procurement practices as required by
ARM 38.8212(1) were that bidders' anonymity was compromised and a substantial portion of
the RFP process was not conducted by an independent third party and that NWE did not
incorporate a systematic rating mechanism to objectively rank bids as required by ARM
38.8212(2)(c).
175. Mr. Pascoe, on behalf of Exergy, objected to the dismissal of Exergy s wind proposal
as nonconforming without NWE or Lands Energy first attempting to communicate with Exergy
to try to resolve concerns about the bid. He also briefly mentioned the change in ownership of
the Judith Gap project, which he said appears to constitute the same "flipping" of contracts that
was a major issue in Docket D2001.10.144 and is the subject of ARM 38.8212(2)(f). At
hearing in cross-examination ofNWE witness Mr. Thompson and in its post-hearing brief,
Exergy argued that NWE should have informed other wind bidders of the monthly on-peak, off-
peak pricing structure it had accepted in a previous Invenergy bid and that, by not doing so, the
Judith Gap proposal had an unfair advantage in violation of ARM 38.8212(2)(b) and (2)(e).
176. Section 69-419 (2)(d), MCA, requires NWE's procurement process to be open, fair
and competitive whenever possible. The Commission s guidelines for resource acquisition by
the default supplier are found at ARM 38.8212. Subsection (1) of that rule provides that a
default supplier should use industry-accepted procurement practices to acquire resources and
acknowledges those practices are not precisely known and may vary. The rule then describes the
industry-accepted approach as including these basic steps that the default supplier should follow
when acquiring resources: obtain input and recommendations throughout the process from its
technical advisory committee; explore and solicit a variety of alternative resources, products and
prices; analyze the price and non-price factors of the bids; develop a shortlist; negotiate the most
appropriate contract; and, remain flexible in order to respond as necessary to changing
circumstances.
177. No party, including PPL, presented evidence that challenged NWE's compliance with
the basic steps listed above that, according to PSC rule, encompass an industry-accepted
approach to resource procurement. NWE clearly established that its RFP process followed those
steps. NWE consulted throughout the RFP process with its Technical Advisory Committee. The
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 45
RFP was an all-source solicitation that requested a wide variety of resources, products and
prices, including a specific call for wind resource proposals. Lands Energy, in its role as
independent third-party administrator of the RFP process, evaluated the price and non-price
factors of the bids, including the wind bids. Based on that analysis, Lands Energy developed a
preliminary shortlist that was forwarded to NWE. After conducting its own analyses on the
initial shortlist bids, NWE developed a final shortlist that identified the Judith Gap proposal as
the most appropriate wind proposal and negotiated the contract that is the subject of this
proceeding.
178. PPL's claim that NWE's RFP process was not conducted in accordance with industry-
accepted procurement practices relies on its contentions that the anonymity of bidders was not
preserved in the selection process and that a substantial portion of the process was not conducted
or supervised by an independent third party.
179. The PSC's procurement guidelines do not require or even specifically mention
preserving bidder anonymity. However, NWE and Lands Energy prudently designed an RFP
process under which bidders' identities were not provided to NWE by Lands Energy until after
Lands Energy had screened the bids and developed a "blinded" preliminary shortlist and NWE
had finalized the shortlist. At that point, it was necessary for NWE to know the identities of the
final shortlisted bidders in order for NWE to commence contract negotiations. Although
bidders' identities were not provided to NWE until NWE had developed its final shortlist, Mr.
Corcoran readily acknowledged at hearing it was possible to guess the identities of some of the
bidders.
I'll be the fIrst one to tell you that although they were blind, when you work
buying electricity and natural gas in Montana, the characteristics that are
described of these products as they re related to location, and the different
attributes, and stuff. In certain cases, you ll have a pretty good idea of who the
party might be, but I can tell you then in other cases that s not the case. You don
have perfect knowledge, depending on how those bids were presented or
summarized. 5
180. Mr. Corcoran asserted that NWE' s speculation as to the identities of bidders did not
affect its selection of bids for final analysis. TR, p. 43.
5 TR, p. 43, lines 9-18.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 46
181. The Commission approves of the steps taken by NWE and Lands Energy to preserve
bidder anonymity throughout most of the RFP process. Even though the PSC's resource
acquisition guidelines do not require or suggest it, the fairness of the process was enhanced by
the efforts made to keep the identities of the bidders from NWE until the final shortlist stage.
The Commission does not agree with PPL's contention that NWE did not comply with industry-
accepted procurement practices because it was possible for NWE to guess the identities of some
bidders from the information on the blinded bid summaries. There is no evidence to suggest that
even if NWE guessed con-ectly about some bidders' identities, such speculation affected its
selection of the Judith Gap wind proposal over other wind bids.
182. PPL's claim that NWE failed to comply with industry-accepted procurement practices
because an independent third party did not monitor or supervise the entire process is similarly
without merit. The PSC procurement guideline that identifies the basic steps that comprise an
industry-accepted RFP approach does not include any mention of using an independent third
party to administer the RFP process. A relevant PSC rule, ARM 38.8212(2)(h), was not cited
to by PPL in this proceeding. However, it provides that, when an RFP process may involve bids
from affiliates of the default supplier, the default supplier should hire an independent third party
to develop the RFP and review any proposed contract with an affiliate prior to the default
supplier signing a contract. NWE's engagement of Lands Energy to develop, issue and manage
the RFP process up to the point that it provided the preliminary shortlist meets and exceeds the
expectations of the rule with respect to the activities of Lands Energy in regard to the wind
resource selection process. The rule does not require or suggest that an independent third party
monitor and supervise the process from start to finish. The limitation of Lands Energy s role in
the RFP process was reasonable. NWE witness Mr. Thompson indicated at the hearing that
NWE would not necessarily be against having an independent expert at the table at all times, but
identified three reasons why NWE would have to be involved prior to final selection: 1) NWE as
the default supply utility is responsible for procuring resources, 2) NWE has an intimate
knowledge of its loads and its tolerances with respect to counter-party credit worthiness, 3) NWE
owns the GenTrader(g) software used to perform portfolio analyses. For these reasons, NWE
needs the ability to negotiate directly in their role as default supplier. TR, pp. 300 and 305.
183. PPL also contended that NWE did not comply with ARM 38.8212(2)(c), which is
one of several principles enumerated in this rule that the default supplier should adhere to when
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 47
conducting an RFP process. The specific principle cited by PPL provides that the default
supplier should develop a systematic rating mechanism, which does not have to be disclosed to
bidders, to objectively rank bids and then document the mechanism s development and use for
later presentation to the Commission. PPL argued that NWE did not provide documentation that
it had developed and used a systematic bid rating mechanism. PPL witness Mr. King also
claimed the standards applied by NWE to PPL's bids were different than those applied to other
bids and that this alleged unequal treatment proves there was no systematic rating mechanism in
place.
184. Again, PPL's contention is belied by the evidence presented by NWE that
demonstrates NWE and Lands Energy did have and use a systematic rating mechanism to ensure
objective ranking of bids. Mr. Lewis ' testimony included a general description of the two-phase
process used to evaluate the bids: quantitative (price) and qualitative (non-price) analyses by
Lands Energy to develop an initial shortlist, followed by NWE's computer modeling of the
shortlisted bids to identify the final shortlist proposals that would provide the most benefit to the
portfolio. NWE Exhibit 2, pp. 22-23. He also explained the quantitative price ranking and
analyses that were perfonned by Lands Energy and NWE in the selection process. NWE-
pp. 27-30.
185. The most detailed documentation of the price and non-price rating mechanisms
developed and used by NWE and Lands Energy is contained in Mr. Lewis s October 31,2004
memo to NWE regarding the preliminary shortlist. NWE- 2, Confidential Exhibit SEL-9. In that
memo, Mr. Lewis described the predetermined price scoring methodology that was used to rank
the bids as well as the non-price evaluation factors. The memo also included the resulting price
non-price and total combined scores for each of the four Tier 1 wind bids.
186. Additional documentation of the ranking system exists in the record. Mr. Lewis
September 27 , 2004, memo to NWE regarding the Lands Energy screening of proposals included
discussion of Lands Energy s use of a spreadsheet -based net present value versus market
analysis to compare similar types of resources that were bid into the RFP against each other.
NWE-, Confidential Exhibit SEL-8. The memo listed several key areas of information that had
been requested from all bidders and that were subsequently evaluated by Lands Energy for each
bidder. Mr. Lewis testified that Lands Energy consulted extensively with NWE and the T AC'
modeling subcommittee about Lands Energy s process for analyzing the non-price (qualitative)
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 48
factors of the bids to ensure it was fair. NWE-, p. 22. At hearing, when asked by PPL'
attorney if NWE had developed and used a systematic rating mechanism, Mr. Thompson replied
yes and reiterated that the TAC had been involved in discussions with NWE regarding
development and application of the ranking system that was used. TR, p. 220. He said the T AC
meeting notices conflfm this issue was discussed. He also noted that NWE is not required to
disclose its rating system to bidders.
187. The RFP document itself contained a section titled "Evaluation Criteria," which
informed bidders that the initial screening would employ a qualitative and quantitative review
process that included the use of a "predetermined rating matrix." NWE-2, Exhibit SEL-
pp.
188. Mr. King s claim that PPL's bids were held to a different standard because NWE
compared PPL's post-2007 bid to PPL's CUITent or past prices has as its basis a section ofMr.
Corcoran s prefiled testimony (NWE-, p. 34, lines 1-3) that PPL itself requested be stricken
from the record in this phase of the proceeding as iITelevant.6 This issue raised by PPL is not
directly related to the proposed wind contract and is irrelevant for purposes of this phase of the
proceeding, but it may be addressed in the second phase of this proceeding because it is related
to NWE's request in this application for Commission comments on its decision not to replace the
PPL baseload contracts at this time.
189. Exergy s objection to the rejection of its wind bid as nonconforming by Lands Energy
is not credible. Mr. Lewis ' September 14,2004 "Bid Elimination Memo" (NWE-, Exhibit
SEL-4) fully documented the rationale for Lands Energy s decision, which was appropriate
given Exergy s choice to submit a deficient bid that failed to include much of the information
requested in the RFP. Exergy s witness Mr. Pascoe acknowledged several significant
deficiencies in the Exergy bid under cross examination at hearing and the risk of rejection
Exergy assumed when it decided to submit a bid that did not conform to the specific terms of the
RFP. TR, pp. 333-334 and 353-354.
190. Mr. Pascoe also suggested a change in ownership of the Judith Gap wind project had
occuITed that might constitute a violation of ARM 38.8212(2)(1), which provides that the
default supplier should not reassign supply contracts to an additional third party after the original
bid activity and during the evaluation of bids. Although an entity named Wind Park Solutions
6 See Docket D2005.PPL Montana, LLC's Motion To Strike Irrelevant Testimony, March 17,2005.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 49
had bid a similar Judith Gap wind proposal into a previous NWE RFP, the proposed contract at
issue in this proceeding is between NWE and WPSA Judith Gap I, LLC, now known as Judith
Gap Energy, LLC, which is wholly owned by Invenergy Wind LLC. NWE explained the
ownership interests in these entities in its response to PPL's data request PPL-22. Mr. Pascoe
did not provide any evidence that ownership of WPSA Judith Gap I, LLC had "flipped" after the
Judith Gap bid was submitted in the RFP and during the evaluation of the bids. NWE has not
submitted a revised contract or any other information to indicate the principals to the contract
have changed. In the absence of evidence that the contract has been reassigned to another party,
the Commission can find no violation of ARM 38.8212(2)(f).
191. In its post-hearing brief, Exergy argued that NWE's procurement process was not
open, fair and competitive because, Exergy claimed, NWE did not comply with ARM
38.8121(2)(b) by providing all potential bidders with the same standards and criteria by which
NWE intended to evaluate the bids. In addition, Exergy alleged NWE violated ARM
38.8212(2)(e) by not giving all bidders in the wind RFP an opportunity to supplement their
bids to address a new resource attribute or new evaluation criteria that had not been previously
identified. Exergy Brief, p. 5-6. The basis for Exergy s argument is the allegation that the Judith
Gap project had an unfair advantage in the 2004 RFP because, as a result ofNWE's 2003 wind
RFP, NWE had discussed and accepted in 2003-2004 negotiations with WindPark Solutions and
its successor on the Judith Gap project, Invenergy, the same basic pricing structure contained in
the now-proposed Judith Gap contract. Exergy argued that Invenergy s proposed pricing
structure was considered a resource attribute by NWE and, therefore, NWE should have
communicated that information to all wind bidders in the RFP.
192. The Commission disagrees with Exergy s claim that the process was unfair to other
bidders. As explained by Mr. Thompson at hearing, Invenergy proposed an innovative pricing
structure and discussed it with NWE as a result of being shortlisted after the 2003 wind RFP.
, p. 160, lines 11-16. It is evident that Invenergy knew when it was requested to re-bid into
the 2004 RFP that NWE had, at least informally, indicated it would accept the previously
proposed pricing structure. TR, p. 161 , lines 10-13. However, there is no evidence to suggest
that NWE and Lands Energy favored the Judith Gap bid over others, or applied different
standards or criteria to their evaluation of the Judith Gap bid than to other wind bids. There was
no guarantee that NWE would select the Judith Gap project if Judith Gap chose to include the
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 50
pricing structure in its 2004 bid, given that other bidders could well have developed their own
better proposals. Market participants generally recognize the variation of on-peak and off-peak
prices throughout the year. Any bidder could have offered economically rational pricing
structures that reflect this variation.
193. The Commission disagrees with PPL's position that the existing default supply
procurement process is broken and should be revamped. The RFP process that is the subject of
this proceeding was the fITst to be conducted by NWE under the Commission s default supply
and procurement guidelines since the company s initial default supply plan was filed and
commented upon by the Commission last year. NWE applied the guidelines to its RFP process
and, as is evident from the Commission s findings in this order, NWE was able to demonstrate
the prudence of its selection of the Judith Gap wind resource. That is not to say that
improvements to the process cannot be made as experience is gained over time. The
Commission notes that, as discussed at the hearing, any person or party, including PPL, may
propose changes to Commission rules at any time. PPL's New Jersey-type auction alternative
was presented by Mr. King. MCC witness, Dr. Wilson, disagreed with the applicability of that
alternative within the NWE's market area. TR, pp. 648-650.
Price
194. None of the interveners contested the reasonableness of the energy price contained in
the power purchase agreement. The record establishes that the energy price in the agreement is a
competitive and attractive price for wind resources. Lands Energy short-listed the Judith Gap
project and another offer, bid 7., after a reasonable analysis of the nominallevelized price
streams specified by eight of nine wind bids.? Lands Energy also evaluated, at a basic level, each
of the wind bids in terms of their affect on the current default supply portfolio. This analysis
captured the unique capacity factors and generation profiles of the Tier 1 bids. The analysis
conducted by Lands Energy fairly compared the wind bids based on price and non-price
attributes, using criteria specified in NWE's RFP. NWE-, p. 22. Price received a 70%
weighting in the evaluation. Lands Energy eliminated the effect of the property tax pass-through
in the Judith Gap bid to ensure an "apples-to-apples" comparison. TR, pp. 95-96. Following
Lands Energy s selection of the two short -listed wind bids, the bidders were given an
7 As described in paragraph 177, Exergy s bid did not include detailed price information.
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 51
opportunity to refresh their bids, at which point bidder 7.2 increased its price by approximately
13%, while Judith Gap s bid did not change.
195. Several witnesses testified that the price of the Judith Gap resource is one of the most
attractive prices for wind projects they have seen in the Pacific Northwest. NWE-3, p. 78
RNP-, p. 6, RNP-, p. 6. The unique and innovative monthly on-peak and off-peak pricing
structure enhances the attractiveness of an already low price by making it easier for NWE to
integrate the resource more economically. NWE-3 p. 76, RDR, PSC-005. Judith Gap s expected
capacity factor exceeds that of bid 7.2, the other the short-listed wind project. TR, p. 167, RDR
MCC-004. And project site wind data indicate that the shape of electric generation from the
project complements the daily default supply load shape. TR, pp. 167-168, NWE Late Filed
Exhibit MDT - 7. When wind resources are available at the project site, Judith Gap will provide
low cost energy that can displace market energy purchases or provide off-system sales revenue
depending on prevailing market prices and default supply load. The project will also provide
some capacity value on a statistical basis without any accompanying capacity charge.
Statistically, Judith Gap will provide energy coincident with the NWE's system peak and
average monthly peaks. If, in the future, WECC and/or the Northwest Power Pool explicitly
recognize the capacity value of wind resources, the statistical capacity associated with Judith
Gap could provide additional portfolio benefits. TR, pp. 306-308. Mr. Mainzer testified that
PacifiCorp has announced that it will be awarding capacity value to its wind resources and that
the California Energy Commission, with help from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
is seriously studying the capacity value of wind resources. TR, p. 612. Finally, if Ms. Gravatt
and Mr. Thompson are correct that the price of wind turbines is likely to increase (possibly by as
much as 20 percent, according to Ms. Gravatt) in 2006, Judith Gap s price would represent a lost
opportunity if not approved. TR, pp. 274-275, and 615.
Integration costs
196. Acquiring any wind resource requires purchasing integration services, either directly
or indirectly. The record identifies a range of costs associated with integrating Judith Gap
variable energy production into the default supply resource portfolio and NWE's transmission
control area. Several witnesses compared the variation of wind energy production to the minute-
by-minute, hour-to-hour variability of default supply load. For example, RNP witness, Mr.
Mainzer, testified that "although wind projects are sources of electricity generation, from the
DOCKET NO. D2005.ORDER NO. 6633b Page 52
perspective of a utility operator, wind actually behaves more like an electrical load than a source
of generating capacity." RNP-1, p. 2. MCC witness, Dr. Wilson, similarly stated that "the
variability of a wind resource is quite analogous to the variability on the demand side.
TR, p. 639. NWE must continually balance loads and resources today under conditions where
actual load differs from expected load. Integrating wind resources into the default supply
portfolio simply requires managing the net variability produced by changing load and changing
wind energy production. RDR, PSC-006, PSC-010. The Commission agrees with Dr. Wilson
that NWE is fully capable of managing this net variability. TR, p. 640.
197. The Commission finds that NWE is properly analyzing multiple strategies for
addressing net variability associated with integrating wind resources into the default supply
portfolio. These strategies include using internal resources like the PSC-approved Basin Creek
natural gas reciprocating generator, a potential combined cycle natural gas turbine generator
within the control area, third party purchases of integration services, dynamic scheduling
opportunities and various combinations of these resources. In the near term, NWE may also be
able to rely on the characteristics of certain intermediate contracts it executed through its RFP as
a source of some integration services. TR, p. 319 Although the ultimate cost of integrating
Judith Gap energy production into the default supply portfolio is uncertain, the Commission
agrees with RNP witness, Mr. Mainzer, that NWE has adopted an intelligent strategy toward
wind integration. The record strongly demonstrates that utilities in the Pacific Northwest and
throughout the country have successfully integrated large and small, concentrated and
geographically diverse wind resources without experiencing unreasonable costs for integration.
See for example RNP-1 - specifically the chart in the attached power point slide titled Cost
Convergence, NWE-, RDR, PSC-OO7. NWE generally appears to have considered high quality,
current, national analyses in developing its integration strategy. Nothing in the record suggests
NWE's cost to integrate the Judith Gap project will be outside the range of costs seen by other
utilities.
198. Exergy witness, Mr. Pascoe, asserted that integration costs would potentially be less if
NWE diversified the geographical location of wind capacity within the control area. The record
supports the basic concept of diversification as a means of reducing integration costs. Exergy-
RNP-1. The record also shows that NWE is aware of this basic concept and has evaluated
multiple sites throughout its system. RDR, PSC-007. The Commission finds reasonable NWE'
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 53
conclusion that Judith Gap s very attractive energy price and complementary (to load) generation
profile outweighed the potential benefits of site diversification in this instance. MCC witness
Dr. Wilson, also supported this conclusion. MCC-, p. 12. To a large extent, NWE was limited
by the offers submitted in response to its RFP. It is possible that NWE could have achieved
diversification through simultaneous negotiation with several attractive wind offers. But there is
no guarantee that the price achieved for the Judith Gap project could have been preserved; given
the prices of the two next best wind bids, it is likely diversification would have increased the
overall cost of wind energy. In fact, Mr. Pascoe s Exhibit (W AP-8 rev) indicated splitting the
wind capacity between Judith Gap and bid 7.2 would not have produced a lower total wind cost
using his estimates of internal and external integration costs. A slight improvement (about 1 %
with external integration, less than 1 % with internal integration) in total costs might have been
achieved by splitting the wind capacity between Judith Gap and bid 14, which was not short-
listed. But Mr. Pascoe s analysis is high-level; it does not reflect any differences in the specific
shape of wind generation and it does not compare total portfolio costs under each scenario.
Therefore, the effects of diluting the beneficial monthly on-peak and off-peak pricing structure
through diversification are not accounted for. NWE's Late Filed Exhibit MDT-7 shows
significant differences between Judith Gap and bid 7.2 in tenDS of total portfolio benefits.
199. Importantly, the record suggests that NWE could see diversification benefits within
the Judith Gap project itself, which would employ 80 - 100 turbines spread over some 20 square
miles. RNP witness, Mr. Mainzer, stated that BPA's largest wind project maintains a flatter
output shape compared to smaller projects. Large wind projects generally involve a large
geographic area with varying topography and the turbines are spread out over that area such that
changes in wind speeds do not impact all turbines simultaneously. TR, pp. 455-456, RNP-
Integration cost cap
200. MCC witness, Dr. Wilson, recommended that the Commission cap the amount of
integration costs that NWE would be able to recover through default supply rates. While NWE
identified a likely range for integration costs of $5.00/MWh to $9.00/MWh, Dr. Wilson
recommended a cap of $5.00/MWh. He reasoned that a $5.00/MWh cap would make the total
cost of Judith Gap comparable to other non-wind resources. He said setting the cap higher than
$5.00/MWh would imply a willingness to pay a premium for other perceived benefits of wind
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 54
power. A cap higher than $9.00/MWh would be excessive, according to Dr. Wilson.
MCC-, p II.
201. At the public hearing, both the Montana Consumer Counsel, Mr. Nelson, and his
witness, Dr. Wilson, seemed to acknowledge that the uncertainty related to integration costs is
not a source of significant risk for customers. Mr. Nelson stated that the recommended cap is
intended to minimize "what little risk there is to the ratepayers" from undefined integration costs.
, p. 20. Dr. Wilson indicated that testimony at the hearing by NWE and RNP witness, Mr.
Mainzer, suggested a lower level of risk than he anticipated when he drafted his pre filed
testimony. TR, p. 654. Responding to a question about whether a cap on integration costs could
interfere with efforts to minimize those costs, Dr. Wilson stated that NWE seems to be
genuinely focused on getting the best deal for consumers..." TR, p. 656.
202. The upper limit of Dr. Wilson s range of acceptable integration cost caps
($9.00/MWh) is generally consistent with Mr. Pascoe s sensitivity analysis ofNWE's estimated
integration costs ($9.12/MWh from external resources). Exergy s post-hearing brief
characterized Mr. Pascoe s integration cost estimates as "solid calculations of internal and
external integration costs." These costs are well above the actual experiences of other utilities,
as described in Mr. Mainzer s testimony. But even assuming a $IO.OO/MWh integration cost
which is double the expected cost of about $5.00/MWh, the impact of the difference on a typical
residential customer s bill would be $0.28 per month, less than one-third the amount of the
Universal System Benefits Charge.
203. Dr. Wilson s testimony did not explain exactly how the Commission would implement
an integration cost cap. The record suggests that actual integration costs would have to be
averaged for comparison against his recommended cap of $5.00/MWh. MCC's post-hearing
brief proposed that the cap apply to average integration costs for those hours in which such costs
are incurred in each month. Brief p. 6. Integration of wind represents a new resource and the
Commission expects that there will be a learning curve associated with this resource. Imposition
of a monthly cap is unwarranted in the Commission s view. And given the prevailing view that
the process of integrating wind involves managing the net variability of simultaneous changes in
loads and wind energy output, it is not clear how certain capacity-related costs will be attributed
solely to one source of variability versus another. Although Dr. Wilson suggested such issues
(($5.00/MWh*455,OOO)/6,000,000)*75MWh per month = $0.28 per month
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 55
might be resolved through additional work by Commission staff MCC and NWE, this additional
process seems unwarranted given the acknowledged minimal risk related to integration cost
uncertainty. In the long-run, evaluating the prudence of actual integration approaches used by
NWE in the annual electric tracker appears to be a better approach for encouraging innovation,
incorporating best practices and minimizing costs.
204. MCC's desire to protect ratepayers from taking on risks they cannot control is
reasonable. However, the Commission s role is to pass judgment on whether NWE's proposal to
add a new resource to the default supply portfolio is reasonable and in the public interest. The
Commission can best serve this purpose by evaluating all aspects of the proposed resource,
including any risks related to uncertain costs, and determining whether the overall benefits
outweigh the overall costs, including inherent uncertainty. Many utility costs are uncertain, but
the Commission does not place caps on them. Examples include day-to-day operations costs,
labor costs, maintenance costs and fuel costs. The Commission does not cap ancillary service
costs incurred to deal with the variable nature of customer load. The issue of placing a cap on
wind integration costs raises larger questions of the current risk-reward environment under which
NWE operates, rate caps and other forms of regulation which are beyond the scope of this
proceeding. Additionally, the Commission is sympathetic to RNP witness Mr. Mainzer
concerns about disincenting desired behavior and otherwise unintentionally interfering with
NWE's ability to procure integration services at the lowest possible cost. TR, p. 490.
Portfolio analysis
205. NWE's portfolio analyses demonstrated that the Judith Gap project would add value to
a number of different possible portfolio structures. NWE's stochastic modeling showed that
adding Judith Gap to the existing portfolio of resources would reduce the expected total cost and
risk of the portfolio. NWE-, Exhibit CMDT-RFP-21), RDR, PSC-004. NWE Late Filed
Exhibit No. MDT -3 showed several other portfolio structures with and without Judith Gap. Each
of the portfolio structures perfonns better from a total cost and risk perspective with Judith Gap.
NWE's scenario analyses, using actual wholesale electricity and natural gas prices for the years
2000 through 2004, demonstrated that the Judith Gap resource performs well from a portfolio
perspective under a variety of market conditions, but particularly when market prices are high.
NWE-l, Exhibit CMDT-RFP-20), RDR, PSC-003. The Commission finds that procuring Judith
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 56
Gap would not predetennine any particular portfolio structure, but would improve the ultimate
portfolio s performance with regard to total cost and risks.
206. PPL witness, Mr. King, testified that the statistics in, Exhibits NWE-(MDT-RFP-
20) and (MDT -RFP-21), and presumably others referenced above
, "
cannot possibly be the basis
for the procurement decisions that NWE is recommending to the Commission." PPL-, p. 13.
According to Mr. King, NWE is not planning to procure a single one of the portfolios described
in the two exhibits since they either anticipate no further resource procurements or anticipate
procuring resources that NWE is not going to procure. The Commission does not agree. Mr.
King s statement mischaracterizes the nature of NWE' s portfolio analyses. Nowhere did NWE
suggest that it does not plan to procure resources to replace the PPL contracts that expire in 2007.
In fact, the slice product Mr. King said NWE does not plan to procure was the subject of
negotiations between NWE and PPL. NWE's decision to not procure the replacement resources
from its current RFP does not imply that those resources will never be procured. All the
modeled portfolios except the "full market exposure" portfolio identify a resource procurement
strategy and incorporate some reasonable proxy for the baseload and on peak resources currently
purchased from PPL. Those proxies were derived from actual RFP bids. The Commission does
not agree with Mr. King that the portfolios NWE analyzed are irrelevant to assessing the cost-
effectiveness of the Judith Gap project. In a dynamic wholesale market environment, the default
supply utility must maintain flexibility within its planning and procurement process. It will not
always be possible to follow through with procurements anticipated in a default supply plan or a
request for proposals. Moreover, long-term modeling of a portfolio of resources with staggered
contract terms, as envisioned in ARM 38.8204, will necessarily require NWE to make
assumptions about the cost to replace contracts that expire during the planning horizon.
207. The Commission finds unreasonable Mr. King s assertion that NWE should have
evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the Judith Gap project by comparing its average price,
including integration costs, property taxes, interconnection and transmission system
reinforcements, to a rejected counter-offer for a shaped baseload and peak product. The record
clearly demonstrates that NWE is not procuring wind resources as a substitute for baseload
resources, but rather to complement strategies for serving intermediate load requirements. TR
pp.
267-268.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 57
208. Mr. King criticized NWE's portfolio modeling approach for being inconsistent with
ARM 38.8213. PPL-, p. 21. He stated that NWE's analysis uses techniques, models,
assumptions and inputs that are not proven or rigorous and are far from standard industry
practice. PPL-, p. 24. These assertions are not supported by prior Commission decisions or the
findings of industry experts hired by the Commission to evaluate NWE' s modeling approach and
input assumptions. The Commission hired Quantec, LLC in Docket No. N2004.15 to conduct
an independent and impartial assessment of NWE' s methodology in preparing its 2004 Electric
Default Supply Resource Procurement Plan. Quantec s final report stated:
Based on our assessment, the Plan is a rigorous effort on the part of NWE to
comply with and follow the requirements of the (Commission s) Guidelines. It
attempts to balance competing objectives of resource cost and risks; incorporates
diversity into the resource portfolio with a mix of supply, demand-side, and
renewable resources; and presents the information with sufficient transparency so
that it is accessible to both industry professionals and the public.
With respect to the PCI GenTraderCID Monte Carlo planning and analysis model, Quantec s report
found that about 15 utilities use this tool for planning purposes. Quantec found the stochastic
modeling capabilities of GenTraderCID appropriate for analyzing the uncertainty related to fuel
prices, spot market prices, availability, projected loads, and environmental risks. GenTraderCID is
a complex tool because it models each hour of each year being studied. Quantec determined this
complexity would limit the number of scenarios that GenTraderCID could practically model but
that it provided most of the tools needed for longer-term portfolio assessment. Quantec stated
that the Northwest Power and Conservation Council is a well-accepted source for price
information in the region and that NWE appropriately captured the uncertainty and volatility of
electricity and natural gas prices using Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) probability
distributions. 1 0
209. The Commission also commented on NWE's portfolio modeling approach in Docket
No. D2004.3.45, NWE's application for advanced approval of a power purchase agreement with
Basin Creek LLC. In Order 6557c the Commission stated:
...
the Commission has reviewed NWE's default supply plan and issued comments
on the plan. Although the Commission recommended that NWE consider
Written Comments Identifying Concerns Regarding NorthWestern Energy s Compliance with ARM 38.8201-
8229, Montana Public Service Commission. August 17,2004. See Attachment A.10 The main characteristic of the assumed Geometric Brownian Motion probability distribution is that variance in
prices tends to increase over time and they capture the skewedness associated with very high price outcomes.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 58
enhancing it long-term analytical methods, the Commission s comments were not
an impeachment ofNWE's portfolio planning approach or modeling assumptions.
The Commission determined that the probabilistic analyses NWE conducted
using the GenTraderCID modeling software were appropriate because they
incorporated explicit assessments of uncertainty, and, therefore , helped to identify
and evaluate risks and interrelationships between variables.
In the present application for advanced approval of a power purchase agreement with Judith Gap,
NWE has updated the wholesale electricity and natural gas price forecasts to reflect the most
current analyses, but continues to use the Northwest Power and Conservation Council's data.
NWE-, p. 60. And NWE has adapted its application of GenTraderCID to incorporate long-term,
dynamic portfolio modeling, addressing a key Commission comment in Docket No. N2004.1.15.
NWE-, p. 56.
210. Finally, NWE's approach to default supply portfolio planning and resource
procurement has been an on-going process guided by Montana statutes, Commission-hosted
workshops, administrative rules and orders, as well as feedback in the form of Commission
comments on the Company s first comprehensive portfolio plan. At least some in the industry
believe Montana has developed a reasonable framework for default supply portfolio planning
and resource procurement, as evidenced by the July 2003 joint Calpine-Natural Resources
Defense Council-PacifiCorp proposal to state utility regulators on electricity resource portfolio
management responsibilities. This Commission s rules also align well with recent reports by the
Regulatory Assistance Project and the Edison Electric Institute. I I Although there are
undoubtedly areas of both the Commission s rules and NWE's process that could be improved or
refined, the record in this proceeding, especially when placed in the context of the body of work
that has come before it, demonstrates that NWE's portfolio modeling techniques, assumptions
and inputs are reasonable and consistent with the Commission s rules.
11 Resource Planning and Procurement In Evolving Electricity Markets, January 2004, prepared by the Brattle
Group for Edison Electric Institute.
Portfolio Management: How to Procure Electricity Resources to Provide Reliable, Low-Cost, and Efficient Services
to All Retail Customers, October 2003 prepared by Synapse Energy Economics, Inc for The Regulatory Assistance
Project.
Portfolio Management: Protecting Customer in an Electric Market That Isn t Working Very Well, July 2002, The
Regulatory Assistance Project.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 59
Transmission congestion and reliability costs
211. Exergy witness, Mr. Pascoe, and PPL witness, Mr. Palmerton, asserted that the total
cost of wind generation should include the costs of transmission upgrades. Mr. Pascoe stated
that the Judith Gap project will interconnect to NWE's transmission system at a point considered
to be on the West of Broadview cutplane. Exergy-, pp. 30-31. He also asserted that there is
approximately 140 MW of available transmission capacity through the West of Broadview
cutplane, prior to considering the needs of the Judith Gap project, and that there are currently a
number of other new generation projects ahead of Judith Gap in NWE's transmission service
queue. If these other generation projects are completed, he believes the Judith Gap project could
become responsible for significant transmission upgrades. Since the contract between Judith
Gap and NWE states that NWE is responsible for arranging and paying for transmission service,
default supply customers would ultimately pay for the cost of the upgrades included in NWE'
FERC-regulated transmission revenue requirement and allocated to Network Service customers.
212. Mr. Palmerton asserted that it could cost up to $10 million to upgrade the transmission
system to accommodate the Judith Gap project. He identified as potential upgrades a new 230
k V line from Judith Gap to Great Falls, a new transformer at Judith Gap and upgrading the entire
length of the 100 kV the transmission line Judith Gap-Harlowton-Broadview.
213. Russel John Leland presented live rebuttal testimony on behalf of the NWE default
supp ly utility addressing the transmission-related assertions of Mr. Pascoe and Mr. Palmerton.
Mr. Leland is the manager of electric transmission planning for the functionally separate NWE
transmission unit and incoming chair of the Reliability Subcommittee of the WECC Planning
and Coordination Committee. He disputed Mr. Pascoe s assertion that the Judith Gap project
will interconnect to NWE's transmission system at a point on the West of Broadview cutplane.
According to Mr. Leland, the Judith Gap project will actually be located at a point that is west of
the West of Broadview cutplane and Mr. Pascoe s incorrect assumption about the location of the
Judith Gap project in relation to the cutplane means his conclusions regarding the need for
transmission upgrades are wrong. NWE Late Filed Exhibit No. RJL-l confIrms that the WECC
path rating catalog shows the Judith Gap substation is on the West of Broadview path. It also
confIrms that the metered end of that path is the Broadview substation. Thus Mr. Leland'
testimony regarding the location of the Judith Gap project in relation to the point where power
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 60
flows on the West of Broadview path are metered is consistent with the information in the
WECC path rating catalog.
214. Mr. Leland testified that Mr. Palmerton s conclusions rest on the same incorrect
assumption as Mr. Pascoe s. TR, pp. 665-666. Mr. Leland stated that, historically, there has not
been a congestion problem through the West of Broadview cutplane. Congestion at the cutplane
could become a problem to the extent new generation is added to the east. But as the Judith Gap
project is to the west, it will not contribute to congestion at the cutplane.
215. Mr. Leland explained that the Judith Gap interconnection agreement contains
overload mitigation" provisions that are designed to prevent the overloading of a stepdown
transfonner at Judith Gap (the town) in the event of an outage on the line between Judith Gap
(the project) and Broadview. He indicated that such an overload would only occur if the project
output exceeds 150 MW, i.e., greater than the capacity in the power purchase agreement between
Judith Gap and NWE. The reliability studies NWE conducted indicated that the overload
mitigation provisions were all that was needed to reliably connect the Judith Gap project at its
full 188 MW planned capacity to the 230 kV system. TR, pp. 668-669. Judith Gap is
responsible for paying for the necessary facilities to mitigate any overload situations.
216. In addressing a criticism by Mr. Palmerton about the age of the reliability studies, Mr.
Leland essentially suggested that NWE's transmission system impact analyses are conservative
because they rely on load assumptions today, rather than load assumptions that reflect future load
growth. Mr. Leland testified that load growth improves the perfonnance of the transmission
system because Montana is a net exporter of generation. TR, p. 673.
217. Finally, Mr. Leland emphasized several times the important distinction between a
network customer designating resources to serve network loads and new resources requesting
point-to-point transmission service in order to move power off the transmission system. Since
Judith Gap will be a network resource designated by NWE's default supply utility to serve
default supply loads, the transmission analysis involved insuring that the new network resource
would be interconnected with the same reliability as all other network resources and that energy
output from the resource can be moved anywhere within the system. Therefore, the generation
interconnection study covered all relevant transmission related issues; it was studied thoroughly
and, as Mr. Leland indicated, additional studies are not required to obtain transmission service.
DOCKET NO. D2005.2.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 61
The transmission service request is a formality needed to designate a new point of receipt for a
network resource. TR, p. 680.
218. The Commission finds that Mr. Leland's testimony reasonably demonstrated that there
are neither reliability issues nor transmission congestion issues related to NWE's procurement of
between 135 MW and 150 MW of wind capacity from Judith Gap. His testimony further
demonstrated that reliability issues related to interconnecting the full 188 MW of potential
capacity have been addressed in the interconnection agreement between Judith Gap and the
NWE transmission unit, although the power purchase agreement between NWE and Judith Gap
only envisions up to 150 MW. Thus, NWE default supply customers are not responsible for any
interconnection related costs, except to the extent the Commission approves additional purchases
from the project above 150 MW and the price of those purchases reflects overload mitigation-
related costs. Furthermore, due to its location, Judith Gap will not cause congestion at the West
of Broadview cutplane and, therefore, will not cause transmission upgrade costs that will affect
NWE customers. Mr. Palmerton s testimony that NWE's transmission unit failed to adequately
study the reliability impacts of interconnecting Judith Gap, violated reliability standards
established by WECC, NERC and FERC, or otherwise neglected its responsibilities as a
transmission services provider in ways that may harm the quality of service available to Montana
customers or damage generating facilities connected to the transmission system is particularly
suspect. First, PPL has a direct financial self-interest in preserving opportunities to supply
NWE's default supply utility. Second, the record is completely void of any evidence that PPL
has either sought, or plans to seek, remedies for such failures from any of the organizations that
are in a position to actually enforce reliability standards, standards for studying the potential
effects of interconnecting new large generators and non-discriminatory, unbundled wholesale
transmission service. Finally, the Commission finds that it is NWE's transmission division, the
control area operator, which is directly responsible for satisfying all transmission reliability study
and action requirements, not PPL or Exergy. The Commission finds no evidence that the
transmission division failed in that responsibility or has any reason to jeopardize its control area
within the WECC transmission system through non-compliance with its reliability study
obligations.
DOCKET NO. D2005.14, ORDER NO. 6633b Page 62
Quantity and term of the Judith Gap power purchase agreement
219. No party directly contested the overall quantity or term contained in the power
purchase agreement with Judith Gap. Exergy and PPL indirectly contested the quantity by
questioning the integration costs and/or whether it would be better to divide the quantity into
smaller pieces that would be interconnected to the transmission system in different locations.
Integration cost issues were addressed in the previous section.
220. The Commission finds the quantity and duration reasonable. Notably, the 135 MW to
150 MW quantity is consistent with NWE's 2004 electric default supply resource procurement
plan previously reviewed by the Commission. NWE specified procurement of wind generation
in an action plan accompanying the 2004 plan and the preferred procurement strategies in the
plan all contained 150 MW of installed wind capacity. The duration is likely a function
financing provisions for a new , capital intensive utility scale generation resource. In the context
ofNWE'existing default supply portfolio, the duration of the Judith Gap power purchase
agreement will contribute to long-term price stability.
Other non-price considerations
221. Several other non-price considerations serve to further illustrate that NWE' s selection
of the Judith Gap project was reasonable and justified. The record indicates that the Judith Gap
project team includes highly experienced and recognized independent power developers with
strong financial backing. Judith Gap would be subject to financial penalties of up to $8 million if
it fails to achieve capacity installation deadlines. The Judith Gap project demonstrated an
advanced state of planning and development with respect to environmental issues, turbine
acquisition, transmission interconnection issues and community relations.
222. As described in the above findings, the power purchase agreement between NWE and
Judith Gap resulted from a reasonable effort by NWE to comply with the objectives in Section
69-419, MCA and the Commission s rules in ARM 38.8201-28. Also, as described, the
price, quantity, duration and other discussed contract terms directly related to the price, quantity
and duration of the power supply in the in the agreement are reasonable. Advanced approval by
the Commission is a condition precedent to the respective obligations of Judith Gap and NWE
contained in the power purchase agreement. Without the Commission s approval the project will
not be built and the benefits described in this order will not accrue to NWE's customers.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 63
Therefore, advanced approval of the specific parts of the agreement described in this order is in
the public interest.
Renewable Energy Credits (green tags)
223. Mr. Thompson stated at the hearing that NWE has considered the possibility of selling
between 20 percent and 25 percent of the renewable energy credits associated with the energy
production from the Judith Gap project. NWE would keep the rest of the renewable attributes in
the default supply portfolio to satisfy any future portfolio standard that it may be subject to. TR
p. 285 lines 13-18. Mr. Thompson indicated that renewable energy credits cuITendy trade at a
price of between $2.00 and $5.00 per megawatt hour. The Commission expects NWE to
consider the potential sale of renewable energy credits in the context of its long-term portfolio
planning process and discuss options with its Technical Advisory Committee. The
environmental attribute of the Judith Gap energy production covered by the power purchase
agreement addressed in this proceeding are dedicated to the default supply portfolio. Disposition
of those attributes must be consistent with the goals and objectives of ~69-419, MCA and the
Commission s default supply planning guidelines. Prior to selling any renewable energy credits
associated with energy purchased from Judith Gap, NWE must justify its strategy in a
subsequent default supply plan or an update to the plan submitted in 2004.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Advanced approval of the power purchase agreement between NWE and Judith Gap is
in the public interest.2. The Judith Gap power purchase agreement resulted from a reasonable effort by NWE
to comply with the objectives of ~ 69-419, MCA, and related administrative rules ARM
38.8201-28.
The price, quantity, duration and related terms of the agreement are reasonable.
For purposes of the Commission s consideration of the Judith Gap wind contract, the
Commission finds the RFP process that resulted in the selection of Judith Gap was conducted
fairly, openly and competitively as required by ~ 69-419(2)(d), MCA.
The RFP process that resulted in the selection of the Judith Gap wind proposal was
conducted in accordance with industry-accepted procurement practices in compliance with ARM
38.8212(1).
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 64
NWE and its agent, Lands Energy, complied with ARM 38.8212(2)(c) by
developing, using and documenting a systematic rating mechanism to objectively rank the bids
received in the RFP process that resulted in the selection of the Judith Gap wind proposa1.
7. Exergy s claim that Lands Energy unfairly rejected its wind bid as nonconforming is
not credible.8. There is no evidence in the record to support Exergy s suggestion that the Judith Gap
wind contract may have been reassigned to an additional third party after the bid was submitted
and during the bid evaluation process in violation of ARM 38.8212(2)(t).9. The energy prices in the Judith Gap wind contract, which average $31. 111M wh, are
reasonable.
10.NWE is properly analyzing multiple strategies for addressing net variability caused by
integrating wind resources into the default supply portfolio.
11. NWE reasonably concluded that the combination of the attractive energy price and
complementary (to load) shape of the energy production for the Judith Gap project outweighed
the potential benefits of site diversification in this instance.
12.The cap on wind integration costs recommended by MCC is not warranted, given that
undefined integration costs pose little risk to ratepayers, there exist uncertainties about how such
a cap would be implemented, and that, over the long term, PSC prudence reviews ofNWE'
actual integration approaches is the better approach for encouraging innovation, incorporating
best practices, and minimizing costs.
13. NWE's portfolio analyses demonstrated that the Judith Gap project would add value to
a number of different possible portfolio structures.
14.PPL's claims that NWE's portfolio modeling approach does not comply with ARM
38.8213 and that NWE's analyses use unproven and non-standard techniques, models
assumptions and inputs conflict with prior findings of the Commission and those of industry
experts hired by the Commission to evaluate NWE' s modeling approach and input assumptions.
15.Although there are undoubtedly areas of PSC rules and NWE' s planning and
procurement process that could be refined, the record in this proceeding demonstrates that
NWE's portfolio modeling techniques, assumptions and inputs are reasonable and consistent
with PSC rules.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 65
16.NWE demonstrated that there are neither reliability issues nor transmission congestion
issues related to NWE's procurement of between 135 MW and 150 MW of wind capacity from
Judith Gap.
17. Reliability issues related to interconnecting the full 188 MW of potential capacity
from Judith Gap have been addressed in the interconnection agreement between Judith Gap and
the NWE transmission unit, although the wind contract only envisions up to 150 MW.
18.Due to the location of the Judith Gap project, it will not cause congestion at the West
of Broadview cutplane and, therefore, will not cause transmission upgrade costs that will affect
NWE customers.
19. Environmental attributes associated with energy delivered under the Judith Gap power
purchase agreement are default supply resources the optimal disposition of which is governed by
NWE's proper application of ARM 38.8201-29.
20.All introductory or discussion statements that can properly be considered findings of
fact and that should be considered as such to preserve the integrity of this Order are incorporated
herein as findings of fact.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Montana Public Service Commission (Commission) regulates the rates and
services of public utilities. Title 69, Chapter 3, MCA.
NorthWestern Energy (NWE) is a public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.
NWE is a distribution services provider and a default supplier of electricity supply.
~ ~ 69-103(8)(9)( 11) and 69-21 O( 1), MCA.4. NWE is obligated to procure a portfolio of electricity supply to meet the requirements
of all default supply customers. ~ 69-208(3), MCA.
The Commission is required to process this Application according to
~ 69-421, MCA.6. Pursuant to ~ 69-421(3)(c), MCA, the advanced approval of the agreement presented
in this Application, according to the terms of this Order, is in the public interest; the agreement is
a result of a reasonable effort by NWE to comply with ~ 69-419, MCA, and the administrative
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 66
rules referenced in that section; and the price, quantity, duration and related terms of the
agreement are reasonable.
All findings of fact that can properly be considered conclusions of law and that should
be considered as such to preserve the integrity of this Order are incorporated herein as
conclusions of law.
ORDER
The monthly on-peak and off-peak energy prices specified in Exhibit A of the power
purchase agreement are reasonable.2. The good faith estimates of charges for integration costs specified in the Application
and supporting testimony and exhibits are reasonable. NWE must prudently procure necessary
wind integration services and apply its best efforts to ensure that the strategy for obtaining wind
integration services minimizes long-term total portfolio costs.3. The initial 20 year term of the power purchase agreement is reasonable. NWE must
assess the potential advantages and disadvantages of exercising the options to extend the term of
the power purchase agreement pursuant to Section 2.03 of the agreement and submit its findings
to the Commission for review and comment prior to exercising the options. This assessment
may be included in a default supply plan or plan update.
Wind integration services procurement costs are not approved in advance. Wind
integration procurement will be evaluated for prudence in the context of default supply cost
recovery applications filed by NWE.
NWE must file a final signed and executed power purchase agreement.
Green credits associated with the Judith Gap project are the property of the default
supply. NorthWestern must receive advanced approval from the PSC for the sale, trade or
transfer of green credits from the Judith Gap project. Any proceeds from the conveyance of
these green credits will be reflected for the benefit of the default supply.
DONE AND DATED this 30th day of March 2005, by a vote of 4 to 1.
DOCKET NO. D2005., ORDER NO. 6633b Page 67
BY ORDER OF THE MONT ANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
GREG JERGESON, Chairman
BRAD MOLNAR, Vice-Chairman
Voting to Dissent (To Be Filed)
DOUG MOOD, Commissioner
ROBERT H. RANEY, Commissioner
THOMAS J. SCHNEIDER, Commissioner
ATTEST:
Connie Jones
Commission Secretary
(SEAL)
NOTE: Any interested party may request the Commission to reconsider this decision. A motion
to reconsider must be filed within ten (10) days. See ARM 38.2.4806.
Service Date: April 28, 2005
DEP ARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
IN THE MA TIER of the Application of
NorthWestern Energy for Advanced
Approval of Certain Proposed Electricity
Power Supply Purchase Agreements DOCKET NO. 2005.
UTILITY DIVISION
DISSENT OF VICE CHAIRMAN
BRADLEY A. MOLNAR TO FINAL ORDER NO. 6633b*
Evidence given by NorthWestern Energy (NWE) is compelling and the majority
position defensible, I believe, only if the consideration is whether this is a good wind
project or not. Indeed many of the evidences presented by NWE, and references by others
are specifically comparisons to other wind projects. This, in my opinion, is where we lost
focus then ignored rule and law.
Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 69-419(2)(a) charges that the default supply
portfolio be composed of reliable services at the lowest long-term total cost.
The only way a wind product can be reliable is if it is fIrmed through ancillary
services; this project is pointedly not. Indeed Administrative Rules of Montana (ARM)
38.8204(1)(c) specifically addresses this issue, "
.. .
rate design that most efficiently
supplies firm, full electricity supply.
The Montana Consumer Counsel (MCC) intervened in this docket and
specifically stated that a cap on fIrming services, not to exceed $5 per MWh, was
necessary to insure that preference was not improperly being given to this wind project to
the detriment of consumers. The MCC recommendation was in keeping with the law and
their constitutional charge, ARTICLE XIII Section 2, which is "representing consumer
interests" in Montana. By not accepting the MCC referenced cap, preference was given to
* Commissioner Molnar s signature, indicating his dissent, is attached to
Order No. 6633b. This dissent should be attached to that Order.
Docket No. D2005.
the wind project in violation ofMCA 69-419(d) which requires an open,fair, and
competitive procurement process." Certainly an open ended contract is neither fair nor
competitive against rival offers that are fIrm, reliable, predictable, and similar for long
term total cost as required by Montana law.
Staff inferred, and the Commission majority agreed, that the cost of flfming was
negligible so should not be considered. If it s negligible why not include it? No
consideration was given to the cost of not contracting for ancillary services, especially
balancing services, to determine the "used and useful components" of this wind project.
For example, assuming a night time base load of 300MWh and a demand of only
290MWh, Montana consumers pay for the unneeded 10MWh if a willing buyer can t be
found. An acceptable risk to receive the base load cost. If at the same time the wind is
blowing hard in Judith Gap the wind will uncontrollably generate an additional 150 MWh
of excess electricity. We will then have to charge Montana consumers for the unsold or
undersold 150MWh of electricity even though they will not have used it. An unnecessary
risk.
In this example, the same number of used and useful wind generated MWhs will
cost $54, not $32. During peak hours waste is significantly less likely (and profit more
probable if production is underestimated), but the need for ancillary services and costly
hour by hour trades will be more necessary than with a slice product. When wind
generated electricity is curtailed, or the system trips off, Montana consumers will pay for
the electricity that would have been generated. This may benefit a wealthy Chicago
family, but Montana families and employers will be abused.
The fact that we must pay for all wind generated electricity, whether used or not,
is totally glossed over and not accounted for in any projections, especially the twenty-
eight cents per month figure. The cost of having a wind generated product as the core of
our ramping and peaking needs, with all of its uncertainty (testimony was received that
day before wind predictions" were unreliable), and the increased cost of hourly market
back up was never quantified. Perhaps if we had taken more time...
Docket No. D2005.
Also, I believe that it was an error to accept calculations using the estimate of $5
MWh to balance the loads inherent with a wind project in a service area as restricted as
ours. No evidence was offered that $5 MWh was a defendable estimate based on similar
projects with similar transmission bottlenecks, limited generation suppliers, and small
customer base.
The only ancillary costs or balancing services testified about were from
Bonneville Power Authority. Their expert witness testified that balancing services could
be contracted for about $5 per MWh plus $4 MWh for transportation. This $9 MWh is
probably the best deal possible, but BP A has contracted for this service with only one
entity in the entire northwest region and then only for one year. They testified that they
may not even renew that contract. The $9 MWh figure may not even be available. When I
specifically asked Pat Corcoran of NWE if there was an open and robust market for
firming services" his answer was non responsive. When pressed he confITmed that third
party suppliers were assumed to be too expensive. Mr. Corcoran felt that NWE could
possibly provide more cost effective ancillary services but that he could not give a price.
His solution was to offer that the PSC should look favorably on a future re-re-re-
examination of NWE' s mothballed gas plant south of Great Falls.
Firming electricity generated by natural gas is very expensive ($50 MWh + is
common) and also drives up the cost of home heating. The decision to bifurcate the
decisions on fITming and basic procurement is a fatal flaw and reduces future negotiating
power for ancillary services. I feel that we are being boxed into accepting firming
services from the Basin Creek plant (it was partially justified as a wind fITming source
when accepted) and/or from the MMI plant which, I believe, needs a contract to find a
home thus providing the revenue necessary to fund corporate bonuses outside the
bankruptcy limitations.
Leaving a major component up to future offerings by NWE, refusing to cap the
contract, and a willingness to acquiesce to the unknown (to give credence to a fabled
deadline), violates not only the aforementioned laws and rules but also MCA 69-419(c)
which identifies the legal necessity to "manage and mitigate risks.
Because, by law, the PSC can only look at offerings brought forward by
NorthWestern Energy, they are totally in the driver s seat to promote the use of gas fITed
Docket No. D2005.
back up and profit enormously by the transportation and distribution charges. Montana
consumers will take a double hit, and NWE's shareholders will have profited not by
transmission and distribution services, but by manipulation.
Various Commission members have stated we should passively rely on dynamic
scheduling and very expensive spinning reserves, and non spinning reserves, to flfm the
wind product. Not only is scheduling the wind an undiscovered art but the only
applicable conversation about load balancing was by Elliot Mainzer of the BP A. The
BP A is very bullish on wind power but, again, will not offer a contract to match the life
of this contract, has never offered a contract over one year, has not offered NWE any
contract, and refused to speculate after 2011 (when BPA will stop serving eastern
Montana coops due to a lack of available power). On-going drought conditions and
federal fisheries policies do not bode well for a load balancing contract with BP
Therefore this decision has generated unnecessary economic risk for Montana consumers.
Contrary to Mr. Corcoran s verbal testimony, NWE admits (PPL-O55) that their
internal costs to integrate the wind power will not be lower than the offerings of BP A or
Pacific Corp. This higher, admitted unknown, cost is ignored in the analysis. The
unnecessary shifting of unknown costs to consumers and away from profiteers is not
defensible and would be neither contemplated nor tolerated for traditional, more reliable,
forms of energy. Nor is it allowed by law or rule. According to exhibit PPL-O57, the
proposed cost of wind integration is a work in progress and was as such not given to the
Commission. This does not allow "a fair, open, and competitive procurement process" as
identified in MCA 69-419(2)(c). Certainly the Commission not being able to access
pricing information, even with the availability of proprietary status, flaunts the standards
required to be considered "open" and does not allow the Commission to make fact based
decisions mandated by already referenced rule and law.
Montana law plainly mandates the inclusion into our default supply only of
energy products that can demonstrate the lowest long term total costs MCA 69-
419(2)(d). The decision to not accept MCC's recommendation and cap the firming costs
means we have no idea what the costs will be on day one or any other of the seven
thousand three hundred days of this contract. A plain violation.
Docket No. D2005.
Rule 38.8212 allows the DSU to withhold the specific ranking method to select
preferred bids. This rule is in violation of 69-419(2)(d) for it takes away the necessary
transparency to be able to protest if preferential treatment is being given. Information of
this nature is commonly distributed in private and federal RFPs. No logical reason to
have kept this information secret was offered. This is a significant flaw in the process and
casts doubt on the fairness of the outcome. The decision to keep the information secret
was arbitrary on the part ofNWE.
MCA 69-210 provides that customers shall be allowed to purchase electricity
from environmentally preferred generation sources. NWE has advertised such a product.
One tenth of one percent of their customers are willing to pay extra for "green power.
The other 99 9/10% are not. By ignoring the MCC determination of the need to cap the
costs of ancillary services at $5 MWh, so as to not give preference to this wind project
over competitive products (slice products), customers in the NWE service area were
denied this guaranteed right of choice. At least part of the problem comes from previous
commissions that wrote the rules of procurement and heavily slanted the rules to favor
the mandating of "green energy," thereby improperly expanding the law. This
specifically violates MCA 69-403(6), "The commission shall promulgate rules that
protect consumers, distribution services providers, and electricity suppliers from
anticompetitive and abusive practices.
Conclusion
We will never know if the inclusion of this project was the best possible for Montana
consumers or not. Comparisons to choices rejected will be unfruitful. We do know that
even if this project were undeniably good that current law and rule do not allow
unreliable forms of generation and unlimited costs into the portfolio. Rather, such
supplies (and risks involved) are relegated to speculators. Perhaps the law and rules need
to be changed to allow random production products to be included. Until that time this
offering is illegal, which is regrettable for properly bundled it could possibly have been a
positive addition to Montana s portfolio for electricity supply.
I fITmly believe that appealing this decision to the Montana Public Service
Commission would have been fruitless. However, as a public service PPL should have
challenged the order rather than turning to political expediency. In the same vein the
Docket No. D2005.
Montana Consumer Counsel is charged with protecting the consumers of Montana and
should challenge the inclusion of this incomplete offering in district court.
Had ancillary, and especially load balancing services, been accounted for, I
believe this project may have stood on its own merit.