20110826Idaho Power Protest and Intervention.pdf

MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY -1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
Cedar Creek Wind, LLC )Docket No. EL11-59-000
)
MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF
IDAHO POWER COMPANY
Pursuant to Rules 211, 212, and 214 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
(“FERC” or “Commission”) Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.211, 212, and
214, and the Commission’s August 8, 2011, Notice of Petition for Enforcement in the above-
captioned docket, Idaho Power Company (“Idaho Power”) moves to intervene in this proceeding,
as well as to protest, Cedar Creek Wind, LLC’s (“Petitioners” or “Cedar Creek”) request to
institute an enforcement action against the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (“Idaho PUC”).
Idaho Power asserts that the Idaho PUC properly rejected the Firm Energy Sales Agreements at
issue in this docket pursuant to the authority delegated to it by the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”) as well as the Idaho PUC’s statutory obligation under Idaho
law to uphold the public interest. Accordingly, the Commission should decline the enforcement
sought by Cedar Creek and affirm that the Idaho PUC properly exercised its authority under
federal and state law.
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I. COMMUNICATIONS
Communications regarding this pleading should be addressed to the following:
Jason B. Williams Donovan E. Walker
Corporate Counsel Lead Counsel
Idaho Power Company Idaho Power Company
P.O. Box 70 P.O. Box 70
1221 West Idaho Street 1221 West Idaho Street
Boise, Idaho 83702 Boise, Idaho 83702
[phone] [phone]
[e-mail] [e-mail]
Lisa A. Grow Randy Allphin
Senior Vice President,Power Supply Senior Energy Contract Coordinator
Idaho Power Company Idaho Power Company
P.O. Box 70 P.O. Box 70
1221 West Idaho Street 1221 West Idaho Street
Boise, Idaho 83702 Boise, Idaho 83702
[phone] [phone]
[e-mail] [e-mail]
II. BASIS FOR INTERVENTION
Idaho Power, an Idaho corporation,is a vertically integrated electric utility engaged in the
business of generating, purchasing, transmitting, and distributing electrical energy. Idaho Power
utilizes an interconnected grid to provide wholesale and retail electric service throughout
approximately 24,000 square miles of service territory in southern Idaho and eastern Oregon. As
a public utility providing retail electric distribution and supply service, Idaho Power is regulated
by the Idaho PUC and the Public Utility Commission of Oregon. As a public utility under Part II
of the Federal Power Act, Idaho Power has market-based rate authority for wholesale energy
sales under its FERC tariff and provides transmission services under its Commission-approved
Open Access Transmission Tariff (“OATT”).
Idaho Power is subject to the provisions of PURPA as implemented by the rules and
regulations of the Idaho PUC and this Commission. Pursuant to its PURPA obligations, Idaho
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Power has entered into Idaho PUC approved power purchase agreements with numerous
Qualifying Facilities (“QF”) for the output from these projects at published avoided costs rates.
Over the last 30 years, Idaho Power has been deeply involved in the Idaho PUC’s evolving
adoption and implementation of PURPA, including recent Idaho PUC decisions which lead to
the rejection of the power purchase agreements that are at issue in this docket. Notably, the
Idaho PUC rejected 13 power purchase agreements between QFs and Idaho Power on the same
day it rejected the power purchase agreements that are the subject matter of this requested
enforcement action. Accordingly, Idaho Power has a vested interest in the Commission’s
determination in this proceeding.
Cedar Creek alleges that the Idaho PUC wrongly rejected five Firm Energy Sales
Agreements between Cedar Creek and PacifiCorp d/b/a Rocky Mountain Power (“Agreements”)
“solely” because Rocky Mountain Power did not execute the Agreements prior to December 14,
2010.1 The Idaho PUC issued Order No. 32260 on June 8, 2011,rejecting the Agreements. On
that very same day, the Idaho PUC issued five orders rejecting 13 power purchase agreements
that Idaho Power had entered into with various QF wind developers (“Idaho Power
Agreements”).2 The Idaho PUC’s basis for rejecting the Idaho Power Agreements was generally
the same basis it used to reject the Agreements which Cedar Creek is seeking Commission
enforcement of in this docket. Thus, to the extent the Commission grants Cedar Creek’s request
for enforcement, Idaho Power’s interests in the Idaho Power Agreements will be directly affected
by the outcome of this proceeding.
Moreover, given that Idaho Power is the largest public utility and the largest purchaser of
QF energy in the state of Idaho, no other party could adequately represent Idaho Power’s

1 Cedar Creek Petition at 1.
2 Idaho PUC Order Nos. 32254, 32256, 32257, 32255, and 32258.
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interests in this proceeding. Further, Idaho Power’s intervention is in the public interest as the
information provided herein will assist the Commission in reaching an informed resolution in
this matter.
III. COMMENT AND PROTEST
A.Background.
On June 8, 2011, the Idaho PUC not only rejected the Cedar Creek Agreements but also
issued a series of orders rejecting several similar Idaho Power Agreements as well as issuing an
order modifying the eligibility cap for QFs to receive published, or standard,avoided cost rates.3
The series of orders was the result of a contentious, public process that involved substantial
discovery, a comment period,oral argument, and hearing before the Idaho PUC. The fully
developed record was the result of the state’s recent and unprecedented increase in PURPA
development, primarily PURPA wind development. As of July 14, 2011, Idaho Power had
approximately 294 megawatts (“MW”) of QF wind generation on-line and another 362 MW of
signed QF wind generation contracts approved by the Idaho PUC scheduled to come on-line
within the next year. The Idaho Power Agreements rejected by the Idaho PUC on June 8, 2011,
represented approximately 294 MW of additional QF wind generation beyond the 362 MW that
had already been approved. Notably, the 13 Idaho Power Agreements rejected by the Idaho PUC
were with only five different developers. For example, five of the Idaho Power Agreements
were five wind projects near Burley, Idaho, all within a few miles of one another. Each proposed
project was being proposed by the same developer and each had a nameplate capacity of between
27 MW and 29 MW. The developer had previously studied and proposed to sell to Idaho Power
this same group of five wind projects as a single 150 MW non-PURPA wind project. This

3 Idaho PUC Order No. 32262, rel. June 8, 2011 (“Published Rate Eligibility Order”) which can be found at
http://www.puc.idaho.gov/internet/cases/elec/GNR/GNRE1101/ordnotc/20110608FINAL_ORDER_NO_32262.PDF.
MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY -5
configuration is similar to the Cedar Creek configuration; i.e.,multiple projects proposed by a
sole developer within the same general vicinity.4 Developers in Idaho would disaggregate larger
projects into multiple 10 average megawatts (“aMW”)increments in order to qualify each
segment for the published avoided cost rates available to projects at or below 10 aMW. QF
projects in excess of 10 aMW are directed by the Idaho PUC to receive an avoided cost rate
based upon the Integrated Resource Plan (“IRP”) methodology as established and approved by
the Idaho PUC.
Overall, Idaho Power is dealing with the challenges associated with integrating a total of
close to 1,000 MW of QF generation into is electrical system, 656 MW of this being wind QF
projects. The current contractual financial commitment of Idaho Power to these QF projects is
estimated at over $5 billion dollars. To put the volume of QF wind development into
perspective, consider that Idaho Power’s minimum hourly average load for its entire system was
slightly over 1,030 MW in 2009 and 2010.
As a result of the proliferation of QF projects as well as the financial impact this was
having on its customers, Idaho Power, as well as Idaho’s other investor-owned public utilities,
Rocky Mountain Power and Avista Corporation, petitioned the Idaho PUC to revisit its approach
to QF regulation on a number of key issues, including, but not limited to, its avoided cost
methodology, eligibility criteria for projects seeking published avoided cost rate contracts,
interconnection costs, and other key issues.5 In the Joint Petition, the utilities requested that the
Idaho PUC immediately lower the published avoided cost rate cap from 10 aMW to 100

4 In addition to these five projects, the Idaho Power Agreements included two 21 MW projects,three 20
MW projects,and two 20 MW projects—each of which was being developed by the same developer and each
located in the same general geographic vicinity.
5 A copy of the Joint Petition of Idaho Power, Rocky Mountain Power,and Avista Corporation is available
at: http://www.puc.idaho.gov/internet/cases/elec/GNR/GNRE1004/20101108JOINT%20PETITION,%20MOTION.PDF.
MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY -6
kilowatts (“kW”)pending the Idaho PUC’s investigation of the various QF issues posed in the
Joint Motion.
The Idaho PUC declined the request to immediately lower the published rate eligibility
cap and instead ordered the utilities and interested parties to file comments and scheduled oral
argument. Importantly, the Idaho PUC’s December 3, 2010, notice clearly states that “it is our
intent that our decision regarding the ‘Joint Motion’ to reduce the published avoided cost
eligibility cap shall become effective on December 14, 2010.”6 Notably, the Idaho PUC had
previously lowered the published avoided cost eligibility cap for QF projects upon a similar
request from Idaho Power in 2005 so as to examine wind integration issues associated with QFs.
Further, the Idaho PUC sought to examine and potentially implement disaggregation criteria
which would prohibit large QF projects from artificially disaggregating for the sole purpose of
obtaining the published avoided cost rate, as opposed to the IRP-based rate reserved for projects
in excess of 10 aMW.7
Over the next several months, the Idaho PUC engaged in a rigorous examination of these
PURPA issues, regulating extensive discovery, taking comments,and hearing oral argument. On
June 8, 2011, the Idaho PUC issued a series of orders addressing various PURPA-related issues.
The primary policy order issued that day was the Published Rate Eligibility Order. In that order,
the Idaho PUC modified its avoided cost pricing methodology by concluding that the recent
proliferation of wind QFs in the state, as well as the disaggregation of larger projects into smaller
increments with the express purpose of obtaining the published avoided cost rate,necessitated a
change to the eligibility requirements for published avoided cost rates, reducing the eligibility

6 Idaho PUC Order No. 32131 at 6.
7 Idaho PUC Order No. 32131 at 5.
MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY -7
cap from 10 aMW for wind and solar projects to 100 kW, consistent with the federal standard.8
Equally important, the Idaho PUC ordered that public utilities must still continue to contract with
large wind and solar QFs but utilize the appropriate avoided cost rate methodology for those
larger projects based upon the utilities’IRP methodology previously approved by the Idaho
PUC. Thus, the Idaho PUC did nothing to impact the obligation of public utilities to contract
with QFs; it simply changed the eligibility requirements for the published, or standard, avoided
cost rate methodology–which it has the discretion to do under PURPA.
B.Discussion.
1.The Idaho PUC Has the Authority to Adjust Avoided Cost Rates for QFs
Pursuant to PURPA and the Commission’s Rules.
Petitioners frame the issue as the Idaho PUC improperly rejecting the Agreements
because a “legally enforceable obligation” existed. The focus of their pleading is on Section
292.304(d), suggesting that this provision compels the Idaho PUC to approve the Agreements.
Importantly, section 292.304(d) must be read with section 292.304(a)(1) of the Commission’s
rules, which require that the rates at which utilities purchase QF energy must “(i) [b]e just and
reasonable to the electric customer of the electric utility and in the public interest; (ii) [n]ot
discriminate against qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities.” Further,
this Commission’s regulations expressly provide that “[n]othing in [the Commission’s
regulations] requires any electric utility to pay more than the avoided costs for purchases.”9
Thus, from Idaho Power’s perspective, the issue in the proceeding is whether the Idaho PUC
properly exercised its statutory authority under PURPA and the Commission’s rules. A reading
of the Idaho PUC’s June 8, 2011, Published Rate Eligibility Order and the order rejecting the

8 Idaho PUC Order No. 32262 at 9.
9 18 C.F.R. §292.304(a)(2).
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Agreements make clear that the Idaho PUC properly implemented PURPA and the
Commission’s rules.
Most significantly, the Published Rate Eligibility Order shows the Idaho PUC’s concern
that approval of the Agreements (as wells as the thirteen Idaho Power Agreements) would be
contrary to these statutory requirements as wells as the Commission’s rules.Specifically, the
Idaho PUC found that:
PURPA and our published avoided cost rate structure were never
intended to promote large scale wind and solar development to the
detriment of utility customers.Avoided cost rates are to be just
and reasonable to the utility’s ratepayers. 18 C.F.R. §
292.304(a)(1). PURPA entitles QFs to a rate equivalent to the
utility’s avoided cost, a rate that holds utility customers harmless—
not a rate which a project may be viable. 18 C.F.R. §
292.304(a)(2). If we allow the current trend to continue, customers
may be forced to pay for resources at an inflated rate and,
potentially, before the energy is needed by the utility to serve
customers.This is clearly not in the public interest.10
Importantly, the Published Rate Eligibility Order goes on to find that “[w]hile we recognize the
impact that this decision will have on small wind and solar projects, it would be erroneous, and
illegal pursuant to PURPA, for this Commission to allow large projects to obtain a rate that is not
an accurate reflection of the utility’s avoided cost for the purchase of QF generation.”11
Reading the Idaho PUC order rejecting the Agreements together with language quoted
above paints a more complete picture of the Idaho PUC’s basis for rejecting the Agreements. An
underlying primary concern the Idaho PUC had with the Agreements was that the rates therein
were in excess of Rocky Mountain Power’s avoided costs, may be harmful to customers,and
were not in the public interest.Put simply, the Idaho PUC was concerned approval of the
Agreements would violate PURPA. Commission enforcement of the Agreements, as requested

10 Idaho PUC Order No. 32262 at 8.
11 Idaho PUC Order No. 32262 at 8 (emphasis added).
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as by Petitioners, would be counter to the Idaho PUC’s findings, and, arguably, require Rocky
Mountain Power to pay more than its avoided costs for PURPA energy, a clear violation of the
Commission’s own rules.Accordingly, the Idaho PUC was compelled to reject the Agreements.
As noted by the Idaho PUC, the Agreements represented an obligation for ratepayers of
“payments in excess of $685 million over the 20-year term of these Agreements.”Idaho PUC
Order No. 32260 at 8. These are exactly the “large projects” the Idaho PUC was considering
when it issued the Published Rate Eligibility Order. It is exactly these projects that the Idaho
PUC was concerned were not reflective of the utility’s avoided costs.Thus, in exercising the
authority delegated to it by PURPA and this Commission, the Idaho PUC rejected the
Agreements.Because this was a proper, and indeed necessary, exercise of authority under
PURPA and Commission rules, the Commission should deny the Petitioners’request for
enforcement.
2.The Commission Should Not Disturb the Fact-Intensive Investigation
Conducted by the Idaho PUC.
Petitioners argue the Idaho PUC rejected the Agreements “solely because Rocky
Mountain Power failed to put pen to paper and execute the Agreements prior to December 14,
2010.”Cedar Creek Petition at 8. As evidenced above, this assertion is not entirely accurate. In
making its decision to lower the published avoided cost eligibility cap and thus reject the
Agreements, the Idaho PUC fulfilled its obligation under Commission rules to ensure that
avoided costs for QFs do not exceed the utilities’ avoided costs.Further, the Idaho PUC was
carrying out its statutory duty to ensure that QF rates are just and reasonable, hold ratepayers
harmless,and ensure such rates are in the public interest. The Idaho PUC reached this
conclusion after a full contested case process under its rules, which involved discovery,
MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY -10
comments and reply comments, testimony, cross-examination, and oral argument by all
interested parties, including Cedar Creek.12
The Commission should not disturb a series of Idaho PUC orders (i.e.,the Published Rate
Eligibility Order, the order rejecting the Agreements and the orders rejecting the Idaho Power
Agreements, among others) resulting from a fact-intensive proceeding conducted by the Idaho
PUC. This Commission has consistently relied on the states to make factual determinations of
utilities’ avoided costs in the PURPA contest and has refused:
. . . to second-guess state regulatory authorities’ actual
determinations of avoided costs . . . . Rather, the Commission
believes its role is limited to ensuring the process used to calculate
the per unit charge (i.e. implementation) accords with [PURPA]
and our regulations.13
In this instance, the Idaho PUC made a reasoned decision on June 8, 2010, involving a
series of orders that set policy related to the appropriate avoided cost rates. Petitioners make no
challenge to the process the Idaho PUC used to set avoided costs for wind and solar QF projects
larger than 100 kW in the Published Rate Eligibility Order. Notably, neither Cedar Creek nor
any other party sought reconsideration of the Idaho PUC’s Published Rate Eligibility Order.
Instead, the Cedar Creek Petition effectively asks this Commission to “second guess” the Idaho
PUC’s determination of when QFs should be able to obtain a published avoided cost rate, a rate
which the Idaho PUC has found to be in excess of the utilities’ avoided costs for large scale QF
projects like the Cedar Creek projects. As discussed in greater detail below, Cedar Creek’s
reliance on a legally enforceable obligation argument is misplaced as the Idaho PUC’s decision
in rejecting the Agreements was related to setting policy pertaining to the availability of the
published avoided cost rate.

12 See Idaho PUC Order No. 32262 at 1-4 describing the background of the proceeding.
13 California, 70 FERC at 61,6777.
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Importantly, the Idaho PUC’s June 8 orders do nothing to obfuscate or eliminate the
utilities’ obligation to purchase energy from QFs. Instead, the June 8 orders simply set avoided
cost pricing policy which comports with PURPA and this Commission’s rules. As background,
it is important to note that,currently, the Idaho PUC has implemented PURPA, consistent with
Commission rules, and has established two different methodologies for determining avoided cost
rates:(1) a published avoided cost rate and (2) an avoided cost rate based upon the utilities’ IRP
methodology. Wind and solar QFs that are 100 kW and smaller,as well as other types of QFs up
to 10 aMW in size,are eligible for the published avoided cost rate. Wind and solar QFs larger
than 100 kW and other types of QFs larger than 10 aMW are eligible for the avoided cost rate
based upon the utilities’ IRP methodology.14 Until December 13, 2010, wind and solar QFs that
were up to 10 aMW in size were eligible for published avoided cost rates. Wind and solar QFs
that were larger than 10 aMW were entitled to avoided costs based upon the utilities’ IRP
methodology. Effective on December 14, and still effective to this day, Petitioners are entitled to
avoided cost rates based upon the utilities’ IRP methodology, not the published avoided cost
rates. As noted, the Petitioners make no challenge to the IRP methodology or the process the
Idaho PUC used to establish the benchmarks for avoided cost pricing.In fact, Idaho Power has
executed power purchase agreements with both wind and solar QFs that contain avoided cost
rates based upon Idaho Power’s IRP methodology.
The Idaho PUC rejected the Agreements because “on the date the five Agreements
became effective, published avoided cost rates were available only to wind and solar projects
with a design capacity of 100 kW or less.”15 In implementing rates that utilities pay QFs, “the

14 It is important to note that Idaho Power’s IRP methodology produces a higher per kilowatt-hour (“kWh”)
price for solar QF projects and a lower per kWh price for wind QF projects.
15 Idaho PUC Order No. 32260 at 9.
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Commission has authority under PUPRA to regulate how rates for QF sales at wholesale will be
determined.”16 Although states may set the ultimate per unit (kW and/or kWh) charges for QF
sales at wholesale, they may do so only in accordance with this Commission’s regulations.17 The
Commission’s regulations prescribe that state utility Commission’s must make available
published avoided cost rates available for QFs that are 100 kW in size or smaller.18 There is
nothing in the Commission’s rules that require published avoided rates be made available for
projects larger than 100 kW, but that is exactly the argument Petitioners make here—i.e.,that
they are entitled to receive the published avoided cost rate because a legally enforceable
obligation existed on December 13, 2010. However, as explained above, one of the primary
reasons the Idaho PUC rejected the Agreements was because of the concern that the published
avoided cost rate cap of 10 aMW may be forcing utility customers to pay an inflated rate for QF
energy.19 In making a policy decision consistent with the requirements of PURPA and this
Commission’s implementing rules, the Idaho PUC lowered the published avoided cost rate
eligibility cap. In rejecting the Agreements, the Commission did so “[b]ecause each of the wind
projects exceeds 100 kW, they are not eligible to receive published avoided cost rates.”20 The
Petitioners do not seek enforcement of the Idaho PUC’s decision to lower the published rate
eligibility cap; they merely complain that the timing of the Idaho PUC’s decision somehow
violates the “legally enforceable obligation” standard.

16 Connecticut Light and Power Company, 70 FERC 61,012, 61,027 (1995).
17 Id.
18 18 CFR § 292.304(c).
19 See supra.
20 Idaho PUC Order No. 32260 at 10.
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In sum, the Idaho PUC decision to reject the Agreements is more of a modification than a
rejection of the Agreements. Specifically, the Idaho PUC’s rejection of the Agreements
effectively only modifies the price term of the Agreements. This Commission has held that
whether the particular facts applicable to an individual QF necessitate modifications of other
terms and conditions of the QF’s contract with the purchasing utility is a matter for the states to
determine. This Commission has stated that it does not intend to adjudicate the specific
provisions of individual QF contracts.21 The Idaho PUC made an extensive, factual investigation
into lowering the eligibility cap for QFs to receive published avoided cost rates. The Idaho
PUC’s rejection of the Agreements was part of that investigative process. Accordingly, the
Commission should not disturb the findings of the Idaho PUC and thus not grant Petitioners’
request.
3. The Petitioners’Legally Enforceable Obligation Arguments Are Without
Merit.
PURPA requires that rates at which an electric utility shall purchase energy from QFs
“(1) shall be just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric utility and in the public
interest, and (2) shall not discriminate against qualifying cogenerators or qualifying small power
producers.”22 A state commission may comply with the requirements of PURPA “by issuing
regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis or by taking any other action
reasonably designed to give effect to FERC’s rules.23 It is up to the states, not this Commission,

21 West Penn Power Company, 71 FERC at 61,496.
22 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b).
23 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751 (1982).
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to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase agreements, including the
date on which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred under state law.”24
As noted, the Idaho PUC engaged in an extensive investigation into the impact of its 10
aMW published avoided cost eligibility criteria.The Published Rate Eligibility Order reduced
the eligibility criteria from 10 aMW to 100 kW for wind and solar projects. The Idaho PUC put
parties on notice in early December 2010 that it was going to make December 14, 2010,the
effective date for any decision in this regard. This Commission has previously found that “for
purposes of our regulations, the critical date is the date on which a legally enforceable obligation
is incurred, and choosing that date for a specific QF is the responsibility of the states, not of this
Commission.”25 The Idaho PUC selected December 14, 2010,as the date by which agreements
must have been fully executed in order to receive the published avoided cost rate.The
Agreements failed to meet that standard. In addition (and as described above), the Idaho PUC
was considering other significant avoided cost rate issues when it issued the order rejecting the
Agreements. The Commission should follow its previous precedent and defer to the state of
Idaho in determining the date a legally enforceable obligation occurred.
In addition, Petitioners cite to the Commission’s 1980 Order implementing PURPA,
noting that “the phrase ‘legally enforceable obligation’ was adopted expressly to prevent a utility
from being able to circumvent PURPA’s requirements simply by failing or refusing to sign a
contract with a QF.”26 Rocky Mountain Power did not fail or refuse to sign a contract with a QF.
Petitioners have provided no firm evidence that Rocky Mountain Power was intentionally
circumventing PURPA’s requirement. While Petitioners suggest that Rocky Mountain Power

24 West Penn Power Company, 71 FERC 61,153, 61,495 (1995).
25 West Penn Power Company, 71 FERC at 61,496.
26 Cedar Creek Petition at 10-11.
may have delayed signing the Agreements until after the Christmas holiday in late 2010, there is
nothing to suggest Rocky Mountain Power was intentionally withholding its signature on the
Agreements. In fact, it is undisputed that Rocky Mountain Power did indeed sign the
Agreements. Similarly, Idaho Power signed the Idaho Power Agreements. Thus, the Petitioners'
reliance on arguing a legally enforceable obligation existed is misplaced. Accordingly, the
Commission should deny Petitioners' request for enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Commission should deny the Cedar Creek Petition for Enforcement on the grounds
that it fails to demonstrate that the Idaho PUC violated PURPA or the Commission's rules.
Further, the Commission should not disrupt the results of a fact-specific investigation related to
the Agreements, the Idaho Power Agreements, and the Idaho PUC's modification to the state's
published avoided cost eligibility cap. Petitioners' legally enforceable obligation arguments are
misplaced as they fail to acknowledge the larger context in which the Idaho PUC was operating
when it issued the Published Rate Eligibility Order and the order rejecting the Agreements. The
Idaho PUC's action did nothing to effect any alleged "legally enforceable obligation." The
Idaho PUC's action rejected the Agreements because they contained rates that the Idaho PUC
had determined exceed the utilities' avoided costs-a determination uniquely delegated to the
state commissions by this Commission.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of August 2011.
Jason B. Williams
Counsel for Idaho Power Company
MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY -15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of August 2011 I served a true and correct
copy of the MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY via
electronic mail upon the following named parties at the e-mail addresses listed below:
Larry Eisenstat
[e-mail]
Michael R. Engleman
[e-mail]
Donald Gelinas
[e-mail]
Kelly Goodman
[e-mail]
Tom Cameron
[e-mail]
Dana Zentz
[e-mail]
Scott Montgomery
[e-mail]
Ronald L. Williams
[e-mail]
Karen Hill
[e-mail]
John A. Harvey
[e-mail]
M. Andrew McLain
[e-mail]
Al Brogan
[e-mail]
£=!{I!~fo-
MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PROTEST OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY -16