Yankel testimony.doc

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, ADDRESS, AND EMPLOYMENT.

A. I am Anthony J. Yankel. I am President of Yankel and Associates, Inc. My address is 29814 Lake Road, Bay Village, Ohio, 44140.

Q. WOULD YOU BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE?

A. I received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering from Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1969 and a Master of Science Degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of Idaho in 1972. From 1969 through 1972, I was employed by the Air Correction Division of Universal Oil Products as a product design engineer. My chief responsibilities were in the areas of design, start-up, and repair of new and existing product lines for coal-fired power plants. From 1973 through 1977, I was employed by the Bureau of Air Quality for the Idaho Department of Health & Welfare, Division of Environment. As Chief Engineer of the Bureau, my responsibilities covered a wide range of investigative functions. From 1978 through June 1979, I was employed as the Director of the Idaho Electrical Consumers Office. In that capacity, I was responsible for all organizational and technical aspects of advocating a variety of positions before various governmental bodies that represented the interests of the consumers in the State of Idaho. From July 1979 through October 1980, I was a partner in the firm of Yankel, Eddy, and Associates. Since that time, I have been in business for myself. I am a registered Professional Engineer in the states of Ohio and Idaho. I have presented testimony before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), as well as the State Public Utility Commissions of Idaho, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia.

Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?

A. I am testifying on behalf of the Idaho Irrigation Pumpers Association (IIPA).

Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A. The purpose of my testimony is to determine whether or not the proposed merger between ScottishPower and PacifiCorp (the Applicants) will adversely impact the interests of the Idaho ratepayers. My examination is based upon the materials filed by the Applicants in this case and the other merger related cases in the other jurisdictions in which PacifiCorp operates.

WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION WITH RESPECT TO THE MERGER?

A. I have found that the ScottishPower/PacifiCorp merger is adverse to the overall public interest of the ratepayers of Idaho as defined by the Idaho Code. The Applicants have suggested that costs and rates could increase by reason of the merger—in direct conflict with the requirements of the Idaho Code. Contrary to the Idaho Code, the Applicants have not demonstrated a bona fide intent to operate and maintain the system in the public service. I recommend that the Commission deny the merger.

THE IDAHO PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD

WHAT ARE THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN THE IDAHO CODE THAT MUST BE MET BEFORE THE PROPOSED TRANSACTION/MERGER OF PACIFICORP AND SCOTTISHPOWER CAN TAKE PLACE?

The Commission in Order 27939 stated that the applicable standards and scope of review of the joint Application are as set forth in Idaho Code 61-328 and Idaho Code, Title 61, Chapter 9. Specifically the Commission must find that:
The public interest will not be adversely affected;
The cost of and rates for supplying service will not be increased by reason of such transaction; and

The Applicants have the bona fide intent and financial ability to operate and maintain said electrical property in the public service. (Emphasis added)

Additionally, the Commission informed the parties in that Order that it expected the Applicants to address and respond to the following issues:
Irrigation concerns

Continued eligibility to participate in the BPA residential exchange program

Eligibility to participate in the BPA subscription process

Assurances that ScottishPower will not sell electric assets, reduce the work force, or adversely affect water rights

Concrete evidence to support the Applicants’ claims of efficiencies to be achieved as a result of the merger

BASED UPON YOUR 25 YEARS OF INVOLVEMENT IN UTILITY REGULATORY CASES IN IDAHO AND ELSEWHERE, WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THESE STANDARDS?

The first standard set forth in the Idaho Code is specifically designed to protect the public interest. To gain approval of the merger the Commission must make a positive finding that the Applicants have demonstrated that the transaction will not adversely affect the public interest. Although the Idaho Code does not require that the merger have a “net positive benefit” as do other jurisdictions that regulate PacifiCorp, the first Idaho Standard effectively results in the same level of protection of the public because there must by an assurance that there will not be an adverse affect. Although the Applicants contend that the merger is in the public interest for the system as a whole, they have not provided any evidence that the public interest of Idaho ratepayers will not be adversely impacted. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates a strong possibility that Idaho customers could be worse off after the merger.
The second Standard set forth in the Idaho Code is clearly designed to insure that utility cost and rates will not be adversely impacted because of the merger. To gain approval of the merger the Commission must make a positive finding that the Applicants have demonstrated that the transaction/merger will not lead to increased cost or rates. Although the Idaho Standard does not require a rate reduction, the second Standard calls for a positive finding that rates will not increase—both now and in the future as a result of the merger. The Applicants have not provided any evidence that rates will not go up in the future as a result of the merger. Although ScottishPower has claimed that there are large cost savings to be gained once it takes over PacifiCorp, these costs savings are not proposed to be directly passed on to the consumers but:
Following the initial period of service quality and customer service improvements, cost savings will begin to occur and will reduce the need for price increases.

Such expectations of merely reducing “the need for price increases” years in the future are speculative and not verifiable based upon any of the information supplied by ScottishPower in discovery responses filed in the various jurisdictions in which PacifiCorp operates. Based upon such unsupported statements, a positive finding can not be made that rates in Idaho will not increase by reason of the merger. Additionally PacifiCorp witness O’Brien testifies that the “improvements” resulting from the merger “require significant up-front investments.” Nowhere in the Application, Direct Testimony of the Applicants witnesses, or responses to data requests made in this jurisdiction (or any other PacifiCorp jurisdiction) over the 6 months since the merger was announced does it say that a rate increase will not be requested that covers these merger related improvements.
The third Standard set forth in the Idaho Code is designed to insure that the Applicants have the bona fide intent to operate and maintain the electrical system in the public service. Once again, to gain approval of the merger the Commission must make a positive finding that the Applicants have demonstrated that they have the bona fide intent to operate and maintain the system in the public interest. ScottishPower has failed to carry its burden of proof, being vague and non-specific as to how it would operate and maintain its system in the various jurisdictions. It did not know where cost savings and cut backs would occur, which assets would be replace and/or maintained, or where investments would be made.

IS THERE A SUFFICIENT BASIS PUT BEFORE THE IDAHO COMMISSION UPON WHICH TO MAKE A POSITIVE FINDING WITH RESPECT TO ANY OF THE STANDARDS REQUIRED BY THE IDAHO CODE FOR APPROVAL OF THE MERGER?

No. The Applicants failed to provide sufficient information for a positive finding to be made with respect to any of these three Standards. The Applicants claimed that the merger was in the public interest, without presenting any factual basis to support that conclusion. The Applicants anticipate that the merger would save money, but provide no guarantees and in fact left the door open for a rate increase. The Applicants contend that they would bring improvements to the system, but could not specify if their proposal would impact Idaho customers positively or negatively.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
HOW HAVE THE RATES OF EASTERN IDAHO’S INVESTOR OWED UTILITIES COMPARED WITH THOSE OF THE REST OF THE STATE?

For at least the 25 years that I have been involved in electric utility matters in Idaho, the consumers in Eastern Idaho have paid substantially higher rates for comparable service than their counterparts in the Idaho Power and Washington Water Power service areas. This rate disparity has been a constant concern to all customers in Eastern Idaho and the Irrigation customers in particular.
About 20 years ago a load management program was proposed by Utah Power and Light (UP&L) in order to alleviate some of this price disparity. The Commission approved the Irrigation Load Management Program that allowed cost reductions to those Irrigation customers willing to have their loads interrupted. In return for interruptibility Eastern Idaho Irrigators received a rate more in line with that paid by Irrigators on Idaho Power for firm power.
The Irrigation Load Management Program was also adopted in the other states in which UP&L operated (Utah and Wyoming). Although the rates for Irrigation customers were high when compared to the rest of Idaho, they were comparable to or lower than the rates offered to UP&L’s Irrigation customers in Utah. A comparison of UP&L Irrigation rates in Idaho and Utah for a 200 Hp customer in 1987 (before the merger that formed PacifiCorp) follows:

Idaho Utah Idaho/Utah
Option A $4,755 $4,501 106%
Option B $4,138 $4,205 98%
Option C $3,152 $3,867 82%

In 1987 a merger was proposed between Pacific Power and UP&L. That merger resulted in the PacifiCorp that we have today. The merger 10 years age was one of two utilities serving neighboring areas—there was no ocean separating them. Merger savings were possible in the formation of PacifiCorp because of synergies associated with production and transmission plant. Pacific was winter peaking while Utah was summer peaking. Utah’s transmission was north-south while Pacific’s was east-west. With the proposed merger of UP&L and Pacific Power, the merger benefits were to be passed back to the Eastern Idaho customers of UP&L in the form of a rate reduction. The Utah jurisdictional customers were also promised a rate decrease.
However, 10 years after the formation of PacifiCorp a comparison of today’s irrigation rates for Eastern Idaho and Utah under PacifiCorp for the same 200 Hp customer yields results that are very different than those found before that merger took place:
Idaho Utah Idaho/Utah
Option A $4,659 $2,461 189%
Option B $4,076 $2,461 166%
Option C $3,097 $2,461 126%

The net effect is that Eastern Idaho Irrigators received a slight decrease (on the order of 2%), over the last 12 years (1987-1999). However, Utah Irrigation customers on the PacifiCorp system received a significant rate reduction. For example an Option A (firm) Eastern Idaho Irrigation customer saw his typical monthly bill decrease 2.0% from $4,755 per month in 1987 to $4,659 per month in 1999. Over that same timeframe, Option A Irrigation rates in Utah were almost cut in half, from $4,501 per month in 1987 to $2,461 per month in 1999.

WHAT SIGNIFICANCE SHOULD BE PLACED UPON THIS HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE IN LIGHT OF THE PROPOSED MERGER NOW BEFORE THE COMMISSION?

A. The first observation that should be made is that merger benefits and rate impacts are not necessarily spread evenly across all jurisdictions. Just because a merger may provide some benefits to a system, it does not mean that those system benefits will be spread evenly to all jurisdictions. As a matter of fact, some jurisdictions could benefit while others are hurt by a merger. The huge reduction in rates experienced by Utah Irrigators compared to the near flat treatment of Eastern Idaho Irrigation customers by PacifiCorp attests to the real possibility of wholesale disparity between jurisdictions.
Second, the PacifiCorp merger provided an anticipation of a long awaited price reduction that Eastern Idaho customers sought. The Commission’s Order No. 21867 approving the merger that formed PacifiCorp stated with respect to rate changes that:
The Applicants pledge that Pacific’s overall level of its retail rates in Idaho will not increase for four years following the merger. Furthermore, Utah Power’s retail rates in Idaho will be reduced 2% across the board (except for special contract customers) within 60 days after the merger is approved. The Applicants anticipate additional reductions that together with the two percent reductions will total 5-10% for the Utah Power division in the first few years following the merger.

However, although these rate reductions were promised, and to some extent enacted, this does not mean that the customers in Eastern Idaho saw a decrease in their overall bills because of the BPA Credit. As the Commission noted in Order 23117 in Case No. UPL-E-90-1 where a merger related decrease (along with other minor decreases) was being considered:
Thus, even though Utah Power proposed to reduce the billing components for these customers by uniform percentage decrease, nevertheless some of these qualifying customers would face slight increases in the bills they pay because their credits under the Act will be reduced by more than the amount of reduction in Utah Power’s rates. (Emphasis added)

Thus, in spite of the clear declaration to reduce rates in the last merger, the overall impact upon the bills to most Eastern Idaho customers was negative or only very slightly positive. In this case there is not even a suggestion of a rate decrease, but the door has been left open for a rate increase because of the merger itself.

HOW DO IRRIGATION RATES IN EASTERN IDAHO COMPARE WITH THE REST OF THE IRRIGATION RATES ON THE PACIFICORP SYSTEM?

A. Today, the rates in Eastern Idaho are significantly above those paid elsewhere on the PacifiCorp system. The following table lists monthly bills for a typical 200 Hp pump taking firm service (150 kW and 55,800 kWh) on the PacifiCorp system:

IMPACTS ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST
HAVE THE APPLICANTS SUGGESTED THAT THE MERGER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?

Yes. On page 2 of Mr. O’Brien’s direct testimony he outlines why the Applicants believe that the merger is in the public interest:
The combination with ScottishPower will result in a financially stronger company than PacifiCorp standing alone;

ScottishPower will add significantly to PacifiCorp’s ability to improve its reliability, system operations and customer service;

ScottishPower and PacifiCorp together will produce greater efficiencies, innovations and cost savings in PacifiCorp’s operations:

ScottishPower has demonstrated its commitment to employees and the communities it serves and will enhance PacifiCorp’s efforts in these areas; and

ScottishPower will complement and strengthen PacifiCorp’s efforts in environmental stewardship and the development and marketing of green power.

ARE MR. O’BRIEN’S ASSERTIONS THAT THE MERGER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST SUFFICIENT TO INSURE THAT THE MERGER IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE IDAHO RATEPAYERS?

No. First, the assertions that are made by Mr. O’Brien are system-wide assertions and do not address anything specific in Idaho. As a matter of fact, the testimony filed by the Applicants is (with minor exceptions) virtually the same testimony that was filed in all of the other state jurisdictions served by PacifiCorp.
IS IT IMPORTANT THAT AN IDAHO SPECIFIC REVIEW OF THE MERGER BE UNDERTAKEN?

Yes. The Idaho Code requires that a State specific review be made. Additionally, because the Eastern Idaho service territory is relatively small when compared to the PacifiCorp system as a whole, it is imperative that Idaho specific information be obtained because overall system parameters may not be indicative of the Applicants’ intent in one of its smallest service areas.
A painful example of this problem comes from the changes that occurred with the PacifiCorp merger. At the time of the merger 10 years ago, Eastern Idaho represented 8.0% of the UP&L customer base. Today Eastern Idaho represents only 3.6% of the PacifiCorp’s customer base. As pointed out above, since the merger 10 years ago that formed PacifiCorp, the Eastern Idaho Irrigation customers have gone from a position of relative rate advantage over their Utah counterpart to being greatly disadvantaged. As the size of the jurisdiction decreases with respect to the overall size of the system, so does its importance to and influence upon corporate management.
If the proposed merger with ScottishPower were approved, Eastern Idaho customers would represent a mere 0.8% of the overall ScottishPower system. It is impassive that the impacts on this small jurisdiction (which is being thrust into an ever-expanding ocean) be known before had. However, the Applicants have provided no indication of what would happen to the Eastern Idaho jurisdiction should the merger be approved.

IS THE FACT THAT THE APPLICANTS DID NOT ADDRESS HOW THE MERGER WAS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR IDAHO CUSTOMERS THE ONLY CONCERN?

No. The lack of information with respect to the impact of the merger on the public interest is not limited to Idaho, but to the entire PacifiCorp system. When information was sought that would explain how the public interest would be impacted or what the Applicants’ bona fide intent for operating and maintaining the system was, the Applicants’ answers were vague and non-specific. After reviewing statements made by ScottishPower or supplied in data responses in this and other jurisdictions over the last six months, the only thing that can be concluded is that the Applicants are either unable or unwilling to disclose the extent of the impacts on the merger on the public interest or the future operation and maintenance of the electric system. The Applicants have failed to meet heir burden of proof to disclose the extent of the impact of the merger on customers or what operation and maintenance procedures were to be utilized under the merged system. Accordingly there is an insufficient factual basis for the Commission to make a positive finding that “the public interest will not be adversely affected.”

PACIFICORP WITNESS O’BRIEN LISTS FIVE REASONS WHY HE BELIEVES THE MERGER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. THE FIRST OF THESE REASONS IS THAT: “THE COMBINATION WITH SCOTTISHPOWER WILL RESULT IN A FINANCIALLY STRONGER COMPANY THAN PACIFICORP STANDING ALONE. DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS ASSERTION?

No. As I will describe later in my testimony, ScottishPower is paying a “bid premium” of $1,300,000,000 (or more) over the price of PacifiCorp’s common stock. If this “bid premium” is not recovered, the merged company can not help but be greatly weakened. As will be discussed later, ScottishPower suggests that this “bid premium” be recovered from the ratepayers. I know of no regulatory jurisdiction in this country that would permit the recovery from ratepayers of a “bid premium” solely for the benefit of shareholders, let alone one of this magnitude. Thus, I conclude that the combination with ScottishPower will not result in a financially stronger Company.

THE SECOND REASON PUT FORTH BY MR. O’BRIEN AS TO WHY THE MERGER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS THAT: “SCOTTISHPOWER WILL ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO PACIFICORP’S ABILITY TO IMPROVE ITS RELIABILITY, SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND CUSTOMER SERVICE.” DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS ASSERTION?

No. The Applicants have not produced any cost/benefit analysis to demonstrate that specific system performance and customer service improvements are indeed cost effective and thus in the public interest. As a matter of fact, ScottishPower will not even begin to assess how to accomplish these system performance and customer service improvements until after the merger is finalized. Public interest that is quantified after the fact is of no value. The impact upon the public interest must be established before the merger is approved.
Additionally, there is no recognition that PacifiCorp (acting alone) could not provide the same “improvements” during the next 5-plus years as are being promised by the merger. In fact, some of these so-called commitments could reduce system performance and customer service in Idaho. For example, one of ScottishPower’s proposed system performance standards (to be achieved 5-plus years from now) is that 80% of customers that experience an outage have power restored within 3 hours. However, this proposed system performance standard excludes extreme events, where there are problems with a customer’s facility, or where the Company does not have access. In fact, over the last four years (1995-1998) well over 90% of the Idaho customers that experienced an outage had power restored in less than 3 hours.
The other system performance standards have a similar luster that quickly fades upon closer examination. For example, the improvements in SAIDI, SAIFI, and MAIFI indexes have limited value. These improvements not only exclude extreme events, but are to be based upon an unknown baseline which will be measured on an as yet uninstalled monitoring and reporting system.
The customer guarantees being offered by ScottishPower are equally hollow. For example, ScottishPower proposes that it will pay a residential customer $50 or a commercial or industrial customer $100 if power is not restored within 24 hours after an outage begins. However, in addition to the “extreme event” exclusion, a customer must also request the payment if it is due, i.e. it is not automatically given. Even without these qualifiers, this customer guarantee is virtually meaningless because in Idaho there were only 5 customers over the last 5 years combined that even had outages (extreme event or not) of more than 24 hours14.

THE THIRD REASON PUT FORTH BY MR. O’BRIEN AS TO WHY THE MERGER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS THAT: “SCOTTISHPOWER AND PACIFICORP TOGETHER WILL PRODUCE GREATER EFFICIENCIES, INNOVATIONS AND COST SAVINGS IN PACIFICORP’S OPERATIONS.” DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT?

I only agree that the Applicants are proposing to do more cost cutting than PacifiCorp has proposed on its own. However, these actions are not being taken in the public’s interest, but in the interest of the stockholders. As will be discussed later in my testimony, ScottishPower plans to first pass all of these savings on to the stockholders and then, at some unspecified time in the future, begin to allow the ratepayers to share in the savings that the stockholders have enjoyed (in the form of greatly increased profits) for years.

THE FOURTH REASON PUT FORTH BY MR. O’BRIEN AS TO WHY THE MERGER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS THAT: “SCOTTISHPOWER HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS COMMITMENT TO EMPLOYEES AND THE COMMUNITIES IT SERVES AND WILL ENHANCE PACIFICORP’S EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS.” DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS ASSERTION?

ScottishPower has made no adequate showing in support of its claim to the employees or the community to meet any public interest criteria. ScottishPower has not supplied any details with respect to its future plans. For example, in response to Request S2.12 of the Utah Division of Public Utilities for information regarding personnel reductions ScottishPower stated:
ScottishPower does not have specific plans nor has it commenced detailed planning for implementing workforce reductions in PacifiCorp. Detailed planning will only be completed after the completion of the transaction.

THE FIFTH REASON PUT FORTH BY MR. O’BRIEN AS TO WHY THE MERGER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS THAT: “SCOTTISHPOWER WILL COMPLEMENT AND STRENGTHEN PACIFICORP’S EFFORTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT AND MARKETING OF GREEN POWER.” DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS ASSERTION?

No. The largest dollar commitment in this area is a commitment to add 50 MW of additional renewable resources. Mr. Richardson’s testimony at page 14 in this case describes that commitment as follows:
PacifiCorp will develop an additional 50 MW of renewable resources (wind, solar and/or geothermal) at an anticipated cost of approximately $60 million within five years after the approval of the transaction.

There are a number of problems with this commitment. First, the commitment being made in Idaho in this case is different than the commitment being made in Oregon. Although the merger testimony filed in the various states (with minor exceptions) is the same, it is different with respect to this commitment. Mr. Richardson’s testimony in Oregon contains three qualifiers that are not found in his Idaho testimony. His testimony regarding the addition of renewable resources in Oregon reads as follows:
PacifiCorp will develop an additional 50 MW of renewable resources (wind, solar and/or geothermal) at an anticipated cost of approximately $60 million within five years after the approval of the transaction, on the following bases:

Extension of the system benefit charge and renewables incentive portion of the AFOR:

Increase in the Oregon AFOR cap on eligible renewable resources; and

Resources must pass the AFOR renewable resource cost-effectiveness standard.

Given the contingencies being placed upon this commitment in Oregon, one can not say that the commitment as stated in Idaho is valid.

Q. WHAT OTHER PROBLEMS MAKE THE APPLICANTS’ CONTENTION TO ADD 50 MW OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?

A. This commitment is contrary to PacifiCorp’s own RAMPP-5 resource acquisition model that was filed December 1997. Several statements from the Executive Summary of that RAMPP Report demonstrate how this commitment is contrary to the resource needs of PacifiCorp and thus contrary to the public interest:
The major finding in the company’s fifth Resource and Market Planning Program is that PacifiCorp does not need to make any new resource acquisition decisions during the next several years.

The least-cost supply-side resource choice continues to be gas-fired plants (it was coal-fired in RAMPP-3 and gas-fired in RAMPP-4 and in the RAMPP-4 updated).

Modest amounts of DSM are cost effective relative to plant operating costs and market prices.

Renewables are not cost effective compared to gas-fired resources.

Given the fact that these findings are in direct conflict with the commitment to add 50 MW of renewable resources, this commitment can not be in the public interest. It would appear that even ScottishPower recognizes the conflict of this commitment with RAMPP-5 because in response to Utah Division of Public Utilities Request 8.2 additional conditions were placed upon this commitment:
ScottishPower’s commitment to develop an additional 50 MW of new renewable resources is conditioned on resources meeting cost-effectiveness standards derived from PacifiCorp’s integrated resource planning process.

There are so many conditions placed upon this commitment that it can no longer even be considered a commitment.

HAVE THE APPLICANTS ADDRESSED IN THEIR TESTIMONY ANY IRRIGATION CONCERNS AS REQUIRED BY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 27939 THAT SCHEDULED THIS CASE FOR HEARING?

No. One of those concerns would be the continuation of the Irrigation Load Management Program in Idaho with appropriate recognition of the load shedding ability it brings to the system. Given the RAMPP-5 statements that DSM is cost effective and renewable resources are not, one would have expected that the public interest as related to the Irrigation Load Management Program would have been addressed as opposed to the renewable resources.
Another of the Irrigation concerns is the rate disparity that has developed between rates in Idaho and the other jurisdictions in which PacifiCorp operates. The Applicants’ testimony has not address this issue at all.
In addition to the Irrigation concerns, the following issues were not addressed that the Commission stated in Order No. 27939 that it expected the Applicants to address:
Continued eligibility to participate in the BPA residential exchange program.
Eligibility to participate in the BPA subscription process.
Assurances that ScottishPower will not sell electric assets, reduce the work force, or adversely affect water rights.
Concrete evidence to support the Applicant’s claims to efficiencies to be achieved as a result of the merger.

PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOU TESTIMONY WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST STANDARD FOUND IN THE IDAHO CODE—THAT THE TRANSACTION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

A. Based upon the foregoing, it is my conclusion that the proposed merger will have an adverse impact upon the public interest and should be denied on that basis alone.

THE MERGER’S IMPACT UPON COSTS AND RATES

THE IDAHO CODE REQUIRES THAT RATES WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY REASON OF A MERGER. HAS SCOTTISHPOWER AFFIRMATIVELY STATED THAT RATES WILL NOT INCREASE BECAUSE OF THE MERGER OR IN ANY WAY CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THAT RATES WOULD NOT RISE BECAUSE OF THE MERGER?

No. Although there are many estimates and suggestions that ScottishPower hopes to institute a number of cost saving measures, there is no showing that these cost savings, if they materialize, will be used to actually bring about a rate reduction. Nor is there any commitment on the part of ScottishPower that rates will not go up because of the expenses and investments that are being proposed by the Applicants as a part of this merger. Several factors suggest that a rate increase may occur as a result of the merger and/or there will be financial burdens placed upon the Idaho ratepayers.

UPON WHAT EVIDENCE DO YOU BASE THE CONCERN THAT THERE COULD BE A FINANCIAL BURDEN PLACED UPON THE IDAHO RATEPAYERS BECAUSE OF THE MERGER?

According to ScottishPower, the “bid premium” placed upon the merger could be calculated to be $1,300,000,000 above the market price of PacifiCorp’s common stock. The Oregon Staff testimony in the merger case in that jurisdiction (Case UM 918) estimates the “bid premium” to be on the order of $1.6 billion. Either figure represents a significant premium to be paid to PacifiCorp stockholders.
The financial burden that is placed upon the Eastern Idaho ratepayers comes about because this $1,300,000,000 (or more) “bid premium” was not paid without some expectation of being repaid and repaid with interest. When questioned about recovery of the $135,000,000 of capital and expenses that are proposed to be invested in the system performance and customer service commitments being made in association with the merger, it was indicated by ScottishPower that if these costs were not covered by offsetting savings, then a rate increase would be sought. If ScottishPower is determined to recover its investment in system performance and customer service commitments, then it is obvious that the recovery of a “bid premium” that is ten times greater will be the focus of even greater attention.

HOW DOES SCOTTISHPOWER PROPOSE TO RECOVER THIS “BID PREMIUM” OF APPROXIMATELY $1,300,000,000?

The policy that ScottishPower hopes to implement to recover this “bid premium” of $1,300,000,000 is to greatly lower capital and operating expenses while maintaining high rates. The desire to implement this policy was expressed in the ScottishPower Response to the Utah Division of Public Utilities Request S4.2. That Response stated in part:
ScottishPower would recommend that regulators, when setting price controls, recognize separately the savings that have arisen as a direct result of acquisitions and, so long as the businesses are otherwise efficient, provide a longer period for investors in the acquiring companies to benefit from these particular savings. This approach would not necessarily guarantee recovery of the bid premium (otherwise incentives could be distorted in the opposite way) but would address the present bias in favor of customers at the expense of investors.

If such a policy were adopted, in all likelihood this would lead to lower capital expenditures, termination of personnel, and reductions in the overall operation and maintenance budgets. However, the benefits of the reduced capital expenditures and reduced O&M expenses would go to the stockholders and not the customers. Combined with the other announced policies to target spending where the largest number of customers are involved (discussed later in my testimony), this profit maximization policy would be additionally detrimental to the ratepayers in Eastern Idaho.

ARE THERE ANY DEFINITIVE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE APPLICANTS THAT ADDRESS WHETHER OR NOT FUTURE RATES WILL BE LOWER THAN THOSE CURRENTLY IN PLACE ONCE SCOTTISHPOWER HAS BEGUN TO INITIATE ITS EFFICIENCY AND COST CUTTING PROCEDURES?

A. Yes, there is a definitive statement by ScottishPower that rates will not be lowered. Although ScottishPower has claimed that it expects to reduce non-production operating and maintenance expenses on the PacifiCorp system by approximately $200,000,000 per year, it has no intention of passing those savings on to ratepayers in the form of reducing rates below current levels. With respect to sharing those cost savings with the ratepayers, ScottishPower witness Richardson testifies:
Q. In the Application, ScottishPower and PacifiCorp suggest the possibility of prices for PacifiCorp's customers that are lower than they otherwise would have been without the transaction. Are you suggesting that PacifiCorp's rates will be lower than current rates after the transaction is completed?

A. No, I am not suggesting that.

Q. HAVE THE APPLICANTS DISCLOSED THE EXTENT OF THE SAVINGS THAT IS EXPECTED TO BE REALIZED IN THE EASTERN IDAHO SERVICE AREA AS A RESULT OF THE MERGER?

A. No, at least not within the regulatory framework. The Applicants are either unable or unwilling to disclose the extent to which reductions in non-production operation and maintenance costs will occur in Idaho. According to a December 12, 1998 Bridge News Report, ScottishPower’s Chief Executive Ian Robinson stated at a press conference (held the day the proposed merger was announce) that the transaction was attractive based on “growth potential” and the identifying of “immense” cost savings and improved efficiency. ScottishPower’s Deputy Chief Executive Ian Russell was quoted as stating:
Nongeneration costs alone per PacifiCorp customer could be reduced by $100 to $150 by 2004. This, as you can see is a significant cost savings on a 1.4 million franchise customer base.

However, by the time the Applicants’ direct testimony was filed on February 26, 1999, ScottishPower was backing away from its originally stated motivations for promoting the merge. At least from a regulatory perspective ScottishPower was backing away from the “growth potential” and “immense cost saving aspects of the merger”. On page 9 of his direct testimony PacifiCorp witness O’Brien states:
The present transaction does not involve the consolidation of two operating companies and is not principally motivated by potential operating improvements and savings. (Emphasis added)

In effect, the Applicants are asking the Commission to ignore the major cost reductions that ScottishPower has planned after the merger and only focus on some suggested “improvements” in system performance and customer service quality that no one was asking for in the first place. Very simply, ScottishPower hopes to extract hundreds of millions of dollars per year out of PacifiCorp and it hopes the Commission will allow this to happen without adjusting rates downward. Clearly the merger shifts benefits to the shareholders with ratepayers bearing all the risks.

HAS SCOTTISHPOWER PROVIDED ANY SPECIFIC DETAIL REGARDING HOW ITS INTENT TO REDUCE PACIFICORP’S “NON-PRODUCTION COSTS PER CUSTOMER” WOULD IMPACT SERVICE OR RATES IN IDAHO?

No. Specific information was sought in IIPA Request 68-F with regard to how ScottishPower intended to bring the “non-production costs per customer” in Idaho down to the $200 per customer level. This is the level that reflects where it would have reduced Company-wide “non-production costs per customer” to achieve a savings of approximately $200,000,000 per year. ScottishPower’s Response was as follows:
ScottishPower has only undertaken high level benchmarking analysis at the corporate level to identify the opportunity for performance improvement. ScottishPower intends to undertake a detailed planning process with PacifiCorp at point of closure of this transaction based on experience and processes developed in previous transactions. A copy of the generic approach is attached. This is described in more detail within the testimony of Andrew MacRitchie, filed with the Commission on February 26, 1999. (Emphasis added)

It is unreasonable to believe that a Company the size of ScottishPower would:
study the U.S. utility market for a couple of years in order to find a suitable purchase;
be in merger discussions with PacifiCorp from August 1998 until it was announced in December 199820;
offer a “bid premium” of at least $1,300,000,000 over the price of common stock to the shareholders;
tell the press that there is approximately $200,000,000 per year of cost cutting it can make in just the non-production costs of PacifiCorp; and then
in a regulatory setting now state that it does not know what cost reductions it can achieve, but plans to make a detailed analysis at the point of closure of the merger.
One can only assume (given the background before the filing of the Applicants’ testimony in this case) that the vagueness in the testimony and data responses is either the result of an unwillingness to provide information or simply an inability to know what the merger’s overall impact will be on customers or the rates paid by Idaho customers. If ScottishPower does not know what these impacts will be, its investment of a “bid premium” of $1,300,000,000, or more, is reckless. If ScottishPower does not know what these impacts will be, then the Idaho Code requires that the Commission reject the merger, because the Applicants falls short of providing sufficient evidence to make a positive finding that the merger will not increase rates.

OTHER THAN BEING VAGUE AS TO HOW COST CUTTING MEASURES ARE GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND WHO WILL BENEFIT FROM THOSE NEW OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE POLICIES, HAS SCOTTISHPOWER LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR RATE INCREASES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MERGER?

Yes. Contrary to the requirements of the Idaho Code that costs and rates will not increase because of the merger, ScottishPower has admitted that if cost reductions are not realized, then it will seek rate increases to cover the capital and operating costs of the new system performance and customer service commitments that are associated with the merger.
As a part of the merger transaction ScottishPower is planning to implement “improvements and commitments” regarding system performance and customer service. PacifiCorp witness O’Brien indicates that these “improvements require significant up-front investments”. ScottishPower witness Moir states that: “These expenditures are in addition to the funding for which PacifiCorp had already planned without the transaction.” These statements are in direct opposition to the Idaho Code that requires that the cost of and rates for supplying service will not be increased by reason of such transaction.
The vast majority of the $135 million additional amount that ScottishPower estimates it will spend in association with the commitments being brought about by the merger will be above the line. With these costs recorded above the line, the Company can come in at any time and ask for a rate increase associated with these commitments. ScottishPower stated that it reserves the right to request such a rate increase it Response to IIPA Request 145-D:
Request
Will ScottishPower agree to not attempt to collect this “bid premium” from ratepayers by allowing any delays to occur in the passthrough of cost reductions?

Response
ScottishPower, as does PacifiCorp, seeks to earn its allowed return on equity. Cost reductions that increase return above the allowed level may lead the Commission to request a price review. Equally, ScottishPower reserves the right to seek justified rate increases if cost reductions are inadequate to generate permitted returns. (Emphasis added)

With most of this $135 million in capital expense and O&M expense associated with merger commitments being above the line, and ScottishPower’s willingness “to seek justified rate increases”, there is a real possibility that rates could increase because of the merger. Thus, these statements are also in direct opposition to the Idaho Code that requires that the cost of and rates for supplying service will not be increased by reason of such transaction.

EARLIER IN YOUR TESTIMONY IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT PACIFICORP WITNESS O’BRIEN INDICATED THAT THESE “IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT UP-FRONT INVESTMENT18” AND THAT SCOTTISHPOWER WITNESS MOIR STATED THAT “THESE EXPENDITURES ARE IN ADDITION TO THE FUNDING FOR WHICH PACIFICORP HAD ALREADY PLANNED WITHOUT THE TRANSACTION19”. HAVE THESE STATEMENTS BEEN CONTRADICTED ELSEWHERE BY SCOTTISHPOWER?

Yes. In supplemental testimony filed by ScottishPower witness Richardson on April 16, 1999 in Utah the following statement appears at page 8 line 1:
The $55 million expenditure is not really a “cost” of the transaction and should not be considered as an “offset” to the benefits identified earlier in my testimony. As noted above, this investment is not over and above PacifiCorp’s existing capital plans, but represents a refocusing of those plans. (Emphasis added)

The magnitude of this contradiction is disturbing. This major contradiction suggests the lack of planning, resulting in unknown impacts upon PacifiCorp and its customers.

Q. ARE THERE ANY INDICATIONS THAT SCOTTISHPOWER HAS MADE STATEMENTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS THAT IT WILL SEEK INCREASED RATES IF YET-TO-BE IDENTIFIED COST REDUCTIONS DO NOT OCCUR?

A. Yes. Such statements were made to the Staff of the Utah Division of Public Utilities. This is evident from Data Request S10.9-a of the Utah Division of Public Utilities:
Request
My notes show that during a March 19 meeting with Lindsay Johnston, Bob Green, Robin MacLaren, and Brian Burnett, Bob Green indicated to the DPU that ScottishPower management is confident of being able to realize $17 million per year in yet-to-be identified savings and efficiencies. Bob also indicated ScottishPower would propose a well-supported rate increase request if the Company is not successful in identifying the annual $17 million in savings and efficiencies. Please:
Confirm that ScottishPower proposes customers bear the risk of SP not successfully identifying the $17 million in annual savings and efficiencies. In other words, customers risk paying higher rates to the extent ScottishPower does not identify $17 million in savings and efficiencies. (Emphasis added)

Nowhere in the long response provided to that request was there a denial or retraction of the statement that ScottishPower will seek a rate increase to cover the costs of its $135 million expenditure associated with its merger commitments if the Company is not successful in developing offsetting cost reductions. Throughout the discovery phase of this case ScottishPower has continually indicated that it did not know what actions can be taken, what savings can be achieve, or what the overall impact of the merger will be until after the transaction is completed. With ScottishPower’s admission that it will seek rate increases associated with these merger related expenditures if necessary, it is impossible to be assured that “the costs of and rates for supplying service will not be increased by reason of the transaction”.

PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOU TESTIMONY WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND STANDARD FOUND IN THE IDAHO CODE—THAT COSTS AND RATES FOR SUPPLYING SERVICE WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY REASON OF THE TRANSACTION.

A. The Applicants have not met their burden of establishing that costs and rates will not increase by reason of the merger. The Applicants have left the door wide open for a rate increase to be requested by reason of merger related expenditures. This is contrary to the requirements of the Idaho Code. The proposed merger must be denied on this basis, even if the public interest requirement was met.
APPLICANTS BONA FIDE INTENT TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN
THE SYSTEM IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

PLEASE GIVE A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF SCOTTISHPOWER’S LACK OF DISCLOSURE OF ITS BONA FIDE INTENT REGARDING HOW IT WILL OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

In order to determine what impact the merger would have generally, as well as specifically on Idaho, with regard to operation and maintenance practices the IIPA (as well as parties in other jurisdictions) have requested documentation from ScottishPower regarding its intentions in this area. IIPA Request 79-B was one such attempt. That request and ScottishPower’s response read in part:
Request
On page 6 lines 24-26 of his direct testimony, Mr. Richardson makes the following observations about PacifiCorp: "The company combines an attractive asset base and customer profile with a core utility business that offers substantial scope for improved performance in customer service and system operations, as well as improved efficiency." Please answer the following:

B. Please provide a qualitative and quantitative description of the "substantial scope for ... improved efficiency" that ScottishPower has identified. An explanation is sought as to the specific areas that can be improved, how they will be improved, and the overall cost and savings involved.

Response:
The yardstick analysis of non-production costs used to identify potential cost savings is shown in exhibit AM1 of Mr. MacRitchie's testimony. This indicates that a substantial amount of cost reduction would have to occur for PacifiCorp to be ranked as one of the top ten utilities within the US. ScottishPower believes that it can assist PacifiCorp in its drive to reach such a position. No detailed plans have yet been developed. It is important to understand that ScottishPower has found that the variance identified in the yardstick comparison, while directionally correct, can be inaccurate for a number of reasons:
…

Yardstick comparisons have inherent data problems and can mask best or worst practices in specific areas. Drawing too great a set of inferences about steps that should be taken to better manage the organization without knowing whether best practices are being employed in any or all areas could lead to erroneous recommendations.

For these reasons it is inappropriate to conclude from a yardstick comparison where potential savings exist.

Upon completion of the transaction, ScottishPower intends to undertake a detailed planning process with PacifiCorp based on its experience and processes developed in previous transactions. A copy of the generic approach is attached. The output of this process will be the first phase of initiative development that will indicate the potential size, timing and cost of each efficiency savings. (Emphasis added)

Very simply, the potential system improvements and changes that would be implemented by ScottishPower are in fact either unknown or ScottishPower is unwilling to share its knowledge. Although ScottishPower claims that the merger “offers substantial scope for improved performance in customer service and system operations, as well as improved efficiency”, ScottishPower states that it does not know how it will bring this about, or even if it can bring about, such improvements.

Q. PLEASE GIVE ANOTHER SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF SCOTTISHPOWER’S LACK OF DISCLOSURE OF ITS BONA FIDE INTENT REGARDING HOW IT WILL OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

A. In IIPA data request 80-A, general information was requested regarding the anticipated investments and associated improvements. IIPA request 80-A and ScottishPower’s response was as follows:

Request
Please provide a detailed description of each investment anticipated and the corresponding service improvement expected.

Response
Explicit investment details have not been identified. The investment amount of approximately $55 million identified by Mr. Moir’s testimony (of which $30 million is associated with direst investment in the network and $25 million on other service improvements) is ScottishPower’s estimated costs based upon the knowledge gained through the implementation of these standards in the UK. (Emphasis added)

It is noteworthy that in the previous data response to IIPA 79-B, ScottishPower cautioned about drawing too great a set of inferences because “without knowing whether best practices are being employed in any or all areas could lead to erroneous recommendations” but, in this response ScottishPower admits that its assertions about potential investments is based upon its knowledge of utilities in the UK and not in the U.S. or in Idaho specifically.
IIPA data requests 80-D and 80-E sought specific information for Idaho with respect to what ScottishPower witness Richardson labeled as required investments associated with these “improvements”. The requests and ScottishPower’s responses were as follows:
Requests
Please quantify the magnitude of each investment, as it will impact the Idaho jurisdiction.

Please quantify the expected service improvement in Idaho associated with each investment.

Responses
No explicit numbers are available by state. ScottishPower believes the $55 million will achieve the proposed level of standards in all jurisdictions.

Please see the Response to IIPA’s Request No. 80.D to ScottishPower.

ScottishPower not only has made assertions about needed investments without any detailed planning based upon PacifiCorp specific conditions, but it does not have any basis for defining what the merger’s impacts will be in Idaho. Without even the Applicant’s making an assessment (detailed or otherwise) of the impacts of the merger in Idaho, it is impossible to make a positive finding that the merger is not adverse to the best interests of the Eastern Idaho ratepayers or that the system will be operated and maintained in the public interest.
To add to the uncertainty as to what the merger means to the ratepayers in Eastern Idaho, ScottishPower does not even know if these proposed changes will have an impact upon rates in Idaho. Such information was sought in IIPA data request 80-F. The request and ScottishPower’s response were as follows:
Request
Please indicate the Company’s anticipated timing of any rate changes that will occur in Idaho as a result of the investments that are contemplated to make the proposed service improvements.

Response
ScottishPower has no expectations at present that the proposed investment will result in rate changes. ScottishPower’s experience shows that a targeting investments efficiently, and increase in service can be achieve in tandem with lower operating costs. (Emphasis added)

HAS SCOTTISHPOWER PERFORMED ANY COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS THAT WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CLAIMED $135 MILLION TO BE SPENT TO BRING THESE ASSERTED CUSTOMER IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE A NET BENEFIT TO IDAHO?

No. When asked in IIPA Request 103 if such a cost/benefit analysis was performed to determine if these expenditures would have a net-benefit to Idaho customers, ScottishPower replied in part:
No detailed cost-benefit or other analyses have been performed to date. All expenditures will, however, be subject to a full investment appraisal by ScottishPower before funds are committed. (Emphasis added)

At this point, the problem with the merger goes beyond the fact that ScottishPower does not know what (if anything) it will spend in Idaho, what improvements (if any) it will make in Idaho, or what impact (positive or negative) these changes will have on rates in Idaho. The fact that all expenditures will “be subject to a full investment appraisal” raises the additional concern that (with Idaho being the smallest PacifiCorp jurisdiction) limited, long-term investment may be made in Eastern Idaho.

HAS SCOTTISHPOWER INDICATED THAT FUTURE INVESTMENT DECISIONS WILL BE BASED UPON MORE THAN JUST STRAIGHT FORWARD ENGINEERING ASSESSMENTS?

Yes. ScottishPower has indicated that replacement of distribution equipment will be based upon “condition assessments and is performance driven”. In response to IIPA Request 107-A ScottishPower supplied the following definitions of “condition assessments” and “performance-driven”:
A condition assessment, as used in the context of the reply to Irrigator Data Request 12, refers to an engineering assessment of operational equipment to determine the remaining life, operational adequacy, safety of operation and availability of spares to ensure its safe and reliable operation.

Performance-driven, as used in the context of the reply to Irrigator's Data Request 12, refers to investment criteria used to prioritize asset replacement. This is based on historical performance and the strategic importance of the asset in ensuring reliability of supplies to customers and to the security of the distribution system. (Emphasis added)

One would expect that “the strategic importance of an asset” would be based upon a combination of the total energy, the number of customers, and the revenue that is associated with the asset. Eastern Idaho can ill afford the highest rates in the State and/or the Pacific Northwest while having low investment priorities because of the size and density of the service area.

HAS SCOTTISHPOWER SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT INVESTMENT PRIORITIES WILL BE GIVEN TO PORTIONS OF THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM THAT SERVE THE MOST CUSTOMERS?

Yes. The Utah Division of Public Utilities Data Request S4.3 sought information regarding how ScottishPower was moving away from the traditional approach to replacing utility assets. That Request and relevant portions of ScottishPower’s Response were as follows:
Request
In its response to OFFER's business plan questionnaire, Scottish Power states, "We have moved away from the traditional Electricity Supply Industry approach of routinely replacing assets on a 'like for like' basis, and have categorized expenditure on the basis of investment output." Please elaborate on process of categorizing expenditure on the basis of investment output. Provide examples of how this process works. Would Scottish Power expect to implement a similar process at PacifiCorp? Is this an area of potential savings? Explain.

Response:
For example our overhead lines are ranked by both condition and reliability. The subsequent investment will replace, to a stronger construction, those sections of the circuit supplying most customers. Sections of the circuit supplying small customer numbers will typically be refurbished. (Emphasis added)

At this stage it is too early to commit to detail of how ScottishPower would apply this policy in PacifiCorp but we would expect to bring this customer service focus to management of the assets.

Such a movement away from the traditional utility approach may be wise from a stockholder standpoint of minimizing costs while maximizing investment, but it is certainly not in the best interest of Eastern Idaho ratepayers. Nor is this movement away from the traditional utility approach reflective of the type of operation and maintenance of the system that the customers of this State should expect from their utilities.

PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOU TESTIMONY WITH RESPECT TO THE THIRD STANDARD FOUND IN THE IDAHO CODE—THAT THE APPLICANTS HAVE THE BONA FIDE INTENT TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN SAID PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

A. From all of the above, it can be concluded that the Applicants do not know how they will operate or maintain the system after the merger, or they are unwilling to share that information. Thus, the Applicants have failed to meet their burden of establishing their bona fide intent to operate the system in the public interest. The proposed merger should be denied.

DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY?

A. Yes.
PacifiCorp witness O’Brien’s direct testimony at page 2 lines 6-16
See Responses to Utah Division of Public Utilities Request 4.1.
PacifiCorp witness O’Brien’s direct testimony at page 9 lines 13-15
PacifiCorp witness O’Brien’s direct testimony at page 9 line 7
For example see Responses to IIPA Requests 7, 68-F, and 79-B.
See Response to Utah Division of Public Utilities Request S4.3.
See Response to IIPA Request 80.
See Response to IIPA Request 145-A.
See IIPA Exhibit 301
See IIPA Exhibit 302
See ScottishPower’s Response to IIPA Request 103.
For example see ScottishPower’s Responses to IIPA Requests 68-F, 79-B, 80, 103, and 106.
See Applicants’ Exhibit 208.
See PacifiCorp Response to IIPA Request 136
Provided in Response to IIPA Request 151.
See ScottishPower’s Response to IIPA Request 145-A.
See ScottishPower’s Response to IIPA Request 7.
Provided in Response to IIPA Request 4.
Based upon Bridge News Report of 12-7-98 a $150 per customer saving over 1.4 million customers yields an annual saving of $210,000,000.
See IIPA Exhibit 303
Direct testimony of Richardson at page 6 line 22.

O’Brien direct testimony at page 9 line 7.
Moir direct testimony at page 15 lines 15 and 16.
See ScottishPower’s Response to Request SP34 of the Staff of the Public Utility Commission of Oregon.
The Response to the Utah Division of Public Utilities was supplied in response to IIPA Request 4.

37 Yankel, DI
Irrigators

Sheet3
Sheet2
Sheet1
Chart4
Idaho
Utah
Oregon
Washington
Wyoming (Pac. Div)
$4,659.00
$2,461.00
$2,760.00
$2,996.00
$2,207.00
Idaho
Utah
Oregon
Washington
Wyoming (Pac. Div)
4659.00
2461.00
2760.00
2996.00
2207.00