20250424Published Opinion.pdf

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 51238
SAMUEL and PEGGY EDWARDS, )
Complainants-Appellants, ) Boise,February 2025 Term
V. ) Opinion filed: April 24, 2025
IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
COMMISSION and PACIFICORP, dba )
ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER COMPANY, )
Respondents. )
Appeal from the Idaho Public Utilities Commission.
The Commission's orders dismissing the Edwards' complaint and denying
reconsideration are affirmed.
Samuel and Peggy Edwards, Rexburg, Appellants pro se. Samuel Edwards argued.
Raul R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent Idaho Public Utilities
Commission.Adam Triplett argued.
Rocky Mountain Power Company, Portland, Oregon, for Respondent PacifiCorp dba
Rocky Mountain Power Company. Joseph M. Dallas argued.
MOELLER, Justice.
This is an appeal from the Idaho Public Utilities Commission ("the PUC"). Citing health
concerns, Samuel and Peggy Edwards ("the Edwards") refused to allow PacifiCorp, dba Rocky
Mountain Power Company ("Rocky Mountain"), to install a "smart" electrical meters on their
property. Rocky Mountain considered the Edwards'refusal to be a violation of its terms of service,
which authorized Rocky Mountain to access electrical meter bases on customer properties for a
1 Smart meters,also known as Advanced Metering Infrastructure("AMI")meters,"wirelessly record[] and transmit[]
consumers' energy consumption data" to the electric utility provider. Zachariah Sibley, Centralizing Energy
Consumption Data in a State Data Hub,20 Minn. J.L. Sci. &Tech. 315, 318-19 (2019). This removes the need for
manual collection of data, allows for the communication of"significantly more detailed information"for the benefit
of both the consumer and the provider,and produces insightful and"meaningful data"on"one's energy usage."Id.
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variety of reasons. After negotiations with the Edwards failed, Rocky Mountain informed the
Edwards that electrical service to their home would be terminated unless Rocky Mountain was
allowed to replace its existing meter with a smart meter.
Before service could be terminated, the Edwards filed a formal complaint with the PUC,
maintaining that they had not denied Rocky Mountain access to the meter base on their property
and asserting that they should be allowed to "opt-out" and choose a reasonable alternative to the
smart meter.In response,Rocky Mountain filed a motion to dismiss the Edwards'complaint,which
the PUC granted. The Edwards then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the PUC also
dismissed. The Edwards then appealed to this Court. For the reason stated below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Edwards reside in Rexburg, Idaho. Rocky Mountain is a public utility in the state of
Idaho, and it provides electrical service to the Edwards' home. Rocky Mountain places electrical
meters on its customers'properties so that it can measure the amount of electricity consumed and
bill accordingly. Rocky Mountain retains ownership of these meters.
In December of 2021, the Edwards received a letter from Rocky Mountain notifying them
that beginning in January of 2022, it would be replacing its existing analog electrical meters in
their neighborhood with new, digital, "smart meters."The Edwards responded, advising that they
did not consent to the installation of a smart meter due to concerns about its alleged negative health
effects, which they argue would be exacerbated by the meter's proximity to their home. The
Edwards were specifically concerned about the allegedly "deleterious" effects the smart meter
might have on their special needs daughter,who has"a complex medical history."Rocky Mountain
informed the Edwards that they could not opt out of the meter upgrade.
The Edwards maintained communications with Rocky Mountain throughout the spring of
2022, with both parties working to find a solution to the impasse. Rocky Mountain offered to
relocate the meter to a different location on the property at the Edwards'expense(roughly$5,000),
but the Edwards maintained that it was too expensive for them to do so. Eventually, in the summer
of 2022,a subcontractor for Rocky Mountain came to the Edwards'home to replace their electrical
meter with a smart meter. The Edwards again declined the replacement, citing health concerns.
The Edwards informed Rocky Mountain that they would not consent to any smart meter being
installed on their property.
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In November of 2022, Rocky Mountain sent the Edwards another letter, stating that its
"installer couldn't access the meter base" located at the Edwards' home. The letter instructed the
Edwards to contact Rocky Mountain to "resolve any access issues and set an appointment" for a
meter replacement. Subsequently, the Edwards sent a letter to Rocky Mountain disputing that any
installer had been "denied access" to the meter base at their home. On March 3, 2023, Rocky
Mountain sent another letter, again notifying the Edwards that its installer had been denied access
to the meter base. On March 17, 2023, Rocky Mountain sent a final notice to the Edwards stating
that, unless they allowed Rocky Mountain to install the smart meter, service to their home would
be terminated.
The Edwards responded by filing a formal complaint against Rocky Mountain with the
PUC, seeking to prevent Rocky Mountain from terminating service to their home.2 The complaint
alleged eight violations of law: (1) breach of peace by attempting to install AMI meters on their
residence;(2)attempted extortion of the appellants'will;(3)impairment of contractual obligations;
(4) attempted extortion by trying to take over the appellants'private property for commercial use;
(5)attempted illegal wiretapping; (6)threat with intent to commit harm of the appellants; (7)gross
and hazardous negligence; and(8) actionable fraud.
The PUC consolidated the Edwards' claim with similar complaints from four other
customers in Rocky Mountain's service area, each of which concerned Rocky Mountain's
"notification to terminate electric service if customers refused to allow installation of [smart]
meters at their residences." Rocky Mountain filed a combined answer to the four complaints and
a motion to dismiss, alleging that each complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The Edwards filed a response opposing the motion to dismiss. After considering the
parties' respective arguments, the PUC issued Order No. 35849, which dismissed the Edwards'
complaint. In that Order, the PUC concluded that the complainants had not "provided evidence to
support a finding that [smart] meters present a legitimate safety concern, or that public utilities in
Idaho should be required to provide an opt-out option for [smart] meters." The PUC also
determined that Rocky Mountain had authority to access electrical meters on its customers'
properties so that it could replace them with smart meters.
2 As of the date of oral argument,Rocky Mountain has not yet terminated services to the Edwards'home due to the
ongoing nature of the case.
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The Edwards petitioned the PUC for reconsideration of the order dismissing their formal
complaint. In their petition, they alleged that the PUC "overlook[ed] the material substance" of
their initial complaint and asserted several new arguments. The PUC subsequently issued Order
No. 35904, denying the Edwards' petition for reconsideration and concluding that the Edwards
had failed to demonstrate that its previous decision was unreasonable,unlawful, erroneous, or not
in conformity with the law. The Edwards timely appealed to this Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Idaho Constitution grants this Court appellate jurisdiction over orders of the PUC,
subject to the legislature's authority to establish the conditions, scope, and procedure for such
appeals. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9. Exercising this power, the legislature has provided that this
Court's appellate review of the PUC "shall not be extended further than to determine whether the
[PUC] has regularly pursued its authority . . . ." I.C. § 61-629. Thus, this Court reviews whether
the PUC "abused or exceeded its authority or made findings unsupported by substantial
evidence. . . ."Intermountain Gas Co. a Idaho Pub. Utilities Comm'n,97 Idaho 113, 127, 540 P.2d
775, 789 (1975). "Where the [PUC]'s findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence,
this Court must affirm those findings and the [PUC]'s decision."Indus. Customers ofldaho Power
u Idaho Pub. Utils Comm'n, 134 Idaho 285, 288, 1 P.3d 786, 789 (2000) (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
We have been asked to determine whether the PUC properly determined that Rocky
Mountain has the authority to access the Edwards' property to replace its existing analog meter
with a smart meter.Thus, we must first consider the governing laws, rules, and regulations that set
forth the parties' rights in this matter. Public utilities in Idaho are required by statute to file
"schedules showing all rates, tolls, rentals, charges and classifications collected or enforced," and
all rules and regulations "which in any manner affect or relate to rates . . . or service," including
grounds for termination of service. I.C. § 61-305. Once these documents, known as "tariffs," are
filed with and approved by the PUC, they bind both the public utility and the customer with the
force of law. See Lowden v Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U.S. 516, 520 (1939). The
tariff forms the contractual agreement between the customer and the utility. The Idaho Utility
Customer Relations Rules ("UCRR") also govern public utilities and"provide[] a set of fair,just,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory rules" for, among other things, denial and termination of a
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customer's utility service. IDAPA 31.21.01.001. Importantly, if a provision of a tariff and a
provision of the UCRR conflict, the UCRR supersedes the tariff. IDAPA 31.2 1.0 1.0 10.
On appeal, the Edwards argue that Rocky Mountain is only authorized to enter their
property for the specific purposes listed in Rocky Mountain's tariff, and that "replacing" a meter
is not a purpose listed in the tariff. Thus, the Edwards assert that they did not "deny" Rocky
Mountain access in a manner that entitled Rocky Mountain to terminate service to their home. The
Edwards maintain that the PUC misinterpreted Rocky Mountain's tariff, and did not properly
address whether Rocky Mountain's actions were consistent with the UCRR.
We note that while this is how the arguments were presented to us on appeal, the extent to
which they were made before the PUC is murky. As explained above, the Edwards' complaint
originally stated eight claims against Rocky Mountain, all of which sounded in either criminal or
tort law. In its order dismissing the Edwards' complaint, the PUC correctly concluded that it was
"not the appropriate body" to adjudicate such claims, as it has only limited jurisdiction under the
Idaho Code.Notably,the Edwards'complaint did not allege a violation of either Rocky Mountain's
tariff or the UCRR; instead, it was limited to criminal and tort claims. However, the Edwards'
complaint made an incidental allegation that Rocky Mountain did not have "access" to their
property and was breaking their"existing contractual agreement"through its actions. It seems that
this allegation, in the PUC's view,raised the specter that Rocky Mountain violated its tariff. Thus,
notwithstanding the Edwards' failure to explicitly raise a cognizable claim under the terms of the
tariff or the UCRR, the PUC addressed whether Rocky Mountain's tariff provided it with the
authority to access a customer's property for the purpose of replacing an existing meter with a
smart meter.It concluded that Rocky Mountain was authorized to do so.Accordingly,it determined
that the Edwards'refusal to allow installation of the new smart meter violated the tariff.
Because the Edwards did not explicitly allege a violation of the tariff, it appears that the
PUC addressed the issue of"access"under Rocky Mountain's tariff out of an abundance of caution.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the PUC decided the issue the Edwards raised regarding their
contractual agreement with the Rocky Moutain, we will also address it.
A. The PUC correctly interpreted the tariff as providing Rocky Mountain with authority
to access the Edwards' property to replace its existing analog meter with a smart
meter.
The Edwards contend that the PUC erred when it interpreted Rocky Mountain's tariff as
allowing Rocky Mountain to enter a customer's property to replace an existing analog meter with
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a smart meter. They assert that "replacing" a meter is not listed in the tariff as one of the reasons
that a customer must grant Rocky Mountain access to its property. Thus, they maintain that they
never"denied access"to Rocky Mountain in a way that would enable Rocky Mountain to properly
terminate services.
Electric Service Regulation ("ESR") No. 6 of Rocky Mountain's tariff provides: "The
customer shall provide safe, unencumbered access to [Rocky Mountain]'s representatives at
reasonable times, for the purpose of reading meters, inspecting, repairing or removing metering
devices and wiring of [Rocky Mountain]." (Emphasis added). ESR No. 7 of the tariff states:
"[Rocky Mountain] will furnish and maintain all meters and other metering equipment."ESR No.
7(1). (Emphasis added). The PUC concluded that, read together, the provisions provide Rocky
Mountain with the authority to replace existing meters with smart meters:
ESR No. 6(2)(d) requires [the Edwards] to provide access to [Rocky Mountain]
representatives"for the purposes of. . . [among other things] repairing or removing
metering devices. . . ."Under this ESR, [Rocky Mountain]may remove the existing
meter to replace it with an AMI meter. If [the Edwards] refuse to allow [Rocky
Mountain] to remove [Rocky Mountain]-owned meters,they are violating the ESR.
Further, ESR No. 7(1) requires [Rocky Mountain] to "furnish and maintain all
meters and metering equipment." When read together, ESR Nos. 6 and 7 require
that [Rocky Mountain] provide its customers with the meter and associated
metering equipment and requires the customer to provide [Rocky Mountain] with
access to the meter to accomplish this. Based on the foregoing, [Rocky Mountain]
has the necessary authority to install an AMI meter on the [Edwards'] property in
its furnishing of electric service as a public utility.
(Second brackets and ellipses in original). The PUC went on to conclude that the Edwards'refusal
to allow Rocky Mountain access to replace their existing meter with a smart meter was"a violation
of the ESR agreed to as a condition of receiving [Rocky Mountain]'s service." On appeal, the
Edwards maintain that the PUC misinterpreted the tariff and argue that it does not give Rocky
Mountain authority to access their property to replace the existing meter with a new one.3
Here, the ESRs unambiguously provide Rocky Mountain with authority to access existing
meters to replace them with new ones.The ESRs require customers to grant Rocky Mountain"safe,
unencumbered access" to "repair" and "remove" meters, while also imposing a duty on Rocky
s The Edwards also take issue with the PUC's statement that ESR No.6(2)(d)requires them to provide access to Rocky
Mountain"for the purposes of. . . [among other things]repairing or removing metering devices . . . ."(Alteration in
original).The Edwards complain that the PUC's inclusion of"[among other things]"signals the addition of numerous,
unnamed reasons for which Rocky Mountain can access their property. However,this is clearly mistaken; the PUC
was simply indicating that the ESR itself listed other such reasons and it was omitting those reasons in its quote because
they were not relevant to the issue at hand.
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Mountain to furnish meters. Moreover, there is no limitation on the reasons Rocky Mountain may
remove a meter.4 Because Rocky Mountain has a duty to furnish meters,which is coupled with the
authority to remove and repair those meters,the plain language of the ESRs supports the view that
Rocky Mountain can also replace a meter. It defies common sense to parse the words "removal"
and"furnish"as suggesting that they somehow,when read together,exclude the ability to"replace"
a meter. Indeed,when combined,removing and then furnishing a meter necessarily means that the
original meter is being replaced. The Edwards' interpretation goes so far as to suggest that Rocky
Mountain has no authority to replace a meter when it is "repairing" a meter. This interpretation
defies a natural reading of the ESRs and conflicts with its intent to enable Rocky Mountain to
effectively provide services. Therefore, we conclude that the PUC did not exceed its authority in
determining that the plain language of the tariff provides Rocky Mountain with authority to access
the Edwards'meter base for the purposes of replacing it with a smart meter.
B. The PUC did not err by failing to interpret and apply Uniform Customer Relations
Rule 302.
The Edwards next contend that the PUC was required to address whether their refusal to
allow Rocky Mountain to replace its meter provided the grounds for termination set forth in UCRR
302.UCRR 302 outlines the grounds upon which a utility may involuntarily terminate a customer's
service. Apropos to this case, UCRR 302 permits termination when "[t]he customer or applicant
denied or willfully prevented the utility's access to the meter." IDAPA 31.21.01.302.0l.e. The
Edwards assert that the PUC was required to address and interpret UCRR 302 and determine
whether Rocky Mountain properly terminated service to their home. Because the PUC never
addressed whether refusing the installation of a smart meter was the equivalent of denying Rocky
Mountain access under UCRR 302, the Edwards maintain that the PUC's order is erroneous and
that the case should be remanded to address this error.
The Edwards' argument is unavailing. The PUC did not need to answer the question of
whether Rocky Mountain could properly terminate services under UCRR 302 because the Edwards
never raised the issue in their formal complaint. PUC's Rules of Procedure are set forth in IDAPA
31.01.01.54,which addresses how a person may file a formal complaint against a utility,notifying
4 At oral argument, the Edwards asserted that ESR No. 10, which was not in the record, limited the reasons Rocky
Mountain could permissibly remove a meter.After taking judicial notice of the tariff in whole following the parties'
agreement at oral argument,and reviewing the ESRs,we can locate no language limiting the reasons for which Rocky
Mountain may remove a meter.
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it of the allegations against it. The complaint is required to (1) "[fJully state the facts constituting
the acts or omissions of the utility," (2) reference the "specific provision of statute, rule, order,
notice, tariff or other controlling law that the utility has violated," and then (3) state the relief
requested." IDAPA 31.01.01.54.02—.04. Referring to the relevant legal provision violated is
particularly important because, unlike the general jurisdiction of a district court, the PUC's
"jurisdiction is limited and has to be found entirely in the enabling statutes." Afton Energy, Inc. u
Idaho Power Co., III Idaho 925, 928, 729 P.2d 400, 403 (1986). Additionally, the Respondents
point out that the PUC's procedural rules do not contain a provision allowing unpleaded issues to
be tried by consent; therefore, issues not raised in an initial or amended pleading are not properly
before the PUC for determination.
Here,the Edwards'formal complaint neither alleged a violation of UCRR 302 nor referred
to it. The first reference to UCRR 302 is found in the Edwards' written objection to Rocky
Mountain's motion to dismiss the formal complaint. There, for the first time, they averred that
Rocky Mountain was not denied access to their meter for a reason specified in UCRR 302, and
that declining a meter upgrade is not equivalent to denying access to the meter. The Edwards
briefly mentioned UCRR 302 once more in their petition for reconsideration in the form of a
rhetorical question. However, the Edwards did not raise this claim to the PUC in their formal
complaint or seek to amend their complaint to add it. Therefore, they cannot raise it for the first
time in a petition for reconsideration.
The PUC, acting pursuant to its duty to adjudicate the specific claims brought by the
Edwards against Rocky Mountain, had no authority to decide issues beyond the scope of the
Complaint. See Afton Energy, Inc., III Idaho at 928, 729 P.2d at 403; IDAPA 31.01.01.054.
Because the Edwards did not reference the alleged failure to comply with UCRR 302 as a basis
for relief in their complaint,the PUC did not need to address that rule to properly dismiss the case.
As we noted above,the Edwards only marginally raised the issue of"access"under Rocky
Mountain's tariff. The Edwards' formal complaint alleged that Rocky Mountain was not denied
access to their property and that Rocky Mountain was breaking their "existing contractual
agreement"through its actions. In an effort to construe the pleadings liberally, it appears the PUC
addressed the Edwards' claim under the terms of Rocky Mountain's tariff. However, nothing in
the Edwards' formal complaint even marginally raised the issue of the tariff complying with the
UCRR, which is the argument the Edwards now make on appeal. Likewise, although the UCRR
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was briefly referenced in the Edwards' motion for reconsideration, it was not the basis of their
request for relief.Therefore,the PUC did not act unreasonably when it failed to address the UCRR
in its decision on reconsideration.
Moreover,just because the Edwards made a claim regarding Rocky Mountain's authority
to replace a meter under the terms of its tariff, it did not require the PUC to address the legally
distinct issue of whether the tariff itself violated the UCRR. While a tariff contains all the binding
rules and regulations for service between the utility and the customer, the UCRR provides "fair,
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rules" that limit the terms of the tariff. See IDAPA
31.21.01.001. Due to this relationship, UCRR 302 acts as a limitation on the grounds for
terminating services that a utility may include in its tariff. See generally I.C. § 61-305. Thus, it is
the tariff that provides the affirmative authority for termination, while the UCRR operates as a
legislatively created limit on the terms of the tariff. For this reason, a claim alleging a violation of
a tariff and a claim alleging a violation of the UCRR are separate inquiries. Just because the PUC
addressed Rocky Mountain's authority to replace a meter under its tariff does not mean it was
required to also weigh in on the separate issue of whether the tariff's terms exceeded the bounds
of the UCRR when that issue was not raised by the Edwards.
Finally,the undisputed facts show that the Edwards denied Rocky Mountain access to their
property. The Edwards essentially fault the PUC's order for not explicitly stating that denying
Rocky Mountain access for the purposes of installing a smart meter constituted a denial of access
under the UCRR. But it is easy to see why the PUC's order did not make such a determination—
it was undisputed that Rocky Mountain was denied access to the Edwards'property to replace the
existing meter. In fact, it was a foundational assumption of the Edwards' complaint. The question
before the PUC was whether Rocky Mountain had authority to access the Edwards' property to
replace their meter. If it had such authority, then the Edwards' denial of access violated the tariff
and warranted the termination of services. The PUC had already determined that Rocky Mountain
had such authority. Thus,the PUC had no reason to go beyond the issue at hand to state an obvious
and uncontested fact: that the Edwards denied Rocky Mountain access to their property.
While the PUC never expressly determined whether the Edwards' conduct constituted
grounds to terminate their electrical service under UCRR 302, that issue was not before it. The
PUC determined that Rocky Mountain had authority under its tariff to access the property to install
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a new meter and that fully resolved the issue raised by the Edwards below.5 Because it had no
reason to determine whether the Edwards'denial of access to Rocky Mountain constituted a denial
of access under UCRR 302,we conclude that the PUC did not abuse or exceed its authority by not
addressing and interpreting UCRR 302. Therefore, we hold that its findings and conclusions are
sufficient to affirm the denial of the Edwards'petition for rehearing.
C. The Edwards failed to establish a violation of their constitutional rights.
Finally,the Edwards make a novel constitutional claim:that the Idaho Constitution protects
their right to refuse replacement of an existing electrical meter with a new meter—while still
benefiting from Rocky Mountain's services—due to health and safety concerns. The Edwards rely
on Article 1, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, which states that:
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among
which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety.
Idaho Const. art. I, § 1.
The Edwards claim, for the first time on appeal, that Rocky Mountain violated their
constitutional rights by terminating electrical service to their property "solely because [they]
exercise[d] judgment, in so far as [they were] capable, to secure the safety of[themselves] and
[their] family members . . . ."As evidence of the risk to their health and safety, the Edwards rely
exclusively on the evidence and argument cited in an amicus brief filed in a Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case, purporting to show the negative health effects of smart meters. See Povacz a Penn.
Pub. Util. Conmm'n, 280 A.3d 975 (Pa. 2022).6
Citing exceptions to the general preservation rules, the Edwards argue that we may
permissibly address this constitutional argument despite it being raised for the first time on appeal.
However,we need not address this issue,as the Edwards'constitutional argument has been waived
on other grounds. "It is well established that this Court will not consider an issue on appeal that is
not `supported by argument and authority in the opening brief.' " Greenfield a Meyer, Idaho
5 The Edwards also make a conclusory allegation that Rocky Mountain has a conflict of interest in terminating services
due to their statutory duty to provide service in a "just and reasonable" manner. However, because the Edwards
provided no support for this argument,we decline to address it.
6 In Povacz,the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the arguments advanced in the amicus brief filed by Children's
Health Defense, holding that the customers had failed to demonstrate that smart meters were unsafe or that forced
exposure to smart meters amounted to unreasonable service. 280 A.3d at 1009-14. The Povacz court noted that the
customers relied on"inconclusive research and studies regarding the effects of[the radiofrequency electromagnetic
energy that smart meters emit],"and failed to prove a"conclusive causal connection between[smart meter]emissions
and adverse human health effects."Id. at 1012, 1014.
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, 560 P.3d 517, 525 (2024) (quoting Jorgensen a Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d
450, 454 (2008)). "Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity
and to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite
to be heard by the Court."Bach v.Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing
Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975)); see also I.A.R. 35(a)(6) ("The
argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on
appeal,the reasons therefor,with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the
record relied upon.").
Here, the Edwards have failed to sufficiently support their position with cogent argument
or proper authority.As noted, they rely solely on an amicus brief filed in a Pennsylvania case for
evidentiary support, without supplying any foundation for the factual assertions it contains. See
Povacz, 280 A.3d at 1012, 1014. More importantly, the Edwards do not offer any explanation for
how the Idaho Constitution or the United States Constitution would allow a private cause of action
against Rocky Mountain for violation of their rights. They have cited no cases interpreting or
applying Article I, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution to constrain the powers of a private entity.
The Edwards did cite cases dealing with due process under the United States Constitution;
however, they failed to present legal authority suggesting that"a private entity, is governed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth amendments." Cole a Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Idaho , 565
P.3d 815, 819 (2025); see also Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982)
(explaining that the due process rights can only be violated by state action, as opposed to the
actions of private parties).
Simply put, the Edwards have not provided this Court with a proper legal foundation to
understand the basis for, and thereby adjudicate, their claim under the Idaho Constitution. We
conclude that the Edwards waived their constitutional argument because they failed to support it
with sufficient authority and argument.
IV. CONCLUSION
The PUC's orders dismissing the Edwards' complaint and denying their motion for
reconsideration are affirmed.
Chief Justice BEVAN,Justices BRODY,ZAHN, and MEYER CONCUR.
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