20050518Response brief.pdf

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Dean J. (Joe) Miller
McDevitt & Miller LLP
420 West Bannock Street
Boise, ill 83702
[phone]
[phone] Fax
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UTILITIES CDf--1f'iISSl0N
Gregory Diamond
Senior Counsel
Covad Communications Company
7901 Lowry Boulevard
Denver, CO 80230
[phone]
[phone] Fax
gdiamondCfYcovad. com
Attorneys for DIECA Communications, Inc.
d/b/a Covad Communications Company
BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF
DIECA COMMUNICATIONS, INC. D/B/A
COY AD COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY FOR)
ARBITRATION OF AN INTERCONNECTION
AGREEMENT WITH QWEST CORPORATION
Case No. CVD-O5-
COY AD'S RESPONSE BRIEF
DIECA Communications, Inc.d/b/a Covad Communications Company
Covad"), through its undersigned counsel, presents this response brief in support of its
petition for arbitration:
INTRODUCTION
Qwest'initial brief understates and distorts the authority retained by the
Commission under both state and federal law to promote competition and the efficient
investment advanced telecommunications notwi thstanding the Federal
Communications Commission s ("FCC'recent decisions to constrict federal
unbundling requirements under only section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(the "Act,,Contrary to established precedent Qwest would have the Commission
conclude, erroneously, that, as a matter of established black letter law, it has absolutely
no authority whatsoever to require Qwest to unbundle any network elements.This
simply attempts to draw the line far more narrowly than is actually allowed under state
and federal law.
Rather Covad asserts the FCC intended to draw clear distinctions between
elements unbundled pursuant to section 252(c)(3) of the Act on the one hand, and
elements that must be made available by Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs
pursuant to section 271 of the Act and state law on the other. In contrast, Qwest proposes
placing 271 elements in a category separate not only for elements available pursuant to
section 251 , but also separate from, and inferior to, all other wholesale services. In
addition to being unsupported by the Triennial Review Order Qwest's reading would
render it difficult, if not impossible, to make use of the remaining unbundling obligations
set forth in section 271 of the Act, as well as other requirements clearly provided by
Idaho law.
See generally, In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Report and
Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in ee Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-
, and 98-147, (reI. September 17, 2003) Triennial Review Order ); and In the Matters of Petition for
Forbearance of Verizon Telephone Companies Pursuant to 47 USe. 160(c); SBC Communications
Inc. 's Petition for Forbearance Under 47 USe. 160(c); Qwest Communications International Inc.
Petition for Forbearance Under 47 US e. ~ 160(c); BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. Petition for
Forbearance Under 47 USe. 160(c), we Docket Nos. 01-338, 03-235, 03-260, 04-, Memorandum
Opinion and Order (reI. October 27, 2004) ("271 Forbearance Order
).
we Docket No. 04-313; ee
Docket No. 01-338 In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Order on Remand (ReI. February 4, 2005)
TRO Remand Order
ARGUMENT
Qwest opposes the inclusion of terms in the Agreement describing its unbundling
obligations under both section 271 of the Act and Idaho law. In its initial brief, Qwest
makes four overarching arguments against Covad's proposals for the unbundling
network elements: (1) Section 251 of the Act, as now interpreted by the FCC and USTA
describes the "real upper bound" (Qwest Initial Brief, p. 8) of Qwest's unbundling
obligations, and this Commission has no authority to question these impairment
determinations; (2)The Act's state savings clauses do not preserve state utility
commission authority to order further unbundling; (3)The Commission lacks the
authority to enforce section 271 of the Act by enforcing the competitive checklist; and (4)
Any access that is afforded to non-251 elements cannot lawfully be priced at forward-
looking TELRIC rates. All four of these arguments are without merit. They have been
considered and rejected by the FCC and/or federal courts , as detailed below.
Qwest also cites the decisions of other state commissions made in parallel
arbitrations between the parties. Qwest improperly characterizes those decisions in an
effort to convince the Commission that there has been unanimity in state commission
review with respect to this issue. As detailed below, this is hardly the case. Very recent
state commission decisions support Covad's position, and none of the other state
commissions was able to apply the unique provisions of Idaho state law.
It is also important to note at the outset one additional glaring error in Qwest'
initial brief. Qwest would have the Commission believe that Covad's proposals for
United States Telecom Ass 'v. FCC 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) USTA If').
unbundling would "require Qwest to provide unlimited access to the elements in Qwest's
Idaho telecommunications network." Qwest Initial Brief, p. 2 (emphasis added).This
assertion is blatantly false. As detailed in Covad's petition and initial brief, Covad has
carefully defined "network element" to fall clearly within the limits of applicable law
including section 271 , not "unlimited access" to all elements in Qwest's network. See
section 4 of the draft Interconnection Agreement. Covad has also proposed additional
provisions for inclusion in the interconnection agreement (as fully detailed in Covad'
initial brief and the petition) that place a clear limitation on the scope of network
elements available to Covad.See sections 9.1.1 , 9.1.1.6 and 9.1.1.7 of the draft
Agreement.
Finally, Qwest's heavy reliance upon the Federal Communication Commission
FCC") recent decision in the BellSouth Declaratory Order is grossly misplaced.
Qwest simply reads the very narrow holding of the FCC decision in that docket far too
broadly. When read properly, the decision has no application to this docket.
Access Obligations Consistent with the Section 271 Competitive
Checklist Cannot, as a Logical Matter, Conflict with the Act
Qwest over-states the breadth of the Triennial Review Order and claims it stands
for the proposition that any unbundling requirement not meeting the FCC's impairment
standard is necessarily in conflict with the FCC's impairment determinations and the Act
itself.This position ignores, however, the statements made by the FCC, and left
undisturbed by the D.C. Circuit in its USTA II decision, that network elements contained
3 Memorandum Opinion and Order
of Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of BellSouth Telecommunications
Inc. Request for Declaratory Ruling, WC Docket No. 03-251, FCC 05-78 (FCC reI. March 25, 2005)
BellSouth Declaratory Order
in the section 271 Competitive Checklist4 must be available notwithstanding any finding
of non-impairment. The FCC specifically rejected the very same analysis proposed by
Qwest in this proceeding:
Verizon asserts that an interpretation of the Act that
recognizes the independence of sections 271 and 251(d)(2)
places these sections in conflict with each other.
disagree. Verizon s reading of section 271 would provide
no reason for Congress to have enacted items 4, 5 , 6, and10 (loop, transport, switching and signaling) of the
checklist because item 2 (compliance with section 251)
would have sufficed.
Triennial Review Order ~ 654.
If the additional unbundling requirements contained in the Competitive Checklist do not
conflict with section 251 , it follows logically that identical state access obligations would
not conflict with section 251. Therefore, any access obligation limited by the scope of
the Competitive Checklist (such as those proposed by Covad), whether grounded
section 271 or Idaho law, cannot conflict with the Act and cannot be preempted.
B. The Act Grants this Commission Clear Authority to Order
Unbundling in Addition to the Minimum Requirements of Section 251
Qwest makes three separate arguments regarding the lack of Commission
authority to order unbundling beyond the FCC's current interpretation of section 251 of
the Act: First, the Commission lacks any authority to perform the impairment analysis
required by section 251; Second, that the Act does not preserve state commission
authority to impose additional unbundling obligations; and Third, that the Commission
lacks any authority to require unbundling consistent with section 271 of the Act.
See 47 D.C. ~ 271(c)(2)(B) ("Competitive Checklist"
Qwest's first argument, regarding the ability of the Commission to make
impairment determinations, is wrong. First of all Covad has not proposed that this
Commission perform an impairment analysis under section 251. Instead Covad has
asked the Commission to recognize its authority under section 271 of the Act, Idaho law
or both, to order unbundling consistent with the Competitive Checklist and the statutory
prerogatives of the Commission. Notwithstanding its view that the Commission has no
authority to make impairment determinations, Qwest argues that Covad has offered no
evidence of impairment in any event. This argument misses the point. Neither section
271 nor Idaho law imposes or defines impairment as standard under which to make an
unbundling determination.
Qwest's second argument, that the Commission lacks the authority to impose
additional unbundling obligations, has been repudiated not only by the FCC in the Local
Competition First Report and Order but also by every federal court passing judgment
on the meaning of section 252(e)(3) of the Act.6 Contrary to Qwest's assertions that the
Act's savings clauses designed to preserve state authority are ineffective in providing
authority for state unbundling rules, these federal courts have routinely confirmed that
these savings clauses, especially 47 D.C. 9 252(e)(3), provide state commissions with
the requisite authority to enforce their own access obligations.
See Local Competition First Report and Order ~ 244, as well as the discussion of Issue 1 , subsection B
above.
See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Uti!. Comm 'n of Texas 208 F.3d 475 481 (5th Cir. 2000)
The Act obviously allows a state commission to consider requirements of state law when approving or
rejecting interconnection agreements.
);
AT&T Communications v. BellSouth Telecommunications Inc.
238 F.3d 636, 642 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Subject to ~ 253, the state commission may also establish or enforce
other requirements of state law in its review of an agreement." (citing ~ 252( e )(3))); Bell Atlantic
Maryland, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc.240 F.3d 279, 301-302 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Determinations made (by
state commissions) pursuant to authority other than that conferred by ~ 252 are, by operation of ~ 601(c) of
the 1996 Act, left for review by State courts. (citing 47 D.C. ~ 152 note)...Section 252(e) also permits
State commissions to impose State-law requirements in its review of interconnection agreements.
Nonetheless, Qwest appears to argue implicitly (and would have the Commission
conclude) that because of the unbundling limitations the FCC has made pursuant to
section 251 (c )(3) of the Act, the Commission is preempted from ordering unbundling.
This is clearly not the case. As Covad argues in copious detail in its initial brief, the
Commission is not preempted under any theory from making its own unbundling
determinations under section 271 of the Act or Idaho s unbundling law.In order for
state requirements to be preempted, they must actually conflict with federal law, or
federal law must thoroughly occupy the legislative field. Cippillone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.505 D.S. 504, 516, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407 , 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). Congress effectively
eliminated any argument supporting implied preemption by including the following
language in the Act:
(c) Federal, State, and Local Law.
(1) No implied effect.--This Act and the amendments made
by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or
supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so
provided in such Act or amendments.
Pub. L. 104-104, title VI, Sec. 601(c), Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 143. (emphasis added).
As discussed above, the FCC has, as recently as the Triennial Review Order rejected the
premise that access obligations exceeding those required by section 251' s "impair
standard directly conflict with section 251,1 and the Act itself prohibits implicit
Triennial Review Order ~ 654. It should also be noted that the FCC exercised its forbearance authority in
the 271 Forbearance Order to refrain from requiring the unbundling of certain fiber facilities under section
271 of the Act. Inherent in this determination was the realization that notwithstanding their recent
determination that competitors are not impaired without access to the broadband capabilities of FTTH and
FTTC loops, section 271 required the unbundling of all loops. Only by electing to forbear from
enforcement of section 271 unbundling requirements could they relieve RBOCs of their obligation to
unbundle these elements. Most notably, the FCC did not elect to forbear from enforcement of the
unbundling obligations proposed by Covad in this arbitration, such as access to Feeder subloops, DS3
Loops, and DS3 Transport elements.
preemption determinations. As a result, Qwest's veiled attempt at a preemption argument
is without merit.
Qwest's reliance upon the BellSouth Declaratory Order on this same point is
misplaced. In that decision, the FCC was confronted with, in its words, the "discreet
issue" of whether requiring an ILEC to provide digital subscriber line service on the high
frequency portion of the loop constitutes impermissible unbundling of the low frequency
portion of the loop ("LFPL") when another carrier provides voice grade service on the
LFPL.8 The FCC concluded that because it had already ruled in prior orders that an
ILEC was not required to unbundle the LFPL that several state commissions holdings to
the contrary were "inconsistent with federal law" under section 251(d)(3) of the Act.
Notwithstanding the narrow scope of this decision Qwest reads the BellSouth
Declaratory Order for the proposition that the FCC has ruled "that state commissions are
generally without authority to require ILECs to unbundle network elements that the FCC
has declined to require ILECs to unbundle." (Qwest Initial Brief, p. 10). This is an overly
broad reading of the FCC's decision. The FCC specifically notes in the same order that it
had previously rejected the argument that "states are preempted from (issuing unbundling
requirements) as a matter of law 9 Nonetheless, Qwest would have this Commission
believe that in all instances and as matter of law that state commissions have no authority
to add to the national list of unbundled network elements. They clearly do as articulated
here and in Covad's initial brief and petition.
Moreover, when properly understood, the BellSouth Declaratory Order is not
applicable to this docket. In this docket, Covad does not seek the unbundling of any
network element that the FCC has specifically concluded an ILEC is not required to
unbundle.More specifically, Covad does not even seek in this proceeding the
unbundling of the LFPL, the only network element at issue in the BellSouth Declaratory
BellSouth Declaratory Order ~37
BellSouth Declaratory Order ~23, n. 71.
Order. In addition, the FCC did not consider, even in passing, whether an ILEC has
separate and stand alone unbundling obligations under section 271 of the Act or state law.
Here, Covad only seeks to require Qwest to unbundle those elements set forth in section
271 and any elements it is required to unbundle under state law. Hence, the only rule of
law that can be read from the BellSouth Declaratory Order cannot be properly applied in
this matter.
C. The Commission has Authority to Enforce Section 271 by Requiring
Compliance with the Competitive Checklist
Qwest goes on to argue that even if section 271 can be read to create additional
unbundling obligations, this Commission possesses no authority to enforce those
obligations. For this premise, it cites Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Indiana Utility Regulatory
Commission 2003 WL 1903363 at 13 (S.D. Ind. 2003). Qwest also claims that the role
for state commissions envisioned by the Act with respect to section 271 is markedly
different than that envisioned by sections 251 and 252, and that this Commission has no
real power to enforce compliance with the Competitive Checklist.
Qwest's reliance on Indiana Bell misconstrues the court's holding in that case.
The Indiana Bell court held that the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) did
not have authority to order a specific performance and remedy plan as a condition
interLA T A authority, because the FCC, not the IURC, had the ultimate authority to grant
Indiana Bell's application. By ordering compliance with the remedy plan, the court ruled
that the IURC imposes additional obligations on Ameritech, beyond what
contemplated by Section 271 of the Act." (emphasis added) Id. at 6.
Notably, however, the court went to great lengths to explain that the IURC did
have the authority to implement its performance and penalty plan through the 252
interconnection process.The court stated:It is precisely because enforcement
mechanisms are contemplated by Section 252 that they cannot be developed through the
271 Application process alone." In other words, the IURC had no need to require certain
access standards as a condition of 271 approval, because it was free to require the same
terms in its review of 252 interconnection agreements. A proper reading of Indiana Bell
affirms that this Commission may interpret and enforce the Competitive Checklist in its
review of an interconnection agreement. In the current proceeding, Covad does not
propose additional obligations and penalties under the aegis of section 271, making the
court's holding in Indiana Bell inapplicable.
Recently, the Maine Public Utilities Commission issued an order requITIng
Verizon to continue to provide elements on the Competitive Checklist through tariffs
approved by that commission.lo The Maine PUC also specifically found it possessed the
authority to require compliance with the Competitive Checklist in the context of section
252 arbitration proceedings. Maine 271 Unbundling Order at 19. Very recently, the
Public Utilities Commission of New Hampshire forcefully echoed the FCC'
determination that section 251 of the Act is not the limit of Qwest's unbundling
obligation. Rather, section 271 continues to require Qwest to unbundle the listed network
elements:
We address first Verizon s general argument that the FCC's determination
of an element as a section 251 obligation allows Verizon to remove that
element from its wholesale tariff altogether. The FCC made clear in the
TRO (Triennial Review Order) that the removal of a UNE from the list of
section 251 obligations because of lack of impairment did not
automatically resolve the question of whether an RBOC must still make
that UNE available under section 271. See TRO at ~~652-655. The
FCC'TRO has in fact rejected Verizon s argument that once the FCC
10
See Maine PDC Docket No. 2002-682 Verizon-Maine Proposed Schedules, Terms, Conditions and Rates
for Unbundled Network Elements and Interconnection (PUC 20) and Resold Services (PUC 21), Order-
Part II (September 3 , 2004) Maine 271 Unbundling Order
).
A copy of this order is attached as
Attachment 1 to Covad's Initial Brief.
determined that a UNE is not necessary under section 251 , the
corresponding 271 checklist item should be construed as being satisfied.
In rejecting this position, the FCC made it clear in the TRO that "the
BOCs have an independent obligation under section 271 (c )(2)(B) to
provide access to certain network elements that are no longer subj ect to
unbundling under section 251 , and to do so at reasonable rates." The FCC
further concludes that RBOC obligations pursuant to section 271 are "not
necessarily relieved based on any determination (by the FCC) under the
section 251 unbundling analysis.Id. at ~ 655.
Proposed Revisions to TariffNHPUC No. , p. 39 , Dckt. DT 03-201 , 04-176, Order No.
222 (March 11 2005). A copy of this order is attached as Attachment 1.
In disposing of the docket, the New Hampshire commission ordered Verizon, through its
tariff, to continue to provide line sharing to several competing carriers, including Covad
on an unbundled basis.
Moreover, as recently as May 9, 2005, an administrative law judge for the Illinois
Commerce Commission reaffirmed that commission s previous holding that "Section 271
of the Federal Act creates an unbundling obligation to which SBC must adhere
irrespective of its duties under Section 251 and the associated impairment analysis.
Re: Cbeyond Communications, LLP et.al v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Illinois
Commerce Commission, Dockets 05-154, 050156 & 05-174, Administrative Law Judge
Decision
, p.
23 (May 9 2005) citing XO Illinois, Inc. Petition for Arbitration of an
Amendment to an Interconnection Agreement with Illinois Bell Telephone Docket 04-
0371 , Order, Sept. 9 2004, at p. 47.
The foregoing is consistent with the clear direction provided by the FCC in
approving RBOC 271 applications, which firmly support the enforcement authority of
state utilities commissions with respect to the competitive checklist.In approving
Qwest's 271 application for Arizona, the FCC stated:
Working in concert with the Arizona Commissionintend to closely monitor Qwest's post-approval
compliance for Arizona. .
are confident that cooperative state and federal
oversight and enforcement can address any backsliding that
may arise with respect to Qwest's entry into Arizona.
In the Matter of Application of Qwest Communications International, Inc., for
Authorization To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Arizona WC Docket No. 03-
194, Memorandum Opinion and Order, (18 FCC Rcd 25504) (reI. Dec. 3 , 2003), ~~ 59
and 60.
Logically attendant to this enforcement authority is the authority to interpret the
requirements of section 271.Doing so in the context of a section 252 arbitration
proceeding is the most obvious, expedient, and legally defensible method available to this
Commission. By incorporating its decisions in its order in this arbitration proceeding, the
Commission would establish its own authority, separate from section 271 , to enforce the
requirements imposed. If Qwest were to refuse to comply with the Commission s order
in this case, citing this Commission s lack of authority to interpret section 271 , the
Commission could enforce its order as it enforces any Commission order, as well as
advise the FCC of Qwest's non-compliance with section 271 of the Act. Ultimately, only
the FCC may judge whether non-compliance with the Competitive Checklist requires
enforcement under section 271 of the Act, but this is clearly distinguishable from this
Commission s authority to interpret and enforce interconnection agreements.
TELRIC is a Permissible Pricing Methodology to Determine Fair
Just and Reasonable Rates in Compliance with 47 U.C. ~~ 201 and
202 and Idaho Law
Qwest argues that any application of TELRIC to establish rates for elements
available pursuant to section 271 of the Act is unlawful. For this proposition, it cites a
brief prepared by the FCC in connection with the appeal of the USTA II decision, in
which the counsel for the FCC argues that section 252(d)(I) of the Act does not establish
a state role in setting the rates for 271 elements, but only elements governed by section
251(c)(3). These comments, however, are inconsistent with FCC orders. The FCC
discussed the issue of pricing for 271 elements at length in the Triennial Review Order
and never once did it act to preempt state commission authority to set rates for elements
that must be made available pursuant to section 271. To the contrary, the FCC noted that
RBOCs that had already obtained section 271 approval would be required to continue to
comply with any conditions of approvaL In the context of elements for which
wholesale rates were established, and relied upon, by the FCC in granting Qwest's 271
application, the FCC has required continued access at current prices (TELRIC), absent a
request made by Qwest to alter the conditions of its interLA T A entry.l2 To the extent the
Commission approves Covad's proposals for unbundling based upon its state law
authority, it should apply TELRIC, which clearly results in the setting of fair, just and
reasonable rates as required by federal law.13 To that end, it should be noted that the
Commission has stand alone authority under state law to set rates for unbundled network
elements. See Idaho Code 9 62-615(1), See also, Idaho Telephone Association v. Qwest
11 Triennial Review Order ~ 665.
12 Id.13 47 D.C. sec. 201 & 202
Corporation, Inc.Case No. QWE-02-, Order No. 29219, footnote 1 , Idaho Public
Utilities Commission, April 15, 2003.
Existing Decisions From Other Commissions Considering Unbundling
Provide No Consistent Guidance
Qwest has grossly mischaracterized the conclusions reached by other state
commissions in an effort to paint them as fully supportive of its position. A careful
reading of those decisions contradicts Qwest's conclusions.
The Minnesota ALJ Decision cited by Qwest (and recently upheld by the
Minnesota Commission) rejected both parties' language regarding this issue. In fact, the
Commission ordered the parties to adopt language consistent with its determination that it
is premature to remove any section 251 elements from the agreement. The practical
effect of this decision is that the parties will be required to re-insert language into the
agreement providing access to all of the elements Covad seeks, only pursuant to section
251 of the Act. While Qwest may seek changes to this language under the change in law
provisions of the Agreement, the Commission has certainly not pre-determined any
outcome on that issue.
The Decision in the Utah arbitration has likewise been mischaracterized by
Qwest. Qwest selectively cites language from that decision for the proposition that
section 271 and state law unbundling issues are inappropriate subjects of
interconnection agreement as a matter of law, when in fact the Utah decision states
precisely the opposite. While the Commission ultimately declined to adopt Covad'
language, it saw no legal impediment to doing so:
We agree with Covad's general proposition that
states are not preempted as a matter of law from
regulating in the field of access to network
elements.. .we reject Qwest's apparent view that we
are totally preempted by the federal system from
enforcing Utah law requiring unbundled access to
certain network elements.
The fact that under a careful reading of the law the
Commission may under certain circumstances impose
Section 271 or state law obligations in a Section 252
arbitration does not lead us to conclude it would be
reasonable in this case to do so.
Utah PSC Docket No. 04-2277-In the Matter of the Petition of DIECA
Communications, Inc. D/B/A Covad Communications Company, for Arbitration to
Resolve Issues Relating to an Interconnection Agreement with Qwest Corporation
Arbitration Report and Order (February 8, 2005) at 19-21. (emphasis added).
The Washington Commission reached its decision on entirely different grounds
than the Utah and Minnesota commissions. That commisison engaged in an unlawful
self-preemption analysis, and determined that any effort to enforce state unbundling laws
would be preempted by federal law. This decision comes closest to supporting Qwest's
position, but is legally flawed for reasons Covad has stated previously: state access
requirements consistent with section 271 of the Act cannot be preempted as a logical
matter, and in any event, administrative agencies lack the authority to engage in
preemption analysis, and should instead enforce existing state law and administrative
rules. As Covad notes in its initial brief, only the FCC may engage in preemption
analysis and has directed affected parties that the proper course of action is to seek
declaratory relief from the FCC on the issue of preemption, not to oppose unbundling in
state arbitration proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, in the initial brief and petition, Covad respectfully
requests that the Commission adopt Covad' s proposed language to resolve the issues set
forth above, and enter an order consistent with this resolution.
Dated this 18th day of May, 2005.
Respectfully submitted
DIECA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
d/b/a Covad Communica . pany
By
, .
Gregory T. Diamond
Senior Counsel
Covad Communications Company
7901 Lowry Boulevard
Denver, Colorado 80230
Phone: [phone]
720-208-3350 Fax
and
Dean J. (Joe) Miller
McDevitt & Miller LLP
420 West Bannock Street
Boise, ill 83702
Phone: [phone]
208-336-6912 Fax
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 17, 2005, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mary Hobson
Stoel Rives
101 S. Capitol Blvd.
Suite 1900
Boise, ill 83702
[phone] (Fax)
S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax)
John Devaney
Mary Rose Hughes
Perkins Coie, LLP
607 Fourteenth Street, N., Suite 800
Washington, DC 20005-2011
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crl
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