20250825Motion to Object and Answer to Staff.pdf

RECEIVED
August 25, 2025
Susan P. Weeks, ISB No. 4255 IDAHO PUBLIC
James,Vernon, &Weeks, P.A. UTILITIES COMMISSION
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83834
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Attorney for Northern Lights, Inc.
Tyler R. Whitney, ISB No. 9722
Cable Huston LLP
1455 SW Broadway, Ste. 1500
Portland, OR 97201-3412
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Attorney for City of Bonners Ferry
BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
In the Matter of the Application of Northern Case No. C 10-E-25-01
Lights, Inc. and the City of Bonners Ferry
for an Order Approving a Service Territory APPLICANTS' MOTION TO OBJECT TO
Agreement between the Applicants PETITION TO INTERVENE
AND ANSWER TO STAFF'S
EXPEDITED MOTION TO VACATE
COMMENT DEADLINES
Pursuant to Rule 75 of the Idaho Public Utility Commission ("Commission") Rules of
Procedure, IDAPA 31.01.01.075, Northern Lights, Inc., an Idaho non-profit corporation and
electric cooperative ("NLI") and the City of Bonners Ferry, an Idaho municipal corporation ("the
City") (together, the "Applicants") respectfully offer this motion to object to Idaho Forest Group
LLC ("IFG")'s Petition to Intervene ("Petition"). Further, pursuant to Rule 256, IDAPA
31.01.01.256, Applicants respectfully offer this answer and limited objection to Commission
Staff's Expedited Motion to Vacate Comment Deadlines ("Motion").
APPLICANTS'MOTION TO OBJECT TO PETITION
TO INTERVENE,AND ANSWER TO STAFF'S
EXPEDITED MOTION TO VACATE COMMENT
DEADLINES— 1 August 25, 2025

For the reasons discussed below, the Applicants object to IFG's Petition to Intervene
("Petition")as it is untimely. Nor has IFG articulated a direct and substantial interest in the subject
matter of this proceeding that would permit intervention.While Applicants do not generally object
to Commission Staff's Motion to allow staff additional time to review materials submitted by IFG
before Commission Staff must file their comments, any vacatur or change in the comment
deadlines should not have the effect of reopening the intervention period and allow IFG to cure its
untimely Petition.
A. Procedural Background
In this proceeding,Applicants seek Commission approval of the Applicants' 1981 service
territory agreement under I.C. § 61-333. The Applicants requested modified procedure under
Rules 201-204, IDAPA 31.01.01.201-204. The Commission entered a Notice of Applicant and
Notice of Modified Procedure on July 31, 2025. The notices identified an initial comment
deadline of August 21, and a reply deadline of September 4. Pursuant to Rule 73, any petitions to
intervene were due by August 7 (14 days before the initial comment deadline). IFG filed its
Petition on August 19.
B. Motion to Object to Petition to Intervene
1. IFG's Untimely Petition to Intervene Must Be Denied.
Applicants respectfully request that the Commission deny IFG's untimely Petition to
Intervene. Except as otherwise provided by Commission order, "petitions to intervene must be
filed at least fourteen(14) days before...the deadline for filing initial comments, if the case is
being processed by modified procedure under Rules 201-204...," as is the case here. Rule 73.
APPLICANTS'MOTION TO OBJECT TO PETITION
TO INTERVENE,AND ANSWER TO STAFF'S
EXPEDITED MOTION TO VACATE COMMENT
DEADLINES—2 August 25, 2025

"Petitions not timely filed must state a substantial reason for delay."Id. (emphasis added). The
Commission may deny untimely petitions for failure to state good cause for the delay.Id.
IFG's Petition is untimely. Applicants fully complied with Commission rules for
submitting their Application, and the Commission provided public notice in the normal course.
The Commission's rules required IFG to file its Petition no later than August 714 days before
the initial comment deadline. IFG failed to do so. IFG waited until August 19 just two days
before the comment deadline—to file its Petition. The Petition is therefore untimely and should
be denied.
IFG does not even attempt to explain its dilatory filing. Rule 73 states that any untimely
petition, such as IFG's, "must state a substantial reason for delay." (Emphasis added). The
Petition does not provide any reason—let alone a substantial one—for IFG's failure to timely
intervene. See generally, IFG Petition. In fact, IFG falsely certifies that it"timely filed"the
Petition.IFG Petition at¶7. The Commission should therefore deny IFG's Petition.
To the extent IFG may later try to cite lack of notice for its untimely intervention, that
argument fails. In its Comments, IFG complains that Applicants did not provide it with service or
courtesy copies of the Application.IFG Comments at 5.1 To be clear,Applicants fully complied
with Commission rules for filing and serving the Application. No statute or rule required
Applicants to provide a copy of the Application to IFG or any other customer. The Commission
provided public notice of the Application just like it does in every other proceeding. IFG has
1 The Applicants reserve their right to reply to the substance of IFG's Comments in accordance with the
comment deadlines.
APPLICANTS'MOTION TO OBJECT TO PETITION
TO INTERVENE,AND ANSWER TO STAFF'S
EXPEDITED MOTION TO VACATE COMMENT
DEADLINES—3 August 25, 2025

timely intervened in numerous Commission proceedings over the years,2 so the Commission's
notice procedure is clearly sufficient to timely apprise IFG of ongoing proceedings in which it
may have an interest.
Nor is lack of actual notice sufficient grounds to excuse the delay. Rule 73 requires a
"substantial reason" for the delay. The Commission provided notice of the Application to the
public—including IFGin the normal course. It issued Order No. 36695 (Notice of Application
and Notice of Modified Procedure) on its publicly available website. It also issued a news release
advising the public of the comment deadline. If merely failing to receive actual notice of the
comment deadline was a"substantial reason"justifying untimely intervention, then every
untimely petition to intervene would be granted. The exception would swallow the rule.And IFG
is not some unsophisticated party unfamiliar with the Commission or the need to monitor its
dockets. IFG routinely intervenes in cases before the Commission in a timely fashion in order to
protect its interests. It simply failed to do so here.
2. IFG Has Not Satisfied the Substantive Requirements to Intervene.
Even if the Petition was timely, IFG does not meet the required standard to intervene. To
intervene, a party must prove it has a"direct and substantial interest" in the proceeding. Rule 72.
IFG argues the standard is satisfied in two respects: (1)the proceeding could directly affect IFG's
ongoing appeal of its litigation against the City; and(2) the proceeding "could directly or
indirectly impact IFG's electric rates and/or quality of electric service."IFG Petition at¶4.
Neither argument holds water.
2 See, e.g., Case No.AVU-E-25-01 (Feb. 21, 2025 IFG petition to intervene); Case No.AVU-E-23-01;
Case No.AVU-E-21-01; Case No.AVU-E-19-04; Case No.AVU-E-18-03; Case No.AVU-E-17-09; Case
No.AVU-E-17-01; Case No.AVU-E-14-06.
APPLICANTS'MOTION TO OBJECT TO PETITION
TO INTERVENE,AND ANSWER TO STAFF'S
EXPEDITED MOTION TO VACATE COMMENT
DEADLINES—4 August 25, 2025

In 2023, IFG sued the City under Idaho Code § 50-325, arguing that the City's rates were
unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory. IFG also sought a declaration that—in the absence of a
PUC-approved service territory agreement—it could choose what utility it took service from.
The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss that claim at the pleading stage.3 On
appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court will only review whether IFG can choose its service provider in
the absence of a PUC-approved service territory agreement. Thus, no matter how the appellate
court rules on that issue, there is no possible conflict with the Commission approving the
Applicant's agreement.
A hypothetical helps expose the disjunction between the appeal and this proceeding.
Imagine that the Commission stays this proceeding until the Idaho Supreme Court rules, and the
court agrees with IFG that, in the absence of a PUC-approved service territory agreement, IFG is
free to choose its provider. The outcome of this proceeding would be the exact same as if it were
never stayed. Idaho law empowers the City and NLI to enter into a service territory agreement
confirming that IFG is within the City's service territory, and to seek Commission approval of
that agreement. The Commission's analysis is identical whether the matter is taken up now or in
two years after the appeal is complete. This example exposes the flawed nature of IFG's
argument.Any ruling in the pending appeal will have no effect on the Commission's ultimate
evaluation of whether to approve a service territory agreement between the Applicants.
IFG's true concern appears to be that its appellate issue will become moot if the
Commission approves the 1981 agreement. IFG elevates litigation tactics over substantive
concerns. IFG's whole complaint was that the Applicants had not received Commission approval
s The court also ruled in the City's favor on every other claim IFG asserted in the litigation.
APPLICANTS'MOTION TO OBJECT TO PETITION
TO INTERVENE,AND ANSWER TO STAFF'S
EXPEDITED MOTION TO VACATE COMMENT
DEADLINES—5 August 25, 2025

for the 1981 service territory agreement.4 Applicants are now doing exactly what IFG contended
they should have done previously. Rather than gladly accept that development, IFG now protests
because approving the agreement would moot this one appellate issue.5 IFG's claim that this
"could directly and prejudicially affect the outcome"of its appeal is simply wrong.An issue only
becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute for the court to adjudicate. Thus, any
dismissal on mootness grounds is because there is no longer a live dispute between it and the
City—which is a good thing for both parties.And to be clear, IFG's litigation strategies have no
bearing on the Commission's duty to "review and approve or reject contracts between
municipalities and cooperatives"under the ESSA. I.C. § 61-333(1).
IFG's second justification for intervention is equally unavailing. IFG claims that PUC
approval of Applicant's 1981 service territory agreement may somehow impact its rates or
service quality. There is absolutely zero basis for this claim. The City has provided electric
service to IFG's Moyie Springs Mill for decades; NLI has never served that facility. Commission
approval of the Applicants' 1981 service territory agreement merely maintains the status quo.
There is no conceivable way in which this proceeding will affect the quality of service provided
to IFG's Moyie Springs Mill. PUC approval will likewise have no impact on rates.Again,
Applicants merely seek Commission approval of the status quo. Thus, approving the 1981
agreement will not affect rates.
4 See, e.g., Decl. of Andrew P. Moratzka in Support of Idaho Forest Group LLC's Comment,Ex. B at 8
("IFG counters that `I.C. § 61-333 requires that any service territory agreement between the City and a
power cooperative be(1)filed with the PUC and(2)approved by the PUC, after notice and opportunity
for hearing . . . ."').
5 To be clear,IFG has appealed numerous trial court rulings, including the court's ruling after a bench trial
that the City's rates are just and reasonable.Those issues will not be affected in any way by Commission
approval of the Application.
APPLICANTS'MOTION TO OBJECT TO PETITION
TO INTERVENE,AND ANSWER TO STAFF'S
EXPEDITED MOTION TO VACATE COMMENT
DEADLINES—6 August 25, 2025

IFG has failed to prove that it has a"direct and substantial interest" in this proceeding.
The Commission should therefore deny the Petition.
C. Answer to Expedited Motion to Vacate Comment Deadlines
IFG submitted its Petition and Initial Comments on August 19—two days before the initial
comment deadline. Commission Staff requested more time to review those materials before
determining whether they have any bearing on Staff's initial comments.Applicants do not object
to Commission Staff's request for additional time to complete that review. However, any
modification of the comment deadline to facilitate Staff review should not reopen the intervention
period. IFG had a full and fair opportunity to timely intervene in this docket and failed to do so.
Commission Staff's need for more time to review materials should not allow IFG to cure its
untimely intervention and violation of Commission Rules. Applicants therefore request that any
order granting Staff's motion to vacate the current comment deadlines be limited in nature, and
clarify that the intervention period for this docket has already closed.
Dated this 25th day of August, 2025.
NORTHERN LIGHTS, INC.
By: /s/Susan R Weeks
Susan P. Weeks
Attorney for Northern Lights, Inc.
CITY OF BONNERS FERRY
By: s/ Tyler R. Whitney
Tyler R. Whitney
Attorney for City of Bonners Ferry
APPLICANTS'MOTION TO OBJECT TO PETITION
TO INTERVENE,AND ANSWER TO STAFF'S
EXPEDITED MOTION TO VACATE COMMENT
DEADLINES—7 August 25, 2025

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I have this 25th day of August, 2025 served the foregoing Applicants'
Motion to Object to Petition to Intervene, and Answer to Staff's Expedited Motion to Vacate
Comment Deadlines, in Case No. C10-E-25-01,by emailing a copy thereof to the following:
Commission Secretary Idaho Forest Group
Idaho Public Utilities Commission Andrew P. Moratzka(pro hac vice pending)
427 W. Washington Street Stoel Rives LLP
Boise, ID 83702 33 South 6 h Street
[e-mail] Minneapolis, MN 55402
[e-mail]
Commission Staff
W. Christopher Pooser
Adam Triplett Alaina Harrington
Idaho Public Utilities Commission Stoel Rives LLP
P.O. Box 83720 101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900
Boise, ID 83720-0074 Boise, ID 83702
[e-mail] [e-mail]
[e-mail]
sl Tammi Broskoski
Tammi Broskoski
Legal Assistant to Tyler R. Whitney
Certificate of Service