20250724Comments.pdf

RECEIVED
July 24, 2025
Gregory M. Adams (ISB No. 7454) IDAHO PUBLIC
Richardson Adams, PLLC UTILITIES COMMISSION
515 N. 27th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]
Irion Sanger(ISB No. 12488)
Sanger Greene, PC
4031 SE Hawthorne Blvd.
Portland, OR 97214
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]
Attorneys for Northwest & Intermountain Power Producers Coalition
BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF COMMISSION ) CASE NO. GNR-E-25-01
STAFF'S APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL )
OF AN OVERSIGHT PROCESS FOR THE ) NORTHWEST & INTERMOUNTAIN
ACQUISITION OF LARGE SUPPLY-SIDE ) POWER PRODUCERS COALITION'S
ELECTRICAL RESOURCES ) OPENING COMMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Northwest & Intermountain Power Producers Coalition ("NIPPC")hereby submits
its opening comments to the Idaho Public Utilities Commission("IPUC" or"Commission").
NIPPC is a trade association whose members and associate members include independent
power producers ("IPPs") active in the Pacific Northwest and Western energy markets. NIPPC
represents the interests of its members in developing rules and policies that help achieve a
competitive electric power supply market in the Pacific Northwest. Accordingly,NIPPC has
participated in numerous regulatory proceedings related to requests for proposals ("RFPs"),
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bidding rules, and competitive markets before state regulatory commissions in the Northwest and
before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Directly relevant to this proceeding,NIPPC
was an active party—indeed, it was the petitioner—in the underlying IPUC Case No. GNR-E-
08-03, which resulted in this Commission's directive that Idaho Power Company must adhere to
the competitive bidding guidelines of the Oregon Public Utility Commission("OPUC").1
NIPPC was also a lead party in the OPUC's subsequent rulemaking to revise and convert its
bidding guidelines into administrative rules, as they currently exist.
NIPPC stresses, however, that it is a resource-agnostic organization, and its focus in
proceedings such as this one is to ensure that bidding processes are as fair as possible and do not
favor one resource ownership structure over others. As the Commission is aware,utilities have
an inherent incentive to bias such acquisition procedures in favor of utility ownership of the
generation resources. In NIPPC's experience, strong competitive bidding requirements and
oversight can dramatically improve the odds of mitigating that inherent bias to enable acquisition
of the least-cost, least-risk resource. The Commission has "emphasized the importance of
selecting the least-cost, least-risk resources to meet the Company's capacity needs, and the
importance of conducting and maintaining thorough and competitive RFPs regardless of the
Company's shifting capacity needs.,,2 However, achieving the least-cost, least risk outcome
requires persistent and diligent oversight of the utility's bidding process.
1 In the Matter of Request Guidelines for the Procurement of Supply-Side Resources by Idaho
Power Company,Case No.IPC-E-10-03 (Previous Case No. GNR-E-08-03), Order No. 32745 (Feb. 12,
2013).
2 In the Matter of Idaho Power Company's Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity to Acquire Resources to be Online in Both 2024 and 2025 and for Approval of and Energy
Storage Agreement with Kuna BESS LLC, Case No. IPC-E-23-20, Order No. 36011, at 6(Nov. 27,2023).
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Against that backdrop, and as explained below,NIPPC supports the IPUC's desire to
exert regulatory oversight during the RFP development phase. However, the reality is that
Idaho's three utilities are each a multistate utility that will also be subject to neighboring states'
preexisting bidding rules for each RFP that is submitted to the IPUC for approval.3 Thus, the
IPUC's rules should work in conjunction with other states' rules and not be designed to
contradict or supplant other states' rules, which in some cases are more detailed and targeted at
mitigating the utility's bias in favor of utility-owned resources and thus provide real value to
Idaho ratepayers. Staff has communicated that its proposed rules are not intended to discourage
Idaho utilities from complying with applicable rules of neighboring states, and based on that
understanding NIPPC does not object to Staff s proposed rules.
II. BACKGROUND
In 2008, NIPPC,petitioned this Commission to adopt its own competitive bidding
guidelines.4 The Commission limited the proceeding to Idaho Power because Idaho's other two
utilities, Avista and PacifiCorp, represented that they were already subject to competitive
solicitation rules in other states.' Subsequently, Staff moved to close the proceeding on the
grounds that Idaho Power did not have any near-term resource needs, and that Idaho Power
"confirmed that it is bound by competitive bidding guidelines established in the State of Oregon
3 PacifiCorp is subject to Oregon's,Utah's and Washington's competitive bidding statutes and
rules, and Avista is subject to Washington's competitive bidding statutes and rules.
4 See Case No. GNR-E-08-03. The Industrial Customers of Idaho Power("ICIP"),the J.R. Simplot
Company, and the Idaho Irrigation Pumpers Association,Inc. ("IIPA")joined in NIPPC's petition.
5 In the Matter of Request Guidelines for the Procurement of Supply-Side Resources by Idaho
Power Company,Case No. IPC-E-10-03 (Previous Case No. GNR-E-08-03), Order No. 30999, at 3-4
(Feb. 9,2010).
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for its RFP process and that it will comply with those bidding guidelines in Idaho."6 In response,
NIPPC supported use of the Oregon rules in Idaho. The Commission thus determined it was
"appropriate"to close the case while "reminding Idaho Power of its commitment to adhere to the
Oregon RFP guidelines, in the absence of Idaho-specific guidelines."$ The Commission ordered:
"Idaho Power is directed to comply with RFP guidelines applicable in its Oregon service area,
should the Company commence an RFP process for a new supply-side resource prior to the
development of Idaho-specific RFP guidelines."9
More recently, Idaho Power has developed a significant resource deficiency and has
begun acquiring a series of new generation resources. During this period, after Idaho Power
initially procured resources without following the Oregon RFP rules, this Commission
reaffirmed its position that a truly competitive solicitation benefits ratepayers, and that Idaho
Power should hold robust solicitations under applicable bidding rules. For example, in its initial
2021 RFP, Idaho Power excluded third-parry bidders from bidding capacity contracts for the
energy storage resource (known as a"tolling agreement"or"battery storage agreement") and
instead only accepted bids that would result in utility ownership of the resource.10 This RFP also
failed to follow a number of other requirements of the Oregon RFP rules, including retention of
an independent evaluator ("IE").11 Idaho Power stated there was insufficient time to follow the
6 In the Matter of Request Guidelines for the Procurement of Supply-Side Resources by Idaho
Power Company,Case No. IPC-E-10-03 (Previous Case No. GNR-E-08-03), Order No. 32745, at 1 (Feb.
12,2013).
Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 2.
10 In the Matter of Idaho Power Company's Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity to Acquire Resources to Be Online by 2023 to Secure Adequacy and Reliable Service to Its
Customers, Case No. IPC-E-22-13, Order No. 35643,at 2, 6(Dec.27,2022).
11 See id. at 2-6.
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Oregon RFP rules because of an unexpected capacity shortage and ultimately acquired utility-
owned battery energy storage resources outside of the RFP process it held.12 In response, this
Commission reminded Idaho Power of the importance of following a thorough bidding process.
The Commission stated:
The RFP process is designed to facilitate a robust, competitive bid pool from which the
resource(s)best suited to meet the Company's need(s) can be selected and ensures
customers are paying for the least-cost resource to meet the new capacity demand. . . .
The Company's customers should not bear the financial consequences incurred when
Idaho Power fails to adequately plan for its capacity deficiency and in turn acts
reactively, forcing it to add resources that the Commission is unsure are actually the
least-cost resource because a robust RFP was not undertaken. We expect that in the future
the Company will better assess the capacity needs of its system and plan far enough
ahead to ensure a robust, competitive bidding process.13
Thereafter, from NIPPC's perspective, Idaho Power made an effort to adhere to Oregon's
RFP rules in its subsequent solicitations. This was a welcome change and resulted in more
robust participation in Idaho Power's RFPs, and revisions to the initially proposed RFPs that,
from NIPPC's perspective, resulted in more reasonable and competitively designed RFPs.
In a subsequent certificate of public convenience and necessity("CPCN")proceeding for
further resources, Staff recommended that this Commission should adopt its own rules to attempt
to influence the RFPs before they are issued.14 The Commission stated that it"recognizes the
importance of insuring that the RFP process remains as efficient, competitive, and reliable as
possible."15 The Commission "direct[ed] the Company to work with Staff, as expeditiously as
12 Id. at 8-9.
13 Id. at 13-14.
14 In the Matter of Idaho Power Company's Application for Approval of a Market Purchase
Agreement, Case No. IPC-E-24-12, Order No. 36309, at 2(Aug. 29,2024).
15 Id. at 4.
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possible, to address any issues and develop any potential modifications to the RFP process as
necessary."16
On March 31, 2025, Staff filed the resulting application in this case,proposing that the
Commission adopt its own bidding rules for all three Idaho electric utilities. Staff proposes that
the Commission repeal the "explicit"link to Oregon's rules for Idaho Power and the "implicit
dependance" on other states for Avista and PacifiCorp to ensure "Idaho priorities are
maintained."17 Staff further proposes adoption of new Idaho bidding rules applicable to all three
utilities.
In general, Staff s proposed rules are less prescriptive and detailed as the Oregon, Utah,
and Washington bidding rules. For example, Staffs proposed rules would not necessarily
require use of an IE, especially if an IE is already retained for compliance with another state's
rules. As Staff explains, "In most cases, other states will already require an IE, so Idaho can
leverage that IE's oversight. In the rare case that another state does not require an IE, and Idaho
deems one necessary, the Commission can prescribe one as part of its RFP review."18 Further,
unlike the Oregon rules, Staffs proposed rules would not require approval of a shortlist or final
resource other than through the subsequent CPCN proceeding or other resource selection
proceeding (which is also not specifically required) after the contracts are executed.19 However,
Staffs proposal expresses the same general intent of neighboring states' rules of ensuring
16 Id.
17 Staff s Application at 4.
18 Id. at 5-6.
19 See id.,Attachment A at 3 ("If a CPCN is not required,the Company may file an application for
review of the final resource selection and determination of decisional prudence. . . . Alternatively,the
Company may wait until its next rate case before filing for prudence and recovery.").
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"competition, transparency, confidentiality, and fairness through all stages of the procurement
process."20
III. COMMENTS
NIPPC shares the goal of Staff s proposal to ensure that bidding rules applicable to
Idaho's utilities ensure"competition, transparency, confidentiality, and fairness through all
stages of the procurement process."21 NIPPC stresses that substantial benefits can be achieved
for ratepayers by requiring adherence to a truly competitive procurement process.
It is important to review the risks to ratepayers if robust RFP rules are not required of an
investor-owned electric utility. Investor-owned utilities are inherently conflicted in the resource
procurement process to select between a utility-owned option and an independently owned
option offered under a power purchase agreement or tolling agreement(collectively referred to
as power purchase agreements or"PPAs"). The utility will have an inherent incentive to bias the
analysis or outcome of resource procurement in favor of a utility-owned resource because of the
utility's statutory right to have an opportunity to recover its costs and earn a profit on its own
capital investments, including generation facilities. Indeed, the fiduciary duty of investor-owned
utilities to their shareholders compels them to maximize their return on investment—which
under traditional ratemaking is done by expanding rate base with new utility-owned resources.
In contrast,utilities only have an opportunity to recover their costs (but generally no returns on
20 Id.,Attachment A at 1;see also Utah Admin. Code § R746-420-3(1)(a)("All aspects of a
Solicitation and Solicitation Process must be fair,reasonable and in the public interest.").
21 Staff s Application,Attachment A at 1.
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investment)when they purchase power from IPPs in PPAs. Thus, due to standard ratemaking
treatment, the utility has an inherent, economic incentive to favor a utility-owned resource.22
On the other hand, ratepayers are harmed if resource procurement processes are not
transparent, fair, and competitive, and if utility-owned resources dominate as a result. The
logically expected outcome—absent persistent regulatory oversight—is that the utility is likely to
select its own generation resource over a lower cost, more reliable, and less risky PPA with an
IPP. Over time, a pattern of uncompetitive resource procurement can deter IPPs from investing
time and money to develop new projects and prepare bids to be submitted in RFPs. Thus, as this
Commission recently acknowledged in the quote above referring to Idaho Power 2021 RFP, it is
important to promote market competition and protect against utility-ownership bias to ensure that
customers' rates are kept low through the acquisition of generation resources with the least cost
and risk. The consequence of utility self-dealing in biased resource procurements is that
ratepayers will ultimately pay more and assume more risks than they would with genuine
competition and diverse resource ownership. Staff's proposal appears to agree with this
understanding because it states the utilities' RFPs must be fair and unbiased.
However,NIPPC is concerned that Staff's proposed bidding rules are not sufficiently
detailed, on their own, to ensure a competitive outcome in utility procurements. In NIPPC's
experience, achieving a least-cost, least-risk procurement outcome requires persistent and
diligent oversight of the utility's bidding process by stakeholders and its regulatory
commission(s). While the expressed intent of Staff s proposal is sound, the lack of detail could
22 See Direct Testimony of Matthew E. Suess, Staff, at 5-6(March 31,2025)("Each utility also has
incentive to build and own its own resources,versus contract a resource through a power purchase
agreement;therefore,it might design a Selection Plan that favors self-ownership.").
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leave parties litigating complex and controversial points on a case-by-case basis before the
Commission if other states' more detailed procurement requirements were not also being applied
to the utility by other states. Neighboring states' more detailed rules—which will still legally
apply to the RFPs covered by Staff s proposed rules—include many of these more detailed
elements.
For example, Utah's bidding rules—which are applicable to PacifiCorp RFPs—include
the following key requirements:
• Requirement for a pre-issuance bidders' conference open to any interested person
at least 15 days prior to filing the RFP;23
• Requirement that the Commission will retain an IE with clearly defined duties,
including providing input into RFP design, evaluating all models used in
evaluations, validating benchmark bid assumptions and calculations, and
providing recommendations to the Commission on bid ranking, shortlist, and
resource selection;24
• Clearly identified and detailed requirements for the contents of the RFP itself,
including:
o details on the products sought, such as required timing of deliveries,
acceptable places of delivery, pricing options, transmission constraints,
requirements and costs that are known at the time, scheduling
requirements, and qualification requirements;
o a complete description of the evaluation procedures, bid and selection
formats and procedures, price and non-price factors and weights, credit
and security requirements; and
o pro forma power purchase and other agreements;25
• Requirement to use a fair, IE-approved, method for comparing bids of different
types and term lengths,26 which is important in RFPs where utility ownership
options would be placed in rate base and depreciated over a significantly longer
period than the typical power purchase agreement;
23 Utah Admin. Code § R746-420-1(3).
24 Utah Admin. Code §§ R746-420-1(2)-(4),R746-420-3,R746-420-6.
25 Utah Admin. Code § R746-420-3(5)&(7)(c).
26 Utah Admin. Code § R746-420-3(7)(d).
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• Opportunity for stakeholder scrutiny and Commission review and approval of the
RFP design and review and approval of the utility's final resources selection(s)
before final resource acquisition.27
Similarly, Oregon's bidding rules—applicable to Idaho Power and PacifiCorp RFPs
include the following key elements:
• Requirement to retain an IE with clearly defined duties, including independent
scoring of most bids, evaluation of the unique risks and advantages of utility-
owned bids, and preparation of a report on the RFP design as well as a closing
report on the RFP;28
• Clearly identified and detailed requirements for the contents of the RFP itself,
including minimum bidder requirements, standard form contracts, and bid
evaluation criteria;29
• Limitations on the potential subjectivity and bias in non-price scoring criteria;30
• Requirement to complete important sensitivity analyses at the shortlist
development phase to identify potential bias or unreasonable results caused by the
method of comparing bids with different term lengths and the impact of non-price
scores;31
• Requirement that the utility justify any refusal to make ratepayer-funded utility
assets (e.g., site, transmission rights, fuel arrangements) available for use for
independent bidders to supply the lowest cost resource to ratepayers;32
• Requirement that any individual who participates in the development of the RFP
or the evaluation or scoring of bids on behalf of the electric company may not
participate in the preparation of an electric company or affiliate bid and must be
screened from that process;33
• Opportunity for stakeholder scrutiny and Commission review and approval of the
RFP design and review and acknowledgement of the utility's proposed final
shortlist before final resource acquisition.34
27 Utah Code §§ 54-17-201(2), 54-17-302(l).
28 Ore. Admin. Rule § 860-089-0450.
29 Ore. Admin. Rule § 860-089-0250.
30 Ore. Admin. Rule § 860-089-0400(2).
31 Ore. Admin. Rule § 860-089-0400(5)(b).
32 Ore. Admin. Rule § 860-089-0300(3).
33 Ore. Admin. Rule § 860-089-300(1)(b).
34 Ore. Admin. Rule § 860-089-0400(1)& -0500.
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Having these key requirements in the rules prevents the need to litigate the elements of a fair and
unbiased RFP in each individual RFP docket, which as a practical matter is not feasible given the
expedited nature of the RFP dockets that ultimately arise only in times of an impending resource
need to serve load.
From NIPPC's perspective, Idaho Power's recent efforts to adhere to the OPUC's
bidding rules has resulted in improvements to the utility's RFPs and ultimately more robust
participation by IPP bidders. For example, applying its longstanding precedent, the OPUC
rejected Idaho Power's proposal to impose an entirely unreasonable 20%bid adder on all power
purchase agreement bids to account for alleged impacts of imputed debt which would have all
but ensured a utility-owned resource would prevail in the solicitation.35 There were also
numerous other revisions to the RFPs that Idaho Power willingly made in response to feedback
from stakeholders, including NIPPC.36 In subsequent RFPs, most of the these changes from the
initial OPUC RFP proceeding have carried through into Idaho Power's subsequent RFP
proposals and resulted in less process before the OPUC to revise the RFPs in subsequent dockets.
35 See In the Matter of Idaho Power Co., Application for Approval of 2026 All-Source Request for
Proposals to Meet 2026 Capacity Resource Need, OPUC Docket No.UM 2255, Order No. 23-260, at 5-6
(July 17,2023). Notably,the IPUC Staff also criticized Idaho Power's overreliance on the purported
impacts of imputed debt to justify its exclusion of third-party storage capacity contract bids in its 2021
RFP. In the Matter of Idaho Power Company's Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity to Acquire Resources to Be Online by 2023 to Secure Adequacy and Reliable Service to Its
Customers, Case No. IPC-E-22-13, Order No. 35643,at 6-7 (Dec. 27,2022)("Staff did not believe it was
necessary for the Company to own the BESS projects . . . . while it may be true that the cost of debt
would increase, such increase would be minimal and,even if it resulted in a downgrade to the Company's
credit rating,this downgrade would only increase the interest rate by 0.14%. . . ...).
36 See In the Matter of Idaho Power Co., Application for Approval of 2026 All-Source Request for
Proposals to Meet 2026 Capacity Resource Need, OPUC Docket No.UM 2255,Order No. 23-260, at 2-9
(July 17,2023) (discussing all changes to the RFP).
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This has been a welcome development from NIPPC's perspective, and one that NIPPC believes
has likely benefited Idaho ratepayers through more competitive resource solicitations.
Staff s proposal here appears to recognize that neighboring states have detailed
requirements that provide benefits to ratepayers and even seeks to "leverage"the benefits of the
procedures and rules that will be applied by neighboring states without duplicating such
processes.37 NIPPC agrees that it is not necessary to duplicate procedures in Idaho that will
already be occurring in other states for each of the Idaho utilities.
Importantly, while Staff proposes that the Commission no longer expressly rely on other
states' bidding rules, Staff clarified at the workshop that its proposal is not intended to prohibit
or discourage Idaho utilities from following the law and regulations applicable to them in
neighboring states. With that clarification,NIPPC does not oppose Staffs proposal.
NIPPC notes that this clarification is particularly important for Idaho Power, whose
recent RFPs have been significantly improved in their competitiveness due to the utility's
attempt to adhere to the Oregon rules and feedback from stakeholders, like NIPPC, in that
process. NIPPC understands that Staff is concerned that, without Idaho-specific bidding rules,
other state's clean energy mandates could influence Idaho utilities' procurements to serve Idaho
ratepayers.31 Specifically, Staff expressed concern that natural gas plants may have been
precluded, or at least discouraged, from bidding into the recent Idaho Power RFPs.39 Thus,
37 See Direct Testimony of Matthew E. Suess, Staff, at 13 (March 31,2025)(proposing that because
"other states will already require an IE in a Utility's RFP process. . . . Idaho can leverage that IE's
oversight");see also id. (proposing flexibility on procedural timelines will enable the process to"conform
to other state's processes").
38 Id. at 5.
39 See id. at 7 (stating that"the requirement for a gas resource to be convertible to hydrogen
imposed a special burden on the sole carbon-based option"); id. at 8 (stating that Idaho Power's RFP
provided only two years of resource development time,which"effectively precludes resources that have
longer development timelines such as a thermal plant of a nuclear plant").
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Staff s intent appears to be to have the IPUC involved early to ensure Idaho's goals of resource-
agnostic, least-cost, least-risk acquisitions are followed.ao
NIPPC does not oppose Staffs requirement that Idaho RFPs be resource agnostic. As
noted above,NIPPC is a resource-agnostic organization that includes within its membership
developers of different resource types. NIPPC respects Staffs goal of ensuring that other states'
clean energy policies do not undermine Idaho's goal for a resource-agnostic, least-cost, least-risk
procurement of new resources for ratepayers in Idaho. However,NIPPC cautions the
Commission against discarding with the benefits of neighboring state's prescriptive procurement
requirements unrelated to clean energy policies, which like Idaho's goals here are intended to
protect against the incumbent utility's inherent incentive to bias resource solicitations in favor of
utility-owned bids.
Further, in making its decision here, the Commission should be careful not to overstate
the likely impact that neighboring state's clean energy policies may have on Idaho. To illustrate
this point, a review of how Oregon's clean energy laws apply to Idaho Power is instructive.
Oregon's greenhouse gas reduction targets require covered load serving entities to achieve
significant reductions in the greenhouse gas content of their energy deliveries in Oregon by
2030,41 and the Oregon's renewable portfolio standard ("RPS")requires the State's major
investor-owned utilities (PacifiCorp and Portland General Electric Company) to meet escalating
target levels of renewable energy supply with a final target of 50% of Oregon load by 2040.42
However, both Oregon's greenhouse gas requirements and Oregon's RPS are largely
40 See id. at 10("the terms of the RFP should be reviewed before the solicitation is released,
especially to ensure it is open to all feasible resource types . . . .").
41 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 469A.400 to 469A.480.
42 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 469A.052.
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inapplicable to Idaho Power. Oregon's greenhouse gas reduction requirements do not apply to
utilities serving less than 25,000 customers in Oregon, which includes Idaho Power.43 Similarly,
Oregon imposes only a 5%RPS target by 2025 on Idaho Power's Oregon load.44 Since 2021,
Oregon law has barred Oregon's Energy Facility Siting Council from granting permits for new
fossil fuel plants, but that restriction only applies to plants located in Oregon.45 Additionally,
Oregon law requires Oregon utilities, including Idaho Power, to remove of coal generation from
Oregon rates by 2030, but that law does not require any change in ownership of coal generation
or proscribe a multi-state utility, like Idaho Power, from allocating the costs and benefits of coal
generation to a different state, like Idaho.46 Oregon law also does not expressly bar Idaho Power
from building a new natural gas plant outside of Oregon to serve load in Oregon or including that
gas plant in its Oregon rates, and nothing in the OPUC's RFP rules requires Idaho Power to bar
natural gas plants from bidding into its RFPs.
Thus, the Commission should be careful in its order in this proceeding to not
"overcorrect" for a perceived influence of Oregon clean energy laws on Idaho Power. As noted
above, Staff clarified that it is not its intent to prohibit Idaho Power from following Oregon's
bidding rules. Thus,NIPPC's understanding is that Staff does not intend its proposed rules to
43 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 469A.480;see also Idaho Power's 2023 Integrated Resource Plan at 29-30
(Sept. 2023), available at: https:Hdocs.idahopower.com/pdfs/AboutUs/PlanningForFuture/irp/2023/2023-
irp-final.pdf ("Additionally,the Oregon Legislature in 2021 passed HB 2021,which sets GHG emissions
reduction requirements associated with electricity sold to utility customers. Idaho Power is exempt from
the conditions of this bill,as the company has fewer than 25,000 retail customers in Oregon.").
44 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 469A.055 (imposing 5%RPS target by 2025 on"small electric utilities");see
also Idaho Power's 2023 Integrated Resource Plan at 29 (Sept. 2023), available at:
https:Hdocs.idahopower.com/pdfs/AboutUs/PlanningForFuture/irp/2023/2023-irp-final.pdf ("Under the
Oregon RPS, Idaho Power is classified as a smaller utility because the company's Oregon customers
represent less than 3%of Oregon's total retail electric sales. . . . Idaho Power will likely have to meet a
5%RPS requirement beginning in 2025.").
45 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 469.413.
46 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 757.518.
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prohibit Idaho utilities from following other state's procurement rules, or to discourage them
from doing so. The proposed rules appear to presume that the other states' rules would be
followed—for example, by declining to require an Idaho-specific IE because other states' rules
already will require retention of an independent evaluator. NIPPC urges the Commission to be
careful not to suggest that it intends for Idaho Power to cease complying with Oregon's bidding
rules. NIPPC supports Staff s proposal, but that support is premised on the understanding that
the utilities will be following more detailed rules in other states.
In practice, the IPUC's adoption of Staffs proposed RFP process would result in parallel
RFP approval proceedings before the IPUC and other states. Each state would have its own
parallel process. The IPUC rules applied would be less detailed,but, as currently proposed,not
necessarily inconsistent with anything in the Oregon, Utah or Washington statutes and rules that
apply to Idaho utilities. Each state Commission would issue an order approving, or approving
with conditions, the RFP. NIPPC's understanding is that Idaho would likely be focused on
making sure each RFP is resource agnostic, whereas states with more detailed RFP rules may
focus more heavily on whether RFP meets all of the criteria in those other states' rules. As
stated above, with those understandings,NIPPC does not oppose Staffs proposed RFP process.
IV. CONCLUSION
As explained above,NIPPC supports the IPUC exerting regulatory influence over the
design of RFPs issued by Idaho utilities, but is concerned that Staffs proposed rules, standing
alone, are not detailed or prescriptive enough to ensure truly competitive RFPs. However, in
light of Staffs communication that its proposed rules are not intended to discourage Idaho
utilities from complying with applicable rules of neighboring states,NIPPC does not object to
Staffs proposed rules.
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Respectfully submitted on July 24, 2025,
k&��
Gr6goly M. Adams (ISB No. 7454)
Richardson Adams, PLLC
515 N. 27th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]
Irion Sanger(ISB No. 12488)
Sanger Greene, PC
4031 SE Hawthorne Blvd.
Portland, OR 97214
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]
Attorneys for Northwest and Intermountain Power
Producers Coalition
NORTHWEST & INTERMOUNTAIN POWER PRODUCERS COALITION'S OPENING
COMMENTS
GNR-E-25-01 —PAGE 16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certify that I have on this 24th day of July, 2025, served the foregoing
document by electronic mail to the following:
Monica Barios-Sanchez Mark Alder
Commission Secretary Joe Dallas
Idaho Public Utilities Commission Rocky Mountain Power
P.O. Box 83720 1407 West North Temple, Ste 330
Boise, ID 83720-0074 Salt Lake City, UT 84116
[e-mail] [e-mail]
[e-mail]
Chris Burdin
Mike Louis Austin Rueschhoff
Deputy Attorney General Thorvald A.Nelson
Idaho Public Utilities Commission Austin W. Jensen
P.O. Box 83720 Kristine A.K. Roach
Boise, ID 83720-0074 Holland& Hart, LLP
[e-mail] 555 17th St., Ste. 3200
[e-mail] Denver, CO 80202
[e-mail]
Donovan Walker [e-mail]
Matt Larkin [e-mail]
Idaho Power Company [e-mail]
PO Box 70 [e-mail]
Boise, ID 83707-0070
[e-mail] Peter J. Richardson
[e-mail] Richardson Adams, PLLC
[e-mail] 515 N. 27th St.
Boise, ID 83702
David Meyer [e-mail]
Shawn Bonfield
Avista Corporation
PO Box 3727
1411 East Mission Avenue
Spokane, WA 99220-3727
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
&6L"'
By:
Gfeg ry M. Adams (ISB No. 7454)
NORTHWEST & INTERMOUNTAIN POWER PRODUCERS COALITION'S OPENING
COMMENTS
GNR-E-25-01 —PAGE 17